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ABSTRACT 
 
Whilst the development of irrigation infrastructure has been proposed as a vehicle 
for poverty reduction in many developing countries, the distributional aspects of 
irrigation interventions, particularly households’ level of access to irrigation water 
have rarely been explored. Furthermore, previous empirical studies on irrigation 
performance have been overtly objective and technical with little regard to farmers’ 
needs and concerns. The premise of this is that ‘objectivity’ is a necessary but 
insufficient measure of access to irrigation water.  In addition to this, whilst 
irrigation interventions have had some success in ensuring access to water for crop 
cultivation, the impact of such interventions have been varied amongst irrigation 
governed by different property right regimes.  
 
In response to these concerns, this multidisciplinary study uses mixed methodologies 
of data collection and analysis to explore a subjective measure of households’ access 
to water from irrigation systems managed by different property right regimes.  Using 
a case study approach, an in-depth institutional analysis of the three irrigation 
systems has been carried out to identify institutional factors which contributed to 
unequal level of access to irrigation water.  
 
The findings demonstrate that households’ level of access to water is influenced by 
socio-economic status, the physical nature of the canal systems and institutional 
characteristics of the management regimes. The results from the quantitative 
analysis reveal a clear pattern of differentiated access to water in irrigation systems 
under different property right regimes. The results indicate that the tail-enders, 
female-headed households, dalits and small farmers appear to have weak access to 
water from the canals. However, farmers along these heterogeneities have different 
levels of access to water in irrigation systems governed by different property right 
regimes with farmers in the farmers managed irrigation system performing 
significantly better than the agency managed and jointly managed irrigation systems.  
The thesis concludes that institutional dimensions should be taken into 
consideration by policymakers in order to ensure better access to water in irrigation 
interventions. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview  
 
The importance of water to both human wellbeing and environment is immense. 
Water use, particularly for agricultural purposes, contributes significantly towards 
the livelihoods of millions of farmers across the world, particularly in developing 
countries. Whilst the demand for food, as a result of population growth, is increasing, 
the availability of water for irrigation is decreasing as a result of climate change and 
excessive use. Population growth coupled with the impact of climate change presents 
the challenging task of using natural resources, including irrigation water, in a 
sustainable and equitable way. Different property right regimes have been put in 
place to manage irrigation resources across the world and Nepal is no exception. The 
aim of this Chapter is fourfold. Firstly, the chapter highlights the importance of 
irrigation to sustain peoples’ livelihoods and reduce poverty. Secondly, the chapter 
describes different modalities of irrigation management in Nepal and puts the 
research in context. In doing so, the problems associated with the current irrigation 
governance and the current gaps in knowledge in Nepal are identified and the need 
for alternative ways of studying irrigation governance is highlighted.  Thirdly, the 
chapter presents the analytical framework which will be used to analyse the data in 
the thesis. Fourthly, the structure of the thesis is outlined. 
 
1.2 Introduction 
Irrigation water impinges on many aspects of human life in a myriad of complex 
ways, including: providing systems of livelihood; improving food production in a way 
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that underpins food security; sustaining ecosystems; and contributing to the local 
economy. Emphasising the importance of irrigation water, Daniel Bromley contends 
that “irrigation has become a dominant part of man’s relentless pursuit of enough 
to eat” (1982 p.1). Irrigation water is particularly important in agricultural areas 
where rainfall is irregular, scant and insufficient, in order to supplement water from 
rainfall and to avoid crop failures. It is argued that adequate, timely and equitable 
water distribution is absolutely critical for enhancing agricultural productivity and 
improving food security, which underpins the livelihoods of many local farmers 
(Hussain and Hanjra, 2004; Lipton, et al., 2002a; Hussain et al., 2002a). Whilst 
timely and adequate water supply is necessary for crop growth, equitable distribution 
of water is critical for collective action as inequity creates disincentives amongst 
farmers to engage in collective action necessary for managing irrigation canals (Fujiie 
et al., 2005; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002). Thus, irrigation has been 
advocated as a vehicle for rural development and poverty reduction. In recent 
decades, there has been a resurgence of interest in the dependency of rural 
households on natural resource bases, particularly Common Pool Resources (CPRs). 
It is generally reported that poorer households make greater use of and are more 
reliant on natural resource bases, which contribute substantially to sustaining their 
livelihoods. Particularly, poorer households derive a greater proportion of their 
income from local commons, compared to their richer counterparts (Cavendish 
2000; Beck and Nesmith 2001; Fisher 2004; Shackleton and Shackleton 2006). 
However, in absolute terms, richer households, particularly those with market 
accessibility, derive more benefits than do their poorer counterparts (Cavendish 
2000; Dasgupta, 1993). The difference in appropriation of benefits by users of CPRs 
can be explained by the observation that richer households keep large livestock herds 
and to feed them they gather considerable quantities of forest products such as trees, 
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grass fodder and leaf litter (Adhikari et al., 2004). Furthermore, households can sell 
the products received from CPRs, such as firewood from the forests and fruits, 
vegetable and cereal crops grown using irrigation water at the local markets, which 
are dominated by the richer households (DfID, 2003; Upadhyay et al., 2005; 
Deshingkar et al., 2003a). 
 
There is a growing recognition of the link between poverty and environmental 
degradation (Lele, 1991) in which poor households are trapped in a vicious circle of 
poverty and environmental degradation. The proponents of the ‘poverty pollute’ 
argument posit that in order to cope with the poverty and population growth farmers 
extend crop growing onto  fragile marginal lands and degrade them, which reduces 
yield and further  impoverishes them (Dasgupta and Maler, 1995; Mink, 1993). This 
school of thought assumes that greater reliance on natural resources equates to 
greater appropriation of benefits by poorer households, making them the primary 
beneficiaries of natural resources (Campbell et al., 2001). Contrary to this 
assumption, a growing number of studies report that the degree of resource 
dependency does not equate to the level of benefit appropriation, nor are the asset 
poor households the primary beneficiaries of the local commons (Adhikari, et al., 
2004; Kumar, 2002).  In addition to the issues discussed above, the management of 
water resources, including irrigation water, have come under greater scrutinity 
particularly due to the increased demand for water, whilst the supply of fresh water is 
decreasing as a result of climate change and over exploitation. The issues associated 
with demand for water, water scarcity and their implications for irrigation 
management are discussed below.  
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1.3 Population Growth, Water Scarcity and Irrigation 
The world is facing two quite alarming problems.  Firstly, population growth has put 
extra pressure on increasing agricultural production to feed the ever increasing 
population. Since the early 1970s, global demand for water has increased consistently 
by an annual rate of 2.4 per cent, with much higher trends in developing countries 
particularly due to water intensive agricultural activities and increasing urbanisation 
(Clarke, 1993). According to the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the 
availability of water  at a level below 1000 cubic meters is considered to be water 
scarcity, while below 500 cubic meters is considered a state of absolute scarcity 
(UNDP, 2006).  Hydrologists estimate that if the annual per capita fresh water 
availability of a country falls below 500 cubic meters, the country falls into the 
category of absolute water scarcity. After crossing this line, the country is almost 
certain to face inherent water deficit problems, which may threaten public health and 
socio-economic development. It is estimated that about a quarter of the world’s 
population, i.e. 1.4 billion people (33 percent of developing world) live in absolute 
water scarcity areas and 1.2 billion of these do not have access to clean water (WHO, 
2008). The demand for water is ever increasing and its use has been growing at more 
than twice the rate of population increase over the last century (FAO, 2010).  If the 
present trend of water use continues, it is estimated that by 2025 more than one 
billion people living in arid areas will face absolute water scarcity (Seckler et al., 
1998).  It has been estimated that by 2025, a staggering 800 million people will be 
living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the 
world population could be living under water stress conditions (op.cit. p.3). The 
situation will be exacerbated as rapidly growing urban areas place heavy pressure on 
neighbouring water resources.  
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Evidence indicates a close association between water scarcity and food insecurity, 
with higher water scarcity leading to reduced food security (Rosegrant, 1997; Seckler 
et al., 1998). Many researchers have shown that higher agricultural production leads 
to downward trends in world food prices and agricultural outputs can be increased 
through irrigation facilities (Rosegrant and Perez, 1995; Trostle, 2008).  Also, areas 
with irrigation facilities are found to have lower rates of poverty (World Bank, 2009; 
Hussain et al., 2002).  Indeed, in many developing countries, spiralling population 
growth and increasing water scarcity are likely to pose a serious constraint on food 
security, levels of poverty and overall economic development. Urgent calls are being 
made for conservation and the efficient use of water as Grigg suggests “--the real 
crisis in water is a creeping crisis—it comes on slowly but it demands a response 
right now” (1996 p.3).  
 
Secondly, increasing water scarcity has added pressure to use water more efficiently.  
The world population reached 6 billion in 1999 and with current trends it is 
estimated to reach 7 billion in 2011 and 8.1 billion in 2025 (PRB, 2008 p.4). The 
global population is estimated to increase by almost 50 percent by 2050 (UN, 1999 
p.4). Currently the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of developed countries is 1.7 and it 
remains alarmingly high, at 4.7 amongst the least developed countries (Getis et al., 
2004). By 2050 the global grain demand is estimated to double (Gilland, 2002). The 
pressure created by population growth is highlighted by Thomas Malthus "The 
power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce 
subsistence for man" (Malthus, 1798 p.17).   The impact of rapid population growth 
on food security has received considerable attention over the past decades (Pinstrup-
Anderson, 1995). Population growth continues to out-strip food availability in many 
countries and evidence from many developing countries indicates that countries with 
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high population growth are the same countries suffering from acute food insecurity 
(FAO, 2009a). In recent years, food production has lagged far behind population 
growth in nearly two thirds of developing countries (FAO, 2007). The Sub-Saharan 
region was hard hit as food production fell in 31 of the 46 African countries (FAO, 
2005a).   
 
The direct benefits of irrigational development are felt at both local and household 
levels, with higher production, higher crop yields, and reduced risks of crop failure, 
year-round and non-farming employment opportunities and increased food security. 
The total contribution of irrigation to global food production is estimated to be in the 
range of 25-50 percent with 60 percent of cereals coming from irrigated agriculture 
(Turner et al., 2004; ICID, 2009; Sundquist, 2007). By 2030, estimates indicate that 
almost 70 percent of the world cereal production will come from irrigated land (FAO, 
2005b). Understandably, irrigation is the single most important consumer of water 
in both developed and developing countries, although its importance to developing 
countries is crucial. Agriculture alone consumes about 70 percent of the fresh water 
worldwide, whilst the remaining 20 percent and 10 percent are used for industrial 
and domestic purposes respectively (Wiebe and Gollehon, 2006 p. 25).  
 
Ever since the practice of irrigated cultivation began in Mesopotamia in 4000 BC, 
irrigation has remained an important part of sustaining human life.  Advancements 
in modern agricultural practices have increased the world’s agricultural output to 
feed more than five billion people, with global cereal production doubling in the last 
50 years (Spielman and Pandy-Lorch, 2009). The increase in crop yields have come 
mainly from greater inputs of fertilisers, pesticides, new crop strains and irrigation 
(Tilman,  et al., 2002), which has increased the per capita food supply (FAO, 
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2009b).  Areas with irrigation facilities have increased rapidly following the 
beginning of the ‘Green Revolutions’ in the mid 1940s (Seckler et al., 1998).  The 
worldwide area under irrigation has increased dramatically from 40 million Ha in 
1900 to more than 277 million Ha in 2003 (Field, 1990; Seckler et al., 1998; Li, 
2007). The further expansions of irrigation facilities are estimated to increase the 
total arable area of developing countries by 120 million Ha in 2030 with more than 
80 percent of the projected expansion of arable land taking place in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America and South Asia, the areas with the world’s most chronic food 
shortages (FAO, 2005a). The ‘Green Revolutions’, stimulated governments in 
different countries to invest heavily in the agricultural sector, both with the use of  
improved varieties of crops and the development of agricultural infrastructures to 
increase crop production to feed the growing population. Consequently, the world’s 
irrigated land grew at an annual expansion rate of two percent from 1961-1992 and to 
around one percent from 1993-2003 with a peak of three percent in 1978 (Li, 2007 
p.3).  
 
Nepal’s total irrigable land is estimated to be about 1.7 million Ha, of which only 1.2 
million Ha (i.e. 70 per cent) has access to some form of irrigation, which contributes 
to 33 percent of the total agricultural output (WECS, 2002; DoI, 2007a). Of this, only 
41 percent of the irrigated land has access to year around irrigation facilities. The 
remaining 59 percent of irrigated areas has access to water mostly during the 
Monsoon season only.  
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1.4 Irrigation for Poverty Reduction 
 
The relationship between poverty reduction and irrigational development has 
become a topical issue amongst academics and policy makers alike.  An international 
conference on freshwater management in Bonn in 2001 concluded that “combating 
poverty is the main challenge for achieving equitable and sustainable development 
and irrigation water plays a vital role in relation to human health, livelihoods, 
economic growth as well as sustaining ecosystems" (UNESCO, 2001 p.2).   There is 
a general consensus that irrigation development in agricultural countries can be a 
significant help in reducing poverty (Fan et al., 1999; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; also 
see Mellor, 2001; Desai, 2002).   
 
Considerable work conducted in the last five decades in Asia has shown that the 
multitude of tangible positive externalities associated with irrigation development 
are considered to be the most potent source of higher farm incomes and hence the 
driving force in poverty reduction (Mellor, 2001; Hussain and Hanjra, 2004).  
Studies in India concluded that agricultural output and irrigational development 
coupled with enhanced literacy levels contributed towards poverty reduction and 
that access to irrigation was found to be critical for rural poverty reduction 
(Sakthivadivel et al., 2002).   
 
Furthermore, crop diversification, intensification and shifts from subsistence to 
commercial crops were likely to help poorer households by reducing food prices 
(Hussain and Hanjra, 2004). Writing on Indian irrigation systems, Dahawan and 
Datta (1992) posited that in irrigated rural settings, up to three crops a year could be 
grown as compared to just a single crop a year in rainfed settings.   Indirectly, 
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irrigation development acts as a production and supply shifter and helps boost 
aggregate growth where both rich and poor households benefit. 
 
Drawing on macro level data, Lipton et al.  (2002) compared the prevalence of 
poverty with the amount of land irrigated in Africa and Asia.  They found that regions 
with higher irrigated crop land had higher poverty reduction rates. Similar studies 
were carried out by the World Bank and demonstrated that Sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced the world’s worst forms and levels of poverty, with an absolute poverty 
level of 47.7 percent in 1990 and 41.1 percent in 2004, and with just 3 percent of 
irrigated crop land (Chen and Ravallion, 2007).  In contrast, the experiences of  East 
Asia and the Pacific, North Africa and the Middle East with 35-40 percent of 
irrigated crop lands showed higher poverty reduction in the 1970s (op.cit. p.3).  
Hussain et al.  (2002b p.5) studied intra-country experiences of poverty reduction 
resulting from irrigation and found that the incidence of chronic poverty in the 
rainfed areas of Sri Lanka and Pakistan were likely to be 10 percent and 5 percent 
respectively greater than their adjoining irrigated areas.  Furthermore, the authors 
noted that poverty head counts ranged from 18-53 percent in irrigated and 21 -66 
percent in rainfed settings – a difference of 20-30 percent between the two settings 
(ibid.).  Research has shown that a one percent increase in agricultural production 
could reduce poverty by an equal amount, highlighting the role of irrigated 
agriculture in poverty eradication (Thirtle et al., 2001).  
 
On the production side of the poverty-irrigation relationship, irrigation development 
creates localised demands for both farm and off-farm income, indirectly generating 
economic activities.  A study by Liedholm and Meade (1987) concluded that because 
of the spill over effects of expanding agricultural activities, non-farming employment 
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opportunities expanded readily. The governments in many developing countries have 
invested heavily in the agricultural sector through a series of research, development 
and technology transfer initiatives under the aegis of the ‘Green Revolution’. These 
initiatives included the development of high yielding varieties of crops, expansion of 
the irrigation infrastructure, and distribution of hybridized seeds, synthetic 
fertilisers, and pesticides to farmers. As a result of these initiatives, many developing 
countries boosted agricultural production with a 4-6 percent annual growth rate, 
which has helped to reduce poverty (Mellor, 1995).   
 
Angood et al.  (2002) presented a case study of three Farmer Managed Irrigation 
Systems (FMIS) in Nepal and concluded that small scale irrigation developments are 
effective tools for rural poverty reduction.  Following Angood et al.’s study, Brabban 
et al.  (2004) re-examined the impact of the same three irrigation schemes and 
concluded that irrigational development could have significant positive impacts in all 
dimensions of development -  human assets, natural assets, financial assets, physical 
assets and social assets (Brabban et al.,2004).  
 
However, research into the relationship between irrigation and poverty have mostly 
involved aggregate macro level analysis.  Although much work has been conducted in 
relation to the implications of local level socio-economic differences on forest 
management (Adhikari, 2003; Luintel and Timsina, 2003), very little work has been 
conducted in irrigation development.  The growth aspects of irrigation are well 
accepted. Despite the close links between irrigation development and poverty 
reduction, there is still a considerable polarisation on dimensions of equity.  A 
growing body of literature suggests that unequal growth can lead to a skewed income 
distribution, raising questions about the strength of irrigation development in 
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reducing poverty (Squire, 1993; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Ravallion, 1995; 
Hussain, 2007; Narayanamoorthy, 2007). In many developing countries, the 
distribution of irrigation water is land based, which makes irrigation development 
inherently biased against the landless and land poor. Furthermore, head and tail 
inequity, also known as upstream-downstream inequity has been well documented 
(Hussain, 2004). In his synthesis studies of 307 irrigational systems during 1970-89, 
Freebairn (1995) found that both inter-farm and interregional inequalities widened 
in 80 of the studies. Banik et al. (2003) in their study of natural resource 
endowments and poverty in a tribal belt of Chhotanagpur Plateau (India) 
demonstrated significant differences in the benefits accruing to higher landholding 
households from higher social strata as compared to those from lower caste 
affiliations (Banik et al.,2003).  
 
Since Nepal exhibits a highly skewed land distribution, the probability of inequitable 
water distribution is high. Furthermore, the existence of the caste system with a 
dominance of higher castes in policy domains, and disproportionately higher land 
distribution amongst them has meant that the same groups are deriving many of the 
benefits from the irrigational development in Nepal. Ethnic minorities, indigenous 
people, and the dalits, who represent a significant number of land-poor households 
marred with poverty, have tended to lag behind in benefiting from irrigational 
development. More work needs to be done to inform policy makers about the 
trajectories through which the benefits of irrigation development trickle down in 
heterogeneous Nepalese irrigation communities. 
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1.5. Rationale for Undertaking this Research in Nepal  
Although a detailed review of irrigation policies is presented later in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.11), this section makes a case for undertaking this research in Nepal. It 
highlights the policy relevance of this research and the contribution to knowledge 
that this thesis aims to make.  
 
    1.5.1 Relevance to Irrigational Development in Nepal  
Irrigational development is of special interest for a predominantly agricultural 
country like Nepal where almost one-fifth i.e. about 18 percent of its total land area is 
used for agriculture (CARE-Nepal, 2001; CBS, 2004) and more than 76 percent of 
the total population engages in agriculture for its livelihood (MoF, 2001), 
contributing to up to 40 percent of national GDP (Adhikari, 2001). Also, Nepal is the 
second richest country, following only Brazil worldwide in terms of its potential fresh 
water resources, and possessing about 2.27 percent of the world’s potential water 
resources (CBS, 1999).  A country report on Nepal’s environmental statistics notes 
that, all together Nepal has about six thousand rivers of approximately 45 thousand 
kilometres in length (Kharel and Suwal, 2001).  However, despite being water-
wealthy and having 30 percent (Pant, 2003) irrigation-based agricultural production, 
42 percent of the net cultivated land has access to some form of irrigation (CBS, 
2004 p.3), while just 41 percent of the irrigated land receives year –round irrigation 
(Mishra and Bhattarai, 2003).   
 
    1.5.2 Relevance to Poverty Reduction in Nepal  
 With an average per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 260 and per 
capita income of US$ 1237, Nepal remains the poorest country in South Asia and 
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ranks as the twelfth poorest country in the world (World Bank, 2010; IMF, 2010). 
About nine million people, which is about 31 percent of the population, are currently 
living under the absolute poverty line with a daily income of less than one US dollar a 
day.  Nepal ranks the 144th country on the UNDP’s human development measure 
with a Human Development Index (HDI) measure of 0.553, which is lower than all 
its South Asian neighbours except Pakistan (UNDP, 2009). Within Nepal, rural 
poverty outstrips urban poverty.  Rural poverty, which stands at 44 percent of the 
rural population, is almost double that of urban settings (23 percent of the urban 
population) (op.cit. p.2). The HDI for urban settings is 0.581, while for rural settings 
remains at 0.452 (UNDP, 2004). Also, the Human Poverty Index (HPI) records 
indicate that rural human poverty exceeds urban poverty with the HPI value being 
42.0 and 25.2 respectively. The national HPI of Nepal remains at 32.1, ranking Nepal 
99th among 135 countries for which the index has been calculated (UNDP, 2009).  
The poverty intensity level and severity gap for the urban area is 7.0 and 2.8 percent 
respectively. The same measures for rural areas remains 12.5 and 5.1 percent 
respectively, while overall for Nepal it is 12.1 and 5 percent respectively (NPC, 2003 
p.25). The differences in poverty levels between rural and urban settings call for 
special attention because poverty in Nepal is predominantly a rural phenomenon 
where nearly 90 percent of the population live and 55 percent of the population 
undertake agriculture for their livelihoods and remain below the absolute poverty 
line, far higher than in any other sector (CBS, 2001). Thus it is imperative to 
prioritise rural poverty reduction, particular in the agricultural sector, if poverty in 
Nepal is to be reduced. The development of irrigation in improving the agricultural 
sector in Nepal is very important. Also, if the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation are to 
be maximised, the distributional aspects of irrigation should also be taken into 
account.  
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    1.5.3 Relevance to Equity in Natural Resource Distribution 
 
 
Nepalese agrarian relations are characterised by unequal land distribution where 
land endowments are concentrated amongst rich peasants and landlords (SAAPE, 
2004). Furthermore, unequal cultivable land and access to productive resources such 
as irrigation have reinforced the already high level of poverty in Nepal.  Latest figures 
from the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) indicate that a vast majority of 
agricultural households rely on subsistence farming from small farms. About 45 
percent of small farmers operate in less than 0.5 ha of land, occupying 13 percent of 
the agricultural land while 8 percent of large farmers operate in 2 ha or more, 
occupying about 31 percent of the total agricultural land (CBS, 2004 p.4). The 
concentration index for agricultural land is 0.50 (0.54 in 1997), reflecting a highly 
uneven distribution of land resource in Nepal (Pant, 2003; CBS, 2004).   
 
A vast majority of poor, landless and land-poor citizens undertake agricultural 
activities for their own consumption and for landlords. In doing so, a significant 
proportion of agricultural households (about 28 per cent, of which 7 percent are 
landless and 21 percent operate in rented- land) work on a crop share basis also 
known as adhiya (a system in which the total production is equally divided between 
farmers and landlords) or tyahu (a system in which, landlord and the farmer share 
two-thirds, and one third of the total production respectively) or some type of 
contractual basis (CBS, 2004). However, in both adhiya and tyahu systems, 
production costs such as labour, fertiliser and so on are borne by the farmers 
themselves without any contribution from their landlords. According to the census of 
2001, about 25 percent of the households are considered to be agricultural landless 
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(with no land or owning less than two Ropanis1 of land). Landlessness and poverty 
are more acute among the dalits, as out of all absolutely landless, 22 percent are 
dalits (Basnet, 2004). Amongst the dalits, the average landholding per household is 
2.46 Ropanies of khet (irrigated land) and 4.5 Ropanies of pakho land (semi arid and 
rainfed land respectively). This has a major implication for food security.  It is 
reported that more than 50 percent of the dalits suffer from food deficiency (Dahal et 
al., 2002).  Sharma et al.  (1994) in their study of socio-economic status of dalits and 
indigenous tribes in Nepal noted that food security amongst the dalits was severely 
constrained. They reported that in almost 21 percent of the dalit households, the 
food grain produced in a year lasted less than 3 months. For about 19.4 per cent, food 
grain lasted for 4-6 months, while only 14.5 percent could grow food grain enough to 
last for a whole year. A mere 5.1 percent of them produced surplus food grain.  The 
dalit castes represent the poorest segment of the population, where about 46 percent 
of the dalits remain under the poverty threshold. Given these circumstances, it is 
important to evaluate whether poorer households usually affiliated to lower castes 
have same level of access to water compared to the richer households, usually from 
higher caste backgrounds, in deriving benefits from irrigation canal development in 
Nepal. 
 
 1.5.4 Relevance to Policy shift in Irrigation Management in Nepal  
From a management perspective, Nepalese irrigation systems can be broadly divided 
into three categories: Government Managed Irrigation Systems (AMIS); Farmers 
Managed Irrigation System (FMIS); and Jointly Managed Irrigation System (JMIS).  
Firstly, the AMIS are designed and constructed on the basis of engineering and 
agronomy, with due consideration to cropping patterns, irrigation efficiency and 
                                               
1 20 Ropani = 1 hectare 
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effective rainfall (Pradhan, 2005). They are primarily funded and maintained by 
government initiatives and managed by the Government of Nepal through its 
auxiliary body-the Department of Irrigation (DoI). 
 
Secondly, the FMIS are initiated, constructed and maintained by communal efforts. 
The conceptualisation and construction of the FMIS are based on indigenous 
knowledge making extensive use of locally available construction materials, which 
have often declined in recent years (Pradhan, 2000). The salient features of the FMIS 
are: irrigators’ direct involvement in management; effective monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms; and financial and management accountability (Ostrom, 
1990).  In the FMIS, along with day to day administrative tasks, the farmers are more 
involved in all aspects of irrigation management, including water acquisitions, 
allocation, distribution drainage, resource mobilisation for Operation and 
Maintenance (O & M) activities, decision making and conflict resolutions (Uphoff, 
1986; Pradhan, 1989). 
 
Thirdly, the JMISs are constructed and managed by the Government through the 
DoI in the first stage of development, and transferred to local communities after 
essential communal capacity building. Irrigation systems under JMIS management 
regimes are essentially co-managed systems with technical inputs from government 
while responsibilities for O & M activities and lower level decision making is 
transferred to the beneficiary farmers. The devolution of irrigation systems and 
resultant co-management structure is the product of a policy shift in the early 1990s, 
where a gradual retrenchment of government involvement in construction, 
maintenance and operation of irrigation systems with increasing irrigation 
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management roles for users (DoI, 1992). The major themes prioritised in the Water 
Resource Acts (WRA) 1992 are: 
• to develop cost-effective, viable, sustainable and environmentally efficient 
irrigation systems; 
• to bring uniformity to the irrigation development process and projects of all 
concerned governmental, non-governmental and donor agencies; 
• to decrease government involvement and encourage people’s participation in 
irrigation development and management; 
• to increase capabilities of governmental and non-governmental irrigation 
institutions for the research and training related to technical and social 
aspects of irrigation management; 
• to develop laws giving WUAs rights to collect water tax and to use it for 
further development of the system; 
• to increase the farmers’ capabilities in resource mobilisation for rehabilitation 
and construction works in traditional FMIS  
                                                                                                   (DoI, 1992) 
Based on the degree of involvement of farmers and/or government in the 
management of irrigation systems, Figure 1.1 illustrates the irrigation 
management modalities in Nepal.  
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Figure 1.1 Irrigation Management Modalities in Nepal   
 
 
Whilst the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) programmes have been widely 
advocated by the Government of Nepal, its impacts have rarely been explored. 
Although the main remit of this thesis is not to evaluate the impacts of the IMT 
programmes, this research is a three way comparative case study of irrigation 
systems which are governed by three different property right regimes. By considering 
a case study where an IMT programme has been implemented and comparing it to 
other irrigation systems, this thesis highlights some of the issues pertaining to 
households’ access to water from canals, which are jointly managed by the 
beneficiary farmers and the government. 
 
1.6 Scope and Rationale of the Thesis  
Irrigation organisations provide a fertile terrain for the study of property right 
structures and their relationship with natural resource management, partly because 
access to water, land, labour and capital are all intrinsically involved in irrigation 
organisations (Pradhan, 1990). The existence of different kinds of property rights 
structure in irrigation systems, which often change over time and space, has meant 
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irrigation systems (Coward, 1980). Di-Gregorio et al.  (2008) assert that property 
rights play a crucial role in the study of irrigated agriculture. In addition to use 
patterns and benefits allocations, irrigation systems require infrastructural 
investments and provisions, and as such, irrigation organisations involve constant 
negotiations over acquisition, allocation, water distribution, resource mobilisation 
and conflict resolution (Ostrom et al., 1993; Kelly, 1983; Uphoff, 1986).  
 
The differing nature of property rights and the extent of control over water and 
infrastructure lead to different levels of resource mobilisation in irrigation 
governance.  Hilton (1992), in her comparative study of irrigation systems in Nepal, 
drew some important conclusions. More decision making autonomy to irrigators, 
and control over water and infrastructure, the reliability of water delivery and limited 
and indirect agency interventions, are key to effective local resource mobilisation. 
Pasaribu and Routray (2005) in their study of FMIS in Indonesia conclude that water 
inadequacy and unreliability fuels conflicts in irrigation systems which in turn 
weaken institutional arrangements governing irrigation systems. The accountability 
of a water user's association is the main factor influencing the success or failure of an 
institutional role in the sustainability of irrigation systems (Pasaribu and Routray, 
2005). 
 
The degree of autonomy, both financial and managerial, are critical for the better 
management of the irrigation system because they help to incorporate local socio-
economic and geo-physical dimensions. Hunt (1989) argues that irrigation 
communities function well in systems where property relations such as rights, duties 
and roles have substantial local control. The sustainability of the irrigation system 
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depends on the principles used for water distribution and system management, as 
they define the institutional domains for resource mobilisation (Parajuli, 1999).  
 
The alternations in property right structures and conflicts emanating from them have 
been well documented (Coward, 1986; Leach, 1961 also see Pradhan, 1992; Tamaki, 
1977). Irrigation organisations are essentially socio-economic organisations which 
involve rights, duties, powers, privileges, and forbearance of various kinds, which are 
influenced by the nature of property rights and institutions governing irrigation 
organisations. The physical nature of infrastructure coupled with the economic 
nature of irrigation enterprise represents a mosaic of interactions amongst various 
actors, including landless farmers (Bloch, 1975; Coward, 1980; Lowie, 1948). 
 
Writing on conflicts over water rights between two villages in Western Nepal, 
Pradhan and Pradhan (2000) argued that the readjustment of property rights 
structure is vital in maintaining functional irrigation systems. Similar conclusions 
were drawn by Lowie (1948) in his study of irrigation interventions in eastern Africa.  
Bloch, in his study of two indigenous irrigation canals in Madagascar, reported that 
the creation of powerful forms of property relations have significant effects on social 
structures in connection with natural resources. For example in the Meria 
community in Madagascar the scarcity of land where paddy was cultivated supported 
endogamous principles of marriage. The endogamous marriage practiced in the 
Meria community helped to “to keep outsiders away and to stop them getting claims 
to highly valued land resources and irrigation water for paddy cultivation” (Bloch, 
1975 p. 211).  
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Comparative studies of the FMIS and AMIS have demonstrated that the former 
consistently outperform the latter in all the commonly used performance indicators, 
such as increased efficiency, equity, irrigation area coverage and water productivity   
(Loitos et al.,1986; Pradhan, 1989; Tang, 1992; also see Hilton, 1992; Martin and 
Yoder, 1986; Yoder, 1986).  Similar patterns are observed in other indicators of 
performance evaluation, such as cost recovery, cropping intensity, crop yields and 
increased income from agricultural activities (Trawick, 2001 and 2008; Tanaka and 
Sato, 2003).  In contrast, the many AMISs have gained notoriety for their 
underperformance or sub-optimal performance, neglect of maintenance, theft and 
vandalism of water control structures, environmental degradation and erosion of 
local social capital (Ubels, 1990; Cambell, 1995). Some scholars, such as Groenfeldt, 
argue that, “---governments cannot do everything, and there are some things that 
they are simply not very good at doing and one of them being irrigation systems” 
(2000 p.2).  
 
However, despite the research highlighted above, there is a dearth of comparative 
studies on equity aspects of irrigation intervention in south Asia, particularly in 
Nepal. There are a few exceptions, however (Maskey et al., 1994; Bhutta and van der 
Velde, 1992; Hill et al., 2008). Maskey et al. (1994) studied on-farm water 
distribution management in two medium-scale irrigation systems in the Yamdi 
watershed area in Western Nepal. The irrigation systems considered for the study 
were governed by two different property right regimes, namely the FMIS and the 
AMIS. The study reported that although there was no significant difference in the 
frequency with which farmers irrigated in different locations in the FMIS there was a 
significant difference in the irrigation frequency amongst the farmers in the AMIS, 
particularly at its tail end. The differences in the frequency of irrigation in the 
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systems differed between water abundant and water scarce periods.  Paddy grown 
during the Monsoon season when water is available in abundance shows a 
reasonable degree of equity in its distribution between head and tail reach farmland. 
However, wheat grown in the dry season with a limited supply of water, rendered 
evidence of unfair distribution demanding better management of irrigation water. 
 
A similar study by Bhutta and van der Velde (1992) in the three distributaries of the 
Chenab Irrigation System in the Punjab region of Pakistan reported a significant 
head and tail inequality in water distribution.  The outlets located in the head of the 
canal received water which was almost 150 percent of its design capacity, while those 
located at the tail end of the canal received only 8 percent of its design capacity 
(ibid). Consequently, the upper two-thirds of the canal withdrew considerably more 
than their fair share of water from the canal, while the majority of the farmers 
located in the lower one-third of the distributaries received less than half of their 
intended supply.  
 
A comparative study of a branch canal in a FMIS and AMIS (Hill et al., 2008) 
demonstrated that farmers in the FMIS were self-governed and had designed and 
implemented equitable rules for water access, while the farmers in the AMIS lacked 
an equitable water distribution mechanism.  The presence of dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the FMIS and their lack in the AMIS has meant that the farmers in 
the former were able to facilitate their self-realisation of equitable solutions to the 
problems they faced while the farmers in the latter were unable to do so.  Hill et al.’s 
comparative study pointed out that the even though the Water Users’ Association 
(WUA) in the FMIS were not formally registered, they were more accountable to the 
farmers as they were elected by the local community, compared with the WUA in the 
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AMIS. Since the WUA members were elected by the beneficiary famers, they had to 
be impartial in their conduct, including equitable distribution of irrigation water. 
However, in the AMIS, the informal presence of unelected higher level committee 
members, without even basic information such as the size of the management areas, 
raises doubts at the system level regarding how and for whom decisions are being 
taken and money spent (ibid).  
 
As a response to the disappointing performance of the AMIS, governments in many 
developing countries have initiated a transfer of management responsibilities to the 
beneficiary farmers under the aegis of ‘Irrigation Management Transfer’ (IMT) with 
expectations of increasing performance, enhancing efficiency, reducing operation 
and maintenance costs and controlling the destruction of irrigation infrastructures 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997; Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001; Sam-Amoah and 
Gowing, 2001).  Many studies appear to consider and recommend the transfer of 
irrigation systems to the users as the panacea for underperforming irrigation systems 
(Renault, 2001; Yercan, 2003).  
 
While the success stories of FMIS are well documented (Loitos et al., 1986; Tang, 
1992; Hilton, 1992; Yoder, 1986; Lam, 1998), there are still abundant cases where 
irrigation systems have deteriorated partly because of a lack of technical and 
financial resources (Pradhan, 2000).  Furthermore, a lack of sufficient water in both 
the sources and the canals and increased costs to the beneficiary farmers has meant 
that many FMISs are susceptible to failure (Sakurai and Palanisami, 2001).  Evidence 
from India and Pakistan have shown that arguments of ‘uncritical acceptance of 
equitable water distribution in all FMISs’ has become untenable (Shah et al., 2000 
p.2). Studies have shown that results of many JMISs are also rather mixed despite 
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enormous technical and financial contributions by agencies, both government and 
external (Wade, 1987; Levine, 1981; Hilton, 1990; Shivakoti, 1992).  
 
It should be pointed out that whilst some comparative studies, including those 
reviewed above on the performance of irrigation systems under different property 
rights have been undertaken, those have mainly been characterised by macro level 
project appraisal studies, which tend to have an overwhelmingly technical focus 
(Laitos, 1986; Pradhan et al., 1988; Renault et al., 2007).  Such studies have been 
undertaken which followed technical procedures and not surprisingly produced 
technical outcomes laden with technical jargon, which the local farmers have found 
very difficult to understand.  Whilst ‘objectivity’ is a necessary measure of access to 
irrigation water, it is insufficient since it ignores the subjective measure of access to 
water.   
 
Also, despite a large body of literature on the success of CPR systems in conserving 
local resources (Wade, 1988; Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes and Folke, 1998), 
empirical discussions with regard to the distributional aspects of irrigation resources 
particularly from farmers’ perspectives have not been properly explored.  Against this 
background, it is imperative to investigate the roles of property rights regimes, which 
are designed to manage irrigation systems on farmers’ ability to access irrigation 
water. More crucially, it is important to broaden understanding of the roles of 
institutions in enabling or preventing farmers from accessing irrigation water from 
the canal systems.  
To this end, this thesis has two key aims: 
• Firstly, to investigate whether property rights structures have an impact on 
farmers’ ability to access water from the canal systems.   
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• Secondly, to investigate the role of institutions in water distribution and to 
identify and elaborate some of the enabling factors for equitable water 
distribution in the canal systems in Nepal.   
 
1.7 Focus, Research Objectives and Research Questions  
    1.7.1 Focus 
 
This study focuses on institutional aspects of irrigation management in Nepal, giving 
consideration to property rights, group heterogeneity, equity and distributional 
aspects of the current institutional arrangements. In particular, the empirical 
emphasis is placed on the distributional implications of irrigation resources under 
different property rights regimes. The thesis investigates irrigation polices in Nepal 
in general, as well as more specific issues related to property rights structures and 
other institutional arrangements, which have a bearing on farmers’ ability to 
appropriate benefits from the irrigation systems.  
 
Through a comparative and an in-depth institutional analysis, the thesis aims to 
establish the extent of differences on the farmers’ ability to engage on irrigation 
issues and the extent of benefits derived by farmers with different capabilities from 
irrigation systems governed by different property rights regimes.  It is hoped that the 
findings from this thesis will provide a better understanding of the policy changes in 
the management of irrigation systems in Nepal, particularly the distributional 
aspects and the design principles of institutions. Furthermore, it is hoped that 
findings from this research will highlight the ways in which the marginal and the 
most vulnerable farmers can use the policy changes to improve their livelihoods and 
ensure the long term sustainability of the irrigation systems. The comparative 
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institutional analysis of the three irrigation systems aims to yield policy inputs in 
terms of broadening understanding of good practice and policy transfer from one 
irrigation system to another.   
 
   1.7.2 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
There are two overarching objectives of this thesis. Firstly, the thesis aims to 
investigate if the property rights structures have an impact on the farmers’ ability to 
access water from the canal systems. Secondly, the thesis aims to broaden our 
understanding of the role of institutions in water distribution and to identify and 
elaborate some of the enabling factors for equitable water distribution in the canal 
systems.  As mentioned earlier in Sections 1.6 and 1.7 above, there is a dearth of 
studies on the distributional aspects of irrigation interventions, particularly from the 
farmers’ perspectives. The brief literature review presented in Section 1.7 indicated 
that irrigation systems which are governed by different property rights structures 
have different performance outcomes, at least on objective measures. However, it is 
still unclear as to why property rights structures have differential outcomes in terms 
of farmers’ ability to access to water from the irrigation canals. In response to this 
gap in the literature, this thesis attempts to explore implications of property rights 
regimes on farmers’ abilities to ensure this access.  In Nepal, a good water supply 
enables farmers to grow upto five crops a year.  However, a lack of good water supply 
restricts the farmers to grow only one crop in a year. A detailed discussion on the 
conceptualisation of access to irrigation water is presented in Chapter Two (Section 
2.9) and the creation of weak and strong access to irrigation water is presented in 
Chapter Three (Section 3.9).  The access score is created by asking the farmers about 
the quality of service i.e. water supply to their field in three distinct dimensions of 
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access including adequacy, reliability and equity for the three cropping seasons in 
Nepal. The responses are weighted and added together to compute a composite 
access score with value ranging from 0 to 3. In the context of this thesis, the mean 
access score of 1.73, which is just over half of the maximum value of 3, is considered 
as the boundary between weak and strong access to irrigation water.  The average 
access score indicates that the water available to the farmers is considered to be 
enough for cultivating at least two crops in a year.  The households’ ability to grow 
two crops a year is considered to be critical for their food security.  This thesis uses 
data from the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) process which was carried out 
during the focus group discussions and the household survey data to distinguish 
between a weak and strong access to irrigation water. The notion of strong and weak 
access is based on farmers’ perceptions and is subjective in nature. In order to 
understand the relationship between the property rights regimes and the farmers’ 
levels of access to irrigation water, this thesis attempts to answer the following two 
high level research questions:  
 
1. Under which property rights structures do farmers have better access to 
irrigation water?  
2. What roles do institutions play in enabling this access?  
 
The literature review presented in Chapter Two indicates that farmers have different 
capabilities within society and that a farmer’s socio-economic position within society 
influences his ability to benefit from natural resources such as irrigation water. In 
order to understand the ways in which the farmer’s socio-economic position within 
society influences the ability to derive benefits from natural resource bases, the over 
arching research questions have been further broken down into five constituent 
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questions. Since this research is a comparative study of irrigation systems governed 
by different property rights regimes, the constituent questions listed below combine 
the farmer’s socio-economic status and how this influences his ability to access water 
under different property rights regimes. For the purpose of this thesis, households 
have been divided into different landholding categories, namely small landholders 
(marginal farmers), medium landholders and large landholders. A detailed 
description of these types of farmers is presented in Chapter Three (Section 3.6.3.2). 
 
1a). Are the farmers from the dalit community benefiting equally from irrigation 
systems under different property rights regimes? 
1b). Are marginal farmers benefiting equally from the surface irrigation systems 
governed by different property rights regimes? 
 
1c). Under which property rights regimes do the ‘tail-enders’ have the best access to 
water from the canal system? 
 
1d). Are households headed by females benefiting equally from irrigation systems 
under different property rights regimes? 
 
2a). Which institutions enable farmers to access water from the irrigation canals? 
 
2b). What are the lessons that irrigation systems governed by different property 
rights structures can learn from each other to maximise their impact on farmers’ 
abilities to access water? 
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It is believed that breaking down the bigger research questions into above 
constituent questions will help to assess whether property rights regimes have any 
bearing on household access to irrigation water and if so, to identify the enabling 
institutional structures that are ‘farmer friendly’ in terms of their ability to access 
water from the canal systems.  It also provides operationalisable research questions, 
listed above.  
 
1.8 Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
 
Several researchers (Ostrom, 1990; Quinn et al., 2007; Axelrod, 1986; Baland and 
Platteau, 1996; McKean, 2000; Wade, 1988) have suggested that the CPR theory has 
promising characteristics for use as a foundation for understanding the rules of 
natural resource management. This thesis will be based on an institutional approach 
to natural resource management, which emphasises the role of both formal and 
informal (customary) institutions which are designed and implemented, and 
informal institutions which have practiced over time to manage natural resources 
and to solve some of the problems emanating from conflicting interests in doing so. 
The theoretical perspectives used in this thesis follow the institutional approach 
adopted by Douglas North who defines institutions as “---humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction that ultimately affects the performance of 
economy by their effects on the costs of exchange and production---” (1990 p.1).  
The institutions serve as an action arena where the players are involved in actions 
and interactions. Some institutions facilitate interactions whilst others constrain 
them and in the absence of institutions, social interactions would be very difficult if 
not virtually impossible to effect.  Institutions are governance structures which 
provide action arenas for environmental transactions, shape incentives of parties to 
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given transactions and consequently contribute to a range of possible outcomes 
(Williamson, 1985). In the context of natural resource management, institutions can 
be viewed as a set of accepted norms, behaviours and rules for making decisions in 
terms of eligibility and ineligibility to control and use resources, resolution of 
conflicts, implementation of rules and monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance 
and to generally manage and exploit nature resources. 
 
In this thesis, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework provides 
a conceptual scaffold for analysing and understanding the pattern of interactions 
amongst different stakeholders in managing irrigation resources.  It should be 
pointed out that the thesis conducts its own empirical work, for which a number of 
data collection methods have been employed.  Data for this thesis are collected 
through a household survey, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informants 
Interviews (KIIs) data and documentary analysis. The IAD framework is used to 
make sense of the findings from the empirical study undertaken for this thesis. The 
following section describes the IAD framework and its application in managing 
irrigation resources. 
 
1.9 The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
 
Developed by Elinor Ostrom and other scholars associated with the Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at the Indiana University, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has been in common use for a wide 
range of institutional settings, notably for the development of theories of common 
pool resources (CPRs) since the 1990s (Ostrom et al.,1994). The IAD framework 
takes the traditional approach to analyzing public policy problems from “stages 
heuristic” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993 p.1) i.e. problem identification, agenda 
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setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation (Anderson, 2002) to 
action situations and actors involved in policy making, policy delivery and policy 
outcomes. The IAD framework provides intellectual scaffolding for a coherent 
structure to inquiry (Schlager, 1999).  According to the IAD framework, both policy 
process and policy outcomes are assumed to be affected by four major variables, 
which are external to the individuals or groups involved in the actions or 
interactions. These variables include the following: (a) attributes of the physical 
world; (b) attributes of the community within which actors are embedded; (c) rules 
that create incentives and constraints for certain actions; and (d) interactions with 
other individuals (Ostrom, et al., 1994). In the context of this thesis, action is 
considered the individual’s capacity to be involved in and acquire benefits from the 
irrigation canals.   
 
The IAD framework analyses action taken by the individual in a particular action 
situation. An action situation is conceived as “a social space where individuals 
interact, exchange goods and services and engage in appropriation and provision 
activities, solve problems, or fight” (Ostrom et al., 1994 p.28). The action situation 
includes four elements: (a) participants and their positions; (b) information available 
to the participants to choose (or not to choose) a particular course of action; (c) 
outcomes of the actions taken (or not taken); (d) costs and benefits of the actions; 
and (e) the link between the above mentioned four features (op.cit. p.29). The 
participants, both individuals and groups who take part in the action situation, are 
called actors. These have the following characteristics:  “(a) the preference 
evaluations that actors assign to potential actions and outcomes; (b) the way actors 
acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information; (c) the 
selection criteria actors use for deciding upon a particular course of action; and (d) 
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the resources that an actor brings to a situation” (op.cit. p. 33). The actors affected 
by irrigation interventions are irrigators (farmers), irrigation bureaucracy (DoI), 
donor agencies and other individuals (non-irrigators) who reside in the canal 
command areas.  
 
The IAD framework provides a unique opportunity to investigate and link rules of 
engagement and policy outcomes from an actor perspective.  The choice of IAD over 
other institutional frameworks such as environmental entitlements (Leach et 
al.,1997) and the sustainable livelihoods framework – which has also been recently 
used as a basis for institutional analysis (Messer and Townsley, 2003), have been 
influenced by a number of considerations. Firstly, the IAD framework is efficient in 
linking the local settings with higher decision levels, i.e. those where central 
(governmental) policies and rules governing policy-making are decided. At an 
operational level, the IAD framework is well structured and coherent, and in which 
decisions directly affect the management of natural resources to the collective-choice 
level, where decisions impact the rules that affect the operational level. The 
collective-choice level is finally linked to the constitutional level, where decisions 
impact the rules that govern how decisions are taken at the collective-choice level 
(Clement et al., 2007). 
 
Secondly, the IAD framework explicitly considers local conditions as potential 
determinants of individual behaviour. The factors that affect the action arena where 
decisions are taken by individuals are divided into material conditions, i.e. the 
physical state of the environment where actors evolve rules and attributes of the 
community, which can be broadly assimilated as cultural determinants, as shown in 
Figure 1.2.  
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The IAD framework emphasises that the users of natural resources operate in a 
complex natural and socio-economic system in which the natural resource base is 
located. The users co-ordinate their activities in accordance with the rules designed 
and implemented for the management of these resources. These activities are 
influenced by the action arena where they operate together. The action arenas are 
affected by various factors such as: attributes of physical world; attributes of 
community; and rules-in-use. The appropriators use rules for ordering their own 
relationships, various attributes of the physical world and the nature of the 
community in which the action arena occurs. To understand these institutional 
issues, as noted by Ostrom et al. (1994), it is important to analyse in-depth how rules 
combine with the physical and community world to generate particular types of 
situation. 
 
The management of irrigation systems is also guided by various rules at the level of 
the irrigation system. Through the use of the IAD framework, this thesis investigates 
the rules used for water distribution in three irrigation systems governed by different 
property rights regimes. It is noted that in community managed irrigation systems 
farmers develop a wide range of rules to specify rights and responsibilities among 
themselves (Tang, 1992) and it is most important that they enforce those rules 
without the involvement of external agencies. The situation is not same for all 
irrigation systems. 
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Figure 1.2 The Institutional Development and Analysis (IAD)  
                     Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ostrom et al. (1994)  
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1998). A detailed application of the IAD framework for the purpose of this thesis is 
presented in Chapter Six (Section 6.2). 
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are established. Different property rights regimes designed and implemented for the 
management of natural resources are presented. Secondly, the chapter describes 
property rights in the context of irrigation management and discusses irrigation 
management as a property rights problem. Thirdly, the chapter briefly discusses the 
role of heterogeneity, including the role of power relations in irrigation management.  
Fourthly, the chapter presents a critique of the current methods of measuring 
performance of access to irrigation systems and argues for an alternative approach to 
measuring a household’s level of access to irrigation water by asking farmers to 
define their own levels of access rather than those defined by the irrigation engineers 
and irrigation bureaucracies.  
 
In Chapter Three the thesis presents a detailed description of the methodological 
approach taken in the research. It describes the rationale for an in-depth 
comparative study of irrigation institutions taken to answer the research questions 
and also presents a brief description of the research sites, including respondents’ 
socio-economic characteristics, demographic features, geographical locations and 
cropping patterns.  The choice of three particular irrigation systems for an in-depth 
case study is discussed. Similarly, the chapter presents a detailed sampling 
framework and the criteria used for the household survey. A detailed elaboration of 
the methods used for generating qualitative data through expert interviews and focus 
group discussions is presented, as are the ethical issues considered for the research. 
Finally, the chapter presents a brief description of the data analysis methods used. 
 
Chapter Four will present empirical evidence concerning the level of household 
access to irrigation water in the three different irrigation systems considered for this 
study. This chapter addresses the research questions using various statistical tests. 
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Variables such as socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and resource 
specific characteristics of the irrigation systems are considered in the analysis. This 
chapter identifies variables that have influence on household access to irrigation 
water as defined by this thesis. 
 
Chapter Five presents a regression model to assess the household level of access to 
irrigation water from the canal systems, which are governed by different property 
rights regimes in Nepal. A cumulative index (level of access) is created by combining 
three variables, namely reliability, adequacy and equity and is used as a dependent 
variable to investigate the household level of access to irrigation water.  Variables 
identified in Chapter Two, which are assumed to affect the household level of access 
to irrigation water, are used in constructing the models. This chapter presents the 
results of the regression analysis and discusses the findings.   
 
Taking a qualitative approach, Chapter Six presents a detailed comparative analysis 
of institutional arrangements, which are designed and implemented for the 
management of the three irrigation systems considered in this research.  This chapter 
seeks to demonstrate why some irrigation systems are better than the others in terms 
of enhancing irrigation water. An Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework is used to explore the ‘action situations’ and pattern of interactions of the 
farmers in terms of water distribution. The Chapter aims to explain the ‘whys’ and 
‘hows’ of discrepancies in household level of access to irrigation water in the three 
irrigation systems identified in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Chapter Seven describes the main findings of the thesis and draws conclusions from 
the research.  It also presents policy implications of the research findings of the 
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thesis.  Last but not least, the thesis suggests some of the lessons that can be learnt 
from this research and gives future suggestions for research in irrigation governance. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter presents an extensive literature review, which synthesises arguments 
from a wide range of literature, particularly property and property rights theory. 
Firstly, the notion of property is explained in the context of this thesis. Secondly, the 
chapter describes the notion of property rights in general terms and, in particular, 
property rights in the context of natural resource management. A detailed review of 
different types of property rights regimes designed to manage natural resources is 
provided. Thirdly, the chapter reviews the roles of heterogeneity and power relations 
in the farmers’ ability to access water from the canal systems. Fourthly, the chapter 
explains how the nature of irrigation resources constitutes a property rights problem 
and how the notion of property rights can be used to analyse irrigation management. 
The influence of power relations on farmers’ engagement in and benefit from 
appropriation of irrigation resources are explored. Fifthly, the chapter illustrates the 
complex interactions of different domains in governance and presents a brief critique 
of the methodologies used for measuring performance of the irrigation system and 
the household level of access to irrigation.  It is argued that an over-emphasis on 
‘objectivity’ in measuring irrigation performance, which disregards farmers’ 
perceptions, has led to an insufficient measure of access.  Therefore, ‘objectivity’ is a 
necessary but not sufficient measure of access to irrigation water. In response, the 
chapter presents an alternative approach in measuring household levels of access to 
irrigation water and then reviews the variables which could have an influence on this 
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access. Using the variables indentified in the literature, the chapter finally presents a 
model for household access to irrigation. The model presented in this thesis uses 
property rights as a theoretical framework to develop some of the research questions 
presented in Chapter One.  
 
2.2 The Notion of Property  
 
The notion of property and its application to the study of socio-economic 
organisations, including the management of natural resources, has attracted a great 
deal of interest both from academics and policy makers alike. In earlier days, through 
the vantage point of a natural law, John Locke argued that “-----individual can claim 
everything on earth that takes it through his labour” (Locke, 1689 p.151).  This 
strong contention appeared in his later writing as he argued ‘-----every man should 
have as much as he could possibly make use of---- since there is land enough in the 
world to suffice double the inhabitants----” (ibid). Locke’s emphasis on a self-centred 
notion of property argued that the government should maintain insignificant roles in 
the creation and distribution of property rights. Rather, they should help in the 
recognition, facilitation and enforcement of natural rights (Wong, 2004). However, it 
is now well acknowledged, particularly via the recognition of limits to growth 
theorem, that natural resources are finite and the pressures on them are increasing 
and their uses should be sustainable.  Meadows et al.  in their influential report for 
the Club of Rome argued that:   
“If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this 
planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years-- the most 
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probable results will be sudden and uncontrollable in declines of both population 
and industrial capacity” (1972 p.117).  
 
The recent resurgence in property literature is a clear indication of an increasing use 
of property rights as a tool for individuals to speak out, demand rights and ultimately 
legitimise their claims over resources and services (Ignatieff, 2000; Wiber, 2005). 
Dixon (1941) argues that property is the relationship between people and surpluses 
emanating from material objects with some economic value in their possession. 
Hallowell (1943) confronting Dixon’s assertion of property rights as the relationship 
between people and objects, argues that property rights are “social institution i.e. a 
system of relationship amongst people involving rights, duties, powers, privileges, 
forbearance--- of some kind” (Hallowell, 1943 p.9). For Hallowell, the property 
relationship is triadic: ‘A’ owns ‘B’ against ‘C’ where A, B and C represent individual, 
object and other individual respectively (Hallowell, 1943 p.59). Interestingly, Dixon’s 
over-emphasis on economic surplus, excluding social aspects and Hallowell’s over-
emphasis on social aspects, omitting economic aspects, makes their conception of 
property rights incomplete, partly because the relationship is often socio-economic 
rather than either economic or social alone.   
 
Following an anthropological perspective, von Brenda-Beckmann argues that, 
property rights are “sanctioned social relationships between persons with which 
they relate to each other with respect to the resource/object of some value” (1996, 
p.7). It is argued that by virtue of property rights individuals are privileged and 
authorised to undertake particular action related to the resources (Commons, 2006; 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). The object/ resource can be both material and 
immaterial but the relationship is not with the object itself. The sanctioned social 
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relationships, embedded within the property rights, provide an institutional 
configuration for the formation, operation and functioning of social and economic 
organisations (Barzel, 1997). In pluralist and heterogeneous societies, claims for 
stakes and participation in resource management are accelerating and consequently 
new institutional arrangements are evolving to redress past wrongs and redistribute 
productive assets including land, labour and capital (Wong, 2004).  
 
However, in recent decades there has been a shift in conceptualising property rights. 
The literature on property rights has increasingly attempted to widen its scope and 
scholars have begun to conceive of property as a bundle of rights to explore the 
relationships between people and the valuable resources surrounding them (Wiber, 
1993; F. von Benda-Beckmann; 1995, 2000 & 2001; K von Benda-Beckmann et al., 
1997; F.and K von Benda-Beckmann, 1999). The ‘bundle of rights’ approach to 
defining property avoids over simplistic notions of property, an endemic problem in 
earlier studies of property (Wiber, 2005 p.6).   For example, Daniel Bromley argues 
that property rights are “capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s 
claim to a benefit stream” (1991, p.15). Bromley’s definition of property rights 
attempts to reiterate the existence of a socio-economic relationship between the 
individuals who claim rights over certain goods and services and the institutional 
circumstances in which they claim such rights.  Randall (1981) also recognised the 
existence of a triadic relationship and argued that relationships between people with 
respect to the use of resources are specified by the property rights and penalties for 
any contraventions to these relationships. In an abstract sense, property is not a 
material possession but a capability to exercise rights over the possession per se and 
is a social relationship (Ely, 1914; Macpherson, 1978). 
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Alfred Hallowell, an American anthropologist, gets to the heart of the nature of 
property and argues that:  
“----In property relations, processes of social interaction are validated by 
traditional beliefs, attitudes, and value, and sanctioned in custom and law, it is 
apparent that we are dealing with an institution extremely fundamental to the 
structure of human societies as going concerns---- property rights are 
institutionalized means of defining who may control various classes of valuable 
objects for a variety of present and future purposes and the conditions under which 
this power may be exercised” (1955 p.246). As such, property rights theory is useful 
in the study of irrigation management, as the distributional aspects such as the 
benefits from the irrigation canal are inherently related to the socio-economic power 
relations between farmers. 
 
2.3 Property Rights in the Natural Resource Realm  
 
Based on property rights structures, natural resources can be put into two categories 
- those where property rights are assigned and those where property rights are not 
assigned (Tietenburg, 2005). However, as Wiber (2005) has pointed out, the nature 
of property relationships varies quite dramatically across four major elements, 
including social units (entities considered capable of holding property rights and 
obligations); property objects (values attached to the objects); relationships (rights-
obligations interface) and spatial-temporal dimensions (location and time horizon). 
Hoogendam (1995) has postulated four categories of resources namely: private 
property; common property; public property; and open access property. With private 
property, the stakeholders possess all rights including usage, management rights, 
benefits and transferability rights. For example, private land owned by an individual 
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can be used for cultivation, can be left barren or can be sold to another person as per 
the owner’s wish. Common property (res communis) encompasses a situation where 
a group of members collectively and co-equally hold the rights over the resource 
base, which varies according to the rules agreed upon by the group members 
(Circiacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). For example, community forestry, communal 
irrigation canals, communal pastures and so on, are collectively owned and managed 
by a group of users. The possession of rights by the state or auxiliary institutions over 
the resource or object is often referred to as public property (for example, national 
defence and government buildings) while situations where no rules and regulations 
governing the use and management of resources are called open access property (res 
nullius). Examples of open access property include national parks and national 
forests. However, very few resources fall into only one of the  categories mentioned 
above, as natural resources are less often governed by those idealised types and it is 
often the case that a combination of two or more types of rights are applied in 
managing natural resources (Poudel, 2000). 
 
Garret Hardin’s seminal article entitled ‘the tragedy of the commons’ triggered a 
renaissance era and reincarnated property rights as a locus of intellectual enquiry in 
natural resource management (Hardin, 1968).  Hardin argued that in the absence of 
well defined property rights and rules governing the Common Property Resources 
(CPR), the resource bases encounter their unfortunate fate of depletion. In Hardin’s 
own words: 
“ As a rational human being, each herdsman tries to maximise his gain--- the 
rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to 
add another animal and another and another--- Therein is the tragedy. Each man 
is locked into a system which compels him to increase his herd without limit--- in a 
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world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the freedom of commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”  
                                                               (Hardin, 1968 p.1244)  
 
Hardin’s concept has been widely used to explain species extinction, over 
exploitation of forests, fisheries, problems of overgrazing, water and air pollution, 
public land encroachments, misallocation in oil and natural gases, ground water 
depletion and other problems of resource misallocation (Stevenson, 1991; Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1979).  In the absence of well defined property rights, ‘free riding’ is a 
common problem where the rational individual’s unconstrained use of resources 
leads to over-exploitation, degradation and ultimately depletion of natural resources, 
i.e. the “tragedy of the commons”.  Using the non-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game, Runge (1981) concluded that during times of uncertainty, the rational 
individual’s trust in collective outcomes declines and a propensity to maximise his 
own utility is conspicuous, with catastrophic implications for resource sustainability.  
However, in the repeated Prisoner Dilemma Game, provided there is an indefinite 
number of interactions where each individual becomes acquainted with the other’s 
strategic actions, free riding is still possible but much less likely (Axelrod, 1981; 
Kimber, 1981; Snidal, 1985). Campbell and Sowden argue that, “--- rational players 
who know each other’s likely actions  should have no trouble in establishing co-
ordinations in these games” (1985 p.102).  However, evidence suggests that 
individuals interacting with each other an indefinite number of times become 
acquainted with each others’ actions and adopt different strategies to maximise 
individual gains instead of collective outcomes (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).  In such 
circumstances, particularly in the absence of a proper mechanism for monitoring 
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individuals’ activities, there still exists some chances of defrauding and trust in 
collective outcomes remains low. This is because individuals perceive that defrauding 
will yield more short term benefits than the benefits gained though cooperation. 
 
Hardin’s critics argue that the tragedy of the commons is applicable to resources with 
open access (res-nullius) where property rights are not assigned and enforced, but 
not to the CPRs where property rights are clearly assigned (Circiacy-Wantrup  and 
Bishop, 1975; Runge, 1984; Bromley and Cernea, 1989). They argue that many 
grazing lands, which Hardin himself had predicted to get depleted overtime due to 
over-grazing, have remained decently managed within common property regimes for 
centuries before their decline (Cox, 1985).  Adhikari (2002), reviewing Hardin’s 
critics, argued that the commons’ tragedy cannot be explained by blaming inherent 
flaws in common property management, but from internal institutional 
inconsistencies, failure to capture a socio-economic context of resource bases, and 
institutional weakness in controlling over-exploitation and design and enforcing 
collective action decisions.  
 
2.4 Property Right Regimes 
 
Hanna and Jenttoft (1996) posit that, together with labour and technology, property 
rights maintain connectivity between individuals and natural resources. In the 
context of natural resources the very existence of property rights are facilitated by the 
institutions designed and implemented for the management of resource bases.   
Bromley (2003) argues that, property rights regimes are authority systems, a ‘unit of 
coercion’ with legitimacy to impose sanctions and enforce a structure of property 
rights and obligations. The property rights structure takes various forms, depending 
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on the ‘unit of coercion’, often characterised by different combinations of property 
rights, in terms of access, withdrawal and stewardship (Fuchs, 2003). Berkes (1996) 
contends that the modus operandi for interactions between the social system and 
natural systems are defined by property rights regimes. The most common categories 
of property rights regimes discussed in the literature include: state property regimes; 
private property regimes; common property regimes; and non-property regimes 
(open-access) (Hanna et al., 1996; Bromley, 2003 also see Berkes, 1996; Feeny et al., 
1990). 
    2.4.1 State Property Regimes 
 
 In a state property regime, rights for access to and control over natural resources are 
owned exclusively by the state. The possession of exclusive ownership rights has 
meant that the state as a unit of coercion, controls and regulates the use of resource 
bases. Examples of resources managed by this regime type include national forests, 
national parks and hunting reserves. Acheson (2000) argues that the state maintains 
its authority to protect resources in two ways: (1) through nationalisation of 
resources for example capturing a swath of land for creating park land; (2) through 
legislative procedures, by passing laws to assume rights over resources, for example 
the Nepalese government passed legislation to nationalise thousands of hectares of 
village forests through the enactment of the Forest Nationalisation Act 1975.  
 
Under state property regimes, the state exercises its rights in two ways. Direct 
mechanisms are put in place, where the state itself acts as unit of coercion via its 
auxiliary agencies. Concessions for an individual or group to use resources may still 
be available, but they depend on the forbearance of the state (Bromley, 2003). 
Indirect (lease-out) mechanisms are enacted, where individuals or groups are 
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granted only usufruct (usage) rights over resources, i.e. the resource can be used for 
a fixed period of time or as long as the usufructuaries manage the resource without 
causing damage. The usufruct rights provide individuals with the facility to use 
resources that do not belong to them. For example, the ‘tree growing association’ in 
the Indian state of West Bengal consists mainly of landless and marginal farmers 
where individuals have not been granted land titles but the group has been given 
usufruct rights to the land and ownership rights to its produce (Cernea, 1985). It 
should be noted that the usufruct rights are not necessarily granted on a permanent 
basis. Nonetheless, the authorities grant usufruct rights for a duration, which is 
considered a reasonable length of time to achieve the objective of such a transfer to 
local users. Bromley (2003) suggests that state property rights regimes are 
characterised by distinct ownership-control rights and are actual rights to use. In the 
state property rights regime, usually but not always, the state (on behalf of citizenry 
at large) assumes ownership while management-control and use rights are 
maintained by bureaucrats and citizenry respectively.  
 
States often use economic tools such as taxes and subsidies to secure better 
management of environmental resources, while some states, particularly those in  
fiscal crises, decentralise the management of resources partly because the 
management costs are high (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001). However, resources 
managed by state property rights regimes continue to face problems of free riding, as 
individuals appropriate benefits from resources without contributing toward their 
management or bearing the costs of management (Ostrom, 1990). The ‘common 
good’ nature of many natural resources, including irrigation water are rivalry in 
consumption and it is very difficult to exclude individuals from using the resource. 
The common good aspect of irrigation water presents a real problem as regards free 
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riding, particularly when monitoring mechanisms are absent or weakly enforced. 
Furthermore, an inadequately defined property right makes it extremely difficult to 
exclude free riders and monitoring becomes very costly (Williamson, 1975). It is also 
suggested that state lack of effective enforcement mechanisms might lead to some 
degree of devolution of management to local users (Berkes, 1996).  In order to avoid 
the tragedy of the commons, many countries have transferred property rights to local 
users. For example, in some irrigation systems in the Philippines, productivity and 
sustainability of water use were enhanced only after the successful and active 
integration of farmers’ participation in all aspects of design of distribution, 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms (Maleza and Nishimura, 2007). 
    2.4.2 Private Property Regimes 
 
Private property regimes, also known as individual property regimes (res privatae), 
are the most commonly practised in resource management. Under private property 
regimes, exclusive ownership is assigned to named individuals or corporations, 
together with control, access and a bundle of socially accepted uses (Fuchs, 2003). 
The right holders have exclusive usage rights and can exclude others and regulate the 
management of the resource bases. The private property rights regimes assume that 
the robustness of rule enforcement can be enhanced and ‘free riding’ controlled 
(Berkes, 1996).  Bromley (2003) claims that the presence of strong moral and legal 
sanctions to exclude excess populations coupled with state power to effectively resist 
unwanted intrusion has meant that private property regimes are more stable and 
adaptable. Proponents of private property regimes argue that problems of over-
exploitation and degradation of resources can only be resolved by creating and 
enforcing appropriate private property rights (Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 
1981 also see Cheung, 1970; Circiacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1975; Runge, 1984; Bromley 
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and Cernea, 1989). However, in private property rights regimes, the incentive 
structures tend to come from an economic but not necessarily an environmental view 
point (Wong, 2004). It is important to recognise that resource sustainability depends 
not only on use but also on the characteristics of both the market and resources 
(Berkes, 1996; Gadgil and Berkes, 1991). Rational agents, who are managing natural 
resources under private property rights regimes, are often susceptible to short term 
economic gains ignoring long term resource sustainability and the useful role of 
cultural capital in managing natural capital (Berkes and Folke, 1992). For example, 
an individual with ownership of a private forest might clear it without considering 
ecological impacts. Some scholars, such as Acheson (2000), have recognised 
circumstances which are unfavourable to resource sustainability even though they 
meet economic criteria. Acheson (2000) argues over exploitation of resources is  
eminent in conditions in which financial interest rates exceed resource growth rates, 
encouraging the owner to maximise profit through the rapid use of resources. In the 
wake of risk and uncertainty, property rights holders might adopt strategies to yield 
maximum immediate results, assuming high discount rates, and a short time horizon 
(Adhikari, 2002) leading to the over-exploitation of the resource (Alcheson, 2000; 
Heikkinen and Kuosmanen, 2003 also see Wesseler et al., 2003).  
    2.4.3 Common Property Regimes 
 
Under this type of regime, the property rights are held by an identifiable group of 
users who have the right to exclude non-right holders and regulate the use of CPRs 
(res communes) through constraints placed on use (Ciricy-Wantrup and Bishop, 
1975; McCay and Acheson, 1987, also see Berkes et al., 1989; Bromley, 1989 & 2003; 
Stevenson, 1991).  However, it is unlikely that rights holders have exclusive 
transferable rights, but only access and usage rights (Feeny et al., 1998). Common 
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property regimes are preferred where resources demonstrate rivalry or 
substractibility and a non-exclusionary nature (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Berkes 
and Farer, 1988). Finite resource availability and competition by multiple users and 
the substantially high costs of exclusion has meant that resources are subject to 
depletion or degradation (Varughese, 1998). Hence, CPRs share the first attribute 
with purely private goods and the second attribute with purely public goods.  
 
The CPR regime originates either from legal recognition (de jury) or customary 
practice (de facto). Whatever the foundational framework for CPR regimes, the 
successful exclusion of non-owners is the rule rather than the exception (Berkes, 
2004). Bromley (2003) makes an interesting comparison between common property 
(res communes) and private property (res privatae) for the group of co-owners. 
Bromley posits similarities between the two, partly as a result of the exclusion of 
non-owners, while all others are included in all aspects of use and in decision making 
processes. The group of co-owners resembles the individual in private property 
regimes, where rights are held with corresponding duties associated with the exercise 
of those rights.  Bromley (2003) conceived common property regimes as social units 
with identifiable membership and boundaries, linked up with common interests, 
socio-cultural norms and often with their own endogenous unit of coercion 
(authority). However, the co-owner groups vary in nature, size and internal structure 
across a broad spectrum. The existence of rights and duties remains eminent 
between co-owners and non-members. The co-owners involved in managing the 
resource have the right to exclude non-members, while non-members are obliged to 
abide by the rules of exclusion. Internally, members within groups have rights and 
duties with respect to use rates and operation and maintenance activities (Bromley, 
2003). However, the fundamental difference exists between common property 
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regimes and open access, as there are no definite users and every potential user has 
usage rights while none has explicit legal or customary obligatory liabilities for the 
exercise of neither these rights nor the legal capability to exclude others. Therefore, 
an open access regime is dominated by the notion of mutual privilege, devoid of 
rights and obligation, while common pool regimes are framed within legal and/or 
customary rights and duties, with the ability of co-owners to exclude non-members 
(Bromley, 1991). 
 
   2.4.4 No-property Right Regimes (Open-Access) 
 
In open access regimes, resources can be used by anyone with a social and economic 
capability to harvest the resources without bearing the costs associated with resource 
management. Under this type of regime, resources are managed either by poorly 
defined property rights, or in the complete absence of property rights. The open 
access scenarios exist either in the absence of property rights, or by a breakdown of 
management structures to enforce rules, establish certain norms and values and 
relate members with the resource base due to institutional misfit and corruption 
(Makepe, 2006; Robbins, 2000). Bromley (2003) argues that, in the absence of 
property rights, it is logically inconsistent to assert- as many often do –“everybody’s 
property is nobody’s property rather it can only be argued that everybody’s access 
is nobody’s property” (p.95). Similar views were expressed by Aristotle as early as 
400 B.C: “what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon 
it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest” (cited in 
Ostrom, 1990 p.1) This type of property right regime might be acceptable where 
supply is plentiful with low demands on the resource, as McKean asserts that “no 
management is required for resources available in abundance --- when demand is 
52 
 
too low to make the effort worthwhile. While at least in the short term, open access 
regimes might be able to manage the resource, but in the long term continual 
exploitation leads to resource degradation and possibilities for ultimate depletion of 
resources remain high and real ” (2000 p.10).  In the long term, the supply side (rate 
of resource regeneration) declines over time while demand continues to increase 
owing to the pressure of economic and population growth (Swaney, 2003).  
Considerable evidence has shown that the supply side of the fugitive natural resource 
can be reduced to zero, mainly because of physical and economic exhaustion, and 
sufficiently high rates of use can stub out the generative capacity (Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1979; Stevenson, 1991). 
 
In the absence of well defined property rights structures, the exploitation of natural 
resources generates two kinds of externalities to other users; symmetrical and 
asymmetrical (Stevenson, 1991). Symmetrical externalities represent situations 
where the externalities generated are inflicted on those imposing and other users 
simultaneously - reciprocal externality. For example, ground water, unregulated 
woodlands and forests, open grazing ground, fishery, wildlife and the common oil 
and gas pool. The asymmetrical externality represents situations where the 
externality is non-reciprocal and those inflicting impose costs on others while 
bearing no costs whatsoever; for example, a factory chimney dirtying clothes on a 
washing line that is close to the factory.  
 
Wallace (1981) in his studies of open access forests, illustrated several important 
implications for resource use under open access regimes. In these situations, over 
exploitation usually takes place in two ways. Firstly, even with the availability of 
substitutes, users prefer ‘free goods’ to other goods, as the costs emanating from 
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harvesting is higher to the society than to individuals. Also, individuals make usage 
decisions with short term horizons, and extract resources until their marginal costs2 
and benefits of resource abstraction equalise in a particular year.  Secondly, users’ 
short-sighted thinking drags them to opt for short term benefits rather than long 
term resource sustainability through a pattern of unbalanced use leading to over 
exploitation of resources (Wallace, 1981). 
 
Under open access regimes, the use of capital intensive harvest instead of alternative 
non-intensive harvest at unsustainable levels by free riders has meant that resources 
are susceptible to over exploitation (De Lopez, 2001; Agnello and Donnelley, 1977; 
Kasulo and Perrings, 2006).  As argued by Bromley (2003), the open access regime 
represents a situation where everyone’s access is nobody’s property and lacks 
individual incentives to make sustainable use of resources, assuming that free riders 
enjoy benefits at the expense of their efforts (Varughese, 1999). 
 
Table 2.1 General Classifications of Goods 
 
 
 
Rivalry in  
Consumption 
Excludable  Non-excludable  
 
Private Goods 
example: cars, food, gold 
ring 
 
 
Common Goods or CPR 
example: fish stock, irrigation 
systems, community forests 
 
Non Rivalry 
in 
Consumption  
Club Goods 
example: highways, 
zoos, national parks 
 
Public Good 
example: street light, national 
defence, air 
 
 
                                               
2 Marginal cost is defined as the cost incurred in producing every additional product or service 
(resources) while marginal benefit is the satisfaction for consumption of every additional resource 
(Begg et al., 2008). If the marginal benefit of using the resource is higher than the marginal cost, then 
individuals and group using the resources will continue exploiting them until the marginal cost equals 
the marginal benefits.  
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Table 2.1 presents the nature of the goods based on their rivalry and excludable 
natures. Private goods are both excludable and prone to rivalry in consumption, 
while common goods are prone to rivalry but non-excludable in nature. The finite 
flow of water in the irrigation canal (rivalry) and the high costs associated with 
exclusion pose a challenge to managing irrigation systems (see more in Section 2.6 
below). The thesis will examine the natural resources, which are governed by the 
three types of property rights regimes namely the AMIS, FMIS and the JMIS 
mentioned above.  
 
2.5 Property Rights, Collective Action and Heterogeneity  
 
The relationship between natural resources and the characteristics of the resource 
users have engendered a great deal of interest amongst academics and policy makers 
alike (Chambers, 1977; Wade, 1988 Ostrom, 1994; Lam, 1998). The role of 
heterogeneity on collective action, which is required for commons management, 
requires elaboration. Firstly, the notion of heterogeneity needs clarification here. In 
simple terms, it refers to the socio-economic differences that exist between the 
natural resource users.  Literature on heterogeneity suggests that it emanates from 
different sources; for example, political heterogeneity (little agreement amongst the 
committee members or between committee members and users); heterogeneity in 
endowments (unequal access to land and other resources); heterogeneity in wealth 
and entitlements (large differences in crop production and cattle); economic 
interests (types of crop and diversity in the use of irrigation) and socio-cultural 
heterogeneity (education, castes, values and life orientation).  In this thesis, 
heterogeneity is taken as  the characteristics of the household, ranging from socio-
economic attributes such as caste, gender, size and the location of the landholdings, 
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the level of trust, farmers’ agronomical knowledge and other resources, specific 
characteristics like the nature of water feeding the irrigation systems, cement lined 
canals, and the shape and gradient of canals. 
 
The development of institutions required for the management of natural resources 
involves collective action from all members of the community involved in managing 
the resource base in question. In the case of irrigation, members of the WUA are 
involved, who organise and invest in the management of irrigation systems. The 
structure and composition of the community and the group heterogeneity/ 
homogeneity emanating from it has wider implications for efficient and equitable 
CPR management (Agrawal, 2001; Oakerson, 1986; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; 
Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Arnold, 1998).   It is argued that equitable resource 
distribution amongst the users is vital for successful and sustainable CPR 
management.  
 
Table 2.2 presents studies which have investigated the relationship between 
heterogeneity and collective action. The literature suggests that this relationship is 
not straight forward. There are two competing schools of thought in the natural 
resource management literature which deal with the effects of local level 
heterogeneity in community based resource management. 
 
The first school of thought argues that local level socio-economic heterogeneities 
impose constraints on collective action and institution building (North, 1990). Unless 
guided by rules, regulations and robust institutional arrangements, the diverse 
interests amongst stakeholders have meant that fraud and uncooperative behaviour 
are not uncommon (Kanbur, 1992; Kant, 2000; Bardhan, 1993).   
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Table 2.2 Some Developments on Heterogeneity and Collective Actions 
YEAR 
 
AUTHOR(S)  
TYPE OF 
PAPER 
TYPE OF  
HETEROGENEITY  
 
 RELATIONSHIP 
  
  
  
 
 1965 
 
Olson  Theoretical Wealth  Positive 
1986 
 
Bergstrom et al.   Theoretical Wealth  Positive 
1989 
 
Cernea  Empirical Class  Negative 
1992 
 
Kanbur  Empirical  Wealth  Negative 
1995 
 
Bardhan  Empirical Wealth  Negative 
1996 
 
Sarin  Empirical Interests   Negative 
1996 
 
Shanmugaratnam  Empirical Wealth  Negative 
1996 
 
Baland and 
Platteau  Theoretical Socio-political  Positive 
2000 
 
Vedeld  Empirical Socio-political  Ambiguous 
1998 
 
Baker  Empirical Wealth  Positive 
1998 
 
 
Baland and 
Platteau  Empirical  Wealth  Ambiguous 
1998 
 
Molinas  Empirical Wealth  Inverted U 
  
  
 
Gender  Negative 
1999 
 
Baland and 
Platteau  Empirical Socio-economic  Positive 
1999 
 
Chan et al.   Empirical  Wealth  Ambiguous 
2000 
 
 
 
Bardhan and  
Dyton- 
Johnson 
 
 Empirical Wealth  U-shaped 
2001 
 
 
Bardhan et al.  Theoretical Wealth  U-shaped 
  
  
 
Locational  Negative 
2001 
 
Varughese and 
Ostrom  Empirical Socio-cultural  Ambiguous 
 
Adopted from Pérez-Cirera (2004) 
 
The extent to which resource users co-operate and their confidence, depends on the 
level of trust that they maintain during the interactions that take place while 
managing the commons. Seabright (1993) proposed a model commonly referred to as 
the “habit forming cooperation model”, which demonstrates that co-operative 
actions emanate when stakeholders’ trustworthiness is initiated and maintained. 
Studies from community forestry in Nepal (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006), council 
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forestry in India (Somanathan et al., 2002), tax compliance in the USA (Graetz et al., 
1986) and voting behaviour in the USA (Green and Shachar, 2000) demonstrate 
cases where rules can be designed and followed through to form habits or norms.  
 
The second school of thought argues that group heterogeneity is conducive to 
governance of local commons and facilitates collective action for the efficient 
utilisation and conservation of natural resource bases. Mancur Olson (1965) in his 
seminal book ‘The Logic of Collective Action’ argued that in heterogeneous 
communities, collective action can prevail if stakeholders with the greatest economic 
interests and most powerful influence can initiate collective action. Collective action 
is successful if initiated by privileged stakeholder(s) in circumstances where large 
starts-up costs are required for local resource governance (Baland and Platteau, 
1996). However, the propensity on the part of privileged stakeholders to contribute 
towards collective action may be to the result of anticipation of a greater share of the 
returns, called the ‘Olson Effects’. It is argued that increasing socio-economic 
inequality could provide incentives and engender users’ interests in voluntary 
contributions to the management of local commons (Baland and Platteau, 1999). 
However, the Olson Effects have come under increasing scrutiny over the last two 
decades.  Baland and Platteau (1999) report excessive interests of larger parties in 
resource management and decreased interests of the small parties, as the local elite 
appropriate disproportionate amounts of benefits from natural resources. In essence, 
the Olson Effects increase the free rider problem in the provision of public goods, i.e. 
too many small parties enjoying efforts contributed by privileged parties. It is equally 
plausible that the local elite lose interest in investing in the management of natural 
resources because small users might be free riding at their expense. Dayton-Johnson 
and Bardhan (2002) report a U-shaped relationship between group heterogeneity 
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based on production functions. It is argued that in communities with a higher degree 
of heterogeneity amongst users, the privileged members completely fund and co-
ordinate collective action while in less heterogeneous communities, shared common 
interests amongst users are sufficient to provide social capital for undertaking 
collective action. Some political scientists argue that social capital makes a positive 
contribution towards CPR management (Pretty, 2003; Putnam et al., 1993; Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2002). Positivists argue that social capital entails a notion of shared 
identity and helps to establish recursive relationships amongst the CPR users, whose 
actions and expectations are guided by a set of agreed rules contributing positively to 
overcoming the problems of collective action. Furthermore, it is argued that social 
capital helps to ensure economic efficiency in resource governance by reducing 
transaction costs and controlling fraud and dishonesty amongst the resource base 
users (Ostrom, 1994; Room, 1980; Quibria, 2003), increase in knowledge and 
information flow (Anderson et al.,1994), increased cooperation, less resource 
degradation and depletion (Daniere et al.,2002), more investment in common lands 
and water systems, and improved monitoring and enforcement (Koka and Prescott 
2002).  However, a growing number of political ecologists report that the role of 
social capital in CPR management is highly contentious (Bryant, 1992; Ribot, 1998; 
also see Collier and Gunning, 1999; Otsuka and Tachibana, 2001; Cramb, 2004; 
Durston, 1998). Sceptics argue that internal differences, tensions and stratifications 
are always present in both horizontal and vertical networks of users imposing serious 
collective action problems. Peet and Watts argue:  
‘These tensions occur not only at a given spatial scale, but also across geographic 
scales, and indeed resolving these tensions is important for building more robust 
users’ associations’ (1996 p.36). 
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While it is accepted that individuals connected by a close-knit network can provide 
impetus for economic dynamism and collective outcomes for its members, it also has 
the potential to dilute personal incentives to work hard. Social capital can lead to 
moral hazard and give rise to free riding where it provides a safety net that can 
penalise success and reward failure (Sobel, 2002). The individuals involved in the 
management of natural resources have different priorities over natural resources and 
capacity to benefit from them.  Therefore, their willingness to participate in collective 
action depends on those priorities and capacity. For example, a farmer with a 
primary employment in non-agricultural related sector, such as business or service, 
and with a secondary employment in agriculture sector, perhaps will be less 
enthusiastic to contribute towards collective action. Similarly, a poverty stricken 
farmer belonging to a dalit caste group might not be able to contribute much to the 
collective action as he/she has to take extra work as a wage labourer or a porter to 
supplement his/her income from farming. Also, individual willingness to engage in 
collective action depends on the expected pay off from collective actions and the 
activities of other individuals who are also participating in collective action. A lack of 
trustworthiness and inequitable resource distribution amongst users reduces the 
opportunity for collective action. Under such circumstances, the willingness to 
engage in collective action becomes increasingly difficult. Therefore, habit forming 
behaviours are unlikely to emerge in heterogeneous communities where diverse 
political and socio-economic interests prevail (Seabright, 1993).  Socio-economic 
heterogeneities are both causes and consequences of differential access to and 
command over natural resource bases (Kant, 1998).   
 
Some scholars argue that successful natural resource management can co-exist even 
with substantial inequity (Quiggin, 1993). In heterogeneous settings, privileged 
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members might derive more benefits from the CPR resource bases, albeit with the 
complete acknowledgement of other members.  Of course, there is bound to be some 
degree of heterogeneity in any society and it is quite difficult to find a completely 
homogenous community, not least in terms of socio-economic and power relations 
within the community. It is equally plausible that group differentiation entails 
unequal power distribution, which underpins the use of, and control over natural 
resources such as irrigation canals. Also, group heterogeneity does not guarantee 
collective action and sustainable use of CPR bases (Sobel, 2002). It is often the case 
that in any given community, significant group heterogeneities exist.  
 
Other rational choice theorists argue that while shared socio-cultural features might 
provide some empathy for collective action, this action, however, is guided by 
economic interests. Cleaver (2000) argues that an individual’s motivation for 
becoming involved in effective CPR management is dominated by economic 
motivation.  Users often evaluate costs and benefits associated with collective 
endeavours. If they are convinced that the likelihood of receiving benefits exceeds the 
costof being involved in CPR management, then they are more likely to be 
enthusiastic about undertaking collective action. The embeddedness of economic 
transactions in social life influence individual action and perception in managing 
local CPRs (Granovetter, 1992). Homogenous socio-cultural characteristics coupled 
with shared economic interests make collective action easier (Jodha, 1996; Kant and 
Cooke, 1999; Saxena, 2000). Conversely, the existence of group heterogeneity 
amongst users imposes enormous challenges for collective action. It is argued that 
diverse socio-economic interests and different perceptions regarding CPRs might 
lead to recurring disputes amongst users and create factions (Fresson, 1979). While 
the constraints imposed by heterogeneity are acknowledged, there is considerable 
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disagreement as to what constitutes heterogeneity and the nature, trajectory and 
scale of its influence over natural resource governance remain highly inconclusive 
(Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). In fact, the role of heterogeneity in collective action 
continues to be a theoretical puzzle.  Although the main remit of this thesis does not 
concern the impact of heterogeneity in collective action, it does make a case for 
equity considerations in CPR management and for seeking opportunities for the 
most deprived and marginalised community members.   
 
2.6 Commons Dilemma in Irrigation Management 
 
Irrigation canals are managed through various institutional arrangements.  They are 
privately managed, communally managed, state managed and jointly managed. For 
the purpose of this research, a comparative analysis of a communally managed 
irrigation system (FMIS), an agency managed irrigation system (AMIS) and a jointly 
managed irrigation system (JMIS) have been considered. Irrigation water 
demonstrates inherent characteristics of common pool resources (CPRs).  There is 
rivalry and a non-exclusionary facet to its nature (see Table 2.1 for the nature of 
goods) and it is usually managed communally by a group of individuals (Ostrom and 
Gardner, 1993). The finite flow of water in an irrigation canal is accessed by multiple 
users and withdrawing water by an individual has implications upon the availability 
of water to other appropriators.  Although the WUAs can design and implement rules 
to exclude individuals who are not members from using the water, the costs of doing 
so can be substantially high, commonly called ‘transaction costs’ (Williamson, 1999).  
The costs associated with excluding certain individuals from water harvesting arises 
from many sources, including the cost of diverting water away from them, and the 
costs associated with designing and implementing monitoring mechanisms.  Also, 
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the non-stationary nature of the irrigation water and the demand placed on it in 
crucial times (for example, paddy transplanting) creates added complexities. Paddy 
transplantation takes place over a short period of two weeks (from the end of June to 
mid-July) when demand for water is extremely high. For paddy crops, the total 
growing season of an annual crop can be divided into four growth stages: (a) initial 
stage, from seed sowing to 10 percent ground cover; (b) the crop development stage, 
from 10 to 70 percent of ground cover; (c) the mid-season stage, which includes 
flowering and grain setting or yield formation and (d) the late season stage, including 
ripening and harvesting.  In general, the agronomists have identified that the late 
season stage in the growth of paddy is the least water sentitive while the mid-season 
stage is most sensitive to water shortages (Smith et al., 1996). The mid-stage season 
is characterised by the highest crop water needs; water shortage during this stage of 
paddy growth has a significant negative effect on the total crop yield. According to 
the guidelines issued by the FAO, the irrigation requirement in most part of the mid-
hills of Nepal is that a water layer of 100 mm should be established after the 
transplantion, and maintained throughout the growing season.  However, the water 
layer should be reduced to 20-50 mm during the latter part of the vegetative stage 
and brought back to 100 mm during the mid-season stage (Brouwer et al., 1989; 
Smith et al., 1991). In the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements to 
design and implement property rights, and monitoring mechanisms against fraud, 
many complex problems arise while managing local commons.  
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2.7 Property Rights and Power Influence in Irrigation Management 
As in any institutional arrangement, irrigation resource governance is inherently a 
political process and power relationships (both formal and informal) play a major 
role in both crafting rules and appropriating benefits. Any attempt to institutionally 
analyse irrigation governance should be viewed through the lens of power, process 
and practice and how these shape a farmer’s access, control and use of irrigation 
water. Robert Chambers posits: 
--a central and universal issue in the distribution of irrigation water is who get, 
what and where. This is the very stuff of politics and it is surprising that political 
scientists, political anthropologists and those who study political economy have not 
devoted more attention to it. Where water is scare and often constraining and when 
individual farmers and communities of farmers compete for it, the focus is on the 
processes of allocation and acquisition which determine the access of users to water    
(1977 p.345). 
 
In resource governance, as Hasler (1993) argues, mediation and expression of power 
hegemony are essentially reflections of contesting and negotiating interests amongst 
the stakeholders. Negotiations are games of give and take ingrained between and 
within various levels of society.  Asymmetrical information, insufficient knowledge, 
low participation along with unequal power distribution, results in inequitable 
benefit appropriation from the local commons. This spreads a wave of disincentives 
for collective action and degradation of the natural resource bases are inevitable 
(Perez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006).  However, the impact of power in CPRs 
management is very puzzling.   Baland and Platteau (1996) argue that greater control 
over production factors, including control over labour, information and knowledge, 
provides incentives to contribute more time and efforts in CPR management, with 
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beneficial effects for the entire community. However, in their subsequent studies, 
Baland and Platteau (1999) report that in pursuance of their private interests, 
powerful and influential members can and quite often do eschew adherence to rules, 
undermining collective action and sustainable use of resources (Perez-Cirera and 
Lovett, 2006).  Nepal provides a fertile ground for investigating the impact of 
informal power that emanates from socio-economic heterogeneity and the 
mechanisms through which different property rights regimes are designed and 
implemented in managing irrigation systems can combat the growing inequity in 
water distribution.  
 
Importantly, owing to unequal power distribution and differential access to and 
control over natural resources, the difference between resource-rich and resource-
poor households is widening in relation to land ownership, water resources and a 
lower rate of participation in resource governance (Vaniya and Taneja, 2004). 
Furthermore, higher transaction costs incurred in the management of resources have 
immense implications for the welfare of asset-poor households (Adhikari and Lovett, 
2005). 
 
The concept of livelihoods has gained an increased currency amongst both the 
development practitioners and academics in recent years (Ellis, 1998, Batterbury, 
2001; Chambers and Conway, 1992; also see Carney, 1998; Bernstein, 1992; Francis, 
2000, 2002; Radoki, 2002). The livelihoods approach to understanding the welfare 
of the rural population concerns the links between individual or household assets 
and the different ways in which households have access to mediating processes, 
including institutions and regulations to make use of the asset profile in their 
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disposition (Allison and Ellis, 2001).  The concept of livelihoods has been defined by 
Chambers and Conway (1992) as:  
“--- Livelihood comprise the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance if 
capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base---” (p.9) 
 
The livelihoods of many farmers depend on the success of their agricultural practices, 
which in turn depends on the quality of the irrigation service. The success or failure 
of irrigation systems in meeting their objectives has a direct and immediate impact 
on the farmers’ livelihoods. The welfare of many farmers depends on the success of 
irrigation systems, as its consequences are directly felt by the farmers in economic 
terms: poor irrigation service to his/her field plots results in reduced agricultural 
production and reduced income, and perhaps financial hardship and poverty.  
 
This thesis uses the notion of livelihoods as defined by Chambers and Conway (1992) 
and argues that if policy interventions aimed at improving the livelihoods of rural 
poor widen the gap and maintain a rift (in terms of social, economic and power 
differentiation) between rich and poor households, the urgency for critical 
examination of power relations and sound understanding of differentiation is 
essential, while formulating policy interventions to support rural livelihoods and 
sustainable use of natural resources is necessary.  
 
 
 
 
66 
 
2.8 Interactive Domains in Irrigation Governance 
 
In the previous sections in Chapter Two, we have reviewed the notion of property 
rights and their application in irrigation management. This section of the thesis 
proposes a model for access to water under different property rights regimes, 
focusing on different domains that the literature suggests have interactive effects on 
irrigation governance. In order to construct the theoretical model, this thesis 
combines the IAD framework presented in Chapter One (Section 1.10) and a model 
proposed by Chambers (1988) (with certain modifications to suit this research) to 
illustrate the nature of interactions taking place across the various domains.  It is 
argued that irrigation governance encompasses complex interactions in different 
domains, including physical, human, socio-political and economic, presented in 
Figure 2.1 below. 
 
The model presented in Figure 2.1 illustrates the different domains in irrigation 
management. Firstly, the physical domain includes canal infrastructure both at the 
main and branch levels of the canal. At the main canal level, the physical domain 
includes weirs, diversion dams, canal, gates, and water sources while the physical 
domain at the branch canal level includes water courses, fields, crops, field channels 
and so forth. Secondly, the bio-economic domain includes biological factor such as 
crops and economic factors such as input and O & M costs, production of CPRs, and 
the consumption and sale of the product derived from the CPRs. Thirdly, the model 
captures a human domain, which includes all interactions amongst individuals 
involved in the irrigation system both at a farming household level as well as the 
irrigation bureaucracy.  Fourthly, irrigation management consists of a socio-political 
domain, which encompasses interactions amongst individuals and occurs in their 
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social and operational structures, their interests, conventions and conflicts and 
resolutions.  
 
The viability of irrigation projects are assessed primarily on the basis of their impact 
on the livelihoods of the beneficiary farmers. Although performance is taken as a 
yardstick for measuring the success of irrigation policies, performance based on an 
economic efficiency criterion alone does not necessarily represent the best and most 
accurate measurement of policy success (Wade and Seckler, 1990). While studies in 
the early 1990s have shown some useful insights into elucidating and measuring 
irrigation performance (Small and Svendsen, 1992; Svendsen and Small, 1990), little 
work has been done on measuring the access level of the farmers in the irrigation 
systems, especially in the context of property rights regimes. 
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Figure 2.1 Interactive Model of Irrigation Management 
 
 
Source: Adopted with modifications from Chambers (1988) 
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In order to measure the performance of irrigation systems against set criteria, 
researchers have developed different indicators. The literature on irrigation 
performance indicators demonstrates common performance criteria, such as 
adequacy, efficiency, timeliness and equity (Molden and Gates, 1990; Bird and 
Gillott, 1992; Rao, 1993 also see Oad and Levine, 1985; Oad and Podmore, 1989). 
These indicators can be related to financial, economical, management and water 
delivery objectives, depending on the nature of the study (Tongongar et al., 2008). 
The adequacy of water delivery in the canal system is defined as its ability to deliver 
the targeted quantity of water to the command areas (Molden and Gates, 1990), and 
is taken as a percentage ratio of the volume of water actually delivered to the 
volume of water targeted to be delivered. However, Clemmens and Bos (1990) 
consider adequacy of irrigation water as the percentage ratio of the volume of water 
available to the farmers to the volume of water they require for crop production. 
This indicates the relative amount of extra water the irrigation system needs to 
deliver for crop cultivation. Ideally, irrigation systems are trying to achieve this 
ratio as close to one as possible. If the ratio of the volume of water available to the 
farmers to the volume of water they require for crop production is between .89 and 
1, then it is considered to be a good performance.  Similarly, if the ratio is between 
.80 and .89, it is considered to be a fair performance of the irrigation system.  
However, if a ratio is less than .80, it indicates a poor performance of the irrigation 
canal (Molden and Gates, 1990). Data on the volume of water available to farmers 
can be obtained from the discharge rates, while the amount they require can be 
obtained from agronomic data, such as crop-water requirements and conveyance 
losses from seepage and evaporation.   
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Similarly, efficient use of water use is considered an important agronomic indicator 
of irrigation performance, particularly in areas with a limited water supply (Sinclair 
et al., 1984; Howell, 2001). The efficiency of irrigation systems is measured as a 
percentage ratio of the required or targeted amount of water to the volume of water 
actually delivered. Efficiency indicators have two components: (a) water 
conveyance efficiency; and (b) water application efficiency (Majumdar, 2004). The 
conveyance efficiency is used to evaluate the efficiency of an irrigation system in 
carrying water to its destination, and measures the efficiency of the channels 
conveying water from the source to the field plots. The conveyance ratio is defined 
as the percentage ratio of the amount of water delivered to the fields to the amount 
of water diverted from the source. However, water application efficiency refers to 
the efficiency of water application to the field and measures how effectively the 
water is actually used by the farmers. It is defined as a percentage ratio of water 
stored in the crop root zone to the amount of water delivered to the fields (Rogers et 
al., 1997). Other researchers, such as Bos (1979) and Tongongar et al.  (2008) 
define the efficiency of irrigation systems as the percentage ratio of volume of water 
required for crop production to the volume of water available to the farmers for 
crop production. If the value of this ratio is more than 0.84, the system’s 
performance is considered very efficient, while values between 0.7 and 0.84 and 
less than 0.7 are considered fairly efficient and inefficient respectively (Tongongar 
et al., 2008 p.272).  
 
Studies on the performance of irrigation systems argue that the reliability of a water 
supply is an important dimension in the performance measurement (Murrey-Rust 
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and Snellen, 1993; Renault and Vehmeyer, 1999; Makadho, 1996; Oad and 
Sampath, 1995; Renault, 1999). The notion of reliability of a water supply is the 
degree to which water delivery conforms to the prior expectations of the users. It 
measures the predictability of the water supply from the canal system over time and 
spatial scale, assessing whether farmers receive the amount of water and at the time 
that they have been promised. The reliability dimension is particularly significant in 
areas where a water delivery service is well defined and agreed upon between the 
users and the WUA as the farmers’ expectations would be the same as those agreed 
(Renault and Wahaj, 2003). 
 
Similarly, equitable water distribution is also considered an important aspect of 
irrigation management. Equity is associated with fairness in distribution of 
resources as agreed by the members of the irrigation community. The notion of 
equity reflects the way in which the water resource is spatially distributed. It is 
defined as the spatial uniformity of the ratio of water delivered to the amount of 
water targeted (Majumdar, 2004), measuring variations in the relative water 
delivery from one location to another. It is suggested that good performance of an 
irrigation system in terms of its ability to distribute water equitably is indicated by a 
value of a ratio is 0 and 0.1, while a value greater than 0.25 shows poor 
performance (Sampath, 1990; Bird and Gillott, 1992). However, the current 
measures of equity only consider spatial variations in the distribution of water, and 
fail to consider how the water is distributed across different users.  
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Performance measurement has been a recurring agenda item in irrigation 
management and consequently a considerable amount of work has been 
undertaken in recent decades (Gorantiwar and Smout, 2005; Bastiaanssen and Bos, 
1999, also see Appendix 1).  For Lenton (1986), irrigation performance is the 
system’s ability to achieve the established objectives.   Likewise, Charles Abernethy 
describes irrigation performance as ‘its measured levels of achievement in terms of 
one, or several, parameters which are chosen as indicators of the system’s goals’ 
(1989 p.4).  For Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993), performance measurement is the 
process of assessing the ‘degree to which an organisation’s products and services 
respond to the needs of their customers or users, and the efficiency with which the 
organisation uses the resources at its disposal’’ (cited in Gorantiwar and Smout, 
2005 p.3). 
 
A number of common themes emerged from the literature, focusing on the 
performance of irrigation systems, which can be summarised as:  (a) adequacy of 
the water supply in meeting crop growth in a given season; (b) timeliness of water 
delivery matching the crop growth stage and the expectations of the farmers;(c) 
fairness in water distribution amongst multiple water users (Abernethy, 1986; 
Chambers, 1988; also see Molden and Gates, 1990; Goldsmith and Makin, 1991).  
However, these irrigation performance indicators tend to be generated by engineers 
and agronomists and have an explicit technical focus. Apart from being overtly 
technical (which can make the indicators difficult for farmers to understand), 
farmers are denied the opportunity to assess the performance of their own 
irrigation systems.  Also, good performance against these technical measures does 
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not necessarily mean that farmers are satisfied with the level of service.  The 
technical nature of the measures imposed on the farmers may also lead to 
resentment towards technical experts, increasing farmers’ dissatisfaction and in 
turn limiting their participation in irrigation management (Lam, 1998).  To 
measure and corroborate the conceptualisation of access, the thesis uses three 
dimensions of access, namely reliability, adequacy and equity, which are described 
in detail below. 
 
2.9 Conceptualising Access: Objectivity and Subjectivity 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear, that access to and control over natural resource 
bases helps to sustain livelihoods in the developing world. It is also clear from 
reviews in Chapter One (Section 1.7) and Chapter Two (Section 2.8) that there is a 
dearth of literature directly examining the performance of irrigation systems and 
access to irrigation water from the farmers’ perspectives (Svendsen and Small, 
1990). Although some ‘subjective’ studies have been carried out in the past which 
discuss the objectives and the management of irrigation development (Bottrall, 
1981; Lethem and Ng, 1983; Levine and Coward, 1986), almost all of them assume 
the perspectives of the irrigation managers, with total disregard for the farmers who 
use the irrigation resources. However, one exception is an influential report by 
Douglas Vermillion on an Indonesian irrigation system which considers the 
perspectives of the local farmers in measuring irrigation performance (Vermillion, 
1989). The study considered the changes in the design principles that farmers made 
in their irrigation systems, which helped to enhance their level of access to 
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irrigation water. The study by Vermillion (1989) identified several of the farmers’ 
basic design criteria, including water rights and equity, some of which have 
implications for the performance of irrigation systems. Access to the resource is 
closely related to property rights, as MacPherson posits: “a right in the sense of an 
enforceable claim to some use or benefits of something” (1978 p.3). However, 
access is a much broader concept than rights, as it is associated with the ability or 
capacity of an individual or group to claim benefits from the resources (Ribot, 
1998).  Having access to irrigation is not just about having rights to water from the 
canal system. Firstly, demand for water depends on the type of crop, type of soil, 
temperature and crop growing season, amongst other factors. The necessity for 
water depends on the season, as some seasons have more water from the Monsoon 
than others. Crops require a timely and adequate water supply to give maximum 
yield to the farmers.  Thus, a reliable source of water, capable of delivering a timely 
and adequate supply, is crucial for crop cultivation. Also, access needs to be 
equitable, as inequitable water distribution creates waves of disincentives for the 
management of irrigation canal infrastructures (Perez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006; 
Hardin, 1968).  
 
Although flow measurement has become the standard criterion for assessing 
irrigation performance, in rural settings flow measurements are often not properly 
accorded (Rao, 1993; Lankford, 1998; Horst, 1999 also see Palmer et al., 1991; Faci 
et al., 2000). Also, there are problems with measuring and monitoring of irrigation 
schedules (Goussard, 1996; Horst, 1996).  Even if the data on flow measurements 
are available, the quality of the data cannot be guaranteed, particularly at the 
75 
 
secondary and tertiary field channel levels.  Reasons for this include:  lack of data 
on water delivery; equipment malfunction; lack of desired equipment; and a lack of 
motivation on the part of staff to collect such data (Murray-Rust and Snellen, 1993).   
Furthermore, in the process of measuring access to water, some researchers use 
only one indicator, such as the number of hours spent in irrigating per week, whilst 
others choose several dimensions and combine them to form a composite index of 
access without explaining the rationale behind the variables considered (Lam, 
1998). Whilst the use of a single indicator lacks comprehensiveness, an arbitrary 
choice of multiple dimensions as a measure of access suffers from methodological 
flaws such as omission of important dimensions, combination of irrelevant 
variables, inadequate representation of users’ perspectives and excessive use of 
assumptions (Goussard, 1996; Horst, 1996). Both the above mentioned approaches 
pose serious concerns for the validity and reliability of not only indicators, but also 
of subsequent findings (Schmid and Klimoski, 1991).  
 
In response to the dearth of literature on farmers’ perception about the 
performance of irrigation systems, this thesis has taken a broader approach to 
access is adopted in this research.  This thesis argues that any effort to evaluate the 
performance of irrigation systems should be based on a set of criteria set forth by 
the farmers who are using the irrigation system, rather than the irrigation managers 
and engineers, who do not necessarily appreciate the needs of the local farmers 
(Chambers, 1988 p.30).   Shivakoti (1991) concurs with Seven and Small (1990) in 
outlining the usefulness of farmers’ perceptions in evaluating the performance of 
irrigation systems. He argues that irrigation managers can better understand and 
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accommodate farmers’ behaviours and attitudes towards their irrigation canals 
when they understand their perceptions about the irrigation canals (Shivakoti, 1991 
p.18).   
 
Since the farmers who use the irrigation system for water are the consumers of the 
irrigation services and the producers of the agricultural output which the irrigation 
systems aim to achieve, the performance of irrigation systems should be measured 
and evaluated on the basis of farmers’ experience. As Chambers (1988) argues “a 
good irrigation system, for a farmer, is the delivery to his or her farm, of an 
adequate, convenient, predictable and timely water supply for their preferred 
farming practices” (p.31). Therefore, the use of farmers’ perceptions for measuring 
the performance of irrigation systems is critical. 
 
As described above, access is traditionally defined by distinct but related 
components - reliability, adequacy and equity and this thesis also adopts these 
measures to assess the household level of access to irrigation water. The following 
section presents a detailed treatment of the issue.  
 
   2.9.1 Reliability 
 
Whilst the measurement of reliability, particularly its objective measurement, was 
briefly introduced earlier in this Chapter in Section 2.8, this section describes the 
notion of reliability used in the context of this thesis in detail. Conceptually, 
reliability is understood as the ability of the irrigation system to deliver a water 
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supply as scheduled to meet the crops demand and produce optimal plant growth.  
Reliability is defined as the ratio of the amount of water actually supplied in the 
field plots to the water required or the scheduled supply. In this sense, reliability is 
a function of the predictability of water supply, i.e. the timeliness of the water 
supply in the canal (Makadho, 1996).  It measures the confidence in the irrigation 
system to deliver water from the source to the field plots, where it is ultimately 
utilised for crop production.  On the one hand, a reliable water supply minimises 
the risk of crop failure and on the other, it helps to design proper schedules of 
farming operations in order to achieve optimum crop production. A reliable water 
supply is critical not just for crop production, but also for enhancing users’ 
participation in irrigation management and irrigation related activities, including 
the O & M activities. The level of collective action on the part of the irrigators 
depends on the expected pay-off from the resource base; hence, the collective action 
decreases with unreliability in the water supply and often leads to hostility towards 
the entire irrigation project because the water supply in the canal is not only 
unpredictable but also scarce (Howarth, et al., 2007; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
   2.9.2 Adequacy 
Previous studies on irrigation performance have identified the adequacy of the 
water supply as one of the important measures of performance of irrigation systems 
(Van der Meer, 1971; Molden and Gates, 1990; Bird and Gillott, 1992 and Rao, 
1993). In particular Van der Meer (1971), in his studies of Taiwanese rice irrigation 
argues that the adequacy of a canal irrigation system can be assessed by using 
farmers’ perceptions: “farmers stole water because they could not get as much as 
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they needed and wanted at convenient times --- [or] because they believed their 
fields had not received their due according to the water rights customs” (cited in 
Svendsen and Small, 1990 p.393). Adequacy measures the deviation of actual water 
supply from required water supply measured by the crop’s water requirements 
(Makombe et al., 1998). Measured as the ratio of the amount of water actually 
supplied in the field plots to the water required for crop growth, adequacy assesses 
how well the irrigation service requirements are met both in time and space by the 
irrigation scheme. The adequacy measures take account of a variety of users’ 
farming needs including farming operations and land preparations (Oad and 
Sampath, 1995). It is important to acknowledge that irrigation systems may have a 
reliable water supply, but may not have an adequate supply, and vice versa. 
Farmers might prefer reliability to adequacy in water supply because with 
adjustments in the amount of land cultivated, farmers can avoid crop failure 
through a reliable supply of water. 
 
2.9.3 Equity 
Equity concerns fairness in water distribution. It measures the access to a fair share 
of the water resources according to the amount specified by water rights (i.e. actual 
water supply to users in relation to their allocated water share).  Equity is difficult 
to measure, not only because it is a subjective concept but also because of wide 
variation in water rights systems.  A farmer’s water share depends on water 
allocation rules set forth by the WUA concerned. Four bases for assignment of 
water rights are commonly discussed in the literature. These are: (i) Equal division: 
all households that are members of the irrigation group receive equal water share 
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for example, the Balinese subak. (ii) Proportional to land-holding size: households 
receive a water share proportional to the size of their land-holding, for example, the 
Nepalese Raj Kulo (Yoder, 1994). (iii) Crop water requirements: water shares differ 
according to the water requirements of the different crops grown, for example, the 
Spanish heurta (Maass and Anderson, 1978; Carruthers and Clark, 1981).  (iv) 
Water markets: finally, water shares are fully or partially disassociated from these 
underlying bases if a market exists in water shares, for example the Sri Lankan 
pangu (Leach, 1980). It is important that equity is not confused with equality. 
Equality refers to conditions where all farmers are equal in the face of either 
abundance or shortage of water, regardless of landholding size (small/big), location 
(head/tail), and castes (the dalits/higher castes).  
 
2.10 Factors Influencing Farmers’ Level of Access to Water   
This section of the thesis describes the factors identified in the literature that are 
likely to influence the farmers’ levels of access to irrigation water. These are 
identified and described based on the literature as well as in the Nepalese context.  
The literature suggests that complex social, organisational, legal, technical, socio-
political and cultural interactions influence farmers’ levels of access to irrigation 
resources. Given the nature of the resource base, irrigation water in this case, a 
multidimensional approach is used to investigate farmers’ levels of access to 
irrigation water. This thesis incorporates both user characteristics and resource 
characteristics into the model to understand the impact of different variables on 
access levels. Dimensions such as seasons, space (location), terrain and technology, 
socio-economic status, power relationships, political links, agronomical knowledge 
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(crop-water requirement), participation, simplicity of governing rules and enforcing 
mechanisms are all considered.  As discussed earlier in the thesis (Section 2.5), the 
variables described below represent different types of heterogeneities existing in 
rural Nepal which this thesis assumes to have implications on the households’ 
ability to access water from the canal systems in rural Nepal.   
   
 2.10.1 Caste and Social Stratifications 
 
Social stratification continues to be one of the most prominent features of social 
structures in many developing countries. In a broader sense, social stratification is 
conceived as the horizontal division of society into higher and lower social units 
(Murray, 1950). Stratification denotes differentiation of a given population into 
hierarchically superimposed classes. In the process of stratification, the dominant 
or hegemonic group allocated social position to individuals or groups depending on 
the superiority or inferiority of occupation that they undertake (Gisbert, 1973).  In 
due course, the very social stratification became the essence of unequal distribution 
of rights, privileges, power, duties, responsibilities and other social values (Bhusan 
and Sachdeva, 2003). 
 
Of many forms of social stratifications, the caste system presents the most complex, 
socially ingrained and religiously indoctrinated and orthodoxy differentiation of 
individuals into higher and lower social units, where occupation of a clan is treated 
as superior, equal or inferior, relative to one another, in socially important respects. 
The Hindu caste system is often conceived as a ‘status system’ based in a 
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segmentary social structure at the lineage level and below, and fissile in a different 
way at the level of endogamous and commensal groups (Stevenson, 1954 p.23).  
Based on Hindu mythology, there are two kinds of status – secular and ritual, which 
are derived from different sources and socially manifested in different ways.  The 
secular status of individuals within the groups, or sometimes the groups themselves 
are variables which are determined by such factors as occupation, skills, education, 
wealth, landholdings, and marriage outcomes. However, in contradiction to the 
secular status, the ritual status is derived from the relationships of individuals 
within a group or between groups, particularly with respect to a pattern of 
interactions based in myth, which themselves are assumptions based on purity and 
impurity, which scholars have dubbed ‘Hindu Pollution Concept’ (HPC) (Douglas, 
2002). There are secular as well as religious interpretations of the idea that human 
life is sacred, based on religious scripts particularly the Rig Vedas which divides the 
Hindus into two dichotomous groups i.e. good sacredness and bad sacredness 
(Shrinivas, 1952; Milner, 1994).  
 
The Nepalese society is divided into four mutually exclusive, exhaustive, 
endogamous, and hereditary and occupation specific Vernas (castes).  These are 
Brahmin, Chhetria, Baisya and Sudra.  However, some literature suggests that, in 
the beginning, only three castes existed, namely Brahmins, Chhetria, and Baisyas.  
Similarly, India was reported to have four castes in the beginning but later added 
another caste called ati-sudra (Deshpandey, 2000). The allocation of castes was 
based on the special assignments with which the clans or families were entrusted. 
The principle responsibility of the Brahmins was to act as Guru (teachers, purohit, 
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pandits or priests) whose primary job was to perform religious functions. The 
Brahmins were considered religiously superior and possessed numerical supremacy 
over other castes and were ranked in the highest position in the caste hierarchy 
(Regmi, 1988). The main responsibility of the Chhetria was that of warrior and they 
were involved in governing and providing security to the state in the face of 
invasion. Thus even in the modern Hindu societies, the rulers (kings) are from the 
Chhetria caste. Interestingly, almost all of the national heroes of Nepal are from 
Chhetria castes.  These have received the highest honours for military gallantry.  
Many Chhetria men are employed in the Nepalese, Indian and British armies. In 
the British army, they are popularly known as the Gurkhas.  The responsibilities 
assigned to the Baisyas were of a commercial nature and they were involved in 
commercial activities of management and supply of food and other necessary goods 
to the palaces, civil servants, military men and other people (Poudel, 2000).  The 
Sudras were assigned menial tasks such as tailoring, cobbling (working with 
leather) and as smiths (working with iron or ornaments). Since the Sudras 
undertook menial work they were ranked in the lowest position in the castes 
hierarchy. The Sudras are also called the occupational caste groups i.e. the dalits or 
untouchables.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the principle upon which the entire caste system is based is 
the logic of religious purity and pollution (Hutton, 1946; Srinivas, 1952) and the 
tasks assigned to the dalits (Sudras) are considered to be ritually polluting to merit 
inclusion within the traditional Verna system and continue to face social exclusion.  
Although Nepal has committed to various international, legal and constitutional 
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treaties, social discriminations are still evident in many sectors of the Nepalese 
society. Numerous studies in the past have shown that discriminations are 
extensive in the fields of caste, ethnicity and gender throughout numerous locations 
in Nepal (Dahal et al., 2003; Bhattachan et al., 2002; Subba et al., 2002; FWLD, 
2000).  
  
An important feature of the caste system is that the dalits are considered to be 
‘untouchable’ and they face a multitude of disadvantages in land endowment, socio-
economic marginalisation, political participation and employment opportunities 
(Lawati, 2005). This practice systematically excludes the dalits from access to 
markets, particularly in dairy products. Pervasive landlessness amongst the dalits 
has meant that they have limited access to credit from local micro-finance schemes 
and banks, which are absolutely vital for initiating extra-farming activities 
including purchasing fertilisers and the credit needed for repairing sub-canals 
leading to their plots. 
 
Also, the dalits are mostly sukumbasi (landless) or land-poor if they have any land, 
and live in the rural areas known as khorias (unproductive and rainfed areas) and 
public land. Understandably, this sector of the population represents a significant 
proportion of the population in poverty (NPC, 2002).  Although efforts to alleviate 
poverty and to maintain the sustainable use of natural resources (irrigation in this 
case) through the involvement of local communities have demonstrated some 
success, the dalits and indigenous communities continue to face challenges, 
particularly because of landlessness and land poorness. The benefits from irrigation 
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development accrue to landlords and land rich households, which are usually, but 
not always, from higher caste groups, while associated negative externalities are 
born by mostly landless and land-poor households. The problems of externality 
have come to greater prominence in recent years, particularly because of the 
concern about the link between the economy and the environment. Externality is 
defined as a third party or spill-over effect both intended and unintended, arising 
from the economic activities (production and/or consumption) of goods and 
services by individuals or firms on other individuals or firms for which no 
appropriate compensation is paid (Begg et al., 2008). The problems of externality 
occur when the private costs or benefits to the producer or purchasers of goods and 
services are different from the total social costs or benefits incurred in the process 
of the production of goods or services (Coase, 1960). Externality can be both 
positive and negative. For example, loss of livestock to the canal and the effects of 
damp in houses and the surrounding area are commonly reported by the dalit 
households who are not necessarily benefiting from the canal. Furthermore, the 
opportunity costs associated with engagement in irrigational maintenance tasks are 
higher amongst landless and land poor people (Upasena and Abeygunawardena, 
2009; Ray, 2002; Gonzalez-Alvarez et al., 2006). For example, farmers with small 
amounts of land contribute towards cleaning the canal, but the benefits they obtain 
would be less compared to the amount of money they would earn if they undertook 
waged labour elsewhere. Aggregation of all these factors has meant that the social 
equity aspects of irrigation development are seriously questionable.  
 
 
85 
 
   2.10.2 Size of the Landholding 
In many agrarian societies, landholding is considered to be a vital asset for 
generating income and employment. In Nepal, the amount of land held also reflects 
the economic and socio-political status of the households in the community. The 
customary practice is that households with larger landholdings are respected, 
feared and often act as judiciary arbitrators in village settings. The rural areas of 
Nepal host almost 90 percent of the country’s total population, where the quality 
and size of landholdings remains a crucial determinant of both status and power 
(Karki, 2002). Both the quality and quantity of landholding is considered critical for 
rural households to sustain livelihoods and a secure food supply. Nepal 
demonstrates a highly skewed land distribution.  Evidence suggests that households 
with large landholdings have a higher amount of better quality Khet land which is 
productive and accessible to irrigation facilities, compared to the households with 
small landholdings (Seddon and Hussein, 2002). Land distribution also exhibits 
considerable gender differences, with households headed by men having almost 
double the landholdings of female-headed households.  Equally important, a 
noticeably skewed distribution of landholdings can be observed among groups from 
different castes, as the landholders from higher castes have more than double the 
amount of khet and pakho lands (not irrigable) compared to farmers from dalit  
communities (Goyal et al.,2005).   
 
It is well established that the incidence of poverty in Nepal is much higher amongst 
the landless and marginal farmers than amongst those with medium and larger 
landholdings (NPC, 2004; Karki and Seddon, 2003). This thesis uses the 
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internationally accepted definition of poverty, which is 1.25 US dollar at 2005 
purchasing-power parity (PPP) used by major international organisations such as 
the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Ravallion et al., 2009). The incidence of poverty amongst households with less 
than one hectare of land is about fifty percent (ibid) and this section of the 
population comprises more than two-thirds of the rural households in Nepal. The 
prevalence of higher incidences of poverty amongst the marginal farmers is 
attributed to lower access to agricultural inputs, including irrigation water, 
chemical fertilisers, high yielding varieties and credit arrangements.  In Nepal, the 
rural households with large landholdings dominate the local power structures and 
influence government policies and programmes at the local as well as central level. 
These traditional elites who have control of large landholdings have maintained 
their dominance in society, legitimising their influence through the institutions in 
rural parts of Nepal (Brown and Kennedy, 2005).  
 
This thesis assumes that the large landholders have more participation in irrigation 
governance, particularly in the AMIS and have better access to and appropriate 
more benefits from the irrigation canal. However, in development discourse 
participation has been an over-used and under-specified concept and its 
conceptualisation in the context of this thesis is important to bring “clarity through 
specificity” (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980 p.2). Literature on participatory development 
has formulated different models of participation depending on the degree of 
engagement in the management of natural resources and the capacity in which 
those engagements take place (Lilja and Ashby, 1999). The typology of participation 
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is based on the assumption that differences in who makes the decisions will result 
in differences in what decisions are made. Although relatively old, Arnstein’s (1969) 
“ladder of participation” has a contemporary relevance not least in the context of 
this thesis. The ladder of participation classifies the nature of participation into 
three categories; namely, citizen power, tokenism and non-participation. The 
citizen power remains at the top of the ladder in which the user group is 
empowered as they either take full control of development interventions or work in 
partnership with the external agency. Tokenism on the other hand represents 
situations where the users are only involved in consultation or are merely informed 
about the decisions taken by the external agencies involved in development 
interventions (World Bank, 1996b). Tokenism is characterised by “functional 
participation” (Rudqvist and Woodford-Berger, 1996) or passive participation, 
which is designed to meet project objectives at reduced costs. As such, tokenism 
represents situations in which the users do not have decision power and fall victim 
to the manipulation of the external agencies. The non-participation remains at the 
bottom of the participation ladder in which the users are mere passive recipients of 
the development interventions.   
 
Similarly, Jules Pretty (1995) proposes a five tier model of participation based on 
the capacity in which the users participate in development interventions.  Firstly, 
manipulative participation in which participation takes place in the form of 
representation through unelected board members with no real power for the local 
users.  Secondly, passive participation which represents situation in which the users 
are informed of the decision already made without any consultation. Thirdly, 
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participation by consultation involves a process where the external agencies define 
problems, gather information on project impacts and control analysis, whilst the 
users are only consulted by the external agencies and there is no mandatory 
obligation to take users views in consideration during interventions.  Fourthly, the 
users are asked to take part in the project interventions so that the external 
agencies reduce project costs and meet project objectives which are pre-determined 
- a functional participation. Fifthly, participation can take place in a dynamic and 
interactive fashion in which the users in all aspects of development interventions; 
including problem identification, development of action plans and decision making. 
Sixthly, participation can also take place in the form of self- mobilisation in which 
the users participate by taking local initiatives independently and are involved in all 
stages of development interventions.  
 
    2.10.3 Location of landholding 
 
Irrigation water demonstrates the inherent characteristics of a CPR, i.e. its 
competitive and non-exclusionary nature (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993) and it is 
usually managed by groups of individuals communally.  At any time, there is a finite 
flow of water in the canal system, which is being accessed by multiple users.  
Withdrawal of water from an irrigation canal means that there is less water for 
others to use. Once an irrigation system is in operation, it is very difficult to exclude 
users from its benefits, particularly when property rights are not well defined.  Also, 
the non-stationary nature of irrigation water and its demand at crucial times (for 
example, transplanting) poses added complexities. The heterogeneity in the spatial 
distribution of resource units gives rise to assignment problems (Ostrom et al., 
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1994 p.11). The heterogeneous distribution of resources are characterised by a 
‘patchy’ environment in which the patches may have significantly different levels of 
resource availability. For example, in common fisheries some locations ‘hot-spots’ 
have higher stocks while the ‘cold spots’ have very little stocks (McGoodwin, 1995).  
Similarly, the spatial distribution of water in the canal system demonstrates 
assignment problems, as the households with landholdings adjacent to the 
irrigation canal have direct access to water while the landholdings towards the tail 
end of the canal have indirect access. The farmers with landholdings at the head 
end of the canal naturally have locational advantages over the farmers with 
landholdings at the tail end of the canal. The spatial location of the landholding is 
assumed to have influence on the household access to irrigation water. Even the 
position in which the outlet is constructed in a plot will determine which 
landholdings will get the water next. 
 
The natural locational advantage enjoyed by the farmers at the head end of the 
canal not only has differential economic outcomes but also has implications for 
collective outcomes, due to different levels of incentives among head and tail end 
farmers (Bardhan 1984; Ostrom, 1994; Johnson and Libecap, 1982). In the absence 
of appropriate institutional arrangements to design and implement property rights, 
and monitoring mechanisms for controlling fraud, many complex problems arise 
while managing local commons including irrigation systems.  
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2.10.4 Gender 
A considerable body of feminist literature argues that there is a natural and 
essential connection between gender and nature, giving women an innate 
understanding of ecosystems and environmental protection (Diamond and 
Orenstein, 1990; Shiva, 1988; also see Mackenzie, 1995; Rocheleau et al.,1996; 
Schroeder and Suryanata, 1996). Others argue that it is the material practices that 
bring women closer to nature and which give them learned and practical knowledge 
of ecosystems (Agarwal, 1992; Warren, 1987).  Many political ecologists have 
embraced a historical-materialist argument and focused on gender as one 
relationship through which access to and control over the distribution of natural 
resources is differentiated within societies (Carney, 1994; Fortmann, 1996; 
Freidberg, 2001; Gururani, 2002).   
 
This thesis assumes that the WUA is often dominated by elites and traditional 
decision makers, which mostly include male members of the community.  Women 
are often not included in the WUA committees which influence irrigation 
management decisions (Van Koppen, 2002).  However, in many developing 
countries, including Nepal, a significant proportion of women engage in agricultural 
production and irrigation but are subordinated to males who control the production 
process and its outcomes (Safiliou, 1988). A study from South Asia reports that 
households with females as heads are often poorer than those with males and 
similar results were found in male-dominated irrigation systems studied in 
Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka (Hussain, 2005).  
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The Nepalese society is characterised by the dominance of the male not only in 
decision- making outside the household but also in household decision- making. 
The household heads who are usually male hold land disposal rights, control 
household income/expenditure and make decisions on behalf of the family 
members (Adhikari, 2003). The male members of the household also take part in 
meetings and village level discussions of public interest. Hence, male heads of 
households are more likely to be aware of and have knowledge about irrigation 
issues. The males are also the individuals who make the decisions on behalf of all 
family members and decide on the livelihood activities in the family (Thapa, 2009). 
Thus their decisions have major implications for the welfare of the entire family.  
Since the Nepalese society is male dominated, access to and control over productive 
resources such as land is dominated by males with no decision making powers 
accorded to women.  The lack of decision making power provided to women has 
meant that their ability to influence policy making in irrigation governance is 
severely constrained and leads to a lower level of access to irrigation water 
(Valentine, 2007; Zwarteveen; 1997). 
 
   2.10.5 Human Capital: Agronomical Knowledge of the Local Farmers 
Research shows that human capital such as farmers’ agronomical knowledge has 
implications for the way in which irrigation water is used and the issue warrants 
some discussion, since it has implications for sustained head-tail inequalities in 
irrigation water (Samakande, 2002; Chambers, 1988).  Although the government 
and donor agencies have made significant contributions in the construction and 
rehabilitation of many irrigation systems in Nepal, virtually no efforts have been 
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made to educate farmers on the issue of on-farm water management.  The high 
level of importance attached to the ‘hardware’ side of the irrigation management 
has overlooked the much needed ‘software’ side (Shivakoti and Bastakoti, 2006). 
The level of investment in irrigation infrastructure has not been supplemented by 
social initiatives from the WUAs to educate farmers and raise social awareness of 
the importance of scientific ways of using the water from the canals.  
 
 The lack of such training and awareness amongst the farmers about on-farm water 
management has meant that they are unable to design practical solutions to the 
problems of excessive water utilisation for agricultural purposes, which add to the 
already existing problems associated with water scarcity (Wolff and Stein, 2003; 
Abu-Zeid, 1979). The farmers also lack knowledge as to the amount of water 
required by particular types of crops and the frequency with which the crops need 
to be irrigated. The lack of proper management and planning by the WUA and the 
lack of awareness amongst farmers about the scientific procedures in using 
irrigation water have implications for water availability and water distribution 
(Wolff and Stein, 1999). 
 
In rural farming communities, farmers commonly believe that changing water used 
for paddy irrigation leads to the production of better grain. Farmers at the head end 
often replace paddy plots with fresh water for a better quality harvest, being 
unaware of the salinity problems associated with excess irrigation. Water logging 
and salinity are two problems related to the productivity of land that often occur 
together. Previous studies have shown that salinity costs the world’s farmers US$11 
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billion per year in lost income (Postel, 1999). The positive influence of farmers’ 
agronomical knowledge and their reported level of access to water have huge 
implications for policy circles. Similarly serious implications follow for irrigation 
governance and ensuring equitable access to water as farmers are often following 
unscientific water appropriation practices based on blind faith. For example, the 
water replacement for paddy at the head end area with total disregard to the water 
shortage at the tail end could be avoided by educating the farmers. It is well 
recognised that increasing the knowledge of society and consumers is effective in 
agricultural water management (Pereira et al., 2002). Also, access to information 
such as crop water requirement has an equity dimension as some members of the 
community are in a better position to know about such issues than the others. For 
example, educated farmers can read leaflets produced by the agencies managing 
irrigation systems, whilst those uneducated farmers may lack that opportunity.  
 
   2.10.6 Communal Social Capital: Level of Trust 
 
The degree to which irrigators co-operate with each other is influenced by many 
factors, including social capital (Ostrom, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). Among other 
factors influencing the emergence of a co-operative solution, a ‘continuity over time 
of relationship’ between irrigators (Axelrod, 1984), ‘efficacy of incentive 
mechanism’ (Ullman-Margalit, 1978), ‘social and political inequalities amongst 
individuals’ (Boix and Posner, 1998) and ‘group identity’ (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2002) remain commonly cited. Similar to other forms of capital (including natural, 
human and cultural), social capital is an important form of productive capital, 
enabling achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. 
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Social capital is defined and measured in terms of social integration, individual 
interaction or generic sharing of social values such as “participation in the local 
community, pro-action in social context, feelings of trust and safety, 
neighbourhood connections, connections with family and friends, tolerance of 
diversity, value of life and work connections” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 
p.241). 
 
Trust is an important form of social capital, not only at an interpersonal level but 
also at an organisational and government level, because it lubricates co-operation 
(Putnam, 1993; Levi, 1996).  Kenneth Arrow argued that, “-- virtually every 
commercial as well as non-commercial transaction has within it an element of 
trust; certainly any transactions conducted over a period of time. It can be 
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by lack of mutual confidence--” (1972 p.172).   
 
Similarly, highlighting the necessity of trust, Putnam et al. (1993) argues that, ‘there 
can be no certainty in contract and hence no force to law and society and in the 
absence of trust, society is reduced to a state of semi-savagery’. In many societies, 
trust is considered an important form of moral resource (Hirschman, 1984). With 
increased trustworthiness, an individual not only enhances his/her credibility but 
also puts some form of moral pressure on others to become trustworthy. Equally 
important, by enhancing one’s trustworthiness, individuals build up a reputation 
and by engaging in interaction, he/she takes on board other individuals to engage 
in mutually co-operative endeavours.  It is assumed that a group composed of 
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members with a high degree of trustworthiness on one another will be able to 
accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that level of 
trustworthiness (Hirschman, 1984). Putnam et al. (1993) exemplifies the 
importance of trust in a farming community argues that “--a farming community, 
where one farmer got his hay baled by another and where farm tools are 
extensively borrowed and lent, farmers’ crop irrigated by lending him water 
during his turn, the social capital allows each farmer to get his work done with 
less physical capital in the form of tools and equipment---” (Putnam et al., 1993 
p.167).  In fact, trust helps to invigorate social interaction by establishing 
interdependence amongst individuals. It helps to establish a norm of reciprocity 
and inter-dependence in a network of civic engagement amongst individuals of 
groups. Indeed, a whole range of expectations and relationships arise in the 
presence of  trust, as proponents of social capital argue “Trust also plays a pivotal 
role for individual or group to abide by rules which in turn creates some kind of 
expectation that others will also follow the rules” (op.cit. p.79). 
 
     2.10.7 Simplicity of Rules Governing Irrigation System 
Oftentimes, management of natural resources requires appreciation of complexity 
and uncertainty inherent to the resource base in question (Lee 1993; Rolling and 
Wagemakers 1998). Also, the participation of different stakeholders is critical as 
“success is more likely for collective action as the social learning process which 
takes place among different stakeholders’’ (Pinkerton, 1994). Management of local 
natural resources and the actions of the users are regulated by a well developed set 
of rules (Ostrom, 1990).  Rules are seen as the core of human actions, including that 
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of managing natural resource bases such as irrigation systems. It is absolutely 
necessary for users to be acquainted with the rules and regulations governing their 
natural resources for them to comply with them fully.   
 
The WUA can make stakeholders aware of the rules and regulations that govern 
their irrigation systems through different processes of interactive learning. The 
involvement of the WUA in organising social awareness regarding their irrigation 
system helps to ‘enhance common knowledge, awareness and skills by thinking, 
discussing and acting together” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000 p.12). Simplifying 
rules through public awareness not only helps in the understanding of the rules and 
regulations that guide the terms of farmers’ compliance in resource management, 
but also fosters a high degree of commitment to a process of mutual learning in 
which irrigators agree to achieve collective outcomes (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000 
p.132).   In the co-managed irrigation systems, deliberations by the WUA creates an 
interface between local farmers and other agencies involved in managing irrigation 
systems through communications, collective consideration of issues and increased 
understanding of the rules and regulations.  Simplifying rules through social 
deliberations:   
“---- allows people to discover latent public values that they have in common with 
others, and in the process to create new public values. Together, citizens begin to 
define targets of voluntary action, to identify what they value most about the 
community, and to uncover goals and commitments that transcend their 
narrower self-interests” (Reich, 1985 p.1637).  
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   2.10.8 Shape and Canal Gradients  
 
This thesis assumes that that the physical characteristics, including the shape of the 
canal, influence farmers’ access to water.  Research in India has found very clear 
evidence that the physical status of the system has contributed to the water 
deprivation of the tail-enders (GoI, 2003). In Nepal, irrigation canals are of 
different shapes depending on the geographical/topographical locations in which 
they are based. Also, the shape of the canal depends on the distance between the 
water source and command area and the terrain through which the water flows in 
the canal to reach the command area. In many hilly areas, irrigation canals are 
extremely elongated and stretch along steep hill slopes. The longer the distance 
between the water source and command area, the more the canal will be elongated. 
The canals are located in very difficult terrain and are prone to damage by 
landslides, which are frequent in hilly areas. Also, frequent operation and 
maintenance is required to secure the undisturbed flow of the water in the canal. 
Plus the seepage rate through those canals running along the steep slopes is very 
high, which reduces the amount of canal reaching the tail ends (Higgins et al., 
1988). Since the irrigation systems in Nepal lack proper drainage facilities, the 
seepage not only creates water shortage at the tail end, but also causes water-
logging and salinity problems in the field plots (Depeweg and Poudel, 2003; Perry 
and Hassan, 2000).  
 
In Nepal, many irrigation systems in the mid-hills follow similar gradients to that of 
the source rivers which are feeding the canal systems. The construction of the canal 
with a gradient similar to that of the source river reduces construction costs because 
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the canal systems do not require pumps and high bridges (Regmi, 2007). Instead, 
water finds its own course along the river gradient. In the mid-hills of Nepal, there 
are two types of irrigation system which include those flowing North to South and 
those that flow East to West or West to East.  The canals flowing from North to 
South have steep gradients while the canals flowing in East to West have a milder 
gradient. The canals flowing in East to West mostly irrigate a flat river basin, and 
the canal maintenance efforts are lower and relatively easy (Benda-Beckmann, et 
al., 2000). Therefore, the shape and the gradient of the canal are assumed to have 
implications for farmers’ levels of access to irrigation water. A detailed description 
of the physical nature of the irrigation canals considered for this research is 
presented in Chapter Three.  
 
   2.10.9 Competitive Use of Irrigation Water  
The demand for water has been increasing all over the world for agriculture and 
urban and industrial use. Nepal is no exception. However, water stress is felt 
worldwide, because of the increasing demand caused by population growth and a 
falling supply as a result of climate change. The Global Water Partnership 
concluded that “On the one hand, the fundamental fear of food shortages 
encourages ever greater use of water resources for agriculture. On the other, there 
is a need to divert water from irrigated food production to other users and to 
protect the resource and the ecosystem. Many believe this conflict is one of the 
most critical problems to be tackled in the early 21st century” (FAO, 2000, p.58). 
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Evidence across the world demonstrates that irrigation water supplies also provide 
water for many uses beyond crop production. Some of the areas where irrigation 
water has been needed include domestic use, fisheries, livestock use and for the 
wildlife habitat. Although the multiple use of water is good, it might create 
competition for water use particularly during times of water scarcity. Farmers tend 
to use water not only for agriculture purposes but also for house construction and 
brick factories which are in clear contradiction to agricultural use of irrigation 
water. This creates resentment amongst farmers who face water shortage for 
agriculture purposes.  
 
This section of the thesis has identified the key issues in the literature pertinent to 
household access to irrigation water and these issues form the basis of the empirical 
enquiry in the analysis chapters later in the thesis (Chapters 4-6). The variables 
used include both household characteristics of the sample, communal 
characteristics and resource specific characteristics. The purpose of such 
description right at the outset is to provide readers with an opportunity to 
familiarise themselves with the context of the thesis. This will enable the reader to 
understand the socio-economical and cultural landscape in which the management 
of irrigation systems takes place in Nepal.  
 
2.11 An Overview of Irrigation Policies in Nepal  
This section of the thesis presents a brief discussion on the policy formulation and 
changes at national level. This is done to familiarise readers with the context within 
which this research took place.  
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Figure 2.2 below shows the expansion of irrigation facilities in different Five Year 
Development Plans in Nepal. It is clear that the irrigated land continues to grow 
steadily. Although Nepalese farmers have practised irrigated agriculture for a  long 
time, the rapid increase in irrigation facilities did not start until 1956 when the 
planned development mechanisms called the Five Year Plans were introduced. 
Until 1956, Nepal’s total irrigated land was just over 6000 Ha.  Different policies 
have been designed and implemented for the development and maintenance of the 
irrigation systems in Nepal.  
 
The emergence of water resource policies in Nepal dates back to the Civil Code of 
1853 which was the first comprehensive statutory law in Nepal (Khanal, 1982). It 
established the rights of people concerning the use of water owing to their land 
being located in the irrigation system. Some specific provisions were made for the 
utilisation of water for irrigation. While the ownership of land within an irrigation 
system provided individual rights for the use of water, it also made provision that 
irrigation systems diverting water from the rivers would have prior rights and that 
new systems must get approval from the  
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Figure 2.2 Trend in cumulative Land Irrigated in Nepal 1956-2007 
 
 
 
Sources: Five-Year Plan documents, HMG (1988), Irrigation Master Plan, DoI, 2007 
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users of the irrigation system already in operation. The first attempt to make a 
specific law for the water sector was the Irrigation Act 1961. This was replaced by 
the comprehensive Canal, Electricity and Water Resources Act 1967 which 
introduced the concept of water tax and licensing for water use, although licensing 
was only implemented for the use of water in hydropower generation. After the 
introduction of the Basic Needs Program (BNP) in 1987, the working policy on 
irrigation development for the fulfilment of Basic Needs was formulated early in 
1989. This was immediately followed by the promulgation of the Irrigation 
Regulations in April 1989, which placed emphasis on the greater collaboration of 
water users in all phases of irrigation projects; including planning, construction, 
operation and maintenance.  
 
Water regulation in Nepal consists of customary rights and statutory laws. The 
previous centralised system of governance primarily satisfied the interests of ruling 
elites rather than those of the producers, traders and consumers. With the 
restoration of democracy during 1990 there has been a shift towards community 
participation and private sector involvement in decision-making. This has led to 
changes in the way government institutions operate and the role played by non-
government institutions. In the wake of political changes in the country, the 
government has made many policy changes, with the Water Resources Act (1992) 
and Irrigation Policy (1992). The irrigation policy was further revised in 1997. The 
1992 and 1997 irrigation policy laid clear emphasis on a participatory approach 
towards irrigation management. To this end, following the adaptation of the 
National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS) and the launch of a tenth Five-Year 
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Development Plan, the government brought out a new irrigation policy in 2003.  
 
There are currently four policies, two acts and five regulations related to Nepal’s 
water resources. Among them the acts, regulations and policies that are directly 
related to irrigation development and management are the Water Resources Act 
(WRA) 1992, Water Resource Regulation (WRR) 1993, Irrigation Regulation (IR) 
1999, and Irrigation Policy (IP) 2003. Important aspects are briefly discussed 
below.  
 
   2.11.1 Water Resources Act 1992 
The government of Nepal (at that time, HMG/N) promulgated the WRA 1992 on 17 
December 1992 (HMG/N, 2001). As per Section 3 of the Act, ownership of water 
resources within the country remains with the state. Section Four specifies the 
rights to the use of water resources. Sub-section 4(1) states that no one can use the 
water resources without permission, as provisioned in Section 8. Everyone should 
obtain permission to access water resources except for drinking and domestic use, 
irrigation, water turbines, navigation, and water resources confined to private land 
[Sub-section 4(2)]. Sub-section 4(3) cautions that an individual or an organized 
institution should make careful use of water resources without harming the access 
of others. Section 5 has made provision for the Water Users’ Organisation (WUO) to 
make use of water resources for collective benefits. WUOs have been recognised as 
autonomous bodies with perpetual succession (Section 6).  
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Section 7 of the Act has set the priority for water resource use in seven categories, 
such as drinking water and domestic use, irrigation, agricultural use like animal 
husbandry and fishery, cottage industry, industrial entrepreneurship and mining 
related use, water navigation, entertainment use, among others. Irrigation is placed 
second after drinking and domestic use of water resources, indicating the 
importance accorded to irrigation. The use of water resources for drinking and 
domestic purposes is only the smallest proportion of total consumption, so this 
prioritisation has least threat to irrigation.  
 
As provisioned in the WRA 1992, the Government of Nepal (then HMG/N) could 
make agreements with domestic and foreign companies or organised institutions or 
persons for the use, development and expansion of services related to water 
resources (Section 12) and a contractor could fix and collect fees for services 
rendered on the basis of mutual agreement (Section 13). This provision opened new 
avenues to consider water resources as economic good. It enabled Agency Managed 
Irrigation Systems (AMIS) and Farmer Managed Irrigation System (FMIS) to 
sustain their irrigation systems through cost recovery, particularly operation and 
maintenance (O & M) costs. 
 
2.11.2 Water Resource Regulations 1993 
With the power given in Section 24 of WRA 1992, the government promulgated 
WRR 1993 on 17 August 1993. The WRR prescribed the formation and registration 
of the Water Users’ Organisation (WUO), information to be furnished in the WUO 
constitution, and provision for the amendment of the constitution (Chapter Two of 
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WRR). The third chapter made provision for a nine member District Water 
Resource Committee authorised to sanction permission for water resource use. The 
committee is multidisciplinary, representing government and non-government 
administrative and water resources development and management related 
organisations so that discipline and other biases are minimised. Chapter Two of the 
WRR also defines the procedure for obtaining, renewing and selling or handing 
over of licences. The annual fee to be paid to the government by those who have 
obtained permission to use or provide services for irrigation or agricultural water 
use to others is nominal, but its rationale seems to promote and regulate judicious 
and beneficial use of water resources.  
 
Chapter Four of the WRR has made provision for a Water Resource Utilisation 
Examination Committee to deal with water resource utilisation disputes. The 
Committee consists of representatives from the Ministry of Water Resources as 
chairperson, a representative from each of the District Development Committees of 
concerned districts and the Regional Offices of the National Planning Commission. 
In the event of disputes between more than two districts, the committee includes 
representatives from all District Development Committees concerned. 
 
Provision for a Service Fee Fixation Committee and the amount of the service fee 
has been defined in Chapter Five of the regulation. The committee consists of three 
members, two persons designated by the government as Chairperson and Member 
Secretary and another person from among the water users, also designated by the 
government as a member. The Regulation would have been more transparent and 
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representative if the member representing water users was elected or selected by 
the users themselves, instead of by government.        
 
The sixth chapter describes the acquisition of houses and land for the purpose of 
water resource utilisation and provision of compensation for the acquisition. The 
Compensation Fixation Committee rightly includes the owner or his/her 
representative, whose fixed assets have been acquired for the water resource 
utilisation project. The last chapter describes miscellaneous aspects related to water 
resource utilisation, of which salient descriptions concern accidents, flow of 
information, and government authority to amend WRR Schedules as and when 
necessary.     
 
   2.11.3 Irrigation Regulations 1999 
The government of Nepal has framed and enforced IR 1999 as per the WRA 1992, 
Section 24. The first amendment was made on 23 February 2004. Section 2(b) of 
the regulation clearly defines irrigation as the “means of the act of supplying water 
through structures on the field for agricultural use.” By definition, the regulation 
prohibits other uses of irrigation water in the system, except for agricultural 
purposes.  
 
Chapter Two of the regulation has made provision for: registration; election and 
dissolution of the Executive Committee; function, responsibility and rights; and 
renewal of the WUO. It also defines the procedures for registering the Users 
Coordination Organisation, establishing the O&M Fund, handover of the project, 
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and joint management of the system. Section 26 describes the formation of a local 
level Irrigation Service Fee Fixation Committee, consisting of the chief of the 
District Irrigation Office (DIO) as chairperson, and a representative of the District 
Agriculture Development Office (DADO) and chairperson of the concerned WUA as 
members. This committee is responsible for determining the Irrigation Service Fee 
for turned over and jointly managed schemes only. Section 21 defines the priority 
bases for the distribution of water, in consultation with DADO. All these provide 
clear techno-legal guidance to WUOs for good governance.   
 
   2.11.4 Irrigation Policy 2003 
In Nepal, irrigation systems developed to date are run-off-the-river types. They 
were mainly developed to supplement the water needs of paddy during the 
monsoon season. However, it has been realised that water scarcity is one of the 
important constraining factors for agricultural intensification and 
commercialisation. Thus, development of storage type irrigation systems was felt 
necessary to counter the problem of low flowing rivers in the winter and spring to 
make water available to irrigation systems year round. In this context, the Irrigation 
Policy- 1992 was amended twice, the first time in 1997 and the second time on 4th  
August 2003, with the main objectives of providing year round irrigation facilities 
to land suitable for  irrigation by effective utilisation of the current water resources 
of the country, developing the institutional capability of water users for sustainable 
management of existing systems, and enhancing the knowledge, skill and 
institutional working capabilities of technical human resources, water users and 
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non-government associations or organisations relating to the development of the 
irrigation sector.  
 
This policy has emphasised the transfer of the irrigation system constructed by the 
government to the users, on the basis that a work plan and the possession and 
ownership of land and other infrastructures belonging to the system transferred,   
be provided to the users as per the prevailing law. It aims to strengthen the 
capability of local bodies and users associations to ensure their effective 
participation in the planning, construction and management of small and medium 
irrigation systems. 
 
Similarly, the Tenth Plan’s (2002-07) objective of awarding legal rights to the 
WUAs and Irrigation Division Offices to collect service fees is expected to address 
the paucity of funds for O&M. The Plan also intends to include user centered 
designs in the detailed planning of irrigation projects. It is the first time that user 
designs have been recognised in the government planning document.  
 
   2.11.5 Policy and Regulatory Directive for Irrigation Management  
The review of national policies related to irrigation management shows that the 
government focus is on increased participation of users in the management of their 
systems. To this end, the aim is to transfer the management authority of all the 
government built systems to the users. These regulations also provide directives for: 
registration; election and dissolution of the Executive Committee; function, 
responsibility and rights; and renewal of the WUO. They also provide guidelines for 
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the establishment of an O&M Fund, and fixation and collection of irrigation service 
fees.  All these policies and regulatory directives influence institutional 
arrangements through a direct and indirect effect on the process of regulation 
formation at the irrigation system level.  
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Table 2.3 Summary of Salient Features of Irrigation Policies in Nepal  
 
S.N
. 
Name of 
Act/Policy 
Salient Features 
 
 
1. 
 
 
The Civil Code -1853 
• the first comprehensive statutory law, which is a  collection of administrative procedures and 
legal frameworks for interpreting civil and criminal matters, revenue collection, landlord and 
peasant relations, inter-caste disputes, and marriage and family laws 
• linked water usage rights to land ownership within  the canal command area 
• provisioned ‘prior appropriation rights’ of existing irrigation canals over newly constructed 
canals 
2 The Development 
Board Act -1956 
 
• designed and implemented as one of the first policy measures under the First Five Year plan to 
provide guidance, streamline and increase the effectiveness of development interventions 
including irrigation 
• provided favourable environment for external donor to invest in Nepal’s infrastructure 
development including irrigation 
 
3. 
 
Irrigation Act-1961 
 
• laid the foundation for a legal framework specifically for irrigation 
• replaced by Canal Electricity & Water Resources Act 1967 
 
 
4.  
 
 
 
 
Canal, Electricity & 
Water Resources Act 
1967  
 
 
• replaced Irrigation Act 1961 
• introduced the concept of water tax and licensing (only for hydropower generation) 
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Water Resource Act 
1992 
 
• states that the ownership of all water resources including irrigation rests on the State and its use 
should be permitted by the later (except drinking and domestic use, irrigation, water turbine, 
navigation and water use within private lands 
• individuals or an organised institution should make beneficial use of water resources, which 
should not jeopardise others’ use of water particularly the use by the Water Users’ 
Organisations (WUO) for irrigation purposes. 
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• sets priority for water use in order of drinking and domestic use, irrigation, animal husbandry 
and fishery, cottage industry, industrial and mining related use, water navigation, 
entertainment and others  
• provisions with mutual agreements with between the Government of Nepal (HMG/N)  and 
domestic and foreign nationals, companies or organised institutions to the use, development 
and expansion of services related to water resources 
• recognises water as an ‘economic good’ by granting authority to the contractors to fix and collect 
water fees.  
• enables AIMS and FMIS to sustain their irrigation systems through cost recovery mechanisms 
particularly the Operation and Maintenance (O & M) costs. 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
Water Resource 
Regulation 1993 
 
• provisions for the formation and registration of WUO  
• information to be furnished in the WUO constitution and provisions for necessary amendments  
• provisions for formation of a nine member District Water Resource Committee to sanction 
permissions for water resource utilisation at the district level 
• defines the procedures for obtaining, renewing and selling or handing over license 
• promotion and regulate judicious and beneficial use of water resources and pay water fee to the 
government for obtaining permission to provide services for irrigation or water use related to 
agriculture 
• provisions for a water Resource Utilisation Examination Committee to deal with water resource 
utilisation disputes 
• provisions for Service Fee Fixation Committee to determine amount of service fee from water 
users 
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• empowers and designates Service Fee Fixation Committee to deal with compensation issues 
which are resulted from acquisitions of fixed assets during construction of water related 
enterprises 
7. 
 
 
Irrigation Regulation 
1999 
 
• defines irrigation as ‘means of the act of supplying water through structures on the field for 
agricultural use’ and prohibits other use of irrigation water in the system except for agricultural 
purposes 
• provides a clear techno-legal guide to WUOs for good governance by outlining procedures for 
registration, election and dissolve of WUO executive committee.  
• sets the remits of WUO including functions, responsibilities and rights and renewal of WUO 
licence 
• defines procedures for establishment of O & M Fund and delineate procedures and conditions 
for management transfer of irrigation systems to local users including the joint management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
 
 
 
 
Irrigation Policy 
2003 
• recognises the limitations of run-off-the-river type of irrigation systems and their inability to 
supply water all year around 
 
• priorities the development of storage type of irrigation for agricultural diversification, 
intensification and commercialisation  
 
• adds a greater emphasis in developing institutional capacity of water users for sustainable user 
of the irrigation resources and to enhance the knowledge, skills and technical capabilities of the 
human resources 
 
• strengthening the capabilities of WUOs and effective participation of users in planning, 
construction, and management of irrigation systems.  
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2.12 Access to Water under Different Property Right Regimes  
This section builds the theoretical model of this thesis, done to set the scene for 
an empirical investigation of the impact of property rights regimes and 
distributional aspects of irrigation water in the later sections of this thesis.  Given 
the definition of access provided in section 2.9 above, a condition where farmers’ 
access to water should provide a reliable water supply, adequate for crop 
cultivation and equitable in water distribution, the farmers’ level of access to 
irrigation water will be tested on the cumulative index of the above mentioned 
three constituent components of access.   
 
The management of irrigation systems is a complex phenomenon. Various users 
are involved in water appropriation from the canal’s resources, and thus the 
management depends on how they (or their actions) are coordinated. The 
important point to note here is that users have tended to come together for 
collective arrangements and thus devise various alternative management options. 
The users have adopted various coordinated strategies for appropriation of 
resource units (Ostrom et al., 1994). However, their coordinated strategies are 
influenced by the action arena where they operate together. The action arenas are 
affected by various factors, like the attributes of physical world, the community, 
and rules-in-use. The appropriators use rules to regulate their own relationships, 
various attributes of the physical world and the nature of the community where 
the action arena occurs. Therefore, in order to understand institutional issues it is 
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important to analyse how the rules combine with the physical and community 
world to generate particular types of situation (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
 
The management of irrigation systems is also guided by various rules at the 
system level. It is noted that in community managed irrigation systems, farmers 
develop a wide range of rules to specify rights and responsibilities between them 
(Tang, 1992) and of greatest importance is that they enforce those rules without 
the involvement of external agencies. The situation is not same for all irrigation 
systems and the configuration of rules varies, depending on the mode of 
governance of the irrigation systems. In many irrigation systems, constructed and 
managed by state agencies, the rules at the system level were suggested by higher 
level offices, not necessarily developed by the users (Lam, 1998). It must be noted 
that the likelihood of rules being formulated at the system level may be guided by 
various policies at the national level as well. However, the situation might not be 
similar and other contextual variables may play a significant role.  
 
In the Nepalese context, irrigation systems operate in diverse physical and 
community settings. The ecological diversity across hills/plain areas results in 
diverse physical attributes of the irrigation systems. Physical diversity represents 
not only the characteristics of resource systems, it also represents varying levels 
of external pressure in the form of market influences and commercialisation 
impulses. Similarly, the cultural and ethnic diversity in many parts of the country 
result in varied community settings and may have an influence on rule formation. 
Depending on the physical attributes and community attributes of the action 
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arena, the rules-in-use and the process of rule formation may also vary. Tang 
(1992) noted variations in the rules of authorities and resulting appropriation 
activities between government-owned systems and farmer-owned systems.  
 
The institutional structures which are designed and implemented to manage 
irrigation resources provide action situations where individuals associated with 
the irrigation activities interact.  The theoretical framework proposed in this 
thesis will enable understanding of the influence of institutional arrangements 
and the physical characteristics of the irrigation systems on the nature of 
interactions amongst the farmers and their ability to access water from the canal 
systems. The theoretical framework used in this thesis has emanated from the 
literature review, particularly from the IAD framework proposed by Ostrom et al. 
(1994) and the interactive domain of irrigation governance proposed by 
Chambers (1988) has also guided fieldwork. All aspects of the research, including 
the questionnaire design, household survey, focus group discussions, key 
informant interviews, field notes and observations and documents analysis have 
been guided by the theoretical framework presented in the thesis.  
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Figure 2.3 A Theoretical Model of Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.13 Conclusions 
 
Irrigation impinges on many aspects of human life in a myriad of complex ways. 
Natural resource bases, such as irrigation canals, help farmers relate to each 
other in many ways. The relationship amongst irrigators and that between the 
irrigation system and the farmers depends on whether or not they benefit from it. 
The property rights structures establish the farmers as stakeholders with relation 
to the irrigation canals. The property rights structures and institutional 
arrangements associated with a particular type of property rights regime, 
provides an action situation where farmers, irrigation bureaucracy and donor 
agencies relate to each other. This thesis argues that farmers’ access to and 
control over water, and other irrigation infrastructures are functions of property 
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rights structures designed to manage the irrigation systems. The nature of 
property rights also determines the pattern of use, benefit allocations, investment 
and negotiations associated with acquisition, allocation, water distribution, 
resource mobilisation and conflict resolutions in irrigation management.   Also, 
studies on irrigation performance have been explicitly objective and are 
dominated by engineers and bureaucrats with disregard to the perspectives of the 
local farmers who rely heavily on and make use of irrigation resources to sustain 
their livelihoods.  In fact, there has been a serious lack of research on the 
subjective measurement of access to irrigation water from the farmers’ 
perspectives. In response to these concerns this thesis will draw on a comparative 
study of irrigation systems under different property rights regimes and will seek 
to illustrate the impact of property rights regimes on the subjective measurement 
of farmers’ access to irrigation water.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview   
This chapter returns to the research questions outlined in Chapter One and 
discusses their operationalisation. The rationale for the choice of research 
methodologies and criteria used for selecting research sites are explained and a 
detailed description of the sampling framework used for the household survey is 
given.The households are taken as the unit of analysis throughout the thesis. The 
procedures used for conducting focus group discussions and the process of 
secondary data collection are also described, as are  the methods adopted for 
analysing qualitative and quantitative data, albeit briefly. Also, the chapter 
considers some ethical issues associated with this research. Finally, a brief 
description of the measurement of household access to water, based on the 
factors highlighted in the literature review is presented.  
 
3.2 Introduction 
The central phenomenon this thesis aims to explore is whether or not property 
rights regimes, which are designed and implemented for managing irrigation 
systems, affect the farmer’s ability to access water. This thesis started with two 
high level research questions. Firstly, under which property rights structures do 
the farmers have the best access to irrigation water?  Secondly, what roles do 
institutions play in enabling farmers to access irrigation water? 
119 
 
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter Two has provided a detailed exploration of 
both the high level research questions mentioned above. However, the existing 
literature only provides piecemeal information about the role of institutions in 
natural resource governance, particularly in irrigation management. Also, it is 
apparent from the reviewed literature that the role played by institutions in 
farmers’ ability to access water from irrigation canals has rarely been explored in 
detail.  The literature review presented in Chapter Two (Section 2.10) has 
identified the factors that are likely to influence farmers’ level of access to 
irrigation water and these are identified and described based on the literature as 
well as in the Nepalese context.  The literature suggests that a complex set of 
social, organisational, legal, technical and socio-political and cultural interactions 
influence farmers’ level of access to irrigation resources. Both the theoretical as 
well as the contextual (based on the Nepalese context) have demonstrated a clear 
need for further empirical research in order to answer the following questions:  
 
1a). Are the farmers from the dalit community benefiting equally from irrigation 
systems under different property rights regimes? 
 
1b). Are marginal farmers benefiting equally from the surface irrigation systems 
governed by different property rights regimes? 
 
1c). Under which property rights regimes do the ‘tail-enders’ have the best access 
to water from the canal system? 
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1d). Are the households headed by females benefiting equally from irrigation 
systems under different property rights regimes? 
 
2a). Which institutions enable farmers to access water from the irrigation canals? 
 
2b). What are the lessons that irrigation systems which are governed  by different 
property rights structures can learn from each other to maximise their impact on 
farmers’ abilities to access water? 
 
As argued earlier in the literature review presented in Chapter Two (Section 2.10) 
a number of key factors are likely to influence household level of access to water 
from the irrigation canal systems in Nepal.  Those factors which are assumed to 
have this influence are based in theoretical propositions and contextual premises 
(based on the Nepalese context). The first high level question attempts to 
investigate farmers’ different levels of access to irrigation water in irrigation 
systems governed by different property rights structures. The second high level 
research question attempts to explore the complex set of institutional settings in 
which farmers interact and presents the varied perspectives or meanings that 
they hold in the irrigation systems governed by different property rights 
structures, seeking  reasons why some irrigation systems are able to provide 
farmers with better access to water than others. 
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3.3. Why Case Studies? 
The overarching aim of this research is to investigate the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of 
access to water, which demands an in-depth exploration of institutional 
mechanisms of water distribution. The case study method has proven the most 
appropriate, as it allows us to use a full range of strategies to gather evidence in 
sufficient detail to address the objectives and the associated research questions 
which were presented in Chapter One (Section 1.7.2) (Parajuli, 1999). The 
research objectives and the associated research questions demanded an 
investigation of the link between property rights and access to water, and 
processes in which these two variables interact within the given social settings. 
The case study approach tends to be “holistic rather than dealing with an 
isolated factor”, which helps to unravel the complexities of the irrigation 
institutions, rural politics, socio-economic circumstances of the households and 
the physical nature of the irrigation canals (Denscombe, 2002 p.36).  The need 
for a case study led approach has arisen for a number of reasons, which are 
outlined below.  
 
 Firstly, the nature of the research itself: the overarching aim of the thesis is to 
understand the nature of complex interactions amongst farmers and between 
farmers and the irrigation management committees in different institutional 
andenvironment settings. Secondly, the need for comparative case studies 
emanates from the nature of the research questions posited earlier, which aim to 
explore the implications of property rights regimes on farmers’ abilities to access 
irrigation water. These questions demand extensive, holistic and in-depth 
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descriptions of the ways in which farmers interact with each other in different 
institutional settings (Feagin et al., 1991). Studies in the past reported that 
irrigation communities demonstrated an increasing level of sophistication and 
variation in all aspects of irrigation management, including physical design, 
water acquisition, allocation, drainage, resource mobilisation, decision making 
and conflict resolution (Uphoff, 1986; Hunt and Hunt, 1976; Coward, 1979). 
 
Thirdly, the nature of the analytical framework used in the thesis also influences 
the decision to choose a case study approach. The Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) Framework is used as an analytical framework throughout 
the thesis. The IAD framework analyses the course of action taken by individuals 
in different action situations. An action situation is conceived as “a social space 
where individuals interact, exchange goods and services and engage in the 
appropriation and provision of activities, solve problems, or fight” (Ostrom et 
al., 1994 p.28). Both the research questions and the analytical framework attach 
significant importance to the contextual factors which need to be taken into 
consideration in measuring farmers’ levels of access to irrigation water. Hence,  
this research required a method that allowed the collection of  rich contextual 
materials: case study research places an emphasis on context as Robert Yin 
suggests: “you would use the case study method because you deliberately 
wanted to cover contextual conditions- believing that they might be highly 
pertinent to your phenomenon of study” (2003 p.13).  
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Fourthly, the immediate appeal for case studies also arises from the fact that the 
author had no control over either the actual interactions of the farmers and the 
institutional settings within which those interactions occurred. It is argued that 
the case study method is the most appropriate research method to fully capture 
farmers’ interactions which cannot be controlled by the researchers and the 
institutional settings in which those interactions took place (Ostrom, 1990; 
Yercan et al., 2004). There are thousands of irrigation systems in Nepal and it is 
impossible to consider such a large number within the scope of this research. 
Being selective was crucial in the choice of irrigation systems which reasonably 
represent those governed by different property rights regimes, and for this a case 
study approach was the most appropriate method of enquiry (Flyvbjerg, 2009). 
Furthermore, the author’s aim was to focus on contemporary irrigation issues as 
opposed to historical events concerning access to irrigation water and level of 
access was to be investigated in natural and existing institutional settings. In 
order to undertake such research, a case study approach was the most 
appropriate (Bush and Opp, 1999). 
 
Fifthly, a case study method is often suitable when the research “relies on 
multiple sources of evidence” (op.cit. p.14) and the case study method has a 
“unique strength in its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence- documents, 
artefacts, interviews and observations” (Yin, 2009 p.4). There is no doubt that 
there are multiple sources of evidence in this research-as the property rights 
structures pertinent to irrigation management have local (for FMIS) , regional 
and national (for JMIS and AMIS)  dimensions. The nature of the research 
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questions demand detailed information; the main sources of information were 
both local and national/regional. At the local level, the sources of information 
were local farmers, watchmen and the irrigation management committees, whilst 
at the regional and regional/national level the sources of information were 
irrigation bureaucrats, donor agencies, and irrigation engineers.  
 
The conceptual and theoretical framework used in this thesis will highlight the 
dialectic and iterative interactions, (dis)continuity and interface between the life-
worlds of local irrigators and government bureaucracies which are embedded in 
irrigation management in Nepal. This study goes beyond conventional 
investigations of confrontation within and amongst irrigators and takes on board 
irrigation bureaucracies which work in tandem with local irrigation institutions.  
The comparative study of three irrigation systems provides a fertile terrain of 
struggle where access to and control over irrigation infrastructure and other 
associated natural resource bases such as land and water, provides an arena of 
dynamic interactions, encounters, confrontations and negotiations between 
different social actors. In the  quest to establish an actor perspective in agrarian 
development, Long and van der Ploeg posit that, “thorough investigation of 
intervention practices enable us to understand emerging forms of interactions, 
procedures, practical strategies nature of discourse, cultural categories and 
stakeholder analysis” (1989 p.226). This approach enables us to familiarise 
ourselves with a particular socio-economic context, agrarian relations and  the 
natural resource bases, helping  us to reformulate irrigation interventions from a 
more actor oriented perspective (Palumbo, 1987). 
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Once the decision on the application of a case study method to carry out the 
research was made, and given the nature of the research project, a comparative 
case study approach was selected. The comparative case study provides an 
opportunity for findings to be compared and contrasted with each other, allowing 
the “distinguishing characteristics of cases to act as a spring board for 
theoretical reflection” (Bryman, 2004, p.55). Whilst the advantages of the 
inclusion of multiple irrigation systems from each of the three property rights 
regimes considered in this research were recognised, there were some practical 
constraints. The logistics of undertaking a multi-site case study was hugely 
challenging, as the research had both time and budget constraints. A multi site 
case study would have had enormous budgetary implications and given the scope 
of this research, this was neither feasible nor practical. Considering these 
logistical and operational constraints, this research includes only one case from 
each of the three property rights regimes for in-depth and comprehensive study. 
The inclusion of multi sites case studies (three irrigation systems here) helped to 
broaden the coverage of this research. The variations in the context of the 
research sites provided a unique opportunity to examine whether interactions 
amongst farmers and access to water differed in irrigation systems governed by 
different property rights regimes. Through the use of multiple case studies, it was 
possible to gather different but rich contextual materials, which in turn greatly 
helped to expand the generalisability of the research findings and enhanced 
confidence in the overall outcomes of the research (De Vaus, 2002). 
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3.4 Criteria for Site Selected 
 
This section describes the criteria used for selecting irrigation systems for case 
studies.  
 
   3.4.1 Different Types of Management Regimes 
 
The over arching aim of this research is to compare irrigation systems that are 
being governed by different property rights regimes. Firstly, three such irrigation 
systems were selected. The Begnas Irrigation System (BIS) is an example of AMIS 
and is managed by government, while the Phalebas Irrigation System (PIS) is an 
example of FMIS and is managed by the local farmers. The Rainastar Irrigation 
System (RIS) is an example of a JMIS which is jointly managed by the 
government and local farmers. While other criteria used for selecting irrigation 
systems for in-depth case study attempt to show greater similarities amongst the 
irrigation systems, the management regime attempts to show the differences 
amongst them. In this way, it is possible to identify the impact of property rights 
structures on the household level of access to irrigation water.  
 
   3.4.2 Mid-hill Areas with Comparable Annual Rainfall and 
Temperature 
In Nepal, a farmer’s choice of crops depends on rainfall and temperature, which 
in turn depend on the geographical area. Demand for irrigation depends on the 
amount of rainfall, temperature and the type of crop growth. Crops such as paddy 
require a high amount of water for growth, whilst crops such as maize or potato 
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require much smaller amounts of water. In order for a meaningful comparison to 
be made, the cropping pattern in the case study areas has to be similar; this in 
turn will determine the demand for irrigation. Areas with comparable annual 
rainfall and temperature are likely to have a similar cropping pattern.  In all three 
areas considered for case study, farmers’ choice of crops in different crop seasons 
was fairly comparable.  
 
In many agrarian societies a wide range of socio-cultural factors such as 
traditional practices, local way of life and group identity influence farmers’ choice 
of seeds, crop management and choice of crops (Jarvis et al., 2000; Brush, 1995; 
Zimmerer, 1996; Gonzales, 2000; Thapa et al., 2007).  Also, other institutions 
such as land tenure, access to improved variety of seeds and size and the 
distribution of landholdings in the community also influence the choice of crops 
in rural agrarian societies. For example, in Ethiopia, a change in the land tenure 
system from communal to private ownership led to farmers using more 
sustainable land management practices including terracing, aforestation and 
using improved variety of crop seeds (Omiti et al., 1999); access to land amongst 
a farming community in Mexico was to be a significant determinant of their 
preference for an improved variety of maize crop (Louette et al., 1997).  Whilst 
water availability was the major determinant of crop choice amongst the farmers 
in the research area for this thesis, other factors such as share cropping, market 
opportunities and households’ cultural practices influenced the choice of crops. 
The crop sharer usually cultivated stable food crops such as paddy and maize 
whilst households with access to the local market cultivated cash crops like 
128 
 
sugarcane, peanuts and vegetables.  Households which brewed local liquors opted 
for millet as it was widely used for producing local liquors. The types of crops 
grown in the case study areas are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Type of Crops Grown in Case Study Areas in Different 
Seasons  
 
During the Monsoon season, farmers grow water intensive crops such as paddy, 
while during the winter they grow less water intensive crops such as wheat, 
mustard, potato, sugarcane, and other seasonal vegetables.  Although these crops 
do not require intensive irrigation, but should be irrigated fairly regularly, the 
demand for water still remains high during this cropping season.  The patterns of 
monthly rainfall and temperature in the case study areas selected are given in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
Seasons 
Areas/Crop 
Begnas Irrigation 
System (BIS) 
Phalebas Irrigation 
System (PIS) 
Rainastar 
Irrigation System 
(RIS) 
Monsoon paddy, maize, paddy, maize  paddy, maize,  
 
Winter 
 
 
 
 
potato, millet, wheat, 
mustard, onion, 
garlic, sugarcane, 
legumes, rapeseeds 
 
potato, millet wheat, 
buck wheat, mustard, 
spinach, barley, onion, 
garlic 
 
peanuts, potato, wheat, 
mustard, spinach, 
onion, garlic, 
rapeseeds 
 
 
Spring 
 
spring paddy, spring 
onion  
 
spring paddy, spring 
onion 
 
spring paddy, spring 
onion  
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2007) 
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   3.4.3 Heterogeneous Communities  
The management of natural resources to a large extent involves interactions of 
individuals and households along lines of ethnicity, gender, religion, wealth, caste 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and interest in the resource (Oliver and Marwell, 
2001). The role of heterogeneity in the management of natural resources in 
general and irrigation in particular has already been explored in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.5). The structure and composition of community and group 
heterogeneity existing in the community has a wider implication in the 
management of natural resources. The degree of co-operation amongst farmers 
in managing their irrigation resources depends on the nature of communal 
composition. Although it is very difficult to find an irrigation system used by 
multiple households, which are homogenous in nature, the degree of 
heterogeneity varies greatly amongst communities. In order to make a 
meaningful comparison, cases must be selected which demonstrate a similar 
degree and nature of heterogeneity. 
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Figure 3.1 Average Monthly Temperatures and Rainfall in the Case Study Areas    
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    3.4.4 Local Rural Settings 
 
The availability of ‘exit options’ for the local farmers depends to a great extent on 
their local settings. Exit options are defined as a range of employment 
opportunities outside the agricultural activities, such as employment 
opportunities in service sector, business and foreign employment. For example, 
farmers who live in areas located in close proximity to urban locations have 
greater exit options available to them than others who do not have access to 
urban settings. Access to markets in urban settings may reduce household 
dependency on agricultural activities, as they may have outside earning 
opportunities. In contrast, villages far from the market are more likely to be 
dependent on agricultural activities and irrigation resources as they lack alternate 
livelihood opportunity (Adhikari, 2003). It is equally plausible that if households 
have access to the local market, they may cultivate more cash crops and crops 
such as fruits and vegetables, which can readily be sold in the local market rather 
than crops with a long life cycle. The shift in crop preferences influences demand 
for water, which in turn affects household dependency on irrigation systems.  
 
 3.5 Descriptions of Case Study Sites  
 
Criteria used for selecting irrigation systems for this research have been outlined 
in Section 3.4. These systems are located in the mid-hills and are in rural local 
settings. The farmers in these three irrigation systems have similar cropping 
patterns and the areas in which they are located have comparable average rainfall 
and temperature. All these factors influence the demand for water for irrigation. 
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In addition, the farming communities using water from the irrigation canal 
systems considered for this research are heterogeneous. Since the research aims 
to investigate the effect of property rights regimes on farmers’ ability to access 
water from the irrigation canals, the irrigation systems considered for this study 
are governed by three different property rights regimes. Hence, three case study 
sites with reasonably comparable rural settings were selected for this research. 
The following section describes the systems considered for a detailed 
comparative case study. 
   
 3.5.1 Begnas Irrigation System (BIS)  
 
The Begnas Irrigation System is an example of AMIS, and is located in the 
Lekhnath municipality of the Kaski district in western Nepal, which is about five 
kilometres south-east of the Pokhara valley. The canal system was constructed by 
the Government of Nepal (GoN) in 1984 with technical and financial support 
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), was completed in 1988 and has 
remained under the management of the DoI. Table 3.2 presents some salient 
features of the three irrigation systems considered in the study. The AMIS makes 
use of a permanent headwork (water diversion structure) with sophisticated 
technologies to divert water from the southern end of the Begnas Lake to divert 
water into the canal system. The canal sought to provide irrigation facilities to a 
total command area of 580 Ha of land, to raise the economic standard of about 
6000 members of the farming community (DoI, 2007). The actual area served by 
the canal remains much lower than the estimated 580 Ha land. The total length 
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of the Begnas canal is 13.2 kilometres, including tertiary canals, which extend to 
serve triangular river basins with calcareous (limestone) sandy to sandy loam 
soils. The soil type found in the AMIS area contains a high concentration of 
limestone and requires high water application for crop production. The water 
diversion structures and gates installed in the canal systems are all permanent 
and modern. The majority of the canal command area consists of plain areas of 
terraces sloping south easterly and is formed by deposits from the Seti river and 
its associated tributaries. About sixty percent of the command area is moderately 
plain while the remaining forty percent is hilly. The total agricultural land of the 
Lekhnath municipality is 5305 Ha of which 580 Ha is served by the AMIS. The 
AMIS serves wards one, 12 and 13 which consist of plain, and wards 11 and 14 
which consist of mixed of hilly and plain terrain. The wards are the smallest and 
lowest administrative units in Nepal and are not associated with hydrological 
boundaries. A number of wards combine to form V.D.Cs and municipalities. The 
Lekhnath Municipality is divided into 14 wards of which five are within the canal 
command area of the AMIS. 
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Photo 3.1 Headwork of AMIS 
 
 
Photo 3.2 Cross Section of AMIS 
 
 
 
Ever since it was constructed, the canal system has remained under agency 
management, primarily by the DoI with its technical and financial input. 
Recently, the DoI has constituted the Begnas Irrigation Management Committee 
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(BIMC), which is responsible for the day to day running of the canal system, 
which includes releasing water from the dam, organising operation and 
maintenance activities, conflict resolution and liaising with the DoI. 
 
The BIMC consists of 19 members, of which four are represented from branch 
canals: BC-1; BC-2; BC-3; and BC-4. There are three members representing BC-5 
in the BIMC.  The branch committee consists of eleven members committee, 
including the president, vice-president, secretary, joint secretary, treasurer and 
six others. The canal system has five branches with their own branch canal 
committees.  The DoI has employed three gate keepers, also called Dhalepa3, to 
regulate the water supply in the canal system. One of the Dhalepas is 
permanently employed at the head end to look after the headwork, while the 
remaining two have been assigned responsibilities for taking care of the canal 
structures at the middle and lower part of the canal system. 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Dhalepas is Nepalese term used for watchmen. The Dhalepas patrol canal structures. In the 
AMIS, the Dhalepas are formally responsible to the Department of Irrigation (DOI), but in the 
JMIS and AMIS, they are responsible directly with the WUA or individual farmers on a daily 
basis. 
136 
 
Table 3.2 Some Salient Characteristics of the AMIS, FMIS and JMIS 
 
 
 
 
 
Irrigation 
System 
Water source and system 
characteristics 
Area 
(Ha) 
Date       
built 
Management 
Type 
WUA’s 
Tenure 
 
Phalebas 
Irrigation System 
(PIS) 
Fed by a local seasonal stream.  
Mostly non-cement lined 
earthen canal, with temporary 
headwork. 
 
341 1931 FMIS 3 Years 
 
Begnas Irrigation 
System (BIS) 
 
Fed by lake. Modern system 
with sophisticated 
infrastructure, cement lined 
and permanent headwork. 
 
580 1988 AMIS 3 years 
but not 
renewed 
 
Rainastar 
Irrigation System 
(RIS) 
 
Fed by a perennial river. Semi-
modern with permanent 
headwork. 
 
850 1994 JMIS 3 years 
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Figure 3.2 Map of Nepal Showing the Districts locations of Case Study Sites    
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The demographic characteristics of the command area of the three irrigation 
systems are presented in Table 3.3. The canal command area is semi-urban, 
having a municipal status.  The canal command area of the AMIS has access to 
roads and local market places and to the sub-metropolitan city of Pokhara, 
reached by modern means of transportation. Since the reorganisation of the 
Lekhnath area as a municipality, there has been a surge in development to its 
infrastructure. The Lekhnath municipality has a total of 216 km of road 
networks, of which 20 km is pitched, while 60 km and 136 km roads are 
gravelled and temporary and non-gravelled respectively. The local economy of 
the canal command area is agriculture based. About 87 percent of the 
population of the Lekhnath municipality are involved in agriculture while nine 
percent and four percent are involved in services and business respectively. 
Although the farming system in the canal command area is traditional, 
urbanisation and a surge of development have allowed the farmers to use 
mechanised farming, such as tractors for tillage. There is also a fishery 
research centre within the canal command area, which uses water from the 
canal system. 
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Table 3.3 Demographic Composition in the AMIS, FMIS and JMIS 
 
 
       Number/Percentage 
   
 
 
 
 
   Demographic 
Information 
Phalebas 
area  Begnas area 
 
 
                           
Rainastar area  
  
  
 
 
Bhalayakharka 
V.D.C. 
 
Chaktratirtha 
V.D.C. 
 
Dhamilikuwa 
V.D.C. 
Rainastar area 
Total  
Total Population 3308 41369 
 
2,771 
 
      4,779    4,368     11,918 
Male  1563 (47.2%) 
19,475 
(47.1%) 
 
1,315 (47.4%) 
 
2,200 (46%) 
  
 1,992 (45.6%)      5,507 (46.2%) 
Female  1745 (52.8%) 
21,894 
(52.9%) 
 
1,456 (52.6%) 
 
      2,579 (54%) 2,376 (54.4%)     6,411 (53.8%) 
Annual Population 
Growth  4.6 % 2.9 % 
 
1.4% 
 
      1.6%    2.1(%)       1.7 (%) 
Total Number of 
Households 660 9362 
 
580 
 
      1,004    948       2,532 
Number of Households 
Served by the Canal  505 (76.5%) 4304 (45.9%) 
 
180 (18.6%) 
 
       780 (77.7%) 748 (78.9%)      1,708 (67.4%) 
Average Household Size 6.5 5.3 
 
4.70 
 
        6.1    4.7       5.1 
Population Density per 
Ha 8.7 4.7 
 
 Na 
 
        Na     Na       na 
Source: CBS (2001) and LM (2000) 
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The physical characteristics of the three irrigation systems considered for this 
research are presented in Table 3.4. The Begnas irrigation canal is elongated, 
serving a command area of rugged terrain which makes O & M activities 
relatively difficult.  
 
Table 3.4 Physical Nature of the Irrigation Systems  
 
Figure 3.3 Schematic Diagram of Begnas Irrigation Canal and its 
Command Area 
 
 
 
Physical Nature of the Irrigation Systems  
FMIS AMIS  JMIS  
Non-elongated 
longitudinally  
Elongated 
longitudinally  
C-shaped elongated 
longitudinally  
Following through 
relatively plain 
areas 
Flowing through 
steep area 
Flowing though steep slopes 
Relatively plain 
command area  
Very undulating 
command area 
Plateau like command area 
with sloppy edges on both 
sides 
Source  
Begnas Lake 
BC5 
BC1 
BC4 
BC3 
BC1 
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   3.5.2 The Phalebas Irrigation System (PIS) 
 
The Phalebas Irrigation System is an example of a FMIS which is managed by 
local farmers and is located in the Phalebas Devisthan V.D.C. of the Parbat 
district in western Nepal, about 30 km north-west of the Pokhara valley.  
Historically, the Phalebas area has had no access to irrigation water and the 
farmers depended on the Monsoon rainfall for crop cultivation. The farmers in 
the Phalebas area grew ‘aga paddy’ which was low in both productivity and 
quality (PDDC, 2001). In 1926 a social worker and Jimmawal4 named Bishe 
Pant envisaged constructing an irrigation canal using local resources and 
water from a local stream.  A lack of financial resources, equipment and 
technical ability, coupled with a rugged topography, hampered the 
construction of the canal infrastructure (PDDC, 2001) 
 
As a local social worker, Bishe Pant was determined to prove that the area of 
Phalebas could be self sustained for food by the construction of an irrigation 
canal.  He started lobbying in the village and the initial financial contributions 
for the construction of the canal system were made by the villagers. Using the 
resources contributed by the local farmers, Bishe Pant enlisted local labourers 
of the Magar caste (also called Ahuris) from the Rangkhani village of 
neighbouring Baglung district for the construction of the irrigation system. 
The Ahuris from the village of Rankhani were renowned for their hard work 
and prowess as artisans.  The local farmers joined Bishe Pant and participated 
enthusiastically, contributing voluntary labour for the canal construction and 
by donating food to feed the Ahuris. After relentless efforts over 11 years and 
                                               
4 Individuals with responsibilities of looking after land on behalf of the land owner 
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with the support of the local farmers, Bishe Pant was able to supply some 
water for irrigation in the Phalebas area in 1937. Ever since the construction of 
the Phalebas canal, it has been owned and managed by the beneficiary farmers 
(Pradhan, 1990; PDDC, 2001). 
 
Some of the salient features of the FMIS are presented in Table 3.2. The FMIS 
provides irrigation facilities to 341 Ha of tar5 land bounded by the Kali 
Gandaki river to the west, which is more than 130 meters lower, and to the 
south by the Lamaya stream, which is also a source of water feeding the 
system (PDDC, 2001).  Given the nature of the landscape, the intake required 
has had to be constructed considerably higher upstream to divert water into 
the system.  
 
Even today, the Phalebas Irrigation System makes use of a temporary 
headwork which is constructed by using locally available resources such as 
stone boulders, sandbags, tree branches and grassed soil (also called Lapcha 
or Chapari) to divert water from the seasonal stream named the Lamaha 
Khola.  The temporary nature of the headwork means it is often prone to 
being washed away during the Monsoon season. The canal is elongated 
longitudinally along fractured hard rocks made of granite. These hard rocks 
have been holed and tunnelled by the Ahuri using chisel and hammers to 
divert the water. 
                                               
5 Elevated flat and dry land and usually bordered by rivers on both sides 
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Table 3.5 Caste/ethnic composition of the AMIS, FMIS and JMIS  
  
                              Area/ Percentage 
  Castes 
    
Rainastar 
 
 
Phalebas 
area 
Begnas 
area  
Bhalayakharka 
V.D.C. 
Chaktratirtha 
V.D.C. 
Dhamilikuwa 
V.D.C. 
Rainastar 
area total  
       Brahmins  41 38 32.5 27.2 30.8 29.4 
Chhetriya 9 9 23.5 18.2 8.1 15.7 
Dalits 6.9 13 11.4 21.1 28.3 21.6 
Magar/Tamang 0.6 4 2.8 7.7 14.9 9.3 
Gurung 0.7 13 26.8 5.6 4.4 10.1 
Newar 17 3 0.6 3.9 6.9 4.3 
Kumal  Na Na 1.3 12.3 Na 5.2 
Gharti/Bhujel Na Na Na 2.1 2.3 1.7 
Sanyasi Na Na Na 1.3 2.2 1.3 
Others 24.8 20 1.3 0.4 1.9 1.2 
Total  100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Photo 3.3 Water Source and Headwork of FMIS 
 
 
 
Photo 3.4 Cross Section of FMIS 
 
 
 
Tables 3.3 and 3.5 present the demographic composition of the Phalebas area. 
It is clear that the population of Phalebas is very heterogeneous. The total 
length of the canal system is 14 km, which includes 4 km of tertiary canal 
(distribution network) making a longitudinal arch across tar land with sandy 
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loam to sticky red soil, which has a high water requirement for crop 
production. The total area of Devisthan is 437 Ha of which 362 Ha is arable. 
Of the total arable land of 362 Ha, 217 Ha of land has irrigation facilities and 
134 Ha are served by the Phalebas irrigation system, and the remaining 145 
Ha are not irrigated. The Devisthan V.D.C. has 102.8 Ha of land under forest 
cover, of which 42.71 Ha is under community management (CBS, 2001; 
PDDC, 2001). The land types in the same VDC are presented in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Type of Land in Phalebas Area  
 
Source: PDDC (2001) 
 
Ever since the construction of the canal system, it has remained under the 
management of farmers with both technical and financial inputs. The 
irrigation system is managed by an elected body called Phalebas Irrigation 
Management Committee (PIMC), which is responsible for the day to day 
running of the canal water from the dam, organising operation and 
maintenance activities, conflict resolution and liaising with the DoI. The PIMC 
consists of 20 members, of which five are represented from each of the 
217
145
21 40 14
437
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Khet Pakho Grazing land Forest Uncultivated
lands
Total 
Type of land
Ar
ea
 
in
 
ha
 
 146
Jogichaur, Dee-Kumalgaun, Satkuriya and Chaubiskuria branches. These 
branches have their own eleven member branch committee, of which five are 
represented in the PIMC.   The branch committee consists of an eleven 
member committee including the president, vice-president, secretary, joint 
secretary, treasurer and six other members.   
 
The PIMC has employed two gate watchmen, also called Dhalepas, to regulate 
the water supply in the canal system. The two Dhalepas have been assigned 
responsibilities for taking care of the canal structures across all sections 
including the headworks. The PIMC has employed a messenger called 
‘Katuwal’ of the dalit caste, who is remunerated with one pathi (about 4.5 kg) 
of food grains per household in all seasons after harvesting. For the purpose of 
informing the farmers of any meetings, operation and maintenance activities, 
the Katuwal stands on elevated land and blows his pipes (Karnal) and make 
the announcement four times facing each of the four directions. This 
mechanism of message delivery has proven to be extremely effective in 
informing the farmers about meetings and operation and maintenance 
activities (which the local farmers called ‘chinna jane’).  
 
The water diversion structures and proportioning weirs are all traditional, 
using locally available materials.  In the FMIS, for the purpose of water 
distribution, the farmers use flow splinters, which help to divide the water 
volume into different secondary and tertiary canals, proportionate to the land 
area which the secondary and tertiary canals are irrigating.  The wooden 
proportioning weirs, called Gahak, which are made of water resistant simal 
wood, are placed across the canal with sections cut to allow the water to flow 
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through them.  A detailed description of the Gahak is described in Chapter Six 
(Section 6.4.1).  
 
The canal command area of the FMIS has a typical rural setting with no access 
to roads or modern means of transportation and urban markets. The nearest 
local market, called Kusma bazaar, which is also the headquarters of the 
Parbat district, is about three hours journey by foot.  The local economy of the 
canal command area is primarily agriculture based, as about 94.5 percent of 
the population of Phalebas Devisthan V.D.C. has agriculture as its primary 
occupation while 2.3 percent and 3.2 are involved in business and services 
respectively (PDDC, 2001). 
 
A schematic diagram of the FMIS is presented in Figure 3.5. The FMIS flows 
in an East-west direction. The canal is not elongated, and has a relatively flat 
river basin as its command area. It flows through a rough terrain which is 
prone to landslides, particularly during the Monsoon seasons.  
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Figure 3.5: Schematic Diagram of Phalebas Irrigation Canal and its 
Command Area 
 
 
 
   
3.5.3 The Rainastar Irrigation System (RIS) 
 
The Rainastar Irrigation System is an example of JMIS which is located in the 
south-eastern part of the Lamjung district. Covering three tar areas 
(Rainastar, Alkatar and Sahilitar), it is about 120 kilometres west of 
Kathmandu. The canal system was initiated by the Government of Nepal 
(GoN) in 1984 with the technical and financial support of the World Bank, 
UNDP and the ILO and was completed in 1996. The canal structure consists of 
an alternative permanent headwork without a dam. The dam uses some 
sophisticated technologies to divert back water after hitting steep cliffs on the 
bank of the Chepe river. The canal was envisaged to cover an aggregate area of 
850 Ha of Bhalayakharka, Chakratirtha and Dhamilikuwa V.D.Cs, to raise 
Jogichaur  
Kumal Gaun Pallosaat 
Wallosaat 
Thulachaur 
Dein Area 
Irrigation Canal 
Wallochaubis  
Lamaha Khola 
Pallochaubis 
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the economic standard of 11,918 people residing in 1708 households. The 
actual area and the households served by the canal is much lower than initially 
estimated. The total length of the Rainastar irrigation canal is 21 km including 
tertiary canals which are longitudinally elongated sloping towards the south-
west and forming a triangle. The canal system is fed by a perennial river 
named the Chepe, which flows in a south-westerly direction. The canal 
command area of the JMIS consists of tar land surrounded by the Chepe river 
in the south-eastern part, and surrounded by the perennial Marsyangdi river 
in the south-western part. The northern part of the canal command area is 
occupied by foothills of the local Rainas danda in the Mahabharat range. The 
canal command area is situated at an average elevation of 600 to 800 meters 
from sea level and consists of a mixture of undulating terraces and hillocks 
along the Chepe river valley.  The soil types range from silt-clay loamy to 
sandy loamy soil, with low water holding capacities and requiring high water 
application for crop production. In the Dhamilikuwa, the soil is more fertile 
with better water holding capacity than the soil in Chakratirtha and 
Bhalayakharka where soils are mixed with gravel, boulders, sand and silt, 
which reduces the water holding capacity of the soil. 
 
The diversion structures and gates installed in the canal system are permanent 
and modern but the farmers also make extensive use of their ad-hoc local 
technologies for water diversion, especially at the secondary and tertiary canal 
levels. The land under cultivation consists of unlevelled terraces with plots 
which have bunds to hold water for the cultivated crops. The area mainly 
consists of streams, gullies, terraced farmland and steep areas.  
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Photo 3.5 Headwork of JMIS 
 
 
 
 
Photo 3.6 Canal Cross Section of JMIS 
 
 
 
Immediately after the completion of the canal, it was managed by the 
Department of Irrigation (DoI) for a few years. But due to a high degree of 
enthusiasm from the local farmers to undertake the management 
responsibilities, the DoI transferred the canal to local management while 
retaining some of its responsibilities. Now, the canal system is managed 
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jointly by a committee of 21 members called the Rainastar Irrigation 
Management Committee (RIMC). The RIMC consists of the chairpersons of 16 
branch committees who are ex-officio members of the RIMC and an elected 
president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and a representative of the DoI. 
The members of the RIMC have tenure of three years.  
 
The minor O & M activities, conflict resolution and other minor activities are 
carried out under the juisdiction of the RMIC while the responsibilities for 
major O & M activities are carried out by the DoI.  The canal command area 
has been divided into 16 blocks, each with its own 11 member block 
committee, responsible for the day to day running of the branch canal water in 
their respective blocks, organising operation and maintenance activities, 
conflict resolution and liaising with the RIMC.  
 
The canal command area of the JMIS represents a typical rural setting with no 
access to roads or modern means of transportation.  The nearest local market, 
Baisjanghar and the Turture bazaar in the neighbouring Tanahu district are 
situated just about half an hour and two hours walking distance respectively. 
The local economy of the canal command area was primarily agriculture 
based, with about 81.52 percent of the population of the canal command area 
of the JMIS engaged in agricultural activities. The farming system in the canal 
command area is traditional, with virtually no use of mechanised farming. 
Mostly the farmers use traditional methods of cultivation, like wooden 
ploughs and oxen for ploughing and tillage. 
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Generally, each block covers village settlements, but sometimes the block 
consists of a few village hamlets.  In the JMIS, blocks 1-5 are situated at the 
head of the canal while blocks 6-11 are located in the middle section of the 
canal command area and blocks 12-16 at the tail end. The size of the block 
area ranges from 32 Ha to 80 Ha. Block 11, which comprises Pakhetar village, 
is the smallest block with a command area of 32 Ha and block 13 is made up of 
two villages, namely Majha-hatiya and Naya Pauwa villages is the largest 
block with a command area of 80 Ha. In general, the smaller blocks are 
situated at the head end and larger blocks at the tail end. It should be noted 
that the size of the block is not based on the location, but on the number of 
households and the command canal of the branch canal.  
 
Figure 3.6 presents a schematic diagram of the JMIS. The physical shape of 
the Rainastar canal is C-shaped, elongated longitudinally and running along 
the steep slopes of the Rainastar hill. The canal command area of the JMIS is 
plateau-like flat land, sloping on both sides to the bed of the river Chepe on 
the eastern side and the Marshyangdi on the western side.   
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Figure 3.6 Schematic Diagram of Rainastar Irrigation Canal and its 
Command Area 
 
 
 
3.6. Using Mixed Methods 
 
Having selected three case study sites, data for this research were generated 
using multiple research methods, typical of the case study approach. The 
rationale for using a mixed methods approach was to reduce the likelihood of 
misinterpretation and to strengthen the data gathering and subsequent data 
analysis. The research makes use of between methods or across method 
triangulation rather than within-method triangulations (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998). Cross-method triangulation combines dissimilar methods to 
investigate the same conceptual phenomena and units of analysis (Flick, 
2006; Miller and Gatta, 2006). There are a number of ways in which 
triangulations have been used to increase the validity and reliability of social 
science research which are highlighted below: 
 
Bhalayakharka 
Chakratirtha 
Dhamilikuwa  
Rainastar Irrigation Canal  
Chepe River source 
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a) Data triangulation: Entails a process of gathering data through several 
sampling strategies so that samples are drawn from the same 
population at different points in time and social situations.  
b) Investigator triangulation:  Encompassess a research process in which 
more than one researcher in the field to gather and interpret data is 
used. 
c) Theoretical triangulation: Represents a research process where more 
than one theoretical position in interpreting data is used. 
d) Methodological triangulation: Refers to the use of more than one 
method for gathering data. 
e) Environmental triangulation: Consists of a research process in which 
researchers make use of different environmental conditions such as 
locations, settings and times. 
                                                                                           (Denzin, 1970 p.300)  
 
This thesis has used a number of methods for gathering primary data which 
include a household survey, focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews (methodological triangulation).  The methodological triangulation 
provided an opportunity to gain a better understanding of farmers’ lives and 
the ways in which they experience them and express their life stories (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005). Furthermore, combining different methods made it 
possible to clarify views that farmers held in relation to their irrigation canal 
from several standpoints (Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983) and to verify their 
interpretation, based on what had been gathered simultaneously using various 
methods (Stake, 1995, Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). By adopting such a 
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strategy, the “flaws of one method are often the strengths of another” 
(Denzin, 1978 p.302). 
 
The employment of a mixed methods approach was decided on the basis of 
research needs, relevance, feasibility, accessibility and availability of research 
materials (Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2009). The process of triangulation occurred 
throughout data gathering and data analysis, and the findings were combined 
by using both quantitative and qualitative methods, and inferences and 
conclusions drawn accordingly. Simultaneously, the central phenomenon was 
explored and verified by qualitative data (Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and 
Creswell, 2007). Also, the research process involved investigator triangulation 
implicitly as data were generated by three individuals, including the author as 
a Principal Investigator (PI) and two Nepalese students as research assistants.  
Both of the research assistants were studying rural development in Nepal: one 
with a background in forestry and the other in agri-business. Both of the 
research assistants were knowledgeable about the farming system, literature 
on natural resource management and local livelihood practices. They also had 
excellent communication skills, which made my own contacts with the rural 
households extremely easy (Bailey, 1996).  
 
 
The research assistants were given two days training in conducting fieldwork, 
including household survey and taking notes during the focus group 
discussions. The research assistants also took part in a questionnaire pre-
testing exercise to familiarise themselves with the household survey. Every 
effort was made to ensure that the research assistants collected data to the 
highest standard.  
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Furthermore, data collection took place in different settings and different 
timings i.e. environmental triangulation. The household survey took place at 
different times of the day during the fieldwork.  The time of the focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews varied in the different locations 
within the research sites.  The timing of the focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews had to be adjusted to meet the needs of the research 
participants for their convenience and to maximise the number of individuals 
participating in these activities (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1993; Bryman, 
2004). On some occasions, the focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews took place in the morning whilst on other occasions they were 
conducted during the day or even in the evenings depending upon the 
availability of and convenience for the research participants. All aspects of 
research design, data collection and data analysis used mixed methods 
concurrently, as presented in Figure 3.7 (page 206). 
 
The various methods used for data collection included a household survey, 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups, observation, field notes and 
documentary analysis, all within the overall design of a case study. Data 
triangulation, in which data were derived from several sources from different 
stakeholders in different settings, (farmers, members of the WUA committee, 
local politicians, the elderly, women, dalits, irrigation bureaucrats, engineers, 
policy makers and experts in the field) was employed (Mason, 2002). By 
selecting different settings, the similarities and unique aspects of the concepts 
in the settings emerged (Denzin, 1978).   
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All of the key informant interviews and focus group discussions were recorded 
using a portable audio recorder after getting consent from the research 
participants. The recording of the key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions were transcribed immediately after each session to capture and 
remember key information. The author was involved in transcribing and 
translating the data, and both the transcription and translation were carried 
out in ways which captured everything that was being said and the contents of 
the respondents’ replies were not edited. Since the transcription and 
translation were done in the field itself, it was possible to cross-check and 
clarify the contradictions arising from the interview notes with the 
translations. If there were any contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
content then they were immediately clarified through the local key informant 
interviewees.  Since all the qualitative data were audio recorded and saved in 
the computer, it was easier to double check for contradictions and 
inconsistencies during data analysis as well, and if any contradictions or 
anomalies still remained, those were clarified through follow up calls to the 
WUAs and the local farmers in the research sites.  
 
The following section presents a brief discussion on the various methods used 
for collection data for this research. 
 
3.6.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Although commonly adopted under different aegis in the past, in recent years 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) have re-emerged as a popular data collection 
method in social sciences. They have been used to explore specific issues, such 
as people’s views and experiences of contraception (Barker and Rich, 1992), 
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drink driving (Basch et al.,1989), nutrition (Crokett et al.,1990), mental health 
(Grunig, 1990), communication studies (Albrecht et al.,1995; Staley, 1990), 
education (Brotherson and Goldstein, 1992), politics (Delli-Capini and 
Williams, 1994), marketing (Greenbaum, 1993) and development studies 
(Bamberger, 2000; Cernea, 1991).  The following section presents a critical 
appraisal of the FGD, including its strengths, limitations and the process 
through which those strengths have been consolidated and limitations 
overcome during the operationalisation of the research.  
 
    3.6.1.1 Strengths of Focus Group Discussions 
 
The nature of the research questions demand a detailed understanding of the 
farmers’ perceptions, thoughts, feelings and emotions and thorough 
exploration of  their experience of irrigation systems, their farming activities 
and rural village politics  and their expectations of the irrigation systems 
(Krueger, 1988a). Since very little was known about farmers’ perceptions of 
irrigation systems, it was necessary to stimulate research participants to gain 
an in-depth picture.  In order to obtain rich contextual data, the focus group is 
the best suited research method, as it helps to identify farmers’ concerns and 
stimulate fresh ideas pertinent to irrigation issues. Catherine Hakim argues: 
“focus group discussion is often used for exploratory research areas where 
relatively little is known” (2000 p.38).  The operational flexibility of focus 
group methods helped the author to adapt them to obtain the changing 
circumstances of the different settings (location, caste composition, timing 
and so on) in which those discussions took place.  
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The focus group discussion was also an efficient means of determining the 
language people used when thinking and talking about irrigation issues and 
the prevailing institutional settings (Krippendorf, 2004). This helped to 
provide concentrated amounts of rich data, in participants’ own words, where 
the participants’ interactions added richness to the data that might be missed 
in individual interviews or surveys and, more importantly, provided critical 
information in the development and interpretation of quantitative survey data 
and subsequent data analysis. Focus group discussions also provided an 
opportunity for the researcher to interact directly with participants, 
facilitating discussions, probing responses, posing follow up questions and 
clarifying any dubious and contentious issues (Stewart et al., 2007; Foddy, 
1993).  Some of the contentious issues in this research included alleged 
corruption by the members of the WUA committee in the AMIS, non-payment 
of water levy by farmers in the JMIS and alleged vandalism of canal 
infrastructures in the FMIS. For example, one of the participants of a focus 
group discussion in the AMIS mentioned that he was reluctant to pay the 
water fee.   When asked to provide reasons for being reluctant to pay the water 
fee, he said that on the one WUA had failed provide water regularly while on 
the other hand it was involved in misuse of the fund. This issue was probed 
during the focus group discussions and another participant who was a serving 
executive committee member of the WUA committee disclosed that some of 
the members of the WUA had misused the fund in the past and the WUA 
lacked a proper auditing of its financial activities.  In this respect, focus group 
discussions also helped to facilitate the interpretation of the quantitative 
results and add depth to the responses obtained in the more structured survey 
(ibid.). 
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     3.6.1.2 Limitations of Focus Group Discussions  
 
However, despite all the above mentioned substantive and practical 
advantages, I had to be careful about some of the limitations to the focus 
group discussions.  Some researchers have increasingly become critical of the 
value of focus group discussions as a way of generating data (Kitzinger, 1993; 
Wimmer and Dominick, 1997; Krueger, 1988a, b; Morgan, 2002).  Some of 
the common criticisms of the focus group discussion as a research method 
which are reported in the literature include the following:   
Firstly, the limited number of participants has meant that the data obtained 
from them begs questions on representativeness of the data and the 
generalisability of the research findings.  Secondly, the interactions between 
participants and moderator and amongst participants, particularly the latter’s’ 
responses, were not independent of each other.  This might skew their 
opinions and put the generalisability of the findings into question (Argyris, 
1988). Thirdly, some participants of the focus group discussions were highly 
interactive, whilst some were hesitant to participate. Whilst active 
participation is encouraged, imbalanced participation in a focus group can 
skew not only the discussion but also the data generated and the subsequent 
analysis as Wimmer and Dominick (1997) argue:  
 
“---focus groups are not a good research methodology because of the 
potential influence of one or two respondents on the remaining members of 
the group. These critics say that a dominant respondent can negatively affect 
the outcome of the group and that group pressures may influence the 
comments made by individuals” (p.461).  
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Fourthly, given the ‘open ended’ nature of the FGDs, there is a danger that the 
discussion might be lengthy and unrelated to the core research theme. 
Protracted and unrelated discussion leads to the generation of irrelevant data 
at the cost of genuine discussions on the research topic.   
 
    3.6.1.3 Operationalisation of Focus Group Discussions  
 
The participants of the focus group discussions and were drawn from different 
categories to reflect the socio-economic heterogeneity of the community and 
to make the samples more representative.  From the FMIS, all together 56 
farmers were grouped into five categories with one from each of the five 
branches of the Phalebas canal. Detailed information on the number of 
participants and the different heterogeneities they represent is presented in 
Table 3.6. The first focus group discussion in the FMIS took place at a meeting 
place in the Sewa Kendra area within the Jogi Chaur branch. All together, 11 
farmers participated in the meeting. There were three farmers from the head 
and the middle section and 5 from the tail end. Similarly, there were three 
farmers from large landholding categories whilst two and three farmers from 
medium and small landholding categories respectively. Of the total 
participants, nine were from higher caste groups and the remaining two 
belonged to the dalit castes. Two of the participants had agriculture as a 
secondary occupation whilst nine people took agriculture as a primary 
occupation. The participants had different educational qualifications as seven 
of them were illiterate and three farmers were educated to primary level. Only 
a small proportion of participants (two) were educated to college level. There 
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were an equal number of male and female participants in the focus group 
discussions. 
 
The second focus group discussion took place at the Tallo Khaula of Dee area 
branch within the FMIS where all together 20 people participated. 
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Table 3.6: Focus Group Discussions in the FMIS  
Categories  Focus Group Discussions [Venue for Discussions] 
% (n) 
Jogi Chaur Dee Area Kumal Gaun Sat Kuriya Chhaubis Kuriya 
Gender [Sewa Kendra] [Tallo Khaula] [Kumal Gaun] [Devi temple] [Phalebas Bazaar] 
Male                           91 (10)  75 (15)  66.6 (4)  70 (7)  66.6 (6)  
    Female                        9 (1)    25 (5)    33.3 (2)  30 (3)  33.3 (3)  
Location      
Head end                  27 (3)   35 (6)   33.3 (2) 30 (3) 22 (2)  
Middle end              27 (3)   25 (5)    33.3 (2)  50 (5)  33.3 (3)  
Tail end                      46 (5)   45 (9)    33.3 (2)   20 (2)  44.7 (4)  
Landholdings      
    Larger                         27 (3)   20 (4)    16.6 (1)  20 (2)  22 (2)  
   Medium                      18 (2)   15 (3)    16.6 (1) 20 (2) 11 (1)  
   Small                          55 (6)   65 (13)  66.6 (4) 60 (6)  66.6 (6)  
Caste      
    Higher caste               82 (9)   85 (17)  33.3 (2)  60 (6)  66.6 (6)  
Dalits 18 (2)   15 (3)   66.6 (4)  40 (4)  33.3 (3)  
Primary Occupation      
    Agriculture 73 (7)   10 (2)   83.4 (5)  80 (8)  100 (9)  
   Non- agriculture 27 (3)   90 (18)  16.6 (1)  20 (2)  0 (0)  
Level of Education       
      Illiterate 46 (5)  60 (12)  83.4 (5)   60 (6)  44.7 (4)  
      Primary  27 (3)  35 (7)    16.6 (1)  30 (3)  22 (2)  
      College          27 (3)   5 (1)    0 (0)  10 (1)  33.3 (3)  
Others 
Total                              
 
100 (11)  
 
100 (20)  
 
100 (6)  
 
100 (10)  
 
100 (9)  
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A significantly higher proportion of the participants (12 participants) were 
illiterate whilst remaining seven and one participants had education up to 
primary and college level respectively. There were 15 male and five female 
farmer participants in the focus group.  A significantly higher proportion of 
farmers (nine) were tail-enders whilst the remaining five and six participants 
came from the middle and the head sections of the canal command area 
respectively. Similarly, a significantly higher proportion of farmers (13 in 
total) were small farmers, whilst farmers belonging to the large and medium 
landholding category were four and three respectively. A total of 17 
participants belonged to higher castes while the remaining three participants 
were from the dalit castes. Also, an overwhelmingly high number of 
participants (18 in total) had agriculture as their primary occupation whilst 
the remaining two participants took agriculture as their secondary occupation.  
 
The third focus group discussion was held at the village of Kumal Gaun of the 
Kuman Gaun branch within the FMIS where all together only six farmers 
participated in discussions, of which four were males and the remaining two 
were females.  There were equal number of participants (two each) from the 
head end, middle end and tail end of the branch canal. Of the six participants, 
four were small landholders whilst the remaining participants (one each) 
belonged to medium and large landholding categories.  Two participants were 
from higher castes whilst the remaining four participants belonged to the dalit 
castes. Also, none of the participants had a college level of education. The 
participants were either illiterate or had just primary level education. A 
majority of the participants were involved in agricultural activities whilst a 
small proportion of them had agriculture as secondary occupation.  
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Similarly, a focus group discussion was held at the Devi temple area of the 
village of Satkuriya, which is located within the FMIS. A total of 10 people 
participated in the discussions, of which seven were males while the 
remaining three were females.  The participants of the Devi temple meeting 
were very heterogeneous. The number of participants from head, middle and 
tail end of the branch canal were three, five and two respectively.  A majority 
of the participants (six) were small farmers and of the other four, two were 
from the medium and two were from the large landholding categories. All of 
the participants in Satkuria village had agriculture as their primary 
occupation. Also, there were six participants from higher castes and four from 
the dalit castes.  
 
The final focus group discussions took place in the Phalebas Bazaar area of 
Chaubiskuriya branch within the FMIS, in which a total of nine farmers 
participated; six of which were male and three were female. Also, there were 
six participants from higher caste groups while remaining three participants 
belonged to the dalit castes. Six participants belonged to small landholding 
categories while two came from large landholding groups and only one from 
the medium landholding category.  The number of participants from the head 
end, middle end and tail end of the branch canal were two, three and four 
respectively.  Of the total participants, three were educated to college level and 
four farmers were illiterate. There were two participants with a primary level 
of education.  
 
Similar focus group discussions were also held in the AMIS area with 
heterogeneous participants. All together, 59 farmers were grouped into five 
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categories with one from each of the five branches of the AMIS.  More detailed 
information on the number of participants and the different heterogeneities 
they represent is presented in Table 3.7. The first focus group meeting was 
held at the Dunge Patan area of BC-1 within the AMIS where a total of 12 
farmers participated in the meeting, of which 10 were male and the remaining 
two were female. There were an equal number (four each) of farmers 
participating from the middle, head and tail end of the BC-1.  A significant 
proportion of participants (seven) were small farmers while participants from 
the medium and large landholding categories were three and two respectively.  
Also, ten of the participating farmers were from higher castes while the 
remaining two belonged to the dalit castes.  Similarly, agriculture was a 
primary occupation for nine participants and a secondary occupation for the 
remaining three.   
 
The second focus group discussion was held at the Upallo Gagangauda area of 
the BC-2 in which 14 farmers participated in the discussions, of which 10 were 
male and the remaining four were female.  Four farmers were head-enders 
while the remaining 10 farmers (five each) were from the middle and tail end 
of the branch canal. The numbers of participants from the large, medium and 
small landholding categories were as three, six and five respectively.  The 
participants represented both higher and lower castes with 11 of them from 
the former and three from the latter caste group.  Ten participants considered 
agriculture as their primary occupation, whilst the remaining four undertook 
non-agricultural activities as a primary occupation but undertook agriculture 
as secondary occupation. 
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Table 3.7: Focus Group Discussions in the AMIS 
 
Categories  Focus Group Discussions [Venue for Discussions] 
% (N) 
BC-1 BC-2 BC-3 BC-4 BC-5 
Gender [Dhunge 
Patan] 
[Upallo 
Gagangauda] 
[Sajha Bazaar] [Tallo 
Gagangauda] 
[Eklo Kuna] 
Male                           83 (10) 71 (10) 100 (13) 78 (7) 73 (8) 
    Female                        17 (2) 29 (4) 0 (0) 22 (2) 27 (3) 
Location      
Head end                  33.3 (4) 29 (4) 30 (4) 33.3 (3) 36.5 (4) 
Middle end              33.3 (4) 35.5 (5) 30 (4) 33.3 (3) 27 (3) 
Tail end                      33.3 (4) 35.5 (5) 40 (5) 33.3 (3) 36.5 (4) 
Landholdings      
   Larger                         17 (2) 21.5 (3) 23 (3)  22 (2) 18 (2) 
   Medium                      25 (3) 43 (6) 40 (4) 33.3 (3) 27 (3) 
   Small                          58 (7) 35.5 (5) 37 (6) 44.7 (4) 65 (6) 
Caste      
    Higher caste               83 (10) 78.5 (11) 85 (11) 78 (7) 82 (9) 
Dalits 17 (2) 21.5 (3) 15 (2) 22 (2) 18 (2) 
Primary Occupation      
    Agriculture 75 (9) 71 (10) 77 (10) 89 (8) 73 (8) 
   Non- agriculture 25 (3) 29 (4) 23 (3) 11 (1) 27 (3) 
Level of Education       
      Illiterate 25 (3) 29 (4) 23 (3) 22 (2) 18 (2) 
      Primary  41.7 (5) 42 (6) 37 (6) 44.7 (4) 36.5 (4) 
      College          33.3 (4) 29 (4) 40 (4) 33.3 (3) 45.5 (5) 
Total                              12 (100) 100 (14) 13 (100) 9 (100) 11 (100) 
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Similar focus group discussions were also held at Sajha Bazaar area of the BC-
3 within the AMIS in which a total of 13 farmers participated.  However, these 
focus group discussions were characterised by a complete absence of female 
participants. All of the participants were male; five were from the tail-end 
while the middle and the head end section of the branch canal were 
represented by four participants respectively. This group was also dominated 
by individuals from higher caste groups; 11 participants belonged to higher 
castes while only three came from dalit castes.  The number of farmers 
belonging to large, medium and small landholding categories were three, four 
and six respectively.  Ten participants undertook agriculture as their primary 
occupation and four as a secondary occupation.  
 
The fourth focus group discussions were held at the Tallo Gagangauda area of 
the BC-4 from the AMIS in which a total of nine people participated, of which 
seven were male and two were female. Three farmers from each of the head, 
middle and tail end of the BC-4 participated in the focus group discussions.  
Similarly, the group was dominated by the farmers from the higher castes 
(seven) compared with the dalit castes (two).  A majority of the participants 
(eight) undertook agriculture as their primary occupation while only one of 
them undertook it as a secondary occupation. The group was also very 
heterogeneous in terms of the participants’ levels of education. Three 
participants were educated to college level while four of them had a primary 
level education. The remaining two were illiterate.  
 
Similar focus group discussions were also held at the Eklo Kuna village of BC-
5 in the AMIS in which 11 members of the local community participated. 
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Similar to other groups, this group was also highly heterogeneous. Eight 
participants were male while the remaining three were female. There were 
four individuals each participating from the head and the tail end of BC-5 
while three were from the middle section of the branch canal. There were two 
farmers with a large landholding whilst three medium landholders and six 
small landholders.  Two of the participants belonged to dalit castes whilst the 
remaining nine were farmers from higher caste groups.  
 
Focus group discussions were held in the JIMS area too.  All together, six 
focus group discussions were held in different blocks (branch canals) of the 
JMIS in which a total of 84 farmers participated.  Detailed information on the 
number of participants and the different heterogeneities they represent is 
presented in Table 3.8. The first focus group discussions were held at the 
Borangkhola village of Block-1 from the JMIS in which a total of 11 people 
participated of which eight were male and three were female. Four farmers 
from each of the middle and tail end of the Block-1 participated in the focus 
group discussions while three participants were head-enders.  Similarly, the 
group was dominated by the farmers from the higher castes (eight) whilst only 
three participants came from the dalit castes.  A majority of the participants 
(eight) undertook agriculture as their primary occupation and only three as a 
secondary occupation.  The group was also very heterogeneous in terms of 
level of education of the participants. Two participants were educated to 
college level while six of them completed primary education. The remaining 
three were illiterate. 
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Table 3.8: Focus Group Discussions in the JMIS 
Categories                    Focus Group Discussions [Venue for Discussions] 
                                                % (n) 
 
Block 1 Block 4-5 Block 7 Block  11 Block 13 Block 16 
Gender [Borang 
Khola] 
[Satbise 
Bazaar] 
[Tinpiple] [Gaulitar] [Nayapauwa] [Thulo 
Bagaincha] 
Male                           72 (8)  73 (11) 59 (10) 50 (6) 66.6 (10) 64 (9) 
    Female                        28 (3)  27 (4) 41 (7) 50 (6) 33.3 (5) 36 (5) 
Location       
Head end                  28 (3) 33.3 (5) 30 (5) 33.3 (4) 33.3 (5) 28 (4) 
Middle end              36 (4) 33.3 (5) 35 (6) 33.3 (4) 33.3 (5) 36 (5) 
Tail end                      36 (4) 33.3 (5) 35 (6) 33.3 (4) 33.3 (5) 42 (6) 
Landholdings       
   Larger                         18 (2) 20 (3) 24 (4) 25 (3) 27 (4) 21 (3) 
   Medium                      28 (3) 33.3 (5) 35 (6) 33.3 (4) 27 (4) 21 (3) 
   Small                          54 (6) 46.7 (7) 41 (7) 42 (5) 46 (7) 58 (8) 
Caste       
    Higher caste               72 (8) 80 (12) 76 (13) 66.6 (8) 66.6 (10) 72 (10) 
Dalits 28 (3) 20 (3) 24 (4) 33.3 (4) 33.3 (5) 28 (4) 
Primary Occupation       
    Agriculture 72 (8) 73 (11) 70 (12) 84 (10) 80 (12) 72 (10) 
   Non- agriculture 28 (3) 27 (4) 30 (5) 16 (2) 20 (3) 28 (4) 
Level of Education        
      Illiterate 28 (3) 46.7 (7) 35 (6) 42 (5) 40 (6) 28 (4) 
      Primary  54 (6) 33.3 (5) 41 (7) 42 (5) 40 (6) 36 (5) 
      College          18 (2) 20 (3) 24 (4) 16 (2) 20 (3) 36 (5) 
Total                              100 (11) 100 (15) 100 (17) 100 (12) 100 (15) 100 (14) 
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The second focus group discussion in the JMIS took place at meeting place in 
the Satbise Bazaar of Chakratirtha VDC in which farmers from Block-4 and 5 
participated in the discussions. All together, 15 farmers participated in the 
meeting. There were five participants from the head, the middle and the tail 
section of the blocks. Similarly, there were three farmers from large 
landholding categories whilst five and seven farmers from medium and small 
landholding categories respectively. Of the total participants, 13 were from the 
higher caste groups and the remaining four belonged to the dalit castes. Ten 
of the participants had agriculture as a secondary occupation whilst for seven 
of the participants agriculture was a primary occupation. The participants had 
different educational qualifications as seven of them were illiterate and five 
farmers had received primary education. Only a small proportion of 
participants (three) were educated to college level. There were 11 male 
participants and seven participants were female. 
 
Similar focus group discussions were also held at the Tinpiple Bazaar area of 
the Block-7 within the JMIS in which a total of 17 farmers participated.  
However, this focus group discussion was characterised by a gender balance to 
a respectable degree.  Ten participants were male whilst seven were female. 
The middle and the tail end sections of the branch canal were represented by 
six participants each, while five members were from head-enders. This group 
was also being dominated by individuals from higher caste groups with13 
participants and only four from dalit castes.  The number of farmers 
belonging to large, medium and small landholding categories was four, six and 
seven respectively.  Twelve participants had agriculture as their primary 
occupation whilst five had it as a secondary occupation.  
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The fourth focus group discussions were held at the Gaulitar village area of the 
Block-11 from the JMIS in which there was a total of twelve farmers with equal 
participation of both male and female. Six participants were male and six were 
female.  Also, there was equal representation from head, middle and tail 
sections of the canal with four farmers from each respectively.  Similarly, the 
group had a significantly higher proportion of farmers from higher castes; 
with eight compared to only four from the dalit castes. A majority of the 
participants (ten) were involved in agriculture as a primary occupation whilst 
only two of them as a secondary occupation. The group was also very 
heterogeneous in terms of participants’ level of education. Two participants 
were educated to college level while five of them had received a primary 
education. The remaining five were illiterate.  
 
Similar focus group discussions were also held at Nayapauwa area of Block 13 
and Thulobagaincha area of Block 16 from the JMIS. Similar to other groups, 
the participants of these focus group discussions were also highly 
heterogeneous and represented the socio-economically diverse communities. 
The details on the number of participants from different categories of 
heterogeneities are presented in Table 3.8.  
 
 
Firstly, in order to encapsulate the heterogeneous nature of the irrigation 
communities, careful consideration was given to ensuring that an adequate 
sample was selected from several subgroups (e.g. gender, age, level of 
education, size of landholding, location and caste/ethnicity). These subgroups 
were developed based on the heterogeneities existing in the rural communities 
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of the research sites as mentioned in Chapter Two (Section 2.5 and Section 
2.10). This was achieved by sampling purposively. The idea of purposive 
sampling is to increase internal generalisation or trustworthiness of data as 
opposed to external generalisation (Gomm et al., 2000, Kemper et al., 2003). 
Purposive sampling not only helped capture community heterogeneity but 
also to gather rich data, including both typical and atypical cases (Patton, 
1990; Lofland and Lofland, 2006). This helped in garnering information on 
the farmers’ needs, expectations, degrees of engagement in and dependence 
on irrigation resources through gaining access to the farmers’ natural, cultural 
and social world (McCracken, 1988; Gomm et al., 2000). The selection of 
atypical cases also gave opportunity to learn more from their stories (Stake, 
1995). It is clear from Tables 3.6-3.8 that the participants of the FGD 
represented heterogeneous communities, including participants from each of 
different location, caste/ethnicity, landholding size, educational level, 
occupation and gender. 
 
Secondly, the level of interactions amongst the participants of the focus group 
discussions and the discussion between the participants and the moderator, 
has an immense bearing not just on the interactions themselves but also for 
the quality of the data generated (Gilbert, 2008).  Whilst almost all the focus 
group discussions were conducted reasonably smoothly, some of them were 
clearly challenging. Some of the problems encountered during the focus group 
discussions include dominant and hesitant members of the group, private 
conversation and whispering, and discussion becoming lengthy and unrelated 
to the topic. In order to overcome these problems a number of strategies were 
used. Firstly, the role of moderator was absolutely critical in managing the 
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focus group discussions (Puchta and Potter, 2004; Stewart et al., 2007).  The 
author recognised the importance of having a group moderator and took on 
this role for the focus group discussions by demonstrating excellent 
interpersonal and communication skills, and showing a genuine interest in all 
the participants. As a moderator, the author understood his role and acted as 
a neutral moderator rather than participating actively in the discussion as this 
was likely to influence the interactions and responses (Bryman, 2008).  The 
author demonstrated both passion and patience in moderating and listening 
to the views and sometimes uncomfortable remarks expressed by the 
participants of the discussions. The moderator’s role was to act as facilitator 
but also to intervene if the discussions were inappropriate.   
 
Whilst a majority of the focus groups were balanced in terms of individual 
contribution to the discussions, some of the groups comprised of more 
dominant members  than others; resulting in some hesitant participants.  This 
is something that I had anticipated as rural Nepalese society is very 
hierarchical in which some members of the community dominant others. For 
example, crop-sharers would be reluctant to criticise landlords, women are 
dominated by men and people from lower castes are dominated by individuals 
from higher caste groups. For instance, a landlord from a higher caste group 
threatened a landless dalit farmer, who has leased-in a small piece of land 
from him, to stop leasing him land from next year when he criticised him for 
stealing water from the canal. Whilst a level playing field was provided to all 
the participants in the focus group discussions, it should be taken in relative 
terms as some members have remained oppressed in their locality for decades 
if not centuries. The issue of heterogeneities and power relationships amongst 
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the farmers in rural Nepal in relation to their irrigation resources have been 
already discussed in detail in Chapter Two (Sections 2.5 and 2.7).  
 
It was necessary that all the members of the groups participated in the 
discussions as failure to do so would jeopardise the quality of data (Kitzinger, 
1994). The reluctant members were gently drawn into discussions by directing 
questions at them.  When directing questions at the reluctant members of the 
group, care was taken not to intimidate them but to encourage them to 
participate in the discussions freely and actively.  In order to manage the 
dominant members of the group, their contribution was acknowledged and 
other group members were asked what they thought about the dominant 
members’ contribution.  Also, a direct eye contact was avoided with dominant 
members of the group as it might affect the impartiality of the moderator. At 
times, when the members were clearly dominating and driving the discussions 
to irrelevant topics, they were asked in an “assertive” manner to be quiet and 
allow other members to speak and contribute to the discussions (Gilbert, 
2008). If any participants still hesitated in expressing themselves, their 
concerns were followed up after the FGD in one to one interviews. 
 
 
Thirdly, to keep discussions on track and make them relevant to the research 
theme, the moderator guided them around the topic managing some 
dominating and strongly opinionated participants. Topic guides pertinent to 
the research questions were prepared and used for guiding and fostering 
discussion, which made both the discussions and the data obtained 
manageable and minimised lengthy and unrelated conversation prevailing 
during the FGDs.  Topic guides used for focus group discussions are presented 
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in Table 3.13. These encompassed all aspects of irrigation management, 
including the physical conditions of canal infrastructure, collective actions, O 
& M activities, water distribution, water levy collection, revenue regeneration, 
sanctions and conflict resolution, water use and irrigation scheduling, WUA 
committees and so forth.  The use of topic guides for the focus group 
discussions was both practical and helpful in understanding farmers’ 
perceptions, difficulties and challenges faced in managing their canal systems. 
Questions were asked as to how they litigated with the district and regional 
irrigation authorities for such things as budgets and technical expertise. The 
FGDs helped with the understanding of the range of knowledge, attitudes, and 
practices, including the logic of water distribution and the identification of 
vulnerable groups in water distribution.  Other general aspects of block level 
discussions also applied for these FGDs. They were convened to raise 
awareness amongst the irrigators on the wider issues of irrigation 
management, and to discuss in broad terms the objectives of the research 
itself. This helped in gathering useful information pertinent to the research 
questions and solicited feedback on the kinds of information that the study 
could usefully provide to actors in irrigation management, thus improving the 
livelihoods of vulnerable groups in the area and their access to irrigation 
water. 
 
The FGDs were held at the branch/block level. Blocks are administrative units 
in irrigation governance, which are primarily responsible for the management 
of the canal networks, and occasionally of the main canal. Each block or 
branch consists of a number of hamlets, which can be ethnically diverse, 
mixed or homogenous, depending on settlement patterns.  In general, hamlets 
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in the plot areas are mixed. In order to obtain individual perceptions, FGDs 
were conducted in heterogeneous settings (both in income, social status, 
ethnicity and spatial location of landholdings), and both men and women 
were encouraged to participate fully and contribute actively to the discussion. 
This helped to capture the gender dimensions and capitalise on the 
experiences of women.  
 
Open ended questions pertinent to irrigation governance, including conflict 
resolution, water distribution, fee payment and so on were put to the 
members who took part in FGDs. The groups provided a unique opportunity 
to understand the perceptions of community members on a number of issues, 
including the functioning of block committees, roles and responsibilities of 
farmers, water charges, water distribution, conflict resolution, and 
management of communal funds, and their awareness of and participation in 
irrigation management.   
 
The rationale for undertaking focus group discussions was to gather farmers’ 
perspectives on the performance of their irrigation systems and the ways in 
which they interacted with each other in relation to their irrigation systems. 
Crucially, it was believed that the data collected through focus group 
discussions would help shed light on the differences in levels of access to 
irrigation water from systems governed by different property rights regimes. 
Although there are no set research questions that the focus group discussions 
sought to answer, it is hoped that the data generated through focus group 
discussions will be helpful in explaining the differences in the level of access to 
irrigation water across different levels of heterogeneity considered for this 
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research. Crucially, the focus group discussions aimed to define the access 
threshold described in this chapter (Section 3.9).  
 
   3.6.2 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) 
 
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) are qualitative interviews with people who 
are aware of what is going on in the community (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
The following section presents a critical review of key informant interviews, 
including its strengths, limitations and the process through which those 
strengths were consolidated and limitations overcome during the 
operationalisation of the research. 
 
    3.6.2.1 Advantages of Key Informant Interviews 
 
 Through key informants interviews, the aim was to gather respondents’   " 
personal feelings, opinions, and behaviours" (Seidler, 1974 p.817), but 
informants generalise "about patterns of behaviour, after summarizing 
either observed (actual) or expected (prescribed) individual relations 
associated with canal related activities" (op. cit. p.817).  By conducting in-
depth interviews, it was possible to analyse not only farmers’ attitudes and 
behaviour, particularly in relation to their irrigation canals, but also the long 
term experiences and expectations concerning the canal, including the canal 
management committees.  
 
In rural Nepal, particularly in the research sites, a majority of farmers have 
agriculture as their primary occupation. Whilst a small proportion of 
respondents were also involved in non-agricultural activities, such as 
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businesses, cottage industries and services, they were also involved in 
agricultural activities to supplement their income and vice-versa. In rural 
Nepal it is very common for individuals with jobs in the business and service 
sectors to also undertake some agricultural activities (Adhikari et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the majority of the farmers who took part in the key informant 
interviews were primarily farmers. The inclusion of individuals with 
agriculture as a secondary occupation in the focus group discussions helped to 
shed light on their views pertinent to the irrigation issues in the villages.  
There was no distinction made between people undertaking agricultural 
activities as a primary occupation and those as a secondary occupation.  
 
Importantly, key informant interviews were used to elicit and provide a 
platform for local farmers, including the dalits, women and uneducated 
people, to share their experiences and have their voices heard (Ungar, 2003; 
Creswell, 2009), which is one of the desired objectives of social policy.  
Furthermore, they helped to explain divergent, unexpected and immature or 
incomplete results, as well as unseen contextual factors (Jick, 1979) during 
analysis and interpretation. In this regard, the key informant interviews 
worked in adjunct to other methods rather than as alternatives to them, 
providing additional evidence of efficacy (Cook and Payne, 2002). In fact, it 
could be argued that the qualitative methods in this study were found to be 
“the glue that cements the interpretation of multi-method results” (Jick in 
Miles and Humberman, 1994 p.42). 
 
Furthermore, through key informant interviews, it was possible to gather in-
depth knowledge on the socio-economic world of the people and the process 
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in which their interactions with each other take place.  It is believed that such 
information is more likely to be generated and understood through in-depth 
key informant interviews, which seek viewpoints of participants (Gomm, 
2004).  The key informant interviews in this study were found to be useful to 
supplement, validate, explain, illuminate and reinterpret quantitative data 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). In some cases, the results of the statistical 
analysis using quantitative data were insignificant but during the 
triangulation process the qualitative data strongly indicated otherwise.  The 
richness of the qualitative data helped to describe both the practical and policy 
significance of the results despite being statistically insignificant. More 
information on these aspects of analysis are presented in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five.  
 
Inaudible and silenced voices and relatively unknown topics (canal shape, 
canal gradient, vandalism and neglect of infrastructures and social and 
economic needs) were explored and explained through the qualitative 
approach, which helped with the understanding of many of the social 
relationships and tacit knowledge of the participants’ social world (Ungar, 
2003).  
 
    3.6.2.2 Limitations of Key Informant Interviews 
 
Like any other research methods, the key informant interviews have some 
significant drawbacks.  It should be pointed out that both informant bias and 
random error can taint informant reports.  Firstly, the information provided 
by an individuals taking part in the in-depth interview may vary significantly 
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depending on socio-economic position within the community and 
organisational role in irrigation related activities (Seidler, 1974). For example, 
the views of the irrigation engineers may systematically vary from those of the 
farmers because their organisational roles influence their interpretations of 
events and evaluations of irrigation performance. In addition, other more 
idiosyncratic sources of error may contaminate informant reports, especially 
retrospective accounts (Salancik and Meindl, 1984, Schwenk, 1985). 
Informant reports suffer from individual memory failure, or the inaccurate 
recall of past events (Golden, 1992), as well as from memory distortion (Nutt, 
1986; Kumar et al., 1993). Secondly, information might be distorted on 
purpose or from hindsight bias, attribution bias, subconscious attempts to 
maintain self-esteem, or impression management (Huber and Power, 1985). 
Also, there is the risk of their being little correspondence between informant 
reports and actual events. 
 
With due acknowledgment of the limitations of key informant interviews, and 
following a set of eligibility questions that verified key informants were 
selected from a pool of individuals who had firsthand knowledge of irrigation 
issues in local settings and could provide complete and in-depth information, 
which would not be available through other means.  
 
3.6.2.3 Operationalisation of Key Informant Interviews  
At the irrigation system level, all together ten individuals from each of the 
AMIS and the JMIS and twelve from the FMIS were selected for the key 
informant interviews.  In order to make the sample more representative of the 
community in all the three irrigation systems, individuals were selected from a 
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range of heterogeneity dimensions including gender, location, size of 
landholding, caste, education and  primary occupation.  The detailed 
characteristics of the sample for Key Informants’ Interviews are presented in 
Table 3.9.  
 
Semi structured interviews were  held with key informants including the dalit 
leaders, women leaders, local landlords, teachers, the Dhalepas from different 
landholding categories, at both head end, middle and tail end of the canal 
structures, past chairmen and incumbent chairmen of the three irrigation 
systems. The Dhalpas are paid staff who are usually from the local area and 
have a wealth of information about the local areas. Their assignments include 
opening and closing water gates and reporting to the block committees in the 
JMIS and the FMIS amongst others, theft of water, and any physical damage 
to canal infrastructures (in the case of the AMIS, they are responsible to the 
DoI. The Dhalepas have superior knowledge about the informal institutions 
that influence the accessibility of irrigation water and cooperation between 
households for the collective management of the irrigation canal. They also 
have knowledge about water theft, and different methods adopted by potential 
fraudsters to steal water from the irrigation canal. The perspectives of 
Dhalepas are important in designing policy interventions to tackle fraud, 
repair canal infrastructures and so on. 
 
The Executive Director of the Farmers Managed Irrigation Promotion Trust 
(FMIPT) was also interviewed to get his perspective on the devolution of 
irrigation governance to local communities in Nepal.  These key informants 
were asked questions pertinent to irrigation governance, funding mechanisms, 
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and issues related to devolution of irrigation management to local farmers. 
Since these activities were associated with bureaucracies, it was anticipated 
that this would be time consuming. In order to avoid bureaucratic hassles and 
for the smooth running of the key informants’ interviews, every effort was 
made to establish contact with the individuals who could help in identifying 
the key informants at a local level.  
 
For the majority of the respondents, agriculture was their primary occupation 
whilst some respondents were also involved in non-agricultural activities such 
as business, cottage industries and services. It should be pointed out that even 
though respondents were involved in non-agricultural activities as their 
primary occupations, they were also involved in agricultural activities to 
supplement their income and vice-versa. In rural Nepal, it is very common for 
individuals with jobs in business and the service sectors to undertake some 
agricultural activities. Also, the majority of the respondents were illiterate, 
which is not uncommon, as the level of education still remains very low in 
rural areas in Nepal.  Whilst it was relatively easy to interview educated 
farmers, it was challenging to interview farmers with little or no education and 
to put probing questions to them. This is because the people with little or no 
education were unfamiliar with activities such as key informant interviews 
and the terminologies used during the course of interviews, were suspicious of 
the objectives of the study and were fearful of making mistakes and giving 
incorrect answers during the interviews. However, in order to include illiterate 
participants, every effort was made to listen to and learn from their 
experiences.   
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The rationale for undertaking key informant interviews was to gather 
qualitative information on farmers’ perspectives on the performance of their 
irrigation systems and the ways in which they interacted with each other in 
relation to to their irrigation systems. Crucially, it is believed that the data 
collected through key informant interviews will help to shed light on the 
differences in farmers’ levels of access to irrigation water from those systems 
governed by different property rights regimes. The data collected through the 
key informant interviews will address the second big issue raised in this thesis, 
i.e. the role of institutions in enabling farmers’ to access irrigation water. It is 
hoped that the data generated through the key informant interviews will be 
helpful in explaining the differences in the level of access to irrigation water 
across all levels of heterogeneity considered for this research.  
 
The participants of the key informant interviews were drawn from different 
categories to reflect the socio-economic heterogeneity of the community and 
to make the sample more representative.  From the FMIS, all together 12 
individuals were interviewed whilst ten key informants were interviewed from 
each of the AMIS and the JMIS. Detailed information on the number of 
participants and the different heterogeneities they represent are presented in 
Table 3.9 It is important to maintain the quality of the data which was 
collected through multiple methods. In order to maintain consistency in the 
nature and the quality of the data collected, they were cross-checked at the 
transcription/translation stage. The contents of the focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews were cross examined in a number of ways. 
Firstly, by physically listening to the recordings made during the interviews. 
Secondly, they were cross-checked during the translation and transcription 
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stages; if any inconsistencies and contradictions were identified they were 
clarified immediately through the local farmers, including key informant 
interviewees and the participants of the focus group discussions.  Thirdly, the 
data was cross-checked during the data analysis process which used thematic 
matrices as provided in Section 3.8.1 (Table 3.13).  Some of the remaining 
contradictions were clarified through follow up calls to the WUAs and the 
local farmers. Whilst consistency in data is an important issue, the 
contradictions which came about were not discarded but were either clarified 
or taken on board by providing sufficient evidence to accommodate different 
viewpoints expressed by the farmers and inferences are reached and 
conclusions drawn chiefly from the primary data generated during the course 
of the research. 
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Table 3.9 Key Informant Interviews in the three irrigation systems 
Categories                                     Key Informants  
 
Gender    JMIS  
% (n) 
AMIS  
% (n) 
FMIS 
% (n) 
Male                           90 (9) 60 (6) 50 (6)   
    Female                        20 (2) 40 (4) 50 (6)   
Location    
Head end                  30 (3) 30 (3) 33.3 (4)  
Middle end              30 (3) 30 (3) 33.3 (4)  
Tail end                      40 (4) 40 (4) 33.3 (4)  
Landholdings    
   Larger                         30 (3) 30 (3) 33.3 (4)  
   Medium                      30 (3) 30 (3) 33.3 (4)  
   Small                          40 (4) 40 (4) 33.3 (4)  
Caste    
    Higher caste               70 (7) 70 (7) 66.6 (8)  
Dalits 30 (3) 30 (3) 33.3 (4)  
Primary Occupation    
    Agriculture 80 (8) 70 (7) 75 (9)  
   Non- agriculture 20 (2) 30 (3) 25 (3) 
Level of Education     
      Illiterate 40 (4) 30 (3) 58 (7)  
      Primary  40 (4) 40 (4) 25 (3) 
      College          20 (2) 30 (3) 17 (2)  
Total                              10 (100)  10 (100) 12 (100) 
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   3.6.3 Household Survey 
 
Surveys have been widely applied in research strategy, aiming to gather data 
in order to map the social world of the subjects (Sturgis, 2008). Social surveys 
are carried out to gather statistical information about the attributes, attitudes 
and actions of a population by administering standardised questions to some 
of its members (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004). The necessity of using 
surveys for this research came from the research questions themselves, 
particularly questions 1a, b,c and d, which sought to investigate and compare 
the benefits received by small farmers, the dalits and tail-enders. All the above 
mentioned research questions have a strong empirical focus, requiring wide 
ranging and inclusive data in order to view the ‘phenomenon’, i.e. their level of 
engagement in and amount of benefits derived from irrigation systems both 
inclusively and comprehensively (Sapsford, 2007).  However, both costs and 
time factors were clearly constraints for conducting comprehensive the survey 
and sampling was clearly a viable option for this research. Since, the 
administration of the research questionnaires was carried out by the author, it 
was relatively inexpensive.  The survey method also provided a unique 
opportunity to sample households, which could relate to the characteristics of 
the population from which the sample was drawn. The survey method was 
very flexible for generating data, particularly the descriptive statistics critical 
to making statistical inferences from sample to population. In other words, by 
using the sample it was possible to make statistical inferences from 
respondents to the wider population through generalisation (Buckingham and 
Saunders, 2004). Equally important, the use of a survey helped to collect 
statistical data with greater precision by standardising the questionnaire 
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design and maintaining uniformity, while executing the survey questions.  The 
statistical data collected through the survey method was useful in 
investigating “causal process, to develop and test hypothesis on associations 
and relationships between the variables” (Hakim, 2000 p.76). The aim of the 
thesis was to compare the irrigation systems governed by different property 
rights regimes.  The standardisation and uniformity of the survey greatly 
assisted the collection of similar data from different irrigation systems, which 
could then be interpreted comparatively (Denscombe, 2006). By using a 
rigorous stratified random sampling procedure, a more representative sample 
was collected, which in turn helped to increase reliability through the 
application of standardised stimuli to the participants and minimising 
participants’ subjectivity (Hakim, 2000).  The sampling procedure is 
described in detail in Section 3.6.3.2.  
 
However, some practical difficulties were encountered during the household 
survey. Firstly, given the heterogeneous nature of the irrigation communities, 
it was a huge challenge to collect a truly representative sample (Fink, 2003), 
but care was taken, through stratified random sampling, to make the sample 
as representative as possible. The method of stratified random sampling 
involves dividing the population into small groups called strata, where groups 
are formed based on their members sharing a specific characteristic. A 
random sample from each stratum is taken, in a number proportional to its 
size when compared to the population (Lohr, 2010). The strata consisted of 
various categories which are based on the socio-economic heterogeneities 
existing in the rural communities in Nepal. The heterogeneities considered for 
the purpose of selecting sample for this research include variables such as 
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caste, gender, location of landholding and size of landholding. The households 
were divided into higher and lower castes. Similarly, the strata along the 
dimension of location of landholding were head end, middle end and the tail 
end depending on the location of household’s landholding within the canal 
command area. Along the gender dimension, households were stratified into 
two categories i.e. male-headed and female-headed households depending on 
who the head of the household was. The head of the household was on the one 
who made major decisions on behalf of other members of the household such 
as financial matters, marriage and participation in local politics including 
irrigation related activities. Also, the households were divided into three 
categories based on the household’s amount of landholding. A detailed 
classification of households based on the size of landholding is provided 
Chapter Three (Section 3.6.3.2). The criteria used for dividing into different 
landholding categories are presented in Table 3.11. These subsets of the strata 
are then pooled to form a random sample. The stratification of samples 
ensures that a correct proportion of households is surveyed from each 
category of the population, whilst randomness ensures that every household 
has a similar chance of being included in the survey (Levy and Lemeshow, 
2008).  
 
Another practical dilemma that was faced during the fieldwork was that it was 
physically impossible to directly observe respondents’ activities in order to 
independently validate survey responses. Data collection, particularly through 
survey and key informant interviews, involved gathering verbal responses to 
the questions and respondents’ recollections of the events in retrospect might 
not have always been very accurate, partly because people forget events that 
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took place in distant past (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004).  Similarly, since 
the survey used a structured questionnaire seeking objective answers to the 
research questions, it did not necessarily gather the in-depth and quality 
information which is normally obtained through key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions.  This is one of the problems generally associated with 
household surveys and the shortcoming was addressed through triangulation.  
 
    3.6.3.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
In order to carry out the household survey, a questionnaire was designed to 
gather information concerning irrigation governance from the household 
respondents. As mentioned earlier, the management of irrigation systems 
involves multiple activities including O & M activities, conflict resolution, 
water acquisition and budget allocation. The irrigation management process 
was broken down into different themes to investigate the multifaceted aspects 
of irrigation governance.  In particular, issues such as landholdings, location, 
agricultural production systems, operational and maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure, household involvement and awareness in irrigation policy 
issues, water harvesting and distribution and utilisation of costs were to be 
investigated through the household survey, focus group discussions and 
expert interviews. As argued in Section 2.10, these issues encompass the 
factors identified through the literature review and with consideration to the 
Nepalese context which are likely to influence farmers’ level of access to 
irrigation water. These issues have also informed the research objectives and 
research question which this thesis aims to address.  Issues covered in the 
household survey also seek to capture the multi-dimensional nature of 
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irrigation governance in Nepal, which influence the farmers’ levels of access to 
irrigation water.  
 
The questionnaire was piloted in a randomly selected village outside the 
sample frame. It was believed that the responses to the pilot would result in 
the revision of questions not relevant to the research questions.  The piloting 
also helped the researcher to identify and remove some questions from the 
existing questionnaire that were irrelevant and problematic to the local 
context.  The administration of the pre-tested and reformatted questionnaire 
was carried out with the household heads.  The household remains the unit of 
analysis in this thesis.  
 
However, there are some limitations related to the household survey which 
need elaboration. Although households have become common sampling units 
in social research and the household heads are consulted for the survey, their 
usefulness has been questioned.  Firstly, the conventional definitions of 
‘household headship’ have been criticised (Rosenhouse, 1989) and policy 
implications from research findings where the research subjects were 
households heads have been questioned (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997; Bruce and 
Lloyd, 1997). Secondly, although the administration of a questionnaire to the 
household head is considered to be less constraining in a practical sense, it 
raises many methodological concerns. The definitions of both the terms 
‘household’ and ‘head of household’ demonstrate variations as different 
countries use them in different ways.  The term ‘head of household’ is rather 
ambiguous when the assignment of headship is left to the judgment of 
household members. The extent to which the views of the household head 
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represent those of the other members of the household is open to debate. The 
attributes associated with the household headship are subjective and depend 
on the interpretations of the household members.  Also, the term ‘head of 
household’ is not neutral , but is often loaded with additional meanings which 
reflect a traditional conceptualisation of the household as an undifferentiated 
unit in patriarchal societies with no reflection of internal conflicts in the 
distribution of resources (Folbre, 1990). Deshingkar et al. (2003b), in their 
study of livelihood options in India, contend that excessive focus on the 
household head can ignore important experiences of other members of the 
household.  In many instances, the assumption that the household head is 
aware of and shares other members’ experiences leads to an over 
simplification of complex issues, which can jeopardise the quality of data and 
consequently leads to misleading findings.  
 
Notwithstanding these methodological dilemmas, it has become common 
practice to administer questionnaires to the household head.  The extent to 
which the response of the household head represents that of other members 
depends on several factors such as their authority in and contribution to the 
household.  The response of the household head is determined largely by 
factors shared by the entire household. The rationale for administrating this 
survey questionnaire to the household head is that in the research sites they 
generally hold land disposal rights, control the household income/expenditure 
and make decisions on behalf of family members. The household head also 
takes part in meetings and village level discussions concerning public 
interests. He/she is more likely to be aware and have knowledge of irrigation 
issues. In general, households are headed by men, though in some cases by 
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female members who are either widows or women whose husbands have left 
for foreign lands to seek employment. In the latter case, where the male is not 
available, women carry out almost all the work customarily assigned to men.  
In the absence of parents, households are headed by the eldest son in the 
family who performs all the responsibilities that generally fall to the parents.  
The household head responding to this questionnaire is also the person who 
makes the decisions on behalf of all family members and decides on the 
livelihood activities in the family. Thus his/her decisions have major 
implications for the welfare of entire family members.  Households headed by 
females are expected to provide great insights into equity aspects and the 
trickle down effects of irrigation interventions. Jazairy et al.  (1992) maintains 
that households, which are headed by females suffer triple disadvantages: the 
burden of poverty; gender discrimination; and absence of support. These 
households are characterised by lower average earnings, fewer assets, and less 
access to remunerative occupations and productive resources such as land, 
capital and technology.  They are also characterised by low level of education, 
restricted access to land and credit from the banks and local co-operatives 
(Agarwal, 1994; Morris and Meyer, 1993; Stash and Hannum, 2001).  
 
    3.6.3.2 Sampling Strategy 
 
Since this study is associated with the institutional analysis of household 
access to irrigation water at the local level, households were the operational 
sampling units in research design. The main focus of this research is to 
investigate the role of property rights structures on farmers’ ability to access 
irrigation water resources. In order to explore irrigation issues, it is necessary 
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to understand the rules, regulations and other formal and information 
institutional arrangements designed and implemented at the local setting. 
Distributional mechanisms of irrigation water and contributions towards the 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure need to be 
investigated in order to understand irrigation governance in Nepal. As 
highlighted in Chapter Two, the level of dependency of households on 
irrigation water depends on various factors such as size of landholdings and 
their spatial location, availability of alternative irrigation facilities (such as 
private kulo), and crop share-in/out practices. The household level of 
contribution towards system maintenance is determined by how much they 
are benefiting from irrigation water per se. For example, relatively better off 
households with larger landholdings have a higher stake in irrigation water 
and appear to get involved and have much better access to irrigation 
governance than households with smaller landholdings.  
 
Similarly, as outlined in the literature review presented in Chapter Two, 
households with landholdings adjacent to irrigation canals have direct access 
to water, while the landholdings towards the tail end of the canal networks 
have indirect access. The spatial location of the landholding is assumed to 
have influence on the household ability to access irrigation water. Even the 
position in which the outlet is constructed in a plot will determine the 
landholdings to next get the water. For this reason, informal institutions such 
as mutual co-ordination, understanding, trust and so on, are critical for 
irrigation governance, and these are also included in the questionnaire 
designed for the household survey. 
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In order to assess a household’s access to and requirement for irrigation 
water, the households covered by the sample frame were categorised into 
three different landholding groups, i.e. large landholdings, medium 
landholdings and small landholdings.  However, dividing the households into 
the above mentioned three categories was not an easy task.  Similar to other 
farming communities in Nepal, farmers of the canal command areas of 
Phalebas, Rainastar and Begnas irrigation systems are involved with diverse 
income generating activities to sustain their livelihoods. Adhikari (2004) 
noted that it is extremely difficult to categorise households into different 
groups based on their household income and landholding. This would be 
arbitrary and pose methodological flaws for the sampling process. A number 
of scholars have applied a wealth ranking exercise to sample populations into 
different income groups. For example, Fox (1983) and Richards et al. (1999) 
have applied similar methods to categorise sample households into different 
categories through the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) process.  The 
criteria applied by Fox (1983) and Richards et al. (1999) are presented in 
Table 3.10 
 
Table 3.10 Households Types Based on Size of Landholdings 
Households Category Size of Landholdings  
(Ha) 
Mean Landholdings 
(Ha) 
Poor 0- 0.25 0.15 
Middle  0.28-0.75 0.51 
Rich 0.78-4.25 1.33 
Source: Fox (1983) and Richards et al.  (1999)   
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Adhikari (2004) comments that the above categorisation of households 
should be understood in relative terms, as most households sampled 
represent rural farmers who are mostly marginal farmers with very few 
employment opportunities other than agriculture and income from the 
communally managed resources such as forestry. There are no big landlords 
in the case study sites considered for this research. 
 
While the literature suggests that household asset attributes like 
landholdings have implications in access to irrigation water (Shah et al., 
2000), the argument suggesting access to irrigation water depends solely on 
the size of landholding is often seen to be implausible.  Also, the irrigators’ 
entitlement and what they receive is not always the same. Furthermore, 
access to irrigation water based on landholding alone is considered to be 
incomplete and does not necessarily reflect other attributes of the local 
settings. The wave of agricultural modernisation and change in the size of 
landholdings has changed the scenario that landholdings and water 
acquisitions are directly proportional (Nicolson, 1984). This thesis argues 
that the size of the landholding is only one factor which influences household 
access to water and an over-emphasis on the land size ignores other 
influencing factors. In response, this thesis uses other factors across different 
heterogeneities described in Chapter Two (Section 2.10) to investigate the 
household level of access to water from irrigation canals which are governed 
by different property rights regimes. 
 
Given the above mentioned evidence on the number of factors that are likely 
to influence farmers’ access to water, the survey questionnaire was designed 
 197 
and operationalised with great care to obtain a representative and unbiased 
sample for analysis. The sample was selected in stages to pinpoint the 
locations where interviews are to be conducted and to choose the households 
efficiently. The research design contains stratified random sampling in such a 
way that the sample is spread over geographic sub-areas (throughout the 
canal command area, i.e. from the head end, the middle and tail end of the 
canal) and population sub- groups including caste, size of landholding, 
gender and income level. In order to keep costs to a manageable level, a 
survey map was prepared to conduct the household survey by making use of 
the clusters of households.  Careful attention was paid to avoid the sample 
being overly clustered because of the damaging effects on reliability. 
Complexity of household survey design means that standard errors (SE) 
estimated on the basis of a simple random sample design will not reflect the 
true variance in the survey estimates. Statisticians argue that over clustering 
can lead to a substantial increase in standard errors if the community is 
relatively homogenous. 
 
In order to capture spatial and caste/ethnic hierarchy, households were 
randomly selected on a proportional basis from different locations, 
landholdings and castes from each ward of the VDCs served by the irrigation 
canals. The sample households included only private landholdings. There 
were no leasehold lands in the research sites but share cropping was a 
common practice amongst the farmers.  
 
The households were categorised into three landholding groups: small, 
medium and large landholders, based on the area of irrigation land available 
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to them (Richards et al., 1999; Fox, 1983).  The average landholding in the 
mid-hills of Nepal is 0.77 Ha (lower than the national average of 0.96 Ha).  
However, the average landholding size in the research area was 0.9 Ha.  The 
categorisation of households into different groups in the thesis reflects the 
size of the average landholding at both the local areas (case study sites) and 
national level.  Table 3.11 presents the criteria used for categorising into three 
different landholding categories. This research considers farmers with less 
than half the average landholding in research sites (0-0.45 Ha) as 'small', 
while those with landholdings above the national average (>0.96 Ha) are 
considered as 'large' landholdings. In Nepal, the households with less than 
half the national average landholding size are considered to be marginal 
farmers (Sharma and Chhetry 1996). Farmers with landholdings above half 
the local average and below the national average (0.45-0.96 Ha) are 
considered 'medium'. In rural Nepal, the amount of private landholding 
reflects household economic and socio-political status, as households with 
larger landholdings are respected, have greater authority and often act in 
village judicial arbitration. It is plausible that the households with large 
landholdings who enjoy socio-economic dominance in village settings can 
influence access to irrigation water.  
 
Table 3.11 Criterion for Categorising Households  
 
Households Category 
(based on size of landholding) 
Size of Landholdings  in 
(Ha/Ropani) 
 
Small/Marginal 0-0.45Ha (0-9 Ropani) 
Medium 0.45-0.96 Ha (9-19 Ropani) 
Large >0.96 Ha  (>19 Ropani) 
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The framework applied for surveying households is unique because it covers 
the entire canal command area from the head to the tail ends and transcends 
both hydrological and political boundaries. In the JMIS the canal command 
area stretches over all three V.D.Cs namely Dhanilikuwa, Chakratirtha and 
Bhalayakharka. Table 3.12 presents the different wards of the three 
V.D.Cs/municipality served by the irrigation canals considered for this 
research.  
 
 
Table 3.12 V.D.Cs/Municipality wards served by the Irrigation 
canals  
 
 
Irrigation 
System VDC/Municipality  
Wards served by 
canal 
  
 
 
 
Bhalayakharka  1, 2 and 3. 
Rainastar 
 
Chakratirtha  1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
 
 
Dhamilikuwa  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 
  
 
 Phalebas Devisthan  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
  
 
 
  
 
 Begnas Lekhnath  1, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
 
Every effort was made to include households from all the wards from all three 
irrigation systems considered for data collection, although not all wards of the 
VDCs and municipality are served by the irrigation canal systems. 
Nonetheless, some irrigators are living in wards not served by the canal but 
have landholdings down the canal where their plots are being irrigated. In 
order to avoid a systematic exclusion of households who use water from the 
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canal systems, irrespective of their location, all the households whose fields 
were served by the canal systems were considered in the sampling framework.  
 
The command area of the JMIS is divided into sixteen blocks; while the area of 
the AMIS is divided into five branches (BC1- BC5) depending on which branch 
of the canal irrigates the area concerned. In the case of the FMIS there are four 
branches (Jogichaur, Kumalgaun, Satkuriya and Chaubiskuriya). These blocks 
and branches have their own level of committees which are responsible for the 
day to day running of the canal in their respective areas, ensuring release of 
water from neighbouring branches, conflict resolution and liaising with 
RIMC/PIMC/BIMC if necessary. The criterion used for constituting block size 
is often the area served by the irrigation canal and the number of households 
within that area.  In the Phalebas and Begnas areas, data on different 
categories of household were rare. In the absence of secondary data on the 
number of households in different wards in the FMIS and the AMIS, snowball 
sampling methods were used for sampling households. The difficulties 
associated with locating respondents meant that the preference for the 
snowball sampling method was both desirable and inevitable. This approach 
made use of the local informants, including the members of the management 
committee who participated during the WUA meetings, gathering information 
on the number of households in each of the small, medium and larger 
landholding categories, and while in the JMIS area, secondary sources of data 
were used to calculate the number of households in each category.  It should be 
noted that, whilst snowball sampling techniques can dramatically lower 
research costs, this comes at the expense of introducing bias, as the technique 
itself reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross section 
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of the population. To minimise bias, a number of local farmers were asked 
initially about the number of households in different wards. However, their 
estimations were cross checked with other farmers to confirm the tentative 
assumptions as valid on the number of the households in each landholding 
category at ward level. For the purpose of this research, a total of 249 
households was considered. This allowed some margin for the non-
respondents to ensure the generation of sufficient numbers of respondents for 
analysis.  The margin for non-respondents was taken as 12 households, four 
for each of the three systems surveyed. The details of the households in each 
ward and the number of households sampled in each of the landholding 
categories are given in Appendices 3a-3d. 
 
The computation of the total number of households in each landholding 
category warrants some explanation here. The total number of households in 
each ward of the municipality/V.D.C within the canal command areas of all 
three irrigation systems considered for this research was taken from secondary 
sources. The total number of households in each ward as a percentage of the 
total number of irrigating households was computed. The proportion of 
households in each landholding category in the different wards of the V.D.Cs 
and municipality was gathered from a variety of sources. In the case of the 
JMIS, a secondary data source was used, while in the case of the AMIS and the 
FMIS, the knowledge of key informants was utilised to compute the percentage 
of households in each landholding category in each ward served by the canal.  
All together a total of 249 households with 83 households from each of the 
three irrigation systems considered for this research were surveyed. Given the 
nature of the study, the only difference was the property rights structure 
 202
governing the irrigation systems and for any meaningful comparison it was 
critical to select other reasonably similar variables including the sample size.  
 
In order to determine the number of households to be surveyed from each 
ward, the proportion of households located in the ward was taken as a base 
line figure.  For example, in ward number one in the Lekhnath municipality, 
there are in total1204 irrigating households. This accounts for 27.9 percent of 
the total households using irrigation water in the entire canal command area. 
The same percentage of households was computed from the 83 households 
allocated for the AMIS which are 23.15 households.  Then using the key 
informants’ knowledge, the percentage of households in each category of 
landholdings was determined. In the case of ward one of the Lekhnatha 
municipality, 70 percent of irrigator households are small landholders,while 
the percentage of households in the medium and the large landholding 
categories in the same ward were 20 and 10 percent respectively. To determine 
the exact number of households to be surveyed from each landholding 
category, the same percentages -70 percent for small landholdings, 20 percent 
and 10 percent of medium and large landholdings respectively from the 
allocated total of 23.15 households were computed out. Since the number of 
households cannot be a fraction, they were rounded off to the nearest whole 
number to get the exact number of households to be surveyed. For example, 
for the small landholdings in ward one of the Lekhnath municipality, the figure 
was 70 percent of 23.15, which is 16 when rounded to the nearest zero decimal 
place. For medium and larger landholdings in the same ward it was 5 and 2 
households respectively after rounding off to the nearest zero decimal place. 
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   3.6.4 Participant Observations 
 
The institutional analysis of irrigation systems demanded an exploration of 
the social environment in which local farmers live, in order to get a first hand 
insight into their culture and how they maintained their rural livelihoods.  
Since the overarching aim of the thesis was to compare and contrast 
institutional settings in which farmers’ interactions occurred, it was important 
to understand the local context in which the irrigation systems functioned 
(Jorgensen, 1989). In order to understand the local settings and the 
symbolism of the world in which the farmers lived and operated their 
irrigation canals, participant observation was considered as one form of data 
generation technique. The choice of participant observation came about only 
after gaining access and reasonable confidence in building up rapport with 
local people and understanding the local context (Waddington, 2004).  This 
was important for a researcher who was external to the real world of the local 
farmers and needing to understand their social world and the process of 
irrigation governance. These issues were more likely to be understood through 
such an approach (Gomm, 2004). The qualitative approach to investigating 
the social world of the local farmers necessitated spending a significant 
amount of time immersed in the culture of participants (Creswell, 2007). 
 
Although the method was time consuming, the unstructured and flexible 
nature of participant observation made it the most appropriate method by 
which to understand the context in which farmers organised their activities, 
including involvement in irrigation management. The case study method used 
in this research included multiple strategies for data collection, and 
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participant observation could be easily used in combination with other 
methods applied to undertake the research for this thesis. The aim of the 
fieldwork was to gather in depth and contextual data on patterns of 
interaction amongst the farmers in their natural settings, for which it was 
necessary to understand the ways farmers negotiated their water rights, their 
experience of irrigation systems and developed meanings and associations 
within the irrigation communities (Fielding and Thomas, 2008).  
 
Participant observation was useful in investigating small units of study, such 
as executive committee meetings, which encompassed small groups of local 
farmers whose interactions were relatively easy to observe (Smith and Berg, 
1987). During the course of participant observation, numerous executive 
committee meetings from each of the three irrigation systems considered for 
the research were observed.  The rationale behind observing these meetings 
was to understand the working mechanisms of the executive committees, the 
dominating and submissive members, their attitudes and their associated 
characteristics, which in turn could shed light on the farmers’ long term 
perspectives about their irrigation systems. Furthermore, by using participant 
observation, it was possible to identify rules influencing farmers’ actions and 
interactions in local settings, discern patterns of interaction and problematic 
issues (Cassell et al., 2006).  
 
Despite the above mentioned advantages of participant observation, 
numerous disadvantages were experienced in using it as a data collection 
strategy.  Firstly, participant observation alone was not sufficiently robust to 
explore the issue this thesis intended to study (Atkinson and Hammersley, 
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1994). In response to this short-coming, participation observation was used in 
combination with other research methods, like focus group discussion, survey 
and key informant interviews. Secondly, as an observer, the author had less 
control of the situation. This methodological weakness proved beneficial for 
the research, as there was a necessity to minimise ‘observer effects’ and record 
the activities in their natural settings devoid of external influences. 
Throughout the process of participant observation, every effort was made to 
participate in the activities of the local farmers, but the participation was more 
in the role of observer than participant. This approach to participant 
observation was adopted to avoid influencing or manipulating the activities of 
local farmers and to maintain objectivity during the research process 
(Bersson, 1978). Thirdly, numerous studies have questioned the 
generalisibility of findings from participant observation (Fielding and 
Thomas, 2008; Jorgensen, 1989). Since participant observation was used in 
“adjunct to other methods rather than as alternative to them, it helped to 
enhance and complement findings from other methods and provided 
evidence of methodological efficaciousness” (Cook and Payne, 2002 p.23). 
Fourthly, the use of participant observation is not suitable for studying a 
larger and heterogeneous group (Tedlock, 1991) although since the attempt 
was to observe small group of individuals, i.e. executive committee members 
of irrigation systems, the use of participant observation was preferred. In 
order to keep a good record of the observation, field notes were recorded on 
various issues discussed and patterns of interaction during their meetings 
after each round of observation and before engaging in further interaction so 
that full descriptions of interactions were recorded before they were lost 
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Data Collection 
249 questionnaires 
(AMIS-83, FMIS-83, JMIS-83) 
Data Collection 
32 Semi-structured interviews 
(AMIS-10, FMIS-12, JMIS-10) 
11 focus groups  
(AMIS-5, FMIS-5, JMIS-6) 
 3 Participant Observation  
(AMIS-1, FMIS-1, JMIS-1) 
+ 
Data collection & Data Analysis 
Purpose/ Questions 
Qualitative 
Data 
 
Quantitative Data  
Data Analysis 
Inference 
 
Data Analysis 
(Emerson et al., 1995).  It helped to ensure that the general character and the 
order of the event remained intact.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Concurrent Mixed Methods Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.5 Regional/ District Level data and Documentary Analysis 
 
Most of the data generated for irrigation policy at a regional/district level were 
collected using secondary sources by reviewing policy documents and project 
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reports. Key publications were requested from the district development 
committees, municipality publications and publications from the DoI.  WUAs 
were asked for any relevant documentary data. These secondary sources 
helped to familiarise the author with irrigation issues both at local and 
regional levels. In particular, the documentary analysis was relied upon in 
investigating the irrigation issues at the local level. Chapter Six contains 
description of the data gathered from documentary analysis, using the records 
compiled by the WUAs to understand water distribution rules in the three 
irrigation systems considered for this research.  
 
3.7 Research Ethics  
 
This section describes some of the ethical dimensions of this research both 
from theoretical and practical viewpoints.  
 
   3.7.1 Some Ethical Considerations 
 
This research has been carried out following all ethical aspects and codes of 
conduct. Ethical responsibilities towards research participants were derived 
from the research ethical guidelines of the British Sociological Association 
(BSA) which includes voluntary participation, no harm, confidentiality, 
anonymity, or privacy, which is commonly referred to as “informed consent” 
(BSA, 2004). Participants in interviews and focus groups were informed about 
the purpose and nature of the study, including its time period, anticipated 
benefits and confirmation that all information would be confidential.  It was 
made clear that the participants would not be harmed in any way either by 
providing data or by declining to take part in the study. The participation of 
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the research subjects was entirely on a voluntary basis and the subjects were 
free to opt out of the interview or group discussions if they chose to do so 
(Shaw, 2003).  Participants were offered the choice and assured that they were 
free not to answer questions which made them feel uncomfortable talking 
about or reporting and that they could decline to participate in the research at 
any time (as happened in a few cases).  
As mentioned in this chapter in Section 3.6, two research assistants were 
employed for the purpose of fieldwork for this research.  Since the author was 
not familiar with the two research sites, namely Phalebas and Begnas areas, 
the experience of the research assistants and their knowledge of the local area 
were very useful in terms of arranging the logistics.  The research assistants 
were involved in various activities including arranging logistics, conducting 
household survey and taking notes during focus group discussions. Whilst the 
research assistants proved to be useful, I was aware of a number of limitations 
their direct involvement could pose for the quality of the data gathered, 
particularly in the household survey due to inter-interview variability 
(Bryman, 2008; Oppenheim, 1992; Fowler and Mangione, 1990).  The quality 
of data obtained through the household survey and interviews depends on the 
quality of interviewing, which is difficult to standardise due to interviewers 
interactions (Martin, 1983; Gilbert, 2008).   
Previous studies on inter-interviewer variations in social research have found 
a number of factors which contributed towards such variations (Groves, 1989; 
Dillman, 2000; Dillman et al., 2009; Goyder, 1987; Groves et al., 1992; 
Groves and Couper, 1998).  Firstly, the inconsistencies can result from 
difference in administering questions such as difference in words and 
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intonations and a different style and extent of probing to assist respondents 
during the survey (Matveev, 2002; Groves; 1989; de Vaus, 2002). Secondly, 
the demographic characteristics of interviewers and their background, which 
in turn influences the interviewers expectations from respondents and latter’s 
uneasiness in answering questions, may determine the responses obtained 
(Bradburn and Sudman, 1979; Bradburn et al., 2004; Lord et al., 2005).  The 
expectations of the interviewers might influence the respondents to modify 
their responses in their desire for social desirability (Heeb and Gmel, 2001). 
In other words, the respondents might shape their responses to suit what they 
believe the interviewers will find more acceptable. Thirdly, although in varying 
degrees, “Social Attributes” and the demographic characteristics of the 
interviewers such as sexual orientation, caste, race, age, education, political 
beliefs and social status are reported to have influence on the quality of the 
data obtained (Fowler and Magione, 1990; Edward and Berk, 1993; Hox et al., 
2002).  
Fourthly, the “Social Distance” model (Johnson et al., 2000) of interviewer 
variations argues that respondents provide truthful answers if they share 
some common personal characteristics with interviewers due to emotional 
attachment, comfort and sense of friendship (Cantania et al., 1996) In 
contrast, existence of more social distance between the interviewer and the 
respondents will become increasingly reluctant to provide true answers to 
sensitive questions such as  sexual activities, criminal activities and abuses.  
For example, female interviewers were able to obtain a more accurate data in 
research in sensitive topics such as AIDS, contraception, fertility and physical 
and sexual abuse as the respondents were more willing to disclose such 
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sensitive and personal information to them (Axinn, 1991; Groves and Fultz, 
1985; Dailey and Claus, 2001).   
 
A number of procedures were followed in order to bring about uniformity in 
conduct of the household surveys, interviews and to maintain the quality of 
the data collected by minimising the influence of research assistants.   Firstly, 
the questionnaires were designed carefully by removing ambiguities and 
maintaining closed ended questions (Fowler and Mangione, 1990; Bryman, 
2008). Secondly, both the research assistants were given standardised 
training in note taking and conducting a household survey (Gwartney, 2007).  
The research assistants also took part in a questionnaire pre-testing exercise 
to familiarise themselves with the household survey. Thirdly, the research 
assistants shared common research interests with the PI which helped to 
minimise disciplinary conflicts (Echtner and Jamal, 1997; Stern, 1994). 
Fourthly, the allocation of households to be surveyed was randomised which 
helped to minimise any systematic human errors during the survey (Choi and 
Comstock, 1975). Fifthly, the performance of the research assistants was 
reviewed continuously to ensure that the data were collected in a consistent 
way throughout the fieldwork.  This is because variations in the ways in which 
questionnaires are administered can exert an impact on replies which would 
have implication on the quality of the data generated (Schuman and Presser, 
1981).  
 
Contact information of the lead researcher and research assistants was also 
provided. Confidentiality of data provided by participants or gathered from 
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documents, observation and informal interviews with others were respected 
and participants were assured of such confidentiality by signing 
confidentiality declaration forms (Arksey and Knight, 1999). All participants 
and locations were given in the form of pseudonyms when analysing the data. 
All the data, including transcriptions, tapes and other recorded materials, 
were stored securely to maintain confidentiality throughout the research 
process.  
 
In some of the irrigation systems, accessing financial details of the WUA was 
very difficult and impractical for two reasons. Firstly, it contained personal 
and sensitive information about the local farmers, and the WUA was not 
comfortable with distributing these to external researchers without their 
consent. Personal information such as individual and household loans, land 
registration details and details of any sanctions imposed were present in the 
WUA records, which were considered highly confidential and not released. 
Secondly, the WUA particularly in the AMIS had not audited its financial 
reports, and it found this uncomfortable to disclose. In Nepalese culture, 
farmers particularly in rural areas find it uncomfortable to disclose the 
family’s financial affairs to someone outside.  Since the researcher was clearly 
an outsider to the farmers, there were instances, particularly when individuals 
were aware of their financial situation, in which they expressed 
embarrassment and discomfort if they let a researcher, an outsider, invade 
their privacy.  Also, the disclosure of farmers’ financial details to an outside 
researcher was more likely to damage confidentiality and the relationships 
amongst the WUA, DoI and the farmers. These issues were adequately 
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addressed throughout the research process by keeping such information 
highly confidential. 
 
Informal and casual conversations with the research participants, which were 
used to kick start the focus group discussions, contained information which 
did not have implications for the welfare and confidentiality of the 
participants. These conversations were also stored during data compilation 
and logging of data, fieldwork or during observation (Lofland and Lofland, 
2006) to be analysed at a later stage of the research. The farmers’ anonymity 
and confidentiality were ensured throughout the research process. 
Participants were not harmed or distressed as the result of participating in the 
research (Hayes and Devaney, 2004). Sensitive personal data were collected 
only in accordance with research purposes and in the favour of public interest, 
as opposed to individual interest.  
 
   3.7.2 Ethical Approval  
The individual interviews in this study were conducted in private settings 
where the author, as an outsider, constantly needed permission from 
gatekeepers for each stage of the study. Permission to access official records 
and WUA files was obtained through relevant gatekeepers, either in social 
settings or from the DoI.  
 
In October 2007, the DoI in Kathmandu and the Western Regional Irrigation 
Directorate (WRID) in Pokhara were contacted for permission to undertake 
fieldwork. Upon receiving authorisation from the DoI, an official letter of 
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ethical approval was sent to the WUA and the WRID on 18th October 2007. 
Prompt responses were received to undertake the research.  
 
The research activities associated with this thesis involved human participants 
in all aspects. The fieldwork included a household survey, focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews. In order to comply with the 
University of York’s ethical requirements, ethical approval was obtained from 
the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee of the University of 
York, which is responsible for ethical standards for research carried out in the 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University of York. The 
fieldwork for this research took place over a period of four months between 
October and January 2007.  
 
   3.7.3 Gaining Access 
 
It was critical to gain access to the world of local farmers in order to gather 
evidence. Based on their experience with naturalistic research, Lofland and 
Lofland (1984) believe that researchers are more likely to be successful 
gaining access to situations if they make use of contacts that can help remove 
barriers to entrance. After receiving official ethical approval from the DoI and 
the WUAs, the objectives of the study and data collection process were 
explained to the WRID and the presidents of all the three WUAs. The contacts 
and rapport established with the staff at the WRID and the presidents of the 
WUAs were crucial in gaining access to the local farmers. The duration of 
fieldwork was about five months.  The available time for fieldwork was divided 
equally in the three irrigation systems. In all three systems, both formal and 
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informal interviews were conducted alongside checking WUA records. In 
Nepal, personal and social life is shaped by gender roles and the social space 
of women is not generally accorded consideration. Given the social and 
cultural values attached to women’s participation in social space, there was 
limited access to female participants and a structured schedule had to be 
followed when interviewing females.  
  
Initially, difficulties were faced in persuading the WUA that key informant 
interviews should be held with some stakeholders. A sample of key questions 
was provided. Upon receiving the sample research questionnaire and detailed 
modality of the research operation, the DoI gave permission to conduct the 
fieldwork. 
 
Use was made of Silverman’s four principle ways to maintain and enhance 
access in the field during the course of work (Silverman, 2005). Firstly, 
impression management, which required considerable awareness of the 
setting and stakeholders’ or participants’ culture in order to present oneself in 
a positive manner were critical for collective data free of biases. Secondly, 
obtaining ‘bottom-up’ access, in which access was not regarded as a one-time 
permission, meant it was gained, for example, by the DoI for all settings. 
Thirdly, a non–judgmental approach to the farmers, institutions, policies, 
systems, programmes, staff and clients was adopted. Fourthly, feedback was 
offered to the farmers and the members of the WUA committees for sharing 
their invaluable knowledge and experience and being part of the research.  
Fifthly, gaining the trust of all farmers, WUA members and the DoI was the 
only way to gain access to certain participants and also to some of the 
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information. Thus, relationships based on trust, respect and commitment to 
maintaining the privacy of participants were considered a key factor to 
entering the participants’ world (Fontana and Frey, 2005). In addition to this, 
when gaining access to the settings and participants, key informants were 
identified who had access to official records and contact with the local 
farmers. This saved time and limited the likelihood of mistakes when logging 
data and during fieldwork.  
 
3.8 Methods of Analysis 
   3.8.1 Analysing Qualitative Data  
The qualitative data which were in audio format were transcribed and 
translated, and then uploaded into Atlas-ti software for analysis. The 
uploaded transcripts were read thoroughly and all the meaningful data from 
the transcripts were abstracted for data categorisation. An a priori coding 
method was used to code the transcripts of the qualitative interviews.  The 
preference for a priori coding came from institutional analysis literature, 
particularly those associated with the management of natural resources 
(Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990; Bandaragoda, 2000; Lam, 1998). There is a well 
established argument in natural resource management literature, which 
suggests that institutions set the ground rules for resource use and establish 
the incentives, information, and compulsions that guide economic outcomes.  
Institutions are considered to have “organised and established procedures” 
which set out the rules of the game in the society that its members are 
expected to observe (Jepperson, 1991 p.145).  Douglas North argues that 
institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human action” (1990 
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p.3).  Previous studies on irrigation management have focused on issues such 
as the physical condition of canals, water levy collection, conflict resolution, 
collective action and so on (Hilton, 1992; Ostrom, 1990 also see Lam, 1998;  
Tang, 1992).  The issues investigated in this research were established prior to 
the analysis based on the literature on nature resource management. The 
thematic codings used were informed by the above mentioned studies.  The 
issues involved in thematic coding used in the data analysis are presented in 
Table 3.13. This research investigated aspects of irrigation management such 
as history, organisational configurations, governance modalities, water 
distribution, physical infrastructure of canals, contributions towards canal 
maintenance and conflict resolution using qualitative methods.  Hence, a 
deductive approach was adopted to analyse qualitative data where “all 
decisions on variables, their measurement, and coding rules were made before 
the observation began” (Neuendorf, 2002, p.11). However, some additional 
categories were introduced and given the nature and scope of this research, 
revisions were made on the existing themes mentioned in the literature to 
tighten up the categories and maximise mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness 
of those categories (Weber, 1990).  
 
Also, thematic coding templates (matrices) on the above mentioned issues 
were created, resulting in a matrix of seven thematic templates for both the 
KII and FGD, maintaining numeric identifiers for each transcript in order to 
track the source of information and allow for retrieval of verbatim and 
paraphrased quotes.  Each coding included categories comprising “groups of 
words with similar meaning or connotations” (Weber, 1990 p.37). The coding 
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categories were “mutually exclusive and exhaustive” (GAO, 1996, p.20). The 
process of data abstraction and reduction involved pulling quotations onto the 
respective templates in the Atlas-ti software.  Data analysis involved looking 
for similarities and differences in general thematic areas by using the matrices 
and coding templates to retrieve and compare information, resulting in a 
textual summary of findings.  
 
There is a danger that researcher bias might influence the nature and quality 
of findings, depending on what information is retained and what is deleted 
during the process of data coding and abstraction. This is commonly 
understood as selection bias (Collier and Mahoney, 1996) where data are 
distorted to achieve the intended results. This might cause distortion and 
misinterpretation of the meaning intended by an interviewee during the 
process of transcription and data abstraction, which could translate and feed 
in as invalid and unreliable information, altering and distorting the findings 
and subsequent conclusions.  In order to avoid selection biases, a check list 
was prepared and used for undertaking thematic analysis. The themes check 
list included issues such as the history of the irrigation canals, organisational 
configurations, governance modalities, water distribution, physical 
infrastructure of canals, contributions towards canal maintenance and conflict 
resolution. The use of such a check list helped to make both data analysis and 
research findings more systematic, rigorous and reflective (Miller and 
Dingwall, 1997). By adopting a priori coding and using a thematic analysis, it 
was possible to combine and catalogue related patterns of words, phrases and 
communications and any subsequent sub-themes emerging out of such data. 
Sometimes the data demonstrated divergent patterns and rival explanations, 
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which were handled with great care through cross examination rather than 
totally disregarding them.  The cross examination of divergent patterns helped 
to ensure coherence in data analysis and fitted different ideas and components 
together in a meaningful way (Leininger, 1985).  This helped to enhance the 
credibility of the data analysis and the inference drawn from it (Patton, 2002). 
Selection bias leads to seriously erroneous inferences being drawn from the 
investigation. No effort was spared to minimise such selection bias throughout 
the research process.  Data was constantly cross-checked to maintain 
consistency in both its quality and process of analysis. Table 3.13 presents the 
themes covered during the qualitative research undertaken for this research.  
 
Table 3.13: A Priori Coding and Issues Covered in Qualitative      
Research  
 
 
SN      Themes Major Issues Covered  
1 Historical context Initial idea on the construction of canal, initial 
funders/contributors, designing  
2 Physical Condition of 
Canal  
Physical nature of canal, vandalism, standard of 
canal maintenance,  
3 Water Levy Collection Rate of water fee, mechanism and efficiency in fee 
collection, maintenance of account, allocation of 
fund raised, resource distribution between main 
canal and branch canal, deposit to the DoI 
4 Conflict Resolution Existence of water related conflicts, mechanism of 
conflict resolution, complaining irregularities, 
compliance and sanctions, water thefts 
5 Operation and 
Maintenance 
Farmers participation in operation and 
maintenance, rules of participation, 
penalty/sanctions, level of contributions 
6 Performance of WUA Accountability to farmers, relationship between 
farmers and WUA, advocacy work by WUA to 
educate farmers,  
7 Transparency of the 
WUA 
Financial transparency, account maintenance,  
8 Formation of WUA Formation of WUA, constitutions, election, 
composition, branch committee and main WUA 
committee, gender/caste and locational 
representations  
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   3.8.2 Analysing Quantitative Data 
 
Although there is a burgeoning literature on survey methods, the 
administration of the survey questionnaire was one of the most challenging 
tasks during the research process.  A wide range of survey methods including 
postal survey, telephone survey, email survey and online survey are advocated 
in the literature. Some of the commonly practiced survey methods in social 
research are presented in Figure 3.8.  
 
Although the advantages of self-completion questionnaire survey over costs 
and time (Bryman, 2008) are well known, it was not an option for this 
research as most of the household heads to which the survey questionnaires 
were administered were illiterate and innumerate.  Also, the poor postal 
services in the rural part of Nepal with post taking an exceptionally long time 
or being unreliable has meant that postal survey was also not a feasible option 
for this research. There were no internet services available in the research 
sites, which mean it was not an option either.  
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Figure 3.8: Some commonly used survey administration techniques  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Adopted from Bryman (2008 p. 167) 
 
Survey  
Self Completion questionnaire   Structured Interview  
Face to face  Telephone  
Paper and Pen  CAPI  
Supervised  Postal  
Email  Web  
Internet  
Embeded  Attached  
Paper and Pen  CATI  
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In light of the above mentioned constraints, the survey in this research took 
place in the form of structured interviews where the interviewers asked 
questions to respondents and their responses were recorded in the 
questionnaires.  
 
Although time consuming, the structured interview was the most preferred 
method of household survey for this research for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the problems associated with literacy and numeracy levels of the rural 
households had to be considered for the survey. Secondly, although the three 
case study sites were situated in three different geographical locations, the 
households were not very dispersed within the canal command areas making 
the survey less time consuming.  Thirdly, the face to face structured interviews 
had the added advantage for being synchronous communication in time and 
space (Opdenakker, 2006). The aim of this research was to investigate 
farmers’ experience of the irrigation canals which needed to take advantage of 
social cues such as voice, intonation and body language amongst others. These 
social cues helped make the survey process more of a social-emotional 
conversation (Kiesler et al., 1985) by increasing interdependence between the 
interviewer and interviewees (Straus and McGrath, 1994).  Fourthly, the face 
to face structured interviews during the household survey helped to minimise 
“social desirability” biases which was critical for understanding issues such as 
water thefts, negative attitudes towards the WUA and canal vandalism.  These 
activities were more likely to be under-reported in other survey format such as 
postal or web-based surveys (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982; Shuy, 2002).  In 
order to generate high quality and consistent data, the nature of the research 
was explained to the respondents and they were asked to provide answers 
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truthfully without being influenced by the presence of interviewers (Emans, 
1986). Fifthly, face to face structured interviews also helped to standardise the 
survey process (Martin1983; Gilbert, 2008).  
 
The survey questionnaires were paper based where answers were filled in the 
questionnaire itself rather than using a computer as there was no electricity in 
the research sites. Also, since the rural farmers had never seen a laptop, the 
use of such equipment would have been distracting from the actual research 
process, which the author wanted to avoid.  Whilst the household survey was 
paper based, all the key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
were digitally tape-recorded after obtaining consent from the interviewees 
using Sony ICD-UX200 Digital Voice Recorder. The importance of a tape 
recorder during the fieldwork is lucidly highlighted by Patton (2002) “as a 
good hammer is essential to fine carpentry, a good tape recorder is 
indispensable to fine fieldwork” (p 380). Along with improving the quality of 
recording, the use of digital recording for recording focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews helped to naturalise the research experience not 
only during the fieldwork but also after the fieldwork, particularly during 
transcribing and analysing the tapes (Ashmore and Reed, 2000). The 
recording helped to retain the data digitally, which then could be easily saved 
on a computer and transported safely. Through the use of a digital recording 
device, it was possible to maintain a “report of the interview, in anecdotal 
form, including gestures, facial expressions, questions, and remarks of the 
interviewer” (Bryman 2008 p. 202).  The “talk-in-interaction” (Learner, 1996 
p.303; Ten Have, 1999 p.21) recorded helped to document and archive data 
which are subtle, nuanced and highly sensitive in a structured, normative and 
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accountable fashion by keeping “order at all points” (Sacks, 1995 p.22). Unlike 
recording by cassette tape, the use of digital recording helped to minimise 
noises such as the tape hiss which enhanced listening and the transcription of 
even the softly spoken words. The improvement in quality of the data 
recorded helped to reduce the risk of lost data and results in faster, less 
expensive and more accurate transcription (Stockdale, 2002). The advantages 
of digitally recording the interviews and focus group discussions are 
highlighted by Pomerantz and Fehr (1997 p.70):  
a) "Certain features of the details of actions in interaction are not 
recoverable in any other way." 
b) "A recording makes it possible to play and replay the interaction, which 
is important both for transcribing and for developing an analysis." 
c) "A recording makes it possible to check a particular analysis against the 
materials, in all their detail, that were used to produce the analysis." 
d) "A recording makes it possible to return to an interaction with new 
analytic interests."                                          
 
 
 
The digitally recorded interviews were saved in multiple external hard drives 
to ensure that they are not lost, stolen or infected with computer viruses. The 
recorded interviews were transcribed in the field itself.  Whilst research 
assistants helped in carrying out household surveys, all the interviews were 
transcribed by the author.  The author was aware that the transcription of the 
data is the beginning of the data analysis procedure and therefore data were 
transcribed into highly detailed minutes with every audible sound in their 
recording. This was important as this research concerns the detailed 
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understanding of farmers’ perceptions about the quality of the irrigation 
services as transcripts should represent “tape recordings of naturally 
occurring interactions” (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1997 p.73). During the 
transcription process even non-verbal interactions such as silence, sighs, 
laughter, posture and gestures were noted because these might influence the 
underlying meanings in social research (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992).  The 
importance of such non-verbal interactions is highlighted by Watzlawick et al. 
(1967) “the nature of a relationship is contingent upon the punctuation of the 
communicational sequences between the communicants” (p.59).  
 
The importance of language in constructing and describing the social world is 
widely recognised (Stanley and Wise, 1993; Atkinson, 1990; Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995; also see Hammersley, 1993 & 1995; Ladd, 2003; Duranti, 
2003). In describing the importance in understanding the social world, 
Michele Barrett (1992) has argued “researchers have accepted to varying 
degrees the view that meaning is constructed in rather than expressed by 
language” (p.203).  Therefore, the process of translation is not a neutral 
exercise (Bradby, 2002; Duranti, 2003). In order to reduce the degree of 
power relations between the researchers and the research subjects on the 
ground of language, a common language was used for all aspects of the 
fieldwork.  As such Nepalese language was the medium in which all the 
fieldwork including household survey, focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews were conducted.  Although the household survey 
questionnaires were prepared in English, they were translated in Nepalese 
during the actual administration. As suggested by Hansen (1987) the 
translation component was critical in all aspects of the research process 
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including developing data collection instruments (designing questionnaire 
and topic guides), the data collection process (questionnaire administration, 
conduct of focus group and key informant interview) and data analysis (data 
transcription and translation). Although the author is a Nepalese national and 
the fieldwork for this research took place in Nepal, there were many aspects 
including my naivety and little knowledge of local cultural practices and 
idiomatic differences which constantly presented a challenge.  However, for 
reliability and validity of data and research findings, it was important to 
understand the irrigation issues from another cultural perspective (Tripp-
Reimer and Dougherty, 1985; Mackenzie, 1994). This is because Nepalese was 
the main language spoken in rural parts of Nepal including the research sites.  
Also, both the research assistants were bilingual with fluency in both Nepalese 
and English. The digitally recorded interviews were transcribed in Nepalese in 
the field itself.  The rationale for transcribing the qualitative data in the field 
itself was that the researcher could clarify immediately with the local farmers 
if the transcribed texts maintained the same cultural meanings embedded in 
linguistic expression (Simon, 1996) and correct immediately if any 
discrepancies and distortions had taken place.  
 
For the purpose of translation, “The Brislin model” of cross cultural 
translation was used as to achieve the equivalence between two different 
languages i.e. Nepalese and English (Brislin, 1970). The Brislin model of 
translation suggests that a bilingual person should translate the data from its 
source language (Nepalese in this case) to the target language (English in this 
case). The process of translating the data from source language to target 
language is called “forward translation” (Jones et al., 2001). After the 
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completion of the forward translation, another bilingual person back 
translates the documents from the target language to source language which is 
called “backward translation” (Munday, 2001; Groot et al., 1994).  However, 
the back translation is done by blinding the second translator to the original 
data. This is done to maintain the equivalency of the translated data which is 
important for reliability and validity of research. Both the translated versions 
of the data are then compared for accuracy in which questionable items are 
identified and translated further by the translators until the meaning of 
translated data is mutually agreed by them.   
 
Since the PI was bilingual with fluency in both English and Nepali, he acted as 
the first bilingual translator throughout all the translations and transcriptions 
activities associated with this research. This was done also to minimise the 
research costs as translators are very expensive in Nepal. The PI was in a 
position to take this responsibility partly because he had some work 
experience in translating Nepalese to English and vice versa before starting his 
graduate studies at the University of York. The second translator was a 
professional translator from Kathmandu (Nepal) with more than ten years of 
experience in translation related activities.  
 
The adoption of the Brislin model of data transcription included the following 
steps: 
 
Step 1: First bilingual translator (the PI) forward translated the original data 
(Nepalese version 1) into the target language (English version 1)  
 227 
Step 2: Second bilingual translator back translated forward translated data 
(English version 1) into source language (Nepalese version 2) without prior 
knowledge of the source data (Nepalese version 1) 
Step 3: The back translated data (Nepalese version 2) was compared with 
original data (Nepalese version 1) to identify any discrepancies 
Step 4:  Both translators produced mutually agreed version of qualitative data 
(English version 2) 
Step 5: The English version 2 was used for the final analysis but if any 
confusion arose, then the prior versions were also consulted as and when 
needed. 
 
After the completion of the household survey, all the returned questionnaires 
were thoroughly checked to ensure that expectations on data characteristics 
and quality were met. Data from all the completed questionnaires were 
entered in SPSS for analysis, while missing responses were discarded. The 
dataset was tidied and thoroughly double checked for any inconsistencies and 
discrepancies such as missing cases, because data discrepancies can alter the 
findings (Pallant, 2007). 
 
After preparing a complete dataset, general descriptive analysis was 
undertaken, for example, univariate analysis such as percentages and 
diagrams and some appropriate measures relating to central tendencies and 
variability, like distribution and histograms, were carried out. In addition, 
bivariate analyses were also undertaken to uncover whether different variables 
are auto correlated or related. This helped in undertaking t-tests, chi-square 
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tests, anova and regressions to establish the relationship of the different 
variables to household level of access to irrigation water. 
 
Non-parametric tests, such as chi-square, were carried out to find associations 
between the categorical (nominal and ordinal) variables. T-tests and Anova 
tests were carried out to find the mean differences between different group 
categories of farmers. When carrying out regression analysis, checks were 
made for multicollinearity.  In all the statistical tests, p=0.05 (95% confidence 
interval) were considered statistically significant. Moreover, to enable the 
reader to use his/her own judgement about which finding was most 
important, the p value, coefficients and sample size were presented for each 
test, including regression analysis, presented in Chapter Five. 
 
3.9 Measuring Access to Water  
This section follows on from the discussion on the conceptualisation of access 
to water under different property rights regimes presented in Chapter Two 
(Sections 2.9 and 2.11). It describes the approach taken in the thesis to 
measure and quantify household level of access to irrigation water. In order to 
measure household this, a cumulative index is created by combining three 
constituent components of access, namely reliability, adequacy and equity.  
The computation of the three dependent variables Reliability (R), Adequacy 
(A) and Equity (E) warrant some explanation. Respondents were asked if the 
water delivered by the irrigation systems was reliable, equitable and adequate 
in different cropping seasons.  Although the survey was carried out in 2007, 
respondents were asked for their long term concerns about their irrigation 
systems. They were explicitly warned not to base their response on one 
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sporadic event but to take overall performance of the irrigation system into 
account.  As a result, the research findings reflect the overall performance of 
the irrigation systems in delivering irrigation water to farmers in the three 
aspects of access mentioned above. While the variables adequacy and 
reliability capture system characteristics to deliver adequate and reliable 
water to the farmers, equity represents an institutional mechanism for water 
distribution.  
 
In Nepal, the water availability in the canal systems varies greatly, with the 
Monsoon season being water abundant, compared to Winter and Spring 
seasons which are characterised by limited and scare water supplies 
respectively. The Monsoon season ranges from June to mid September, when 
almost 80 percent of the annual rainfall occurs. It is imperative to understand 
that the importance of water to the farming households varies greatly in 
different seasons. In order to capture this variability, different weightings 
have been given to responses in different seasons. Based on field observations 
and views obtained from the participants of the focus group discussions, the 
weighting factors of 0.15, 0.35 and 0.50 were assigned for the Monsoon, 
Winter and Spring seasons respectively. The participants of the focus group 
discussions were asked to give marks out of a hundred for their level of 
dependency on the canal for irrigation during different cropping seasons. The 
average marks given by the farmers were 15, 35 and 50 percent for Monsoon, 
Winter and Spring respectively. The assigned weighting factors for different 
cropping seasons reflect farmers’ dependency on canal resources for crop 
cultivation. The lower weighting factor for the Monsoon season reflects that 
farmers do not rely much on water from the canal for irrigation. Instead the 
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Monsoon rainfall provides water for crop cultivation. But the scant rainfall in 
Winter and virtually non-existent rainfall in the Spring have meant that 
farmers depend highly on the canal for obtaining irrigation water. Therefore, 
higher weighting factors are assigned to the Winter and Spring seasons. The 
dichotomous (binary) responses for the three variables, i.e. reliability, 
adequacy and equity, in all three cropping seasons were weighted and added 
together to compute a continuous variable ranging from  0 to 3.   
 
The quantitative data in this thesis come from a small sample size of 199 
households. In order to make the analysis logical and accurate, the data had to 
be reduced to a format that enabled maximum analysis with minimum loss of 
information (Searle, 2005). There are no simple solutions to this problem. In 
order to divide the dependent variable into reasonably valid and reliable 
categorisations which reflect the farmers’ experiences of irrigation water in 
terms of access, households were divided into two categories, i.e. those having 
strong access to water and those having weak access.   
 
The next stage was to reduce the individual scores into manageable groups.  
However, as Bryman and Cramer argue, one of the main sources of concern 
with collapsing data is that the “choice of cut-off points is bound to be 
arbitrary and will have a direct impact on the results obtained, suggesting 
that it may be better to employ a fairly systematic procedure like quartiles as 
a means of collapsing cases” (1994 p.178).  The distribution of the weighted 
access score was produced and is presented in Figure 3.9.  
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Figure 3.9 Distributions of Access Score in the Sample  
 
 
Searle (2005) points out that there are three issues that need to be taken into 
consideration while deciding the cut-off points. Firstly, the scores need to be 
arranged in a way, which create a valid categorisation of the access scores 
within the population. Secondly, in order to ensure that the sample is 
representative of the population and to maintain a high degree of 
generalisability, care must be taken to ensure that there are sufficient 
numbers of cases within each category. Thirdly, a scientific approach with a 
clear practical and/or theoretical rationale should be used to ensure that that 
the methodology is reliable.  
 
In order to maintain the reliability and validity of the study, the dependent 
variable, i.e. level of access, was created by dividing households into two 
categories i.e. strong access (access score >1.735) and weak access (access 
score ≤1.734).  This was partly informed by the discussions held with the 
farmers during the PRA process. The majority of the farmers insisted that if 
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they have a good water supply throughout the year in all the three measures of 
access as defined in the thesis, they are able to grow up to five crops a year.  
However, they reported that if they do not have good access to irrigation 
water, then they can only cultivate one crop in a year. Furthermore, there was 
a common consensus amongst the farmers during the PRA process that at 
least they should have an average access score for them to grow two crops a 
year, which is critical for their household food security. Therefore, an overall 
mean access score is taken as the boundary for the strong-weak divisions.  A 
mean access score of 1.73, which is just over half of the maximum value of 3   
indicates water availability which is considered to be enough for cultivating 
two crops in year. However, it has to be said that these methods are not 
exhaustive but were considered as providing a reasonable variation in terms of 
addressing the three main issues of validity, reliability and generalisability.  
 
3.10 Some Reflections on the Positionality of this Research 
 
The interactions and their dynamics between the researchers and those being 
researched have become a topical issue both in qualitative and quantitative 
research.  The proliferation of literature in social sciences have increasingly 
argued that the positionality of the researchers have implications in many 
aspects of research process including the epistemological foundation, 
methodological choice, findings and ethical considerations (Greenbank, 2003; 
Ganga and Scott, 2006). Therefore, researchers are increasingly called to 
recognise “their own positionality” (Moser, 2008 p. 384) to explore the 
“politics of position” (Smith, 1993 p.305) and to examine it reflexively (Rose, 
1997). The positionality of the researchers has been defined as their place in 
space (Rose, 1997) in terms of how their values, interests, past experience, 
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background (such as race, ethnicity, education, and sex) influence the way in 
which they relate to the research participants (Greenbank, 2003; Holliday, 
2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003), which in turn determines both the validity 
and reliability of the data collected and the research findings. The 
commonalities such as cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national and religious and 
political beliefs shared by the researchers with their research subjects affords 
researchers a degree of proximity between them (Ganga and Scott, 2006), 
which influences the socio-psychological dynamics of the research.  Therefore, 
the researchers’ reflection on the research process is critical in maintaining 
the neutrality and universality of the knowledge produced (Pile, 1991; Thrift, 
1996; McDowell, 1992). For example, Rosen (1998) highlights the importance 
of positionality in the creation of knowledge:  
"A person’s knowledge can only exist by virtue of a vast range of past 
experiences which have been lived through, often with the most intense 
feelings. These experiences, including textual experiences (books, lectures, 
lessons, conversation, etc), we have been taught to disguise so that our 
utterances are made to seem as though they emerge from no particular place 
or time or person but from the fount of knowledge itself" (p.30).  
 
The following section of this thesis is devoted to my reflection in conducting 
this research on the distributional aspects of irrigation interventions in Nepal. 
This is important because a researcher’s biographical profile can sometimes 
determine the selection of research topic as Burgess (1984) argues:  
"While some [researchers] become interested in an area of study through 
reading other people’s work, this is only one part of the story, for the 
biography of the individual researcher has a part to play." (p.210) 
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Whilst the academic and policy importance of this research is described in 
Chapter One, the much needed encouragement came from my own personal 
experience in Nepalese society in general and in relation to irrigation canal in 
particular.  Because of my shared ethnic background and personal experience 
with some of the participants of this research, I intend to reflect on them in 
the following section of the thesis.  
 
Firstly, as with many children in rural Nepal, I learnt to swim in the canal 
when I was a child. Secondly, as a son of a rural farmer, I was involved in 
farming including participating in O & M activities and diverting water from 
the canal.  It is fair to say that the water acquisition from the canal was not 
always an easy task and it was characterised by bullying, verbal abuse and on 
many occasions being physically manhandled. Thirdly, I undertook my 
undergraduate dissertation research in a jointly managed irrigation canal in 
Nepal, which further enhanced my interest in canal politics.  Fourthly, 
perhaps more importantly, I come from the most marginalised community in 
Nepal, commonly called the dalits (untouchables) with landholding at the tail 
end of the canal. A growing body of literature demonstrates that social 
scientists studying minority groups have faced a mounting pressure to re-
examine their concepts and methods and to change their relationships with 
the people they study (Moore, 1973; Zinn, 1979). Some scholars such as 
Montero (1977) argue that the research techniques used in studying ethnic 
minority community should gear towards sensitising the investigators to the 
actual nature of community and its members. It is argued that “researcher’s 
gender, age, prestige, expertise or ethnic identity may limit or determine 
what he or she can accomplish” (Wax, 1979 p.583). In line with my 
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background, it is important to detail the research process, particularly the 
qualitative interviews undertaken as a part of fieldwork for this research.  
 
Whilst the preference for conducting fieldwork in Nepal was primarily based 
on the policy relevance for this research, the much-needed impetus to do so 
came from a logistics viewpoint. I am a Nepalese citizen and conducting 
fieldwork in Nepal had many advantages including my own established 
network in Nepal, my past experience and the knowledge of local language. 
However, returning to Nepal to conduct fieldwork posed several dilemmas for 
me. Firstly, since my home was in Nepal, returning to Nepal for fieldwork was 
returning “home”. However, I was aware that I had to make a clear distinction 
between “field” and “home” and considered Nepal, at least for the purpose of 
research, a field rather than home (Sultana, 2007). Moreover, whilst I was 
born and raised in a rural village, I attended school and college in Kathmandu, 
the capital city of Nepal. This meant my social connection to my village of 
birth was rather weak. The field sites for this research were typical rural 
villages, which provided me different socio-economic context for conducting 
fieldwork. Nonetheless, because of my family ties to rural area, the settings 
were somewhat familiar to me.  Also, I come from a dalit community and I 
share a common ethnic background with many of my research participants. 
The importance of shared cultural knowledge with research participants in 
influencing the social dynamics during the fieldwork is highlighted by 
Bousetta (1997):  
 
"During data collection, for example, an ethnic background can be very 
helpful. Ethnic researchers can have privileged relations with immigrant 
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groups, which can facilitate access to the field. Similar advantages arise 
from familiarity with the languages and the physical space of the researched 
group. On the other hand, such closeness between a researcher and his/her 
subject can also harm the research process" (p.5). 
 
It is important to highlight that reseachers’ shared background and life 
experience plays an important role in their understanding and interpretation 
of what they observe (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Many qualitative 
researchers such as Denzin (1989) argue that “interpretive research begins 
and ends with the biography and self of the researcher” (p.12). This is 
because when researchers understand, interpret and describe any research 
issues from research participants with a shared background, they are "staying 
close to the phenomena" (Jungck, 1996 p. 166). As such the awareness of 
researcher’s own “biases, blind spots, and cognitive limitations presents a 
high priority for knowledge generation” (Brown, 1996 p.20). 
 
Whilst certain degree of researcher bias and subjectivity are inevitable in 
social research, objectivity and value-neutrality are considered important 
criteria for the credibility of research methods, and reliability and validity of 
research findings (Mehra, 2002).  As a member of the dalit community, to 
some extent, I had some prior knowledge and preunderstanding of many 
aspects of dalit communities including their knowledge, insights, social status, 
socio-economic disadvantages and caste-based discriminations faced by them 
(Gummesson, 2000).  The possession of prior knowledge of the context of the 
research was critical both during research design and research operation. My 
prior knowledge of the research context together with literature reviewed 
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helped me to generate research questions, which are theoretically informed 
and also have strong contextual basis. Whilst it is recognised that in gravity 
flow system of irrigation, tail-enders suffer locational disadvantages in water 
appropriation (Bardhan 1984, Ostrom, 1994; Johnson and Libecap, 1982), the 
research idea about the role of property right structures in determining the 
level of access to water came about from my prior knowledge of the policy 
context of irrigation governance in Nepal. 
 
The valuable prior knowledge about the cultural aspects and power structures 
in the rural communities and the hardship experienced by the members of 
dalit communities enabled me to operationalise research demonstrating 
sensitivity to their culture, norms and traditions. Also, my familiarity with the 
rurality of the research sites enabled me to make use of local colloquial terms 
and draw on my own personal experience in asking questions and 
interviewing (Nielsen and Repstad, 1993). This was critical in following up on 
replies and observations to obtain in-depth information pertinent to irrigation 
issues (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). For example, because of shared 
ethnicity, I was able to share my own personal experience of caste-based 
discriminations in my community with the members of dalit community in 
the research sites, which encouraged the research participants belonging to 
the dalit community to share their own experience during interviews and 
focus group discussions. Furthermore, my shared ethnic background and 
prior knowledge about the research subjects allowed me to see social reality 
from a different “lens” by allowing me to ask questions and gather information 
which others could not.  
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I was able to capitalise on my prior knowledge of the community and local 
networks to establish a good rapport with the research participants in 
maintaining “synergy, commitment and balance needed to operate as an 
insider researcher” (Gorinski and Ferguson, 1997 p.22). My prior knowledge 
of the dalit community and the rural settings helped me to maintain 
“trustworthiness, commitment, familiarity, credibility and accessibility” with 
the research context and research participants and to communicate with 
research subjects effectively (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005 p.63). A shared 
ethnic background and established network provided me with an opportunity 
to acquire ‘understanding in use’ rather than ‘reconstructed understanding’ 
(Adler and Adler, 1987 cited in Coghlan and Brannick, 2005 p.47) 
 
Also, the rurality of the communities considered for this research 
characterised by pre-dominantly agricultural activities meant that the timing 
of the fieldwork was critical for maximising their participation in the research 
process (Punch, 2005; Groves, 1998; Reimer, 1977). In Nepal, generally the 
farmers are busy in agricultural activities throughout the year except during 
the festivals and the time period between harvesting of maize crop and 
monsoon paddy. The fieldwork took place between October and January 
2007, which is the period immediately after harvesting maize and before 
harvesting monsoon paddy. The two most important Hindu festivals, Dashain 
(Dashara) and Tihar (Diwali), also fall during this period in which farmers 
were relatively free and could participate in the research process.  
 
Whilst the possession of such prior knowledge of the research context and the 
research subjects, particularly the farmers from the dalit community was 
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helpful in accessing information, it also presented a challenge to me in a 
number of ways. In particular, because of my prior knowledge, there was 
always a danger that I might assume too much about the research subjects and 
fail to probe enough due to prior assumptions such as backwardness of and 
discriminations against the dalit communities (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005; 
Ferguson and Ferguson, 2001). As Valentine and Valentine (1970) argue, 
contrary to an insider, an external researcher’s background will enable the 
research topic to be investigated from a thoroughly objective viewpoint and 
"this influences the kind of data and the quality of understanding that 
emerges" (p.403). 
 
However, whilst a shared ethnic and cultural background particularly with the 
members of dalit community might locate me with the research participants, 
the “native” at the same time made me the “other” because of my privileged 
background, particularly my education and experience in the UK (Lal, 1996). 
Nevertheless, in material and symbolic terms I was acutely aware of my 
educational privilege compared to the research participants. Although I 
appeared an insider because of my shared ethnicity with many of the research 
participants (Gilbert, 1994; Mullings, 1999), my privileged educational 
background made me somewhat more of an outsider than an insider creating 
“diversity in proximity” (Ganga and Scott, 2006 p.2).   
 
The members of the dalit communities who participated in my research were 
excited and were eager to help me in whatever way possible. I was often 
complimented for my academic accomplishments despite coming from a 
disadvantaged socio-economic and ethnic background. I was aware that 
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“neutrality of the researcher and the power relations involved in the research 
process” are critical for collecting unbiased data (Madge et al., 1997 p. 87). 
Because of my educational background and experience of the western world 
(UK), the farmers often assumed that I was wealthy and powerful man. 
Farmers in the rural village often assumed that researchers are superior to 
them because of their intellectual ability and they had the responsibility to 
provide answers to the questions which they were being asked, especially if 
they were not very personal (Tiwari, 2007; Moser, 1993; Fraenkel and Wallen, 
1990).  
 
The issue of power relations between the researchers and their research 
participants have been widely discussed in the literature (Piquemal, 2001; 
Crigger et al., 2001; Goodwin et al., 2000; Erber and Fiske, 1984; Meara and 
Schmidt, 1991). A growing body of literature suggests that the research 
process is characterised by a "relative powerlessness of the subject vis-à-vis 
the researcher" (LaRossa et al., 1981 p.306) and existence of an inherent 
structural imbalance of power between them gives rise to potential ethical 
questions in research process (Brownlee, 1996; Geyer, 1994; Schank and 
Skovholt, 1997). It is argued that individually perceived power hierarchies, 
which are often rooted in historical factors such as racism, colonialism, sexism 
and casteism provide a backdrop to power relations between researchers and 
their subjects (Harding, 1991; Piquemal, 2001; Morawski, 1997; IDSN, 2009). 
Such historically rooted power differences provide individuals in positions of 
power the opportunity to “engage in thoughts and behaviour, which attempts 
to maintain their position of authority” (Richeson and Ambady, 2003 p.177). 
In the context of this research, such power imbalances between the researcher 
 241 
and research participants emanated from historical social factors and their 
personality traits. Firstly, whilst in general the research participants were 
helpful in answering my queries, at times some farmers’ acted in ways that 
demonstrated they are more powerful than the researcher partly because they 
were the source of information (Kiegelmann, 1996; Cohen et al., 2007).  For 
example, during focus group discussions in the AMIS, when the issue of 
alleged financial irregularities taking place in the WUA was being discussed 
some of the participants were reluctant to provide information on the misuse 
of public funds. One of the participants went as far as suggesting that issues 
pertinent to local village sphere, which could be resolved at the village level, 
should not be reported to external researchers as the latter lacked both 
authority and ability to intervene. Such attitudes demonstrate a clear 
unwillingness to share information by some farmers participating in the 
research. Whilst the farmers demonstrated self-protective behaviour to 
minimise community intrusion by an external researcher (Singer, 1993; 
Shalala, 2000); however, by withholding information on important issues 
such as misuse of public funds and lack of accountability of the WUA, the 
research participants were not only protecting the corrupt WUA officials but 
also denying themselves an opportunity to rectify past mistakes and move in a 
positive direction with greater transparency and accountability within the 
WUA (Johnson et al, 2002; Ostrom, et al, 1994). Although such attitudes to 
external researchers cannot be generalised to all the research participants, 
they still provide evidence of different power relations between the 
researchers and the research participants.  
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Secondly, the power relations between the researchers and their research 
participants can confound with socio-cultural group status partly to maintain 
existing social stratification (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Operario et al., 1998). 
Such power differences, which are rooted in socio-cultural factors, form the 
basis for cognitive biases of powerful individuals participating in research 
process, which serve to maintain their dominance in the society in general and 
the focus group discussions in particular (Sidanius and Pratto, 1993; Lather, 
1988; Edwards, 1990; Stanley and Wise, 1990). Whilst in general the research 
participants treated me with great respect even though I am from the dalit 
caste group, some participants attempted to show their caste hegemony 
during the focus group discussions. For example, dominance of farmers 
belonging to higher castes was clearly visible during the focus group 
discussions, which took place in Tinpiple village in the JMIS, as some farmers 
went to suggest that “dalits would complain about everything when they find a 
dalit researcher, why cannot they so with WUA or researchers from higher 
castes”. Such remarks from farmers belonging to the higher castes simply 
disregarded the ability of the dalit farmers. Furthermore, by making such 
remarks during focus group discussions, the farmers from higher castes were 
being judgemental about the ability of the dalit farmers and the researcher, 
which are based on stereotypes (Fazio et al., 1995; Richeson and Ambady, 
2003). Scholars such as Levkoff et al. (1998) suggest that such stereotypical 
attitudes towards the dalits could emanate from a mismatch between the 
assumptions held by the researcher and the research participants, particularly 
those belonging to the higher castes. 
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Thirdly, this research involved interviews and interactions with some 
prominent key informants such as bureaucrats in the DoI and local politicians 
who were more powerful than the researcher. Whilst in general most of the 
key informants responded positively to my queries, some key informants 
particularly those associated with the AMIS and the JMIS were reluctant to 
provide information. Interviewing local farmers was relatively easier 
compared to some senior bureaucrats at the DoI as Eyben (2004) suggest 
“interactions is easier at lower echelons but there is less preparedness to take 
an interest in the substance of the research as more and more senior staff 
members become involved in the research” (p.4).  Firstly, it was difficult to 
negotiate appointment with senior bureaucrats working in the DoI partly due 
to existence of different “gatekeepers” (Mander, 1992 p.1461) and “key 
masters” (Campbell, 2006 p.97) within the bureaucratic hierarchy in the DoI. 
Secondly, even after gaining access to the ‘core of the DoI’, there was a 
prevalence of various forms of denials, particularly on the issues related to the 
performance of the AMIS and the JMIS. When asked about the poor 
performance of irrigation systems managed by the DoI, the bureaucrats 
attempted to cover their backs by quickly mentioning that “the views 
expressed are those of the individual farmers and do not represent those of 
the WUA and the DoI” (Douglas, 1986 p.19). In one instance during the 
interview a key informant, who is a senior engineer at the DoI, went on to say 
that “if you ask the farmers how much water is enough for them, you will 
soon discover that no amount of water is enough for them--- do not listen to 
them--- they will drive you crazy”.  
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Similarly, as this research used farmers’ perceptions in measuring the level of 
access to irrigation water; which immediately put me at odds with the 
irrigation bureaucrats; they constantly made efforts to hide key information 
regarding the performance of the DoI and the WUA. Cohen (2001) argues that 
the existence of power relations between the researchers and their subjects 
provides grounds for various forms of denial, which are extremely difficult to 
overcome particularly when they are built into the organisational and 
institutional structures. It should be mentioned that existence of such power 
differences between the researchers and research participants provides 
grounds for deniability, which in turn provides opportunity for the “deferral 
of responsibilities” towards the farmers by the DoI (Eyben, 2004 p.5). The 
attitudes of the DoI staff members towards local farmers provided a clear 
indication of power differences between them, which was reflected during key 
informant interviews.  
 
Also, the power relations between the researchers and officials have 
implications in their ability to access secondary data (Hakim, 1982; Sanmartin 
and Ross, 2006; Scott et al., 2006). Despite gaining formal permission from 
the DoI in Kathmandu, some staff members at the DIO in the Lamjung 
district, where the JMIS is situated, appeared to be suspicious about the 
research. The DIO staff members were very reluctant to provide me access to 
project documents related to the JMIS. Obviously, the staff members at the 
DIO were the ‘gatekeepers’ who had access to some of the important 
secondary data which this research needed to obtain. The power relation 
between the researcher and the staff members at the DIO clearly presented a 
challenge during the fieldwork. However, once I explained the aims, objectives 
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and benefits of my research, the staff members at the DIO reluctantly 
provided me access to project documents related to the JMIS.  
 
However, in order to maintain a neutral position throughout the fieldwork, I 
adopted a number of steps. Firstly, I constructed my role as a researcher with 
well-defined scope and boundaries. However, these were flexible enough to 
increase my adaptability depending upon the circumstances during the 
fieldwork. I was an outsider researcher, whose aim was to collect unbiased 
data and maintain neutrality throughout the research process. Ashforth et al.  
(2000) argue that a clearly defined role and flexible boundaries enable a 
researcher to maintain his/her dual role as an external researcher as well as a 
member of the community which is being studied. The boundaries were 
pliable spatially and temporally. The flexibility and permeability of the role 
constructed enabled transition from one role to another. For example, my 
affiliation to the dalit community enabled me to build a rapport with the 
members of the dalit community and obtain even personal information 
pertinent to irrigation issues. Also, because of a clearly defined role, I could 
assume physically one role (a member of a dalit community) and 
psychologically and behaviourally assume another role (a neutral researcher). 
Even though I demonstrated a friendly attitude towards the research 
participants, I never lost sight of the aims and objectives of my research and 
worked diligently to maintain neutrality and generate unbiased data. 
 
A growing body of literature on research methodology asserts that some 
distance between the researcher and the people who are being researched 
should be maintained to provide a “fully external and rigorous observation of 
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social phenomenon and the neutrality of scientific language is the only way 
to approach social reality” (Beltrán and Alonso, 2005 p.5). Therefore, 
consistent with the dominance of positivism in social research, as a 
researcher, I needed to be close to my research subjects to build up rapport 
and to generate much needed data. However, at the same time I kept a certain 
distance to maintain objectivity and neutrality during the research process. I 
never attended dinner at the research participants’ houses either after the 
interview or otherwise despite being invited, as having dinner is perceived as 
being too close in Nepalese culture where the risk of losing neutrality was 
high. Instead, I shared tea with them at the local tea shops at my own expense. 
This approach had a number of advantages. Firstly, it is a customary practice 
for local people in rural Nepal to assemble in local tea shops to discuss issues 
of local interests informally and I could use this opportunity to build rapport 
with the local people. Also, having a cup of tea together instead of having 
dinner at their houses is considered as being “close but not too close” (Welsh 
et al., 2008 p.1854) to the research participants. Secondly, paying for tea was 
a way of thanking the research participants for the time they gave me to 
discuss issues related to irrigation. Also, paying myself for tea means that I 
was not expecting anything from the local farmers apart from honest answers 
to hone my understanding of the irrigation related issues in their 
communities. Thirdly, I neither accepted gifts from the research participants 
nor gave them any gifts as this is likely to influence the social dynamics 
between the researcher and the participants. Fourthly, despite being asked 
what I could do to their villages, I did not promise anything that I could not 
deliver. Instead I told them that this is an independent study for my PhD 
degree and the findings would be shared to the local farmers and the policy 
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makers, which might help to change irrigation policies in the future. Fifthly, I 
took necessary care in generating “situated research” (Atkinson, 2005 p.51) to 
understand the irrigation issues from the perspectives of the farmers, which is 
not influenced by my affiliation to the dalit community, which was being 
researched. In doing so, I distanced myself from my own ‘ethnic affiliation and 
prejudices’ (McKinley, 2005). The respondents were informed at the outset of 
the interviews that our shared ethnic background should not influence the way 
they responded to my questions. The respondents were assured that the 
information they provided would be strictly confidential and that they should 
respond to the questions in a free and impartial manner without any worry of 
being punished for their opinions.  
 
3.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the research methodology used in this research. It 
has briefly revisited the research questions and highlighted the need for a 
distinct research methodology in order to answer the research questions.  
Given the nature and the scope of the study, a case study approach was 
deemed to be the best approach to investigating the issues raised and the 
research questions posited in Chapter One. The case study involved 
triangulation of data obtained through mixed methods. The mixed method 
approach adopted in this thesis has applied a number of data collection 
methods including a household survey, focus group discussions, key 
informant interviews, participant observations and documentary analysis.  
The chapter has highlighted the advantages and limitations of each of the 
general methods used in the thesis and explained how these were applied 
during the course of the fieldwork.   
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Whilst the choice of a sound research method was critical, the choice of case 
study sites was equally important in answering the research questions. The 
chapter has explained the rationale for choosing the three irrigation systems 
considered for this research. The selection of case study was done in light of a 
number of factors, including comparable precipitation and temperature, rural 
settings, similar cropping patterns, heterogeneous settings and different 
property rights structures.  
 
The chapter has described the socio-economic situations and demographic 
patterns of the case study sites in order to familiarise readers with the context 
within which this research took place.  Furthermore the ethical considerations 
have been highlighted. Since the research involved human subjects, it was 
absolutely critical to demonstrate a clear adherence to the research ethics.  
Finally, the chapter has explained the data analysis methods used in the 
research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
HOUSEHOLDS CHARACTERISTICS AND ACCESS TO 
IRRIGATION WATER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
THREE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview   
The relationship between socio-economic heterogeneity and distributional 
implications of natural resource management is becoming a growing concern 
amongst both academics and policy makers alike. This chapter uses both 
households’ socio-economic characteristics and resource specific features, 
which are assumed to have influence on household ability to access water 
from the irrigation canals.  The analysis is based on a household survey from 
the mid-hills of the Nepal to investigate households’ level of access to 
irrigation water from canal systems, which are governed by different property 
right regimes. Depending on the nature of the variables, simple statistical tests 
such as the Chi-square test, ANOVA and t-tests were carried out to answer 
research questions presented in Chapter One. The analysis of field data 
suggests that households with different socio-economic capability have 
different level of access to irrigation water. However, farmers along these 
heterogeneities have different levels of access to water in irrigation systems 
governed by different property right regimes with farmers in the FMIS 
performing significantly better than those served by the AMIS and the JMIS. 
This chapter argues that property rights on natural resources need to be 
combined with social goals for equity for the sustainable management of 
irrigation resources. 
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4.2 Endogenous Variables:  Basic Description of Communal 
Characteristics  
 
This section describes the characteristics of the sample, community 
characteristics and resource specific characteristics. Variables are identified 
through the literature review presented in Chapter Two, which are assumed to 
have implications on farmers’ capabilities to access water. The exercise carried 
out in this chapter will help to design the model for regression analysis in 
Chapter Five.  
 
   4.2.1 Caste and Access to Irrigation Water  
 
 Nepalese society is dominated by caste hierarchy. The dalits who occupy the 
lowest position in the caste hierarchy face a multitude of segregations 
including subordination, untouchability and socio-economic discrimination. 
In order to understand the association between caste and farmers’ access to 
water, the respondents were asked if they faced caste based discrimination in 
general and specifically in relation to water appropriation from the canal 
system. Table 4.1 shows the proportion of farmers who reported to have 
experienced caste based discrimination in general and caste based 
discrimination particularly in relation to water appropriation in the sample 
households.  
 
However, the results show remarkable differences in caste discrimination, 
particularly in relation to irrigation related activities amongst the three 
irrigation systems considered for this research.  None of the farmers from the 
lower castes (the dalits) in the FMIS area, who reported having faced caste 
based discrimination in their communities reported discrimination during 
water appropriation from the canal. Neither did farmers from the dalit castes 
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in the FMIS area who did not report facing caste based discriminations in 
their community, report such discrimination during water appropriation. 
 
It is interesting to note that the caste based discrimination took place in the 
opposite direction in the FMIS area. The data shows that a significant 
proportion of farmers from higher caste groups who reported having faced 
caste based discrimination generally in their community, also reported it 
during water appropriation. About 40 percent of the farmers belonging to 
higher caste groups who reported having faced caste based discrimination in 
their community generally, also reported it during water appropriation, while 
the remaining 60 percent did not.  
 
Despite being a semi-urban area, caste based discrimination, particularly 
during water appropriation, is generally high in the AMIS area.  Although 
none of the farmers belonging to the dalit caste reported discrimination 
generally in the AMIS, all reported it during water appropriation. 
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Table 4.1   General Caste based Discriminations and Caste based Discrimination related to Water Distribution as 
Reported by Farmers   
 
Caste Based 
Discrimination 
Irrigation Systems Over all caste based 
discriminations in 
water appropriations 
FMIS AMIS JMIS 
  
General 
% (n) 
Water specific 
% (n) 
General 
% (n) 
Water specific 
% (n) 
General 
% (n) 
Water specific 
% (n) 
  
Dalits 
 
Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Yes  
% (n) 
No  
% (n) 
Yes  
81.8  (9) 8.9 (5) 0 (0) 3.6 (2) 0 (0) 3.3 (2) 
100 
(3) 1.7 (1) 
61.5 
(8) 
19.6 
(11) 
38.5 
(5) 
22.2 
(12) 36.8 (73) 3.8 (7) 
No 
18.2 (2) 
91.1 
(51) 100 (11) 
96.4 
54) 100 (3) 
96.7 
(58) 0 (0) 
98.3 
(59) 
38.5 
(5) 
80.4 
(45) 
61.5 
(8) 
77.8 
(44) 63.2 (126) 96.2 (192) 
Total  100 (11) 100 (56) 100 (11) 100 
(56) 
100 (3) 100 
(60) 
100 
(3) 
100 
(60) 
100 
(13) 
100 (56) 100 
(13) 
100 
(56) 100 (199) 100(199) 
Pearson Chi-
square       = 
36.768 
D.F. = 1 
P-value   <0.001 
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However, none of the farmers from higher castes reported to facing caste 
based discrimination generally nor during water appropriation. Of the farmers 
from higher castes in the AMIS reporting experiences of caste based 
discriminations, 1.7 percent also reported discrimination during water 
appropriation, while the remaining 98.3 percent did not make such reports. It 
illustrates that the dalit households in the AMIS continue to face caste related 
discrimination in water appropriation, which has serious implications for 
social inclusion in the management of the AMIS and ultimately a profound 
implication on access to productive resources such as irrigation water.  One of 
the objectives of this research was to investigate under which property rights 
regime farmers belonging to the dalit castes have better access to water. The 
data demonstrate that, for these farmers, there is a clear link between 
discrimination on the basis of caste in general and on the basis of caste in 
water related issues including water appropriation from the canal system in 
the AMIS.  
 
Similarly, a significant proportion of farmers belonging to the dalit caste in 
the JMIS who reported caste based discrimination also felt discriminated 
against during water appropriation from the canal system. Data demonstrate 
that 61.5 percent of the farmers from the dalit castes who did not report to 
have faced caste based discrimination generally, reported it whilst 
appropriating water from the canal system, while 38 percent of the dalit 
farmers reported caste discrimination generally also reported it specifically 
when appropriating water from the canal system. Equally important, a 
significant proportion of farmers from the higher castes who experienced 
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caste related discrimination also reported it during water appropriation from 
the canal system.   
 
Overall in the sample, 39 percent of the farmers who reported facing caste 
based discrimination in their society generally also reported it while 
appropriating water from the canal system. Similarly, a significantly higher 
proportion of farmers (63.2 percent) who reported not having experienced 
caste based discrimination generally, also reported facing caste based 
discrimination.  
 
Table 4.1 presents results of the Chi-square test between the irrigation systems 
and caste based discrimination in water appropriation from the canal. The 
results of the Chi-square test indicate that there is a statistically significant 
association between the irrigation systems and caste based discrimination in 
water appropriation. The system level comparison of caste based 
discrimination in water appropriation shows a clear difference. The 
implantation of an egalitarian approach to water distribution in the FMIS has 
meant that perhaps the dalit farmers in the FMIS have a sense of being more 
empowered  and report less caste based discrimination in water appropriation 
(as described in Chapter Six later). This has a significant effect on the welfare 
of the lower caste people who depend on marginal land for sustaining their 
livelihoods.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the level of access to irrigation water by different caste groups 
in the three irrigation systems considered for this research. In the FMIS, the 
dalit households appear to have better access to water than the higher caste 
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farmers in the same irrigation system. The percentage of farmers reporting 
strong access to irrigation water in the FMIS is 90.9 and 82.1 from the dalits 
and higher castes respectively. However, the proportion of the dalit farmers 
reporting strong access to water in the AMIS and the JMIS is rather low when 
compared to people from higher castes. The definition of strong and weak 
access to water in the context of this thesis has been provided in Chapter 
Three (Section 3.9). Strong access to water is the level of access as reported by 
the farmers with an access score value more than the mean access score 
(access score >1.735), while weak access is considered as the level of access 
with an access score less than 1.735. The mean access score is the level of 
access to water, which is enough to grow at least two crops a year essential for 
household food security. The proportion farmers in the AMIS in both castes 
reporting a weak access to water is substantially higher as compared to the 
farmers in the FMIS and JMIS. Only a third of the dalit households in the 
AMIS reported having strong access to water, while 61.5 percent and 90.9 
percent from the JMIS and the FMIS reported strong access respectively.  The 
Chi-square test results presented in Table 4.2 indicate that caste based 
discrimination, particularly in relation to irrigation issues, has statistically 
significant association with the level of access to water.  
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Table 4.2 Level of Access to Water by Castes in Different Irrigation Systems  
 
Level of Access to Irrigation 
Water  
 
Irrigation Systems Households 
reporting caste cased 
discriminations by 
system types 
FMIS 
 % (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS  
% (n) 
Overall  
% (n) 
   
Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits Higher 
castes  
Dalits FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
A strong access 82.1 
(46)  
90.9 
(10) 
21.7 
(13) 
33.3 
(1) 
76.8 
(43) 
61.5 
(8) 
59.3 
(102) 
70.4 
(19) 
83.6 
(56) 
22.2 
(14) 
73.9 
(51) 
A weak access  17.9 
(10) 9.1 (1) 
78.3 
(50) 
66.7 
(2) 
23.2 
(13) 
38.5 
(5) 
40.7 
(70) 
29.6 
(8) 
16.4 
(11) 
77.8 
(49) 
26.1 
(18) 
Total  100 
(56) 
100 
(11) 
100 
(60) 
100 
(3) 
100 
(56) 
100 
(13) 
100 
(172) 
100 
(27) 
100 
(67) 
100 
(63) 
100 
(69) 
Pearson Chi-square= 58.910 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.001 
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   4.2.2 Size of Landholding and Access to Water  
 
Table 4.3 shows the landholding by different households in the three 
irrigation systems under consideration. The categorisation of households has 
been discussed in Chapter Three (Section 3.6.3.2). Whilst the classification of 
households into various categories would suggest inherent differences in the 
size of landholdings amongst the households in those categories, the 
differences in landholding across other heterogeneities also appear to be 
marked.  Firstly, in the FMIS, while there are no apparent differences in the 
holdings of farmers in different locations, the difference between types of 
farmers is striking. On average, the larger landholders have more than five 
times the land of small landholders. As mentioned earlier, landholding not 
only reflects economic power but also social status and privileged position in 
the rural communities in Nepal. Whilst the amount of landholding symbolises 
socio-economic power in rural Nepal, the quality of the land determines the 
actual economic gains from agricultural practices. Generally the Khet land is 
considered to be better than Pakho for crop production. The large farmers not 
only have a significant amount of land, but it is also better quality. The larger 
farmers have a higher amount of productive Khet land as well as Pakho, 
compared to medium or small landholders. In the same system, the male-
headed households have a higher amount of land than female-headed 
households, and they also have access to more of the better quality Khet land 
compared to households headed by females.  The unequal distribution of land 
can also be observed amongst different caste groups. Farmers from higher 
castes have almost twice the amount of landholdings than those from lower 
caste groups.  
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Table 4.3 Households Categories and landholdings 
 
 
 
 
Households 
Categories  
Types of Land in Ropani 
FMIS AMIS JMIS 
Khet Pakho Total Khet Pakho Total Khet Pakho Total 
Large 15.3 7.4 22.7 20.5 5.0 25.6 15.2 11.2 26.4 
Medium 10.1 1.9 12.0 10.1 2.0 12.1 8.5 4.6 12.8 
Small 4.3 0.5 4.8 3.5 0.2 3.7 2.3 2.3 4.6 
Male HH 8.0 2.2 10.2 8.6 1.7 10.3 9.9 6.7 16.8 
Female HH 5.9 2.0 7.9 3.5 0.1 3.6 6.1 5.2 11.3 
Head end 10.7 3.6 14.3 3.7 0.6 4.3 9.2 3.3 12.5 
Middle end 6.7 2.2 8.9 9.2 1.2 10.4 7.5 2.5 10.0 
Tail end 7.1 1.8 8.9 7.4 1.7 9.2 5.9 9.6 15.4 
Higher castes  8.0 2.3 10.3 7.8 1.4 9.2 10.6 7.1 17.8 
Dalits HH 5.3 1.2 6.5 1.0 0.7 1.7 3.4 4.0 7.4 
Over all 7.6 2.1 9.7 7.5 1.3 8.8 9.3 6.6 14.3 
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Secondly, in the AMIS, unlike the FMIS, the distribution of landholdings 
along the spatial scale is quite distinct. The farmers at the tail end of the main 
canal in the AMIS area have larger landholdings than the farmers at the head 
end. However, the farmers at the tail end of the canal have poor access to 
water as compared to farmers at the head end. This has serious implications 
for food production, not only at the household level but also for the entire 
system, as the large swath of land at the tail end lacks good access to irrigation 
water. In the same system, landholdings are distributed very unequally 
amongst the farmers belonging to different caste groups.  Farmers from 
higher castes groups hold almost five fold the amount of land than that of the 
lower castes, and also have access to better quality Khet land than the farmers 
belonging to lower caste groups.  Generally, the farmers belonging to the dalit 
castes have marginal landholdings, which are often located in unproductive 
areas called the Khoriya. These Pakho landholdings are difficult to irrigate, 
while also requiring a high water application for crop production, owing to 
their unproductive nature. 
 
A two-sample independent t-test was used to determine whether there was a 
gender difference in the distribution of land. The t-test shows that on average, 
farmers from households headed by men had access to larger landholdings 
(Mean=12.35 Ropani, S.D. = 12.39, N=156), than female-headed households 
(Mean= 7.57 Ropani, S.D. =5.64, N=43).  
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This difference was statistically significant t (154.25) = 3.859, p<0.05, and 
also represented a medium sized effect (Eta-squared=0.083).6 
 
Similarly, the t-test shows that on average, farmers from higher castes had 
access to larger landholdings (Mean=12.35 Ropani, S.D. = 11.94, N=172) than 
farmers from lower castes (dalit) (Mean= 6.41 Ropani, S.D. =5.56, N=27). 
This difference was also statistically significant t (71.527) = -4.227, p<0.05 and 
represented a medium sized effect (Eta-squared=0.07). 
 
 
Table 4.4 Small Farmers and Access to Water in the Three 
Irrigation Systems   
 
Level of Access to Irrigation 
Water  
Irrigation System/ Marginal Farmers 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
A strong access 76.2 (32) 15.2 (6) 61.9 (13) 
A weak access 23.8 (10) 84.6 (33) 38.1 (8) 
Total  100 (42) 100 (39) 100 (21) 
 
Pearson Chi-square= 31.407 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.001 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows comparative access levels of farmers belonging to small 
landholding categories in the three different irrigation systems.  The data 
clearly demonstrate that the small farmers in the FMIS have better access to 
irrigation water than their counterparts in the AMIS or JMIS. On average, 
76.2 percent of the marginal farmers in the FMIS reported having strong 
access to irrigation water, while just 15.24 percent and 61.9 percent of the 
                                               
6  Cohen’s d, also called Eta-squared is commonly used to indicate the standardized different 
between two means and often used in reporting results of t-test and ANOVA. Cohen (1988) 
suggests that in the behavioural sciences, an effect size of 0.2 indicates a small effect, 0.5 a 
medium effect, and >0.8 a large effect. 
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marginal farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS respectively, made this same 
report. The Chi-square result indicates that there is an association between 
the level of access and irrigation systems for marginal farmers and the 
association is statistically significant at p<0.001 level.  
 
Table 4.5 shows an average access score of the marginal farmers in three 
different irrigation systems. On average, the marginal farmers in the FMIS 
reported higher access scores (2.02) than their counterparts in the AMIS 
(0.84) and the JMIS (1.54).  
 
Table 4.5 Average Access Score of Famers with Small Landholding  
 
Marginal 
Farmers  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Min. Max.  
small farmers in 
FMIS 
41 2.0268 .51504 .08044 .80 3.00 
small farmers in 
AMIS 
39 .8372 .99159 .15878 .00 3.00 
small farmers in 
JMIS 
20 1.8975 1.34228 .30014 .00 3.00 
Total 100 1.5370 1.07188 .10719 .00 3.00 
 
 
A one way between-group analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to 
determine the statistical significance of the household level of access to 
irrigation water as measured by the access score. The marginal farmers were 
divided according to the type of system that served them (Group 1: marginal 
farmers in the FMIS; Group 2: marginal farmers in the AMIS; Group 3: 
marginal farmers in the JMIS).  The results are presented in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 ANOVA Results for Access Score of Marginal Farmers in 
the Three Irrigation Systems   
 
 
Sum of 
Squares d.f Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 31.537 2 15.768 18.606 .000 
Within Groups 82.206 97 .847   
Total 113.743 99    
 
The ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference between the 
groups at the p<0.001 level in the access score for the three groups of 
marginal farmers: F (2, 97) =18.606, p<0.001.  Although the difference in 
access scores between the groups appears small, those small differences do 
indicate a greater significance, as the value of access scores ranges between 0 
and 3 where a small difference could indicate huge significance in practical 
terms.  The effect size, calculated using eta squared was 0.28, which is 
considered to be large statistically (Cohen, 1988).  
 
Table 4.7 Multiple Comparison of Access Score of Small 
Landholders in Three Irrigation Systems  
 
(I) Small 
farmers (J) Small farmers 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
small farmers in 
FMIS 
small farmers in AMIS 1.18965* .20591 .000 
small farmers in JMIS .12933 .25109 .864 
small farmers in 
AMIS 
small farmers in FMIS -1.18965* .20591 .000 
small farmers in JMIS -1.06032* .25319 .000 
small farmers in 
JMIS 
small farmers in FMIS -.12933 .25109 .864 
small farmers in AMIS 1.06032* .25319 .000 
 
The multiple comparisons of the access scores of marginal farmers in the three 
irrigation systems are presented in Table 4.7. While there is no significant 
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difference between the access scores of marginal farmers in the FMIS and the 
JMIS, the difference between the marginal farmers in the AMIS and their 
counter parts in the FMIS and the JMIS is statistically significant. First, the 
small landholders in the FMIS are compared with their counterparts in the 
AMIS and the JMIS. It was found that the marginal farmers in the FMIS are 
significantly different from their counterparts in the AMIS, but have 
statistically non-significant difference with marginal farmers in the JMIS at 
p<0.001 level. When compared with marginal farmers in the FMIS and the 
JMIS, the marginal farmers in the AMIS, the difference in access score was 
found to be statistically significant at p< 0.001 level.  Also, when the marginal 
farmers in the JMIS were compared with their counterparts in FMIS, the 
difference was not statistically significant but comparison with their 
counterparts in the AMIS showed a statistically significant difference at 
p<0.001 level.  
 
As argued in Chapter Two, socially and economically dominant groups have 
greater access to and control over productive capitals such as landholdings, 
while the landless and small landholders depend on the larger landholders for 
their livelihoods. Some of the informal practices of patron-client relationships 
include the practices of Haliya and Balighare.7 The farmers with small 
                                               
7 The term ‘haliya’ denotes a form of agricultural bonded labour practice in Nepal. The haliya 
system is organised on a short term contract where a ploughman ploughs his masters’ plots as 
debt payments.  Generally haliyas are from the background of the ‘low caste’ and ethnic 
community. Although the haliya system has been abolished officially by the Government of 
Nepal in September 2008, it is still widely prevalent all over the country, but is more common 
in Baitadi, Bajhang, Bajura, Dadeldhura, Darchula, Gorkha, Mustang, Myagdi, Parbat, 
Baglung and Gulmi districts (INSEC, 1994). Also, the baalighare system is an age old practice 
of labour arrangements where the bonded labourer or the ploughmen or tailors are paid 
annually in the form of grain for their work for their masters from higher castes. 
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landholdings face multiple problems in securing their livelihoods and depend 
on credits from various formal and informal sources. The dependency of 
landless and small landholders on larger landholders is often mediated 
through patron-client relationships and other forms of informal credit 
relationships.  
 
   4.2.3 Location of Landholding and Access to Water  
The farmers at the head end of the canal systems are often fuelled by a deep 
rooted mentality that they should have natural priority rights to irrigation 
water owing to their location, as demonstrated by the following quotation 
from a key informant interview: 
“---There is no such thing in irrigation management where tail-enders 
should be prioritised at the expense of the head-enders. Head-enders 
should naturally enjoy priority as the water flows through our area. How 
could you think that we will stand on the canal side and watch water 
flowing down when we do not have enough water in our own field---?”    
(Male, 56 years, head-ender in AMIS) 
  
The natural locational advantage enjoyed by the farmers at the head end of the 
canal not only has differential economic outcomes but also implications for 
collective outcomes, owing to different levels of incentives among head and 
tail end farmers (Bardhan 1984, Ostrom, 1994; Johnson and Libecap, 1982). 
In the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements to design, and 
implement property rights, and monitoring mechanisms for controlling 
defrauding many complex problems arise while managing local commons, 
including irrigation systems.  
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Table 4.8 presents the access score, and the number of hours irrigation water 
is used annually in different locations in the three irrigation systems 
considered for this research.  A clear pattern in the access score of different 
households can be observed both across the landholding locations and the 
irrigation systems. The access score has a minimum value of 0 and a 
maximum value of 3. Households with higher access scores have better access 
to irrigation water.  In the FMIS, head-enders have access scores of 1.9, while 
middle and tail-enders have average access scores of 1.9 and 2.3 respectively. 
In fact, the tail-enders in the FMIS appear to have better access to irrigation 
water compared to middle and head-enders.  This is partly because of water 
distribution rules implemented in the FMIS, which will be described in detail 
in Chapter Six.     
 
Table 4.8 Household Irrigation Access Score and Total Number of 
Hours Irrigation Water Applied by Landholding Locations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A one way between-group analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to 
find out the statistical significance of the level of access to irrigation water as 
System 
Type Location 
Average Access  
Score 
Total Number of 
hours irrigation 
water used 
 Head 1.9 692.79 
FMIS Middle 1.9 361.97 
 Tail 2.3 116.73 
 Head 1.7 997.60 
AMIS Middle 0.8 519.38 
 Tail 0.5 382.42 
 Head 2.7 3190.0 
JMIS Middle 2.6 1629.38 
 Tail 0.6 1092.27 
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measured by the access scores. The marginal farmers were divided according 
to the type of systems that serve them. (Group 1: head-enders; Group 2: 
middle-enders; Group 3: tail-enders).  The results are presented in Table 4.9.   
 
Table 4.9 ANOVA Results for Access Score of Landholding 
Locations in Phalebas   
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares d.f 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
1.570 2 .785 3.958 .024 
Within Groups 12.495 63 .198   
Total 14.065 65    
 
 
ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference between the 
groups at the p<0.05 level in the access scores for the three group landholding 
locations: F (2, 63) = 3.958, p<0.05).   The effect size, which is calculated 
using Eta squared, was 0.11 and is considered to be of medium significance 
statistically (Cohen, 1988).   Table 4.10 presents the outputs from multiple 
comparisons.  
 
Table 4.10 Multiple Comparison of Access Score by Landholding 
Group in the FMIS  
 
(I) Location of 
majority of 
household's 
landholdings 
with 
reference to 
main canal 
(J) Location 
of majority of 
household's 
landholdings 
with 
reference to 
main canal 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
  Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound Lower Bound 
head end middle end .03875 .15745 .967 
 tail end -.32750 .17952 .170 
middle end Head end -.03875 .15745 .967 
 tail end -.36625(*) .13173 .019 
tail end Head end .32750 .17952 .170 
 middle end .36625(*) .13173 .019 
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It is interesting to note that the head and tail-enders do not differ significantly 
from each other in the FMIS.  First, the mean access score of the head-ender is 
compared with the middle and tail-enders and have not been found to be 
significantly different from each other (p<0.05). The comparison of the 
middle-enders group with head and tail-enders groups shows the difference 
between middle and tail-enders to be statistically significant at (p<0.05) level, 
while the difference between middle-enders and head-enders was not 
statistically significant. Similarly, when comparing tail-enders with middle-
enders, the difference between them was also found to be statistically 
significant (p<0.05), while the difference between tail-enders and head-
enders was not. Similarly, as mentioned in Table 4.8, in the AMIS, head-
enders have access scores of 1.7 while the middle and tail-enders have average 
access scores of 0.8 and 0.5 respectively. It is clear that the farmers at the 
head end of the AMIS have higher average access scores compared to the 
landholdings in the middle and tail end of the canal system.   
 
Table 4.11 ANOVA Results for Access Score of Landholding 
Locations in AMIS 
  
 
Sum of 
Square
s Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
9.617 2 4.809 4.910 .011 
Within Groups 57.779 59 .979   
Total 67.396 61    
 
 
In order to determine the access scores of famers located in different 
locations, an ANOVA test is carried out. The ANOVA results indicate a 
statistically significant difference between the groups at the p<0.001 level in 
the access score for the three groups of landholding locations: F (2, 59) = 
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4.809, p<0.05) as presented in Table 4.11.   The effect size, calculated using 
Eta squared, was 0.14 which is considered to be large statistically (Cohen, 
1988). 
 
Table 4.12 presents the outputs from multiple comparisons.  The output 
consists of 95% confidence intervals for all differences between the underlying 
true means for weighted access scores of pairs of landholdings situated in 
different locations. It is very interesting to note that the mean access scores of 
head-enders differ significantly from that of both tail and middle-enders.  
First, the mean access scores of the head-enders are compared with those of 
the middle and tail-enders and they are found to be significantly different 
from each other at p<0.05 level. The comparison of the middle-enders group 
with the head-enders indicates a statistically significant difference at p<0.05 
level, while the difference between the middle-enders and tail-enders is not 
statistically significant at p<0.05 level. Similarly, when comparing the tail-
enders with the head-enders, the difference between them is found to be 
statistically different (p<0.05), while the difference between tail-enders and 
middle-enders was not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.12 Multiple Comparison of Access Score by Landholding 
Groups in AMIS 
 
(I) Location of 
majority of 
household's 
landholdings 
with reference to 
main canal 
(J) Location of 
majority of 
household's 
landholdings 
with reference 
to main canal 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
  Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
head end middle end .88250(*) .36456 .048 
 tail end 1.16375(*) .37247 .008 
middle end Head end -.88250(*) .36456 .048 
 tail end .28125 .27528 .566 
tail end Head end -1.16375(*) .37247 .008 
 middle end -.28125 .27528 .566 
 
 
Similarly, in the JMIS, head-enders have an average access score of 2.7 while 
for middle and tail-enders scores are  2.6 and 0.6 respectively. In fact, a very 
low access score of farmers in the tail end of the JMIS shows an enduring 
problem of head-tail inequality.  The ANOVA results indicate a statistically 
significant difference between the groups at the p<0.001 level in the access 
scores for the three groups of landholding locations: F (2, 63) = 32.553, 
p<0.01).   The effect size, calculated using Eta squared, was 0.50 which is 
considered to be large statistically (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Table 4.13 presents the outputs from multiple comparisons in the JMIS.  
Although the head-enders do not differ significantly from middle-enders, the 
difference between head-enders and tail-enders was significant at p<0.05 
level. Similarly, although the comparison of the middle-enders group with the 
head-enders did not indicate a statistically significant difference at p<0.05 
level, the difference between the middle-enders and tail-enders was 
statistically significant at p<0.05 level. Similarly, when comparing tail-enders 
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with the head-enders and middle-enders, the difference between them was 
found to be statistically different (p<0.05). 
 
 
Table 4.13 Multiple Comparison of Access Score by Landholding 
Groups in JMIS  
 
(I) Location of 
majority of 
household's 
landholdings 
with reference 
to main canal 
(J) Location of 
majority of 
household's 
landholdings with 
reference to main 
canal 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
  Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
head end middle end .11688 .24366 .881 
 tail end 2.14500(*) .29787 .000 
middle end Head end -.11688 .24366 .881 
 tail end 2.02813(*) .27391 .000 
tail end Head end -2.14500(*) .29787 .000 
 middle end -2.02813(*) .27391 .000 
 
 
All of the discussions and statistical analyses show that head-tail inequality 
continues to be a major concern in the distribution of water resources in the 
Nepalese irrigation system.  As will be clear from later discussions, head-
enders often appear to free ride at the expense of the contributions made by 
other farmers, mainly those from the tail ends of the canal system. However, 
the irrigation systems differ in terms of catering for the needs of the tail end 
farmers.  Table 4.14 presents the household level of access to water based on 
location in different irrigation systems.  In the FMIS, 80 percent of the head-
enders reported having a strong access to water while 50 percent and 90 
percent of their counterparts did so in the AMIS and the JMIS respectively.  A 
considerably higher proportion (100 percent) of tail-enders in the FMIS 
reported having a strong access to irrigation water compared to just 8.3 
percent in the AMIS and 20 percent in the JMIS.  The Chi-square results 
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indicate a statistically significant association between the landholding 
locations and levels of access to irrigation water. 
 
The data indicate that a clear pattern of access to water exists amongst the 
farmers in three different locations along the main canal. In both the AMIS 
and the JMIS, the proportion of farmers reporting strong access to water 
decreases from head end to the tail end. Interestingly in the FMIS, the 
proportion of farmers who report a strong access to water is higher at the tail 
ends than the head ends. This shows that the FMIS have been able to 
minimise head-tail inequalities while the other two systems still suffer from 
these problems. 
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Table 4.14 Household Level of Access to Irrigation Water by Locations  
Level of Access 
to Irrigation 
Water 
Irrigation Systems/Locations 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Head 
end 
Middle 
end 
Tail end Head 
end 
Middle 
end 
Tail end Head end Middle 
end 
Tail end 
A strong access 80 (8) 70 (28) 100 (17) 50 (5) 17.2 (5) 8.3 (2) 90 (18) 88.2 (30) 20 (3) 
A weak access 20 (2) 30 (12) 0 (0) 50 (5) 82.8 (24) 91.7 (22) 10 (2) 11.8 (4) 80 (12) 
Total 100 (10) 100 (40) 100 (17) 100 (10) 100 (29) 100 (24) 100 (20) 100 (34) 100 (15) 
Pearson Chi-
square= 8.913 
D.F. =   2 
P-value   = 0.01 
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Table 4.15 Tail-enders and Level of Access to Irrigation Water in 
the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Level of Access 
to Irrigation 
Water  
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
A weak access 24.4 (10) 83.3 (30) 48.3 (14) 50.9 (54) 
A strong access 75.6 (31) 16.7 (6) 51.7 (15) 49.1 (52) 
Total  100 (41) 100 (36) 100 (29) 100 (106) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 26.762 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.001 
 
 
Table 4.15 presents the level of access to irrigation specifically among the tail-
enders of the three irrigation systems considered in this research. A 
significantly higher proportion of tail end farmers in the FMIS reported strong 
access to irrigation compared to their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. 
In the FMIS, 75.6 percent of the tail-enders reported strong access to 
irrigation water compared to just 16.7 and 51.7 percent from the AMIS and the 
JMIS respectively.  The results of the Chi-square test indicate an association 
between the system type and access to irrigation for tail-enders at p< 0.001 
level.  
 
Whilst the chi-square results just indicate the relationship of the association 
between two categorical variables (tail-enders in the three irrigation systems 
and level of access to irrigation water in this case), ANOVA tests show if the 
mean of a continuous variable (access score in this case) differs significantly 
amongst different categories of farmers. One of the research objectives was to 
investigate the role of property rights regimes in the ‘tail-enders’ ability to 
access water from the canal system, as stated in research question 1c in 
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Chapter One. In order to answer this research question, an ANOVA test was 
carried out to compare the average access score of the tail-enders in the three 
irrigation systems, which tail-enders is presented in Table 4.16.  On average, 
the tail-enders in the FMIS system have a weighted access score of 2.0 while 
the average access score of tail-enders in the AMIS and the JMIS are 0.69 and 
1.46 respectively. The access score of tail-enders in the FMIS was almost three 
times that of the tail-enders in the AMIS and 1.2 times their counterparts in 
the JMIS.  This indicates that the FMIS has been successful in internalising 
the problems associated with head-tail inequalities in the system through 
appropriate institutional arrangements (explored in Chapter Six).  
 
 
Table 4.16 Access Score of Tail-enders in the Three Irrigation 
Systems  
 
Farmers’ Categories N Mean Std. Deviation 
tail end farmers in FMIS 40 2.0238 .51253 
tail end farmers in AMIS 35 .6943 .98098 
tail end farmers in JMIS 28 1.6429 1.34479 
Total 103 1.4684 1.11124 
 
 
An ANOVA test was conducted to compare the mean access score of farmers at 
the tail end of the three irrigation systems considered for the study.  The 
results of the ANOVA test are presented in Table 4.17. 
 
 
Table 4.17 ANOVA results for Access Score of Tail-enders in the 
Three Irrigation Systems   
  
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
37.056 2 18.528 16.887 .000 
Within Groups 209.560 191 1.097   
Total 246.616 193    
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The ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference between the 
groups (Group 1: tail-enders in FMIS; Group 2: tail-enders in AMIS); Group 3: 
tail-enders in the JMIS) (at the p<0.001 level in the access score for the three 
groups of landholding locations: F (2, 191) = 16.88, p<0.01).   The effect size, 
calculated using Eta squared, was 0.15 which is considered to be large 
statistically (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Table 4.18 Multiple Comparisons of Access Score of Tail-enders in 
the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
(I) tail end farmers 
in different 
irrigation systems 
with reference to 
main canal 
(J) tail end farmers 
in different 
irrigation systems 
with reference to 
main canal 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
   Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
tail end farmers in FMIS tail end farmers in AMIS 1.32946(*) .22175 .000 
  tail end farmers in JMIS .38089 .23607 .245 
tail end farmers in AMIS tail end farmers in FMIS -1.32946(*) .22175 .000 
  tail end farmers in JMIS -.94857(*) .24292 .000 
tail end farmers in JMIS tail end farmers in FMIS -.38089 .23607 .245 
  tail end farmers in AMIS .94857(*) .24292 .000 
 
 
Table 4.18 presents the outputs from multiple comparisons of mean access 
scores of tail-enders in the three irrigation systems.  Firstly, the tail-enders in 
the FMIS are compared with their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. 
While the difference in the mean of tail-enders in the FMIS is statistically 
significant with tail-enders those in the AMIS at p<0.05 level, the difference 
between the FMIS and the JMIS is not statistically significant.  However, 
when the mean access scores of the tail-enders in the AMIS are compared with 
those of their counterparts in the FMIS and the JMIS, they are found to be 
statistically significant with each other at p<0.05 level. Similarly, when 
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comparing the mean of tail-enders in the JMIS with that of the tail-enders in 
the FMIS the difference was not statistically significant, while the difference 
between tail-enders in the JMIS and the AMIS was found to be statistically 
significant at p<0.05 level. 
 
From Table 4.19, it is clear that a significantly higher proportion of tail-enders 
in the AMIS and the JMIS reported having faced institutional disadvantages 
over water appropriation compared to tail-enders in the FMIS.  In this thesis, 
institutional disadvantage has been defined as discrimination against some 
farmers that have been incorporated into structures, processes and procedures 
of the irrigation organisation either because of prejudice or because of failure 
to take into account their particular needs (Reskin, 1998). The institutional 
disadvantages in irrigation management occur because of the collective failure 
of irrigation organisations to provide appropriate service relating to the 
particular needs of some farmers (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Such 
institutional discrimination is often observed in processes, attitudes and 
behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, 
ignorance and thoughtlessness that disadvantage some farmers over others 
(Pandey et al., 2006).  
 
When asked if they faced institutional disadvantages during water 
appropriations, more than a third of the replies from tail-enders from the 
AMIS and the JMIS were positive compared to just under fifteen percent in 
the FMIS.  
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Table 4.19 Tail-enders and Institutional Disadvantages in Water 
Appropriation in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Institutional 
Disadvantages 
 
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Yes  12.2 (5) 38.9 (14) 34.8 (8) 27 (27) 
No 87.5 (36) 61.1 (22) 65.2 (15) 73 (73) 
Total  100 (41) 100 (36) 100 (23) 100 (100) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 7.848 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.05 
 
 
  
  4.2.4 Farmers’ Agronomical Knowledge and Access to Irrigation 
Water  
 
Research shows that farmers’ agronomical knowledge has implications for the 
way in which irrigation water is used and the issue warrants some discussion 
since it has implications for sustained head-tail inequalities in access to 
irrigation water (Samakande, 2002; Chambers, 1988). The implications of 
farmers’ agronomical knowledge on irrigation practices in rural Nepal have 
been discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.10.5). It is assumed that if the 
farmers have some agronomical knowledge, particularly the water 
requirements of different crops in different stages of their development, then 
the farmers can make appropriate decisions as to how much water is needed 
for the crops at their particular stage of development and how frequently the 
crops should be irrigated. In many irrigation systems in Nepal, the WUAs have 
initiated some social initiatives to educate farmers and raise social awareness 
of the importance of scientific ways of using the water from the canal. 
Respondents were asked a series of questions whether farmers had gained any 
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agronomical knowledge from the WUA, particularly in irrigation applications 
and if they had followed any guidelines issued by their WUAs while irrigating 
crops.  
 
Table 4.20 presents the results of a Chi-square test between farmers’ 
agronomical knowledge and irrigation system.  
 
Table 4.20 Farmers’ Self-reported Agronomical Knowledge within 
the three Irrigation Systems  
 
Farmers 
agronomical 
knowledge 
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Yes  88.1 (59) 61.9 (39) 72.5 (50) 74.4 (148) 
No 11.9 (8) 38.1 (24) 27.5 (19) 25.6 (51) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 11.855 
 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <<0.003 
 
 
A significant proportion of the farmers in the FMIS reported having 
agronomical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about crop-water requirements, 
compared with farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS. This is partly because the 
irrigation management committee in the FMIS has put lot of emphasis on 
enhancing farmers’ awareness about crop-water requirements, to avoid 
wasteful use of water.   
 
In the FMIS, 88.1 percent of farmers reported having received information on 
crop-water requirements, compared to just 61.9 percent in the AMIS and 72.5 
percent in the JMIS.  When asked if the farmers use water according to crop-
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water requirements, a significant proportion of farmers in the FMIS reported 
that they do, while the proportion of farmers using water according to crop-
water requirements is considerably lower in the AMIS and the JMIS, as shown 
in Table 4.21. 
 
 
Table 4.21 Farmers Using Water According to Crop-water 
Requirement in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Irrigation practices 
according to crop-
water requirements 
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Yes 96.9 (62) 52.5 (32) 53.6 (37) 67.5 (131) 
No 3.1 (2) 47.5 (29) 46.4 (32) 32.5 (63) 
Total 100 (64) 100 (61) 100 (69) 100 (194) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 37.5372 
 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.01 
 
 
 
There is a burgeoning literature on various types and sources of knowledge 
and their application in the management of natural resources (Olsson and 
Folke, 2001; Cash et al., 2003; Reid et al., 2006; Fabricius et al., 2006; 
Gustavsen, 2004). The types of knowledge widely discussed in the literature 
range from traditional or indigenous to scientific which might be informal, 
such as lay, tacit and implicit knowledge (Polanyi, 1997; Fazey et al., 2005, 
2006) and knowledge embedded in cultural and communal norms (Berkes, 
1993; Healey, 1993; Becker and Ghimire, 2003) to those generated through a 
formal process such as scientific research (Gunderson et al., 1995; Turnbull, 
1997; Pullin and Knight, 2001; Fazey et al., 2004). Also, there is an increasing 
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recognition that western scientific knowledge alone is not adequate for dealing 
with the full complexity of human-environment interactions (Nabhan 1997; 
Johannes, 1998; Olsson and Folke, 2001). Furthermore, there is a wider 
acceptance of the need in integrating scientific knowledge with traditional and 
indigenous knowledge to adequately deal with such environmental 
complexities (Raymond et al., 2010).  The integration of scientific knowledge 
and local knowledge presents a specific process in which co-generation of 
knowledge takes place, which is based on mutual learning between scientific 
communities and indigenous communities (Schon, 1983; Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001). Several studies have documented how indigenous 
communities have interacted with their natural environment in dynamic ways 
for a sustainable management of natural resources (Ruddle and Johannes, 
1985; McNeely and Pitt, 1985). For example, fishing communities in Sweden 
have used their local ecological knowledge to manage their fish stock at a 
sustainable level (Olsson and Folke, 2001); the co-learning of the dynamics of 
wetland between the managers and cattle grazers in Australia has helped to 
conserve wetland ecosystems (Raymond et al., 2010); indigenous knowledge 
about rainfall and water availability has helped local farmers in the Himalayan 
region of Nepal to select crop types (Chhetri, 2007).  
 
 
In rural farming communities, the farmers believe that changing water in the 
paddy plots leads to the production of better quality grain (Tabuchi, 2004). 
Farmers at the head end of the canal, particularly those in the AMIS and the 
JMIS, often replaced paddy plots with fresh water, with the expectation of a 
better quality harvest, often being unaware of the salinity problems associated 
with excess irrigation. The farmers in the local areas believed that in order to 
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harvest better quality grains, water in the paddy plots should be replaced 
every other day. Although farmers lack skills to conduct scientific 
experiments, the indigenous knowledge about the link between the quality of 
grains and water replacement frequency in the paddy plot has come about 
from years of experience by the rural farmers.  Based on years of experience, 
an elderly farmer from the JMIS area said:  
“We were able to replace water in the paddy plots last year and we 
were able to have the best harvest- grains full of fragrance, both the 
paddy field and kitchen were smelling nicely, this year we 
experienced one of the worst forms of water scarcity and could not 
replace water in the paddy plots, the quality of harvest is not very 
good-I probably will exchange these grains for better ones even if I 
make some financial loss” 
(Male, 67, JMIS) 
 
However, I was not able to find any studies with scientific evidence supporting 
the claim that changing water frequently and having extra water tables in the 
field plots leads to the production of better quality grain in the paddy plants. It 
is definitely an issue that needs further investigation.  In fact, as Gadgil and 
Berkes (1991) argue indigenous resource management may not always make 
ecological sense and may even be maladaptive in some situations. The farmers 
in the rural villages who are mostly uneducated and lack even basic knowledge 
of agronomy, appear to relate changing the water table frequently to the 
production of better quality paddy grain, based on their dogmatic beliefs 
rather than from any pragmatic rationale. This is partly because of lack of 
training and education available to the farmers. The positive influence of 
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farmers’ agronomical knowledge and their reported level of access to water 
have a huge implication for policy decisions. 
 
In Nepal, while investment in the irrigation infrastructure is impressive, little 
effort has been made to educate farmers and raise social awareness regarding 
irrigation enterprise. This has serious implications for irrigation governance 
and ensuring equitable access to water, as farmers are often following 
unscientific water appropriation practices based on blind faith. For example, 
replacing water for paddy at the head end area with total disregard to the 
water shortage at the tail end could be avoided with some efforts to educate 
the farmers.   
 
Table 4.22 shows the farmers’ conformity to the rules in using water according 
to crop-water requirements. In the FMIS, an incredibly higher proportion of 
farmers reported conforming to the rules of irrigation water distribution than 
those from the AMIS and the JMIS. On average, 97 percent of the farmers in 
the FMIS reported to have stopped using water after their turn was over, while 
just 37.1 percent and 52.5 percent of farmers from the AMIS and the JMIS 
respectively reported to have done so. Overall, 63 percent of farmers reported 
having stopped irrigation immediately after their turn, while 37 percent of 
farmers reported that they continued applying irrigation water even after their 
turn was over. 
 
However, self-reported responses on sensitive issues such as illegal activities 
including water thefts and non-conformity to rules should not be taken at 
their face value as respondents do not always tell the truth and when they do 
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tell the truth, they do not tell the whole truth whilst sometimes they tell more 
than the truth (Silverman, 2005).  A growing body of literature suggest that 
there is a tendency to overreport socially desirable behaviours and 
underreport socially undesirable behaviours (Phillips and Clancy, 1972; 
Wyner, 1980; Kalton and Schuman, 1982; also see Takalkar et al., 1993; 
Morten et al., 2010). According to Crowne and Marlowe (1964) individual’s 
personality trait, which feeds into a strong desire to command a great social 
approval in his/her conduct, presents a huge challenge for obtaining unbiased 
responses. Behaviours such as health promotion, voting, giving to charities, 
participating in communal activities, political connection, social status and 
attending religious activities are considered socially desirable in many 
societies (Cahalan 1968; Presser and Stinson, 1998) and such socially 
desirable activities are frequently overreported in research. Such socially 
desirable activities contribute towards enhancing personal social status of the 
respondents, which appear to be highly overreported in development research 
(Leonard et al., 2010; Shneiderman, 2009). However, behaviours such as drug 
and alcohol abuse, sexual behaviour, involvements in criminal activities, 
bullying and thefts are considered socially undesirable activities, which often 
appear to be underreported by respondents (Aquilino 1994; Warnecke et al., 
1997; Johnson and Fendrich, 2002; Kim and Hill, 2002; Meston et al., 1998). 
Oksenberg and Cannell (1977) argue that respondents may not always report 
incidents truthfully, particularly those events which are perceived as 
“embarrassing, sensitive in nature, threatening, or divergent from one's self-
image, it is likely to either not to be reported at all or to be distorted in a 
desirable direction” (p.327).   
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Farmers disclosing their involvement in breaking rules and those self-
reporting involvements in water thefts should be interpreted cautiously. This 
is probably due to the fear of being reported to the WUA. Also, farmers in the 
rural villages do not want to disclose their own personal negative conducts 
such as involvement in water thefts that might tarnish their image in the 
village.  
 
Overreporting of socially desirable issues and underreporting of issues which 
respondents consider socially undesirable have implications on the reliability 
of data and validity of the entire research which may impair the results of 
survey research and policy capturing of the results (Karp and Brockington, 
2005; Herbert et al., 1995; Arnold and Feldman, 1981; also see Brookhouse et 
al., 1986; Mazen, 1990).  In order to overcome problems of overreporting and 
underreporting especially of sensitive issues such as water thefts a number of 
steps were adopted. Firstly, the questionnaire was carefully designed with 
inclusion of mostly questions seeking factual answers. It is argued that with 
factual questions that seek to obtain true values for the information sought 
from the respondents, in principle, can be cross-checked from some other 
sources (Kalton and Schuman, 1982). For example, self-reported incidence of 
water thefts and non-compliance to the rules can be cross-checked against the 
data compiled by the WUA. The cross-checking for biases can also be done 
through data triangulations. The qualitative analysis presented later in the 
thesis in Chapter Five and Chapter Six indicate that both the AMIS and the 
JMIS are characterised by a high level of non-compliance to the rules, whilst 
the level of non-conformity to the rules was relatively less in the FMIS. 
However, it is important to recognise that not all the factual questions can be 
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verified from other sources. Secondly, the questionnaire was pre-tested in 
community outside of the research sites to identify any social desirability 
biases. Such biases can be superficially gauged through the degree of unease 
which respondents feel in responding to survey questions. During the 
questionnaire pre-testing exercise, particular attention was paid to 
respondents’ physical reactions to questions such as excitement, unease, facial 
muscle moment and counter questioning from the respondents (Booth-
Kewley et al., 1992). The pre-testing of the questionnaire before conducting 
actual survey helped to identify if certain category of respondents behaved and 
responded differently when presented with research questions (Davies et al., 
1998). This technique of identifying social desirability biases has been widely 
used by many past and present social scientists (Edwards, 1953; Crowne-
Marlowe, 1960; Paulhus, 1991).  
 
Whilst a detailed discussion on the ethical aspects of this research is presented 
in Chapter Three (Section 3.7.1), this section briefly highlights legal and 
ethical aspects of investing illegal activities. Researching farmers’ involvement 
in water thefts presented some ethical conundrums for me because it had 
potential legal implications (Fitzgerald and Hamilton, 1996, 1997; Moore, 
1993). During the course of my field research, I became aware of the 
individuals who reported their involvement in occasional water thefts. Whilst 
I was acutely aware that such activities were not socially desirable, I was not 
judgemental about the individuals engaged in such activities to maintain 
research objectivity and neutrality (Crotty, 1995). Being judgemental about 
such socially undesirable activities by the farmers would likely have 
introduced bias in my research (Tetlock et al., 1996). The introduction of 
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normative judgements based on assumed notion of legality and morality 
because of reported illegal activities by the research participants can give rise 
to a complex psychological pressure which could change the dynamics of the 
relation between the researcher and the research subjects (Hamilton, 1980; 
Tetlock, 1991). In order to avoid pre-assumptions about the research 
participants, I did not characterise farmers as bad or immoral just because 
they were involved in water thefts. Moreover, as an outsider researcher, my 
sole purpose was to objectively study the prevalence of water thefts and non-
conformity to the irrigation governing rules.  
 
Studies in the illegal activities such as drug dealings are usually characterised 
by involvement of undercover researchers because of their highly sensitive 
nature and risk involved (Dunlap and Johnson, 1998; Johnson et al., 1991). 
The researchers assume hidden identities and mix with the research subjects 
under a pseudo name to penetrate into their core to gain access and the 
cooperation (Fettermen, 1989; Barrett, 1984; Werner and Schoepfle, 1987). In 
doing so, the undercover researchers build extensive friendship, offer 
incentives such as favours and assume their roles to disguise themselves from 
their true identity (Marx, 1988; Williams, 1996). In fact, if the undercover 
researchers assume native identity and lose sight of the purpose of doing so, 
they can get involved in illegal and unethical practices themselves using their 
friendship and loyalty with the criminal groups (Farkas, 1986).  
 
In the case of this study, the issue of water thefts was more of an undesirable 
social behaviour rather than a serious criminal activity. For there was no 
formal statutory law against it, only local rules and sanctions implemented by 
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WUA. Moreover, my familiarity with the lives of rural farmers was sufficient 
enough to establish friendship and gain access to the research subjects. I 
followed the ethical guidelines issued by the British Sociological Association 
(BSA, 2004). The BSA’s ethical guidelines consist of aspects such as voluntary 
participation, no harm, confidentiality, anonymity, or privacy, which is 
commonly referred to as “informed consent”. I adhered to the ethical 
guidelines issued by the BSA throughout the research process to protect and 
assist the research participants and to maximise positive aspects of their 
research participation (Barratt et al., 2006). The issue of confidentiality and 
anonymity had a particular resonance at times when illegal aspects of water 
appropriation was investigated and remained an integral part to the whole 
research process (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Smyth and Williamson, 2004). 
The research participants were assured that their identity would be 
anonymised (Oliver, 2003; Gregory, 2003) giving them assurance that they 
will not be harmed as consequence of participating in the research. Whilst as a 
researcher I had a duty to report on the research findings to wider audiences, 
the identity of the research participants were concealed. Since I personally 
signed the confidentiality form, I was legally responsible for any breach of 
confidentiality.  
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Table 4.22 Farmers Stop Irrigating Immediately after Receiving 
Amount of Water Required for Crops 
 
Farmers conforming to water 
application according to crop-
water requirement 
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Yes 97 (64) 37.1 (23) 52.5 (32) 63 (119) 
No 3 (2) 62.9 (39) 47.5 (25) 37 (70) 
Total 100 (66) 100 (62) 100 (61) 100 (189) 
Pearson Chi-square = 53.405 
D.F. = 2 
p-value <0.001 
 
 
As argued earlier, the attitude of head-enders in relation to water utilisation 
determines the water availability for down-stream farmers. From Table 4.23 it 
is clear that the head-enders in the FMIS appear to have observed water 
distribution rules more closely than the head-enders in the AMIS and the 
JMIS systems.  Farmers’ failure to comply with the water distribution rules as 
prescribed in the constitutions has a number of implications for water 
distribution. Firstly, they use water wastefully, which creates greater soil 
salinity, reducing soil productivity.  Secondly, they create an artificial water 
scarcity for the downstream farmers.  
 
 
The qualitative data gathered during fieldwork indicated a number of reasons 
for farmers’ failures to adhere to the water distribution rules. The main 
reasons, as laid out by the WUA, include uncertainty in water delivery, bad 
relationships with neighbouring farmers, and deliberate attempts to stock pile 
water tables in the fields. A significant disparity in the proportion of farmers 
adhering to the rules of water distribution can be observed both across the 
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types of system and the location within the system, as shown in Table 4.23.  
Overall, 53.3 percent households reported having violated water distribution 
rules, while 14.8 percent of the respondents reported having faced uncertainty 
in water delivery, and 16.5 percent made deliberate attempts to stock-pile 
water tables in the field plots. Similarly, a small proportion of farmers (1.1 
percent) reported having bad relationships with neighbouring farmers in 
relation to water appropriation. It should be mentioned that in rural agrarian 
societies, the bad relations amongst the neighbouring farmers can arise from 
other historical factors such as land encroachments and crop thefts, especially 
the green vegetables and fodder. The soured relationship amongst the farmers 
can also arise from financial matters and issues related to marriage. Water 
related conflicts are one of the many factors which can contribute towards the 
bad relationships between the farmers. However, since this thesis is concerned 
with irrigation management, it investigated only the water related factors 
contributing to conflicts amongst the farmers rather than other historical 
factors.  
 
Also, a stark difference in conforming to rules regarding water appropriation 
can be observed amongst farmers in different locations. Overall, a significant 
proportion of the head-enders reported having violated rules of water 
distribution compared to middle and tail-enders. Only 51.4 percent of the 
head-enders reported to have followed rules compared to 72.4 percent and 
59.2 percent of middle and tail-enders respectively.  The results of the Chi-
square test indicate that there is an association between violation of water 
distribution rules and the location of the landholdings.  Also, there is an 
association between the location of the landholding and farmers’ adherence to 
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the water distribution rules amongst the farmers within the AMIS and the 
JMIS. Also, the difference amongst the head-enders in the three irrigation 
systems is statistically significant (Chi-square= 12.841; df.=2; p=0.002). A 
significantly higher proportion of the head-enders in the FMIS reported 
having followed rules of water distribution compared to their counterparts in 
the AMIS and the JMIS.  About 90 percent of the head-enders from the FMIS 
reported having conformed to the rules of water distribution, compared to 
52.9 percent and 10 percent from the JMIS and the AMIS respectively. 
 
Similarly, the results of the Chi-square test indicate that a significantly higher 
proportion of middle-enders and tail-enders in the FMIS reported having 
conformed to the water distribution rules while appropriating water from the 
canal.  Amongst the middle-enders, about 97.5 percent of farmers from the 
FMIS reported having conformed to the rules of water distribution compared 
to 50 percent and 60 percent from the AMIS and the JMIS respectively. Also, 
a significantly higher proportion of tail-enders (100 percent) from the FMIS 
reported having conformed to the water distribution rules compared to just 
34.8 percent and 50 percent of tail-enders from the AMIS and JMIS 
respectively.  
 
 It is clear from Table 4.23 that uncertainty concerning water delivery and 
deliberate attempts to stock pile the water table in the fields remain a primary 
cause of rule violations in the irrigation systems.  Results from Chi-square 
tests are not statistically significant. The head-enders in the AMIS and the 
JMIS reported having a greater concern with water security and acted 
irresponsibly at the cost of the tail-enders.  About 40 percent of the head-
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enders in the AMIS violated the rules of water distribution because of 
uncertainty in water delivery by the canal system, while none of the head-
enders from the JMIS and the FMIS violated rules for this reason. Similarly, 
about 50 percent of the head-enders in the AMIS violated water distribution 
rules deliberately to stock pile water in the fields and 42.1 percent of the head-
enders in the JMIS did so for the same reason, while none of the head-enders 
in FMIS reported having made deliberate attempts to stock pile water tables in 
the fields. These results indicate that farmers in the JMIS and AMIS are more 
involved in rule violations during water distribution compared to the farmers 
in the FMIS.  
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Table 4.23 Reasons for not conforming to the Rules in Water Distribution by Location  
Irrigation  System Locations Reasons for non-rule confirmations 
  
Water uncertainty       
% (n) 
Extra water table 
% (n) 
Bad-relation with 
neighbour % (n) 
Other 
% (n) 
Rule Conformed 
% (n) 
Rule not 
conformed % (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
 
FMIS 
 
Head enda 0 (0) 0 (0) 11.1 (1) 0 (0) 90 (9) 10 (1) 100 (10) 
Middle endb 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 97.5 (39) 2.5  (1) 100 (40) 
Tail endc 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7.7 (1) 100 (16) 0 (0) 100 (16) 
 
AMIS 
 
Head enda 40 (4) 50 (5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 10 (1) 90 (9) 100 (10) 
Middle endb 25.9 (7) 14.8 (4) 0 (0) 3.7 (1) 50 (14) 50 (14) 100 (28) 
Tail endc 40.9 (9) 13.6 (3) 4.5 (1) 0 (0) 34.8 (8) 65.2 (15) 100 (23) 
 
JMIS 
 
Head enda 0 (0) 42.1 (8) 0 (0) 5.3 (1) 52.9 (9) 47.1 (8) 100 (17) 
Middle endb 9.7 (3) 25.8 (8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 60 (18) 40 (12) 100 (30) 
Tail endc 33.3 (4) 16.7 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 50 (5) 50 (5) 100 (10) 
 
Head end 10.5 (4) 34.2 (13) 2.6 (1) 2.6 (1) 51.4 (19) 48.6 (18) 100 (37) 
Overalld Middle end 10.3 (10) 12.4 (12) 0 (0) 1.6 (1) 72.4 (71) 27.6 (27) 100 (98) 
 
Tail end 27.7 (13) 10.6 (5) 2.1 (1) 2.1 (1) 59.2 (29) 40.8 (20) 100 (49) 
Total  
 
14.8 (27) 16.5 (30) 1.1 (2) 1.6 (3) 64.7 (119) 53.3 (65) 100 (184) 
      a Chi-square= 12.841 
bChi-
square=21.975 
 
cChi-
square=17.053 
 
dChi-
square=6.114 
 
       d.f.= 2 
p-value= 0.002 
 
d.f.=2 
p-value=0.001 
 
d.f.=2 
p-value=0.001  
 
d.f.=2 
p-value =.047 
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Table 4.24 Agency Responsible for Raising Awareness about Crop 
Water Requirement 
 
Agency for creating 
awareness about crop 
water requirement 
Irrigation System 
FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
WUA 13. 4 (9) 0 (0) 1.4 (1) 5 (10) 
Practical experience 77.6 (52) 58.7 (37) 56.5 (39) 64.3 (128) 
NA 9 (6) 41.3 (26) 42 (29) 30.7 (61) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 32.65 
 
D.F.= 4 
P-Value <0.001 
 
 
Table 4.24 shows the different ways the farmers obtain information about 
crop-water requirements, which is crucial in changing their attitudes to stock 
piling water tables in the paddy plots. The crop-water requirement is the 
amount of water reasonably considered sufficient for the growth and 
development of a cultivated crop in a particular season. An overwhelming 
proportion of farmers have gained some practical knowledge on crop water 
requirements. On average, 77.6 percent of farmers in the FMIS reported 
having gained practical knowledge regarding crop water requirement, while 
58.7 percent and 56.5 percent did so through practical experience in the AMIS 
and the JMIS respectively.  However, the difference is striking regarding the 
involvement of the WUA in raising farmers’ awareness of crop water 
requirements in the three irrigation systems considered for this study.  While 
13.4 percent of the farmers in the FMIS reported that they received 
information on crop-water requirements from WUA, only 1.4 did so from the 
JMIS and none from the AMIS.  The positive role played by the WUA in the 
FMIS seems to have raised awareness amongst the farmers, particularly those 
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from the head-ends, to make optimum use of irrigation water and to avoid 
problems of water-logging and soil salinity owing to over irrigation.  However, 
both the JMIS and the AMIS suffered greatly from over-use of irrigation 
water, particularly by the head-enders, and the WUAs in the both systems 
have not made sufficient efforts to raise awareness amongst the farmers 
regarding optimal use of water.  
  
   4.2.5 Gender and Access to Irrigation Water  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.10.4) and in Chapter Three (Section 
3.6.3.1), the Nepalese society is still male dominated, as are access to and 
control over productive resources such as land.  Table 4.25 shows household 
land endowments and gender.  It is clear that male-headed households have 
higher amounts of both Khet and Pakho lands compared to female-headed 
households. On average, male-headed households have 8.9 Ropani and 3.7 
Ropani of Khet and Pakho lands respectively, compared to 5.2 Ropani and 2.3 
Ropani of Khet and Pakho lands respectively. The disparities in landholdings 
particularly for Khet land owned by female-headed households, have 
implications for access to irrigation water as Khet lands are more productive 
and have better access to irrigation facilities than Pakho lands.  Both male and 
female-headed households in the AMIS have lower access scores, compared to 
the households in the FMIS and JMIS. The female-headed households in the 
AMIS have significantly lower access scores compared their counterparts in 
the FMIS and JMIS.  
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Table 4.25 Households Landholding and Access Score by Gender in 
the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Households 
Gender 
Amount of 
Landholdings in 
Ropani 
Access Score in Different 
Irrigation Systems 
FMIS AMIS JMIS Overall 
 Khet 
land 
Pakho 
land 
Total 
land     
Male 8.9 3.7 12.6 2.1 0.9 2.3 1.8 
Female 5.2 2.3 7.5 2.0 0.8 1.9 1.6 
Total  8.1 3.4 11.5 2.0 0.8 2.2 1.7 
 
 
 
A one way between –group analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted 
to determine the statistical significance of the level of access to irrigation 
water as measured by the access score. The results of ANOVA are presented in 
Table 4.26.   
 
Table 4.26 ANOVA Results for Access Score of Landholding 
Locations  
 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares d.f 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
11.184 2 5.592 5.267 .009 
Within Groups 41.405 39 1.062   
Total 52.589 41    
 
 
The ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference between the 
groups at the p<0.05 level in the access scores for female-headed households 
in the three irrigation systems: F (2, 39) = 5.267, p<0.05).   The effect size, 
which is calculated using Eta squared, was 0.61 - considered to be large 
statistically (Cohen, 1988).    
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One of the research objectives was to investigate the role of property rights 
regimes in female-headed households’ ability to access water from the canal 
systems, as stated in research question (1d) in Chapter One. In order to 
answer this research question, an ANOVA test was carried out to compare the 
average access scores of the female-headed households in the three irrigation 
systems. For a multiple comparison, the female-headed households were 
divided into three groups according to the type of irrigation systems they were 
served by, (Group 1: females in FMIS; Group 2: females in AMIS; Group 3: 
females in JMIS). Table 4.27 presents the outputs from multiple comparisons.  
 
Table 4.27 Multiple Comparison of Access Score by Females in the 
Three Irrigation Systems  
 
(I) female-headed 
households 
 
 
(J) female-headed 
households 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
female-headed in 
FMIS 
 Female-headed in 
AMIS 
1.14762* .38290 .013 
 female-headed in JMIS .12564 .39044 .945 
Female-headed in 
AMIS 
 female-headed in FMIS -1.14762* .38290 .013 
 female-headed in JMIS -1.02198* .39686 .036 
female-headed in 
JMIS 
 female-headed in FMIS -.12564 .39044 .945 
 female-headed in AMIS 1.02198* .39686 .036 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the mean access scores of the female-headed 
households in the AMIS are statistically significant compared with the female-
headed households in the FMIS and the JMIS. The mean access score of the 
female-headed households in the AMIS was compared with their counterparts 
in the JMIS and FMIS and the difference between them was found to be 
statistically significant at p<0.05 level. However, the difference in the mean 
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access score of the female-headed households in the FMIS and their 
counterparts in the JMIS was not found to be statistically significant at 
p<0.05 level.  
 
Table 4.28 shows household levels of access to irrigation by gender in the 
different irrigation systems. From Table 4.28 it is clear that a higher 
proportion of households headed by males reported having strong access to 
water, compared to the households headed by females. In the FMIS, 80.4 
percent of the male-headed households reported having strong access to canal 
water, while 75 percent of female-headed households reported have done so. 
The remaining 19.6 percent of the male-headed households and 25 percent of 
female-headed households reported having weak access to irrigation water.  
Similarly, in the JMIS, 76.8 percent and 61.5 percent of male and female-
headed households respectively reported having strong access to irrigation 
water, while the remaining 23.2 percent and 28.5 percent of male-headed and 
female-headed households respectively reported having weak access to 
irrigation water.  
 
Table 4.28 Level of Access to Irrigation Water by Gender in the 
Three Irrigation Systems   
 
Gender Level of Access to Irrigation Water in different irrigation systems 
FMIS AMIS JMIS Total 
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
 
Male 
80.4 
(41) 
19.6 (10) 20.4 (10) 79.6 (39) 76.8 (43) 23.2 (13) 76.8 (43) 23.2 (13) 
 
Female 
75 (12) 25 (4) 14.3 (2) 85.7 (12) 61.5 (8) 38.5 (5) 61.5 (8) 38.5 (5) 
 Chi-square = 1.147 
D.F. = 1 
P-value = .284 
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However, the proportion of the farmers who reported having weak access to 
irrigation remained significantly higher in the AMIS. On average, only 20.4 
percent of male-headed households reported to having strong access to 
irrigation water while 14.3 percent of female-headed households reported 
having done so. The remaining 79.6 percent of male-headed households and 
85.7 percent of female-headed households respectively reported having weak 
access to irrigation water. Although the differences in the level of access to 
irrigation water between male and female-headed households are not 
statistically significant, the gender implications of access to irrigation water is 
common to all the three irrigation systems. Although the gender difference in 
the level of access to irrigation water within the different irrigation systems is 
statistically non-significant, the differences do have some serious practical 
significance, as described in Chapter Two (Section 2.10.4).  Despite being 
statistically non significant, the gender implications of access to irrigation 
water still remains a critical issue and needs some further explanation 
(Zwarteveen, 1997; van Koppen and Hussain, 2007). It will be clear from the 
discussion later in the thesis, particularly the evidence from the qualitative 
data,that both the causes and consequences of gender implication of irrigation 
are too important to ignore just because the results of the Chi-square test are 
statistically non-significant. The statistically non-significant results might 
have occurred owing to the small sample size included in this research. Indeed 
the gender implications of irrigation governance and access to water have 
some serious “practical” significance. The gender implications of access to 
irrigation can be attributed to the Nepalese social context, in which women in 
rural areas are confined to household activities while men play a dominant 
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role in many spheres of village life, including irrigation issues.  Women’s 
confinement to household activities has meant that their knowledge of events 
of public interest is limited and they often lag behind in participating in them. 
 
However, when the level of access to irrigation of the female-headed 
households is compared across the three irrigation systems, the difference is 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 4.29 Level of Access to Irrigation by Female-headed 
Households in the Three Irrigation Systems   
 
Level of Access 
to Water  
Gender/Irrigation System 
Female in FMIS 
% (n) 
Female in AMIS 
% (n) 
Female in JMIS % 
(n) 
A strong access  75 (12) 14.3 (2) 61.5 (8) 
A weak access  25 (4) 85.7 (12) 38.5 (5) 
Total  100 (16) 100 (14) 100 (13) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 11.818 
 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value =0.003 
 
 
Table 4.29 shows that a significant proportion of female-headed households in 
the FMIS (75 percent) reported having strong access to irrigation water 
compared to just 25 percent and 61.5 per of their counterparts in the AMIS 
and JMIS respectively. The results of the Chi-square test indicate that these 
differences are statistically significant.  
 
Table 4.30 shows the level of participation of women in the WUAs in different 
irrigation systems.  It is clear that an overwhelming proportion of women in 
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all three systems do not participate in the WUAs. In the FMIS, only 37.5 
percent of the female-headed households reported that women participate in 
the WUAs compared to 11.4 percent and 69.2 percent in the AMIS and the 
JMIS irrigation systems respectively. The lower level of participation of 
women in the WUAs, particularly in the AMIS, conforms to the construction 
of gendered space in irrigation management. 
 
Table 4.30 Participation of Women in WUA in the Three Irrigation 
Systems   
 
 
Participation in 
WUA 
Gender/ Irrigation System 
FMIS (%) AMIS (%) JMIS (%) 
Yes  37.5 (6) 11.4 (2) 69.2 (9) 
No 62.5 (10) 84.6 (11) 30.8 (4) 
Total  100 (16) 100 (13) 100 (13) 
 
Pearson  
Chi-square= 7.917 
 
D.F.= 2 
P-Value <0.019 
 
 
Perhaps this not particularly surprising, as in developing countries men are 
traditionally seen as the family bread-winners, while women are home makers 
and nurturers (Narayan et al., 2000a). However, this is not to say that women 
are always confined to nurturing and home-making roles. In fact many 
women, particularly from poorer households, work outside the home to 
sustain their livelihoods while still responsible for their traditional household 
roles. Women also tend to be responsible for farming family plots, which are 
also major sources of nutrition for the households, although they generally 
have the least influence in decision making within the household or outside it 
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in the wider community (Narayan et al., 2000b; Soussan, 1998; Turton, 2000; 
UNDP, 2000).  The gender differentiation has serious implications on power 
distribution and knowledge dissemination, which in turns affects 
environmental governance and resource utilisation for power distribution   
(Gibson-Graham, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; McDowell, 1999). 
 
The qualitative data also confirms the low levels of women’s participation in 
WUAs.  An elderly farmer from the AMIS area who participated in a focus 
group discussion argued:  
“Today for the focus group discussions the participation of women is very 
low because, we did not have time to inform them---” 
                                                                     (Male, 45, AMIS) 
 
In response to the researcher’s curiosity about the low attendance of women 
participants in the focus group discussions, a respondent replied:  
 
“Well, its nearly lunch time and women are busy in the kitchen 
preparing lunch for the family and doing other households activities. 
After the meeting we can have lunch and go to the office, and women 
have got to go the field for paddy harvesting”    
                                           (Male, 46, AMIS) 
 
Although some women participated in the focus group discussions, they 
remained quiet and did not participate fully. On asking a woman why she was 
so quiet during the focus group discussion in the Begnas area, she contended 
that:  
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“--Well, in our village as a woman, it is rude to argue against men 
through our independent viewpoints—you know men are talking and 
sharing their views--- anyway I will be ridiculed for my viewpoints, 
once you interviewers go away.” 
                                                                (Female, 32, AMIS)  
 
The reasons for the low level of participation of women in the focus group 
discussions could be attributed to the socio-cultural context of the Nepalese 
society and local power structures (Giri, 2009), which acted as barriers to 
participation of women in both irrigation management and in this research 
(Agarwal, 2001a; Lama and Buchy, 2002; Gupte, 2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 
2005). Factors such as gender, caste, wealth, age, education as well as 
individual status in the society provide the context in which a highly gendered 
role in community participation is constructed (NPC and UNICEF, 1996; 
Agarwal, 2001b). In Nepal, individual and household participation in activities 
that are outside the households are highly gendered. It is almost customary 
practice in rural parts of Nepal that men participate in activities outside the 
house including participating in local development activities and village 
politics, whilst women often assume role of nurturing and are confined to 
activities inside the households (Thapa, 2001; Elmhirst and Resurreccion, 
2008). Since the farmers in the rural villages had to juggle around with 
different things such as working in the field, herding cattle, fetching water 
from local wells, collecting fodder for cattle; the timing of the focus group 
discussions was critical for maximising their participation. As such, the 
research design and timing of fieldwork were set to maximise the level of 
participation of both men and women.  In fact, before conducting focus group 
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discussions, the local farmers including many women were consulted to fix the 
location and timing of the focus group discussions so that they can come and 
participate. Generally, women in rural Nepal also have high workload 
particularly during mornings and evenings (IFAD, 1999) which means they do 
not have adequate time for village meetings (Lama and Buchy 2002). 
Furthermore, village men often disapprove and discourage women’s 
participation in local politics and the public sphere on the basis of perceived 
gendered roles and behaviours (Agarwal, 2000; Lama and Buchy, 2002). The 
prevalence of gender stereotypes in patriarchal societies which define the role 
of women as wives and mothers where their primary responsibilities are 
caring and nurturing make them stereotypically inferior and helpless (Liddle 
and Joshi, 1986; Segal, 1987; Barrett, 1980) and by doing so the patriarchal 
societies exacerbate their oppression against women (Walby, 1989). 
 
With such characterisation of women’s role in the rural parts of Nepal, the 
women are preoccupied with household activities such as cooking, collecting 
fodder for cattle and cleaning during the mornings and the evenings, and 
chances of them participating in key informant interviews and the focus group 
discussions are minimal at those times. However, women have some free time 
during the day in which they could to participate in research processes. In 
order to maximise their participation in the research process, most of the key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions were held during the 
daytime when women were free. Also, interviewing women alone is also a 
culturally sensitive issue in Nepal and demonstrates power relations as 
(1989b) argues that “it cannot be assumed that gender-free information is 
obtained in interviews” (p.116). Whilst interviewing men through building 
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rapport was relatively straightforward and socially acceptable, development of 
such rapport with women was highly undesirable due to cultural sensitivity 
(Oakley, 1981). Because of prevalence of cultural sensitivity and power 
relations between the male interviewer (author) and female interviewees, the 
female participants were contacted prior to conducting interviews to make 
sure that they were not alone at home and the timing for interview is good for 
them (Finch, 1984). Accordingly, women were interviewed when there were 
other members present in the household, although other members neither 
took part in the interview nor stood alongside the women who were being 
interviewed. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three (Section 3.10), the timing 
of the fieldwork was deliberately chosen at the time when women were 
relatively free because of the festive period and time-off from agricultural 
activities.  
 
Whilst timing of the research activities are likely to affect participation, it 
should be acknowledged that the research design might also have had 
implications on the low level of participation of women during the focus group 
discussions (Yin, 2009; Kobayashi, 1994; Scheyvens and Leslie, 2000). For 
example, on some of the questions included in the survey questionnaire, 
particularly the ones related to farmers’ personal and financial matters, the 
research participant either refused or lacked the ability to respond, making 
such information inaccessible to the researcher (Williams, 1978; Kenney, 
2006). This is because the information regarding household’s financial 
matters were generally controlled by men and it was considered to be highly 
impolite for women to share such information with an external researcher, 
especially male researcher, without consulting their husband or adult son 
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(Finley and Wright, 1994; Blumberg, 1988). Furthermore, usually female 
participants of the focus group discussions found it incredibly awkward to talk 
about issues in which men were alleged to have involved in corruptions and 
water thefts (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Cox et al., 1990; Billingsley, 
1972). Many feminist researchers, particularly working in patriarchal 
communities have questioned the validity and reliability of mixed focus group 
discussions as an unbiased source of data (Jowett and O’Toole, in press; 
Agarwal, 2000; Bennett, 2005; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999; Kitzinger, 1994).   
 
This research endeavoured to provide a level playing field for both men and 
women in terms of their participation in the focus group discussions. 
However, it should be acknowledged that given the historically patriarchal 
Nepalese society where certain activities including participating in activities 
outside the household and public discussions are highly gendered and the 
level playing field provided by this research perhaps was not perfectly level.  
Nonetheless, this research adopted various strategies to encourage women to 
participate more in the focus group discussions. If men were dominating the 
conversation, as a moderator, I respectfully thanked the men who had spoken 
and suggested that it would be great to hear from some of the women present 
as well. At the times when women seemed to be participating less, I tried to 
make eye contact with women and even asked them direct questions 
individually to foster their participation during the discussions.  However, in 
cases where the gender imbalance in the composition as well as participation 
of focus groups was acute, further steps were taken to address such 
imbalances. For example, the focus group discussions, which were 
characterised by a high degree of gender imbalance and minimal participation 
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of women, were reconducted with only female participants. The informal 
atmosphere of the women only focus group discussions enabled the 
participants to speak more freely about not only irrigation issues but also 
issues that they had concern about in their locality, which they were unable to 
talk about in mixed focus groups. Such technique of designing female only 
focus groups is also being advocated by Madriz (2000) to enable women to 
freely share their experience without being intimidated and fearful. 
 
It is clear that the male-headed households show higher levels of participation 
in WUAs than female-headed households.  Also, similar differences can be 
observed in the frequency of household contact with the members of the WUA 
to discuss their concerns regarding irrigation issues. During the WUA 
meetings, farmers pass their concerns to the designated WUA member in their 
locality who represents their interests.  Table 4.31 shows household levels of 
communication with the members of the WUA by gender.  
 
Table 4.31 Households with a Frequent Communication with the 
WUA by Gender in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 Gender Frequent Communication with WUA 
 YES 
% (n) 
NO 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Male 42.8 (65) 57.2 (87) 100 (152) 
Female 24.4 (10) 75.6 (31) 100 (41) 
Overall  38.9 (75) 61.1 (118) 100 (193) 
Chi-square= 4.588 
D.F. = 1 
P-value = .032 
    
 
Overall, 38.9 percent of the sample households reported having 
communication on a regular basis (frequently) with the WUA member, while 
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61.1 percent did not. A gender difference can be observed in establishing 
communication between the farmers and the WUA member.  In the sample 
households, 42.8 percent of the male-headed households reported having 
communication on a regular basis with the WUA members, while just 24.4 
percent of the female-headed households did so. An overwhelming proportion 
of the female-headed households did not seem to have frequent 
communications with the WUA members.  
 
   4.2.6 Participation in Operation and Maintenance (O & M) 
Activities 
 
The three irrigation systems considered in the study are situated in the hilly 
region with difficult terrain and regular operation and maintenance are 
required for regular and unconstrained water supplies in the canal systems.  
In Nepal, whilst community participation in the management of irrigation 
systems are encouraged, both government and beneficiaries have well 
defined roles to play in terms of contribution towards O & M activities. 
Generally, irrigators’ contributions towards canal maintenance are expected 
in all types of irrigation systems. However, the degree of government 
involvement in O & M activities depends on the level of commitment, as 
specified in WUA constitutions. In the FMIS, all O & M activities are carried 
out at the community level by the users themselves with a minimum or no 
involvement on the part of the DoI, while in the AMIS, a minimum 
commitment is expected from the users and the DoI undertakes almost all 
the O & M activities. In the case of the JMIS, the situation is rather different. 
According to the WUA constitution of the JMIS, major O & M activities are 
carried out with the support of the DoI, while minor O & M activities are 
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carried out by the users themselves. It should be pointed out that the notion 
of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ remains very vague and has different interpretations8. 
In general, clearing of massive landslides or major repairs of headwork are 
considered ‘major’ O & M activities, while regular canal cleaning activities 
are considered as minor O & M activities.  
 
 
 
Table 4.32 Farmers’ Belief about Agency Responsible for O & M 
Activities in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Contribution of 
different 
stakeholders in the 
canal systems Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Local Farmers 93.8   (61) 76.3  (45) 71.6  (48) 
Department of Irrigation  6.2 (4) 23.7 (14) 28.4  (19) 
Total 100 (65) 100 (59) 100 (67) 
Chi-square= 11.452 
D.F. = 2 
P-value = .003 
   
 
Table 4.32 shows that a significantly higher proportion of local farmers in the 
FMIS believed the O & M activities to be their responsibility as compared to 
farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS. A considerably higher proportion of 
farmers (about 93.8 percent) in the FMIS considered that operation and 
maintenance activities were their responsibility, compared to 76.3 and 71.6 
percent of the farmers in the AMIS and in the JMIS respectively.  A small 
proportion (6.2 percent) of the farmers in the FMIS believed that the DoI 
                                               
8 The Operation and Maintenance (O & M) activities were classified as major and minor by the 
DoI depending on the complexity of the tasks. Generally tasks such as repairing headwork and 
clearing landslides which needed technical expertise and financial contributions from the DoI 
were considered as major O & M activities whilst tasks such as day-to-day- operation and 
canal cleaning were considered as minor O & M activities.  
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should carry out all the O & M activities, compared to 23.7 percent and 28.4 
percent of farmers reporting in the AMIS and the JMIS respectively.  
 
Farmers’ sense of responsibility for contributing towards O & M activities 
starts right from the outset of the construction of the irrigation canal systems.  
The sense of ownership of the canal remains higher amongst farmers who 
contributed towards the construction of the canal. In the case of the FMIS, the 
local farmers had made considerable sacrifices in constructing the canal 
infrastructures and a strong sense of both pride and responsibility prevails 
amongst them as demonstrated by the following quotation from a participant 
of a key informant interview: 
“---Look, this canal has been constructed with a great deal of sacrifices 
from the local farmers. every drop of water flowing in the canal is our 
sweat and our ancestors’ sweat-- we worked all day--- every day for 
months and years to bring water to the Phalebas area—this was not an 
easy task to bring water to the Phalebas area—We feel proud and 
blessed to have this canal----the canal is a life line of every villager—and 
it is our responsibilities to keep the spirit of our ancestors who dug the 
canal high---!” 
                                      (Male, 85 years, FMIS)  
 
Table 4.33 presents what farmers considered their contributions at the initial 
stage of the canal constructions.  In the FMIS, 95.5 percent of farmers made 
compulsory labour contributions during the construction of the canal, while 
only 55.6 percent did so in the JMIS. Since the AMIS was constructed with the 
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financial and technical aid of external agencies and the DoI, none of the 
farmers contributed towards the construction of the canal system.   
 
 
Table 4.33 Nature of Contribution During the 
Construction of the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 Compulsory nature of participation during 
Construction 
Irrigation 
System 
Compulsory 
% (n) 
Voluntary 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
FMIS 95.5 (64) 4.5 (3) 100 (67) 
AMIS 0 (0) 100 (63) 100 (63) 
JMIS 55.6 (35) 44.4 (28) 100 (63) 
Chi-square 
=1.193 
D.F. = 2 
P-value= 
.000 
   
 
As discussed earlier, the degree to which the farmers are willing to contribute 
towards O & M activities of the irrigation infrastructure is determined by their 
expected pay off from collective action.  Both the canal infrastructures and the 
water resources in the irrigation canal resemble the provision of public goods, 
which provide benefits to the community members. However, the significant 
costs associated with excluding some members of the community has meant 
that it is very difficult to exclude farmers from reaping benefits from the canal 
systems. Therefore, the potential to free ride is both real and common, 
particularly in irrigation systems where proper institutional arrangements are 
absent or weakly enforced. Poteete and Ostrom (2003) argue that even amidst 
heterogeneous communities, homogeneity in interests such as economics, 
communities might be able to build strong foundations for collective 
 311
activities. Similarly, the availability of exit options (alternative employment 
opportunities) among the users also influences collective efforts towards the 
management of many CPRs, including irrigation systems.  In Nepalese 
community forests for example, the lower level of exit options amongst the 
users is associated with a higher level of collective action (Adhikari and 
Lovett, 2006). 
 
  
Table 4.34 Household Member Participating in O & M 
Activities in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Member 
participating in O & 
M activities Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Men 36.4 (24) 31.7 (20) 56.1 (37) 
Women 60.6 (40) 55.6 (35) 40.9 (27) 
Children 1.5 (1) 6.3 (4) 1.5 (1) 
None 1.5 (1) 6.3 (4) 1.5 (1) 
Total 100 (66) 100 (63) 100 (66) 
Chi-square=14.344 
D.F. = 6 
P-value = .026 
   
 
Table 4.34 shows the member of the farming households who reported to 
have participated in the O & M activities in the irrigation canals considered 
for this research. About 36.4 percent of households in the FMIS had adult 
males participating in O & M activities compared to 31.7 percent from the 
AMIS and 56.1 percent from the JMIS.  It is interesting to note that some 
households send children to participate in O & M activities, as this would 
reduce households’ costs. While the practice of sending children for O & M 
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activities was common to all the three irrigation systems, it was more 
conspicuous in the AMIS. On average, 6.3 percent of the households in 
Begnas systems reported sending children for O & M activities, while 1.5 
percent of households did so in both the FMIS and JMIS. While the 
participation of every member of the community is a good endeavour, 
children’s participation in a difficult terrain not only endangers their welfare 
but does not necessarily compensate the labour input of the adult male 
labourer. 
 
Table 4.35 shows the number of households who appropriate water from the 
canal systems despite their reluctance to contribute to the O & M activities.   
 
 
Table 4.35 Water appropriation by households despite reluctance 
to participate in O & M activities in the three irrigation systems 
 
 
In many rural parts of Nepal a number of sanctioning mechanisms are 
commonly used by the WUA managing the irrigation systems to ensure that 
the farmers comply with the rules governing their irrigation resources.  
However, the degree to which the farmers comply with the rules depends not 
Appropriate water but 
unwilling to participate in 
O & M activities Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Yes 41.8 (28) 54 (34) 76.8 (53) 
No 58.2 (39) 46 (29) 23.2 (16) 
Total 100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 
Chi-square= 17.642 
D.F. = 2 
P-value = .000 
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only on the nature of the sanctions, but also on the strictness with which those 
sactions are imposed. The sanctions imposed for fraudulent activities, 
including non-compliance in participating in O & M activities and stealing 
water from the canal, were severe in the FMIS, whilst those implemented in 
the JMIS and the AMIS were both light and weakly enforced. Since the 
sanctions imposed in the JMIS and the AMIS were weakly enforced, the 
proportion of farmers complying with the rules was significantly less in those 
irrigation systems. The proportion of farmers appropriating water despite 
their reluctance to participate in O & M activities in the AMIS and JMIS is 54 
percent and 76.8 percent respectively. The proportion of farmers complying 
with the rules in the FMIS was significantly higher in the FMIS as only 41.8 
percent of the farmers reported that they appropriated water from the canal 
despite their reluctance to participate in O & M activities. However, despite 
the existence of strict sanctioning mechanism in the FMIS, a significantly 
higher proportion of farmers reported to have appropriated water despite 
their reluctance to participate in O & M activities.  Nonetheless, the 
proportion of farmers appropriating water despite reluctance to participate in 
O & M activities still remains lower in the FMIS compared to the farmers in 
the AMIS and the JMIS.  
 
4.2.7 Households Participation in WUA and Access to Water  
Table 4.36 presents the proportion of farmers participating in WUA 
committees in different systems and the dalit castes.  
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Table 4.36 Household with Participation in WUA by the 
Dalits in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 
It is evident that a significantly larger proportion of the households from the 
dalit caste groups from the FMIS and the JMIS have better participation in 
WUA activities compared to their counterparts in the AMIS. All the 
respondents belonging to the dalit caste groups in the FMIS and the JMIS 
reported having participated in the WUA’s monthly meeting compared to 66.7 
percent from the AMIS.  
 
Table 4.37 shows the level of household participation in the WUA in the three 
irrigation systems and landholding types.  It is evident that farmers with 
larger landholdings dominate the WUA, with 76.5 percent of farmers from 
larger landholding groups reporting representation in the WUA compared to 
73.9 percent and 58.8 percent of medium and small landholding categories 
respectively.  However, on cursory inspection of the level of participation by 
household, a clear difference becomes apparent.  In the FMIS, small 
landholders have excellent representation on the WUA committee.   
 
Households’ 
Participation in WUA Dalit/Irrigation Systems 
 
Dalits in FMIS 
% (n) 
Dalits in AMIS 
% (n) 
Dalits in 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Yes 100  (11) 66.7 (2) 100 (13) 
No 0 (0) 33.3 (1) 0 (0) 
Total 100 (11) 100 (3) 100 (13) 
Chi-square =8.308 
D.F. = 2 
P-value= .016 
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Table 4.37 Households with Participation in WUA by Size 
of Landholding in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 
Landholding 
category 
Household Participation in WUA meetings 
FMIS 
%(n) 
AMIS 
%(n) 
JMIS 
%(n) 
Overall 
%(n) 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Large  85.7 (12 ) 14.3 (2) 88.9 (8) 11.1 (1) 67.9 (19) 32.1 (9) 
76.5 (39) 23.5 (12) 
Medium 90.9 (10) 9.1 (1) 60 (9) 40 (6) 75 (15) 25 (5) 73.9 (34) 26.1 (12) 
Small  78.6 (33) 21.4 (9) 48.7 (19) 51.3 (20) 38.1 (8) 61.9 (13) 
58.8 (60) 41.2 (42) 
 Chi-square = 6.129 
D.F. = 2 
P-value=  .047 
 
On average, 78.6 percent of the farmers from the small landholding category 
reported having participated in the WUA, compared to 85.7 percent from the 
large landholding category and 90.9 percent from the medium landholding 
category. However, the participation of farmers with small and medium 
landholding in the AMIS was very low compared to their counterparts with 
large landholdings.  In the AMIS, only 48.7 percent of small landholders and 
60 percent of medium landholders reported having participated in the WUA 
committee compared to 88.9 percent of farmers with large landholdings. 
Similarly, the participation of farmers with small landholdings remains very 
low in the JMIS compared with their counterparts in the FMIS and AMIS. In 
the JMIS only 38.1 percent of farmers with small landholdings reported 
participating in the WUA committee compared to 75 percent and 67.9 percent 
of farmers from the medium and large landholding categories. 
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Table 4.38 shows the proportion of farmers in different locations and their 
level of participation in the WUA.   
 
Table 4.38 Household Participation in WUA by 
Landholding Location in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Location Household Participation in WUA meetings 
FMIS 
%( n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Overall 
% (n) 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Head end 80 (8) 20 (2) 40 (4) 60 (6) 40 (8) 60 (12) 
50 (20) 50 (20) 
Middle end 80 (32) 20 (8) 58.6 (17) 41.4 (12) 70.6 (24) 29.4 (10) 70.9 (73) 29.1 (30) 
Tail end 88.2 (15) 11.8 (2) 37.5 (9) 62.5 (15) 66.7 (10) 33.3 (5) 
71.4 (40) 28.6 (16) 
 Chi-square = 6.405 
D.F. = 2 
P-value=  .041 
 
Overall, a greater proportion of tail-enders reported participating in the WUA 
compared to farmers at the middle and head ends of the canal systems. On an 
average, 71.4 percent of tail-enders reported participating in the WUA, 
compared to 70.9 percent and 50 percent of middle and head-enders. Equally 
important, the different level of participation of farmers with landholdings in 
different locations along the canal systems becomes clear.  In the FMIS, about 
80 percent of farmers with landholdings located at the head end and middle 
end reported participating in the WUA committee. The difference between 
them is small compared to that of the farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS. In 
the Begnas area, the participation of farmers in general was low, where only 
37.5 percent and 40 percent of the tail-enders and head-enders respectively, 
reported having participated in the WUA committee. Also, the farmers with 
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landholdings at the middle of the canal system reported having a lower level of 
participation in the WUA committee, at about 58.6 percent. Similarly the 
head-enders in the JMIS had a lower level of participation in their WUA 
committee compared to farmers in the middle and tail end of the canal 
system. In the JMIS only 40 percent of tail-enders reported participating in 
the WUA committee compared to 70.6 percent of middle-enders and 66.7 
percent of tail-enders.  The differences between the levels of participation of 
farmers with landholdings at the different locations are statistically 
significant.  A lower level of participation of the head-enders in the WUA 
committee of the JMIS could be due to the fact that the WUA office was 
located at the tail end area, and they often reported finding it inconvenient to 
attend scheduled meetings. 
 
Table 4.39 shows the members of the family participating in the WUA 
meetings. From earlier in Section 4.2.6, the existence of gender bias was 
evident in the level of participation in O & M activities, with a significantly 
higher proportion of women participating in O & M activities. However, the 
participation of women in the WUA committee was consistently lower than 
the level of participation of men in all three irrigation systems. However, the 
difference in the level of participation of both men and women in the WUA 
committee in the FMIS was lower than that of the JMIS and the AMIS.  
 
In the FMIS, 72.7 percent of male-headed households reported having 
participated in the WUA, compared to 21.2 percent of women and 1.5 percent 
of children. Similarly, the difference in the level of participation in the WUA 
amongst male and female-headed households was greater in the AMIS 
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compared to both the JMIS and the FMIS. In the AMIS, 61.7 percent of male-
headed households reported having participated in the WUA, compared to 
just 5 percent of female-headed households. 
 
Table 4.39 Household Member Participating WUA 
Committee in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Member 
participating in  
WUA activities Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
%( n) 
AMIS 
%( n) 
JMIS 
%( n) 
Men 72.7 (48) 61.7 (37) 73.5 (50) 
Women 21.2 (14) 5.0 (3) 20.6 (14) 
Children 1.5 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
None 4.5 (3) 33.3 (2) 5.9 (4) 
Total 100 (66) 100 (60) 100 (68) 
Chi-square= 32.859 
D.F. = 6 
P-value = .000 
   
 
In the same system, 33.3 percent of the respondents reported not having 
participated in the WUA at all, which is considered high. Similarly in the 
JMIS, 73.5 percent of male-headed households reported having participated 
in the WUA compared to just 20.6 percent of female-headed households. 
About 5.9 percent of respondents reported that they did not have any 
participation in the WUA committee.  
 
The lower level of participation from female-headed households in the WUA 
compared to male-headed households can be explained by the level of effort 
that the WUA makes to ensure inclusivity in the WUA committee. Table 4.40 
shows the proportion of respondents who believe that the WUA committee in 
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their area is making efforts to increase women’s participation in the activities 
of the WUA.   
 
 
Table 4.40 Reported level of WUA’s Effort for Gender 
Inclusion in the Three Irrigation Systems 
 
WUA’s Efforts to 
ensure Gender 
Inclusion Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% ( n) 
 
AMIS 
% ( n) 
 
JMIS 
% ( n) 
 
Yes 13.4 (9) 3.2 (2) 27.3 (18) 
No 86.6 (58) 96.8 (60) 72.7 (48) 
Total 100 (67) 100 (62) 100 (66) 
Chi-square= 14.769 
D.F. = 2 
P-value = .001 
   
 
In the FMIS, 13.4 percent of farmers reported that their WUA was making 
genuine efforts for gender inclusion compared to just 3.2 percent of farmers 
in the AMIS. In the JMIS, 27.3 percent of farmers believed that their WUA 
was making genuine efforts for gender inclusion in their WUA’s activities. 
 
Table 4.41 shows the level of participation reported by the farmers in the three 
irrigation systems considered for the study.  During the household survey, the 
farmers were asked to rank their level of engagement with irrigation issues in 
general.  It is clear that the majority of the farmers reported having occasional 
participation in the irrigation issues in all the three irrigation systems. 
However, the differences in the proportion of farmers reported to have a 
strong participation in irrigation governance is higher in JMIS and the FMIS 
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compared to the AMIS. In the FMIS, 23.9 percent of the farmers reported 
strong participation in irrigation governance, while 62.7 percent and 11.9 
percent of the farmers reported that their level of participation was occasional 
and not often, respectively. Only a small proportion (1.5 percent) of farmers 
reported that they did not participate in irrigation governance. 
 
Table 4.41 Household level of Participation in Irrigation 
Governance in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Participation in 
Irrigation 
Governance System Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Strong participation 23.9 (16) 11.1 (7) 28.4 (19) 
Occasional participation 62.7 (42) 38.1 (24) 47.8 (32) 
Not  often 11.9 (8) 31.7 (20) 19.4 (13) 
Hardly ever 1.5 (1) 19  (12) 4.5 (3) 
Total 100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (67) 
Chi-square= 29.067 
D.F. = 6 
P-value = .000 
    
 
However, the proportion of farmers reported to have a strong participation in 
irrigation governance is very low in the JMIS, where only 11.1 percent of the 
farmers reported strong participation in irrigation governance. In the same 
system, 38.1 percent and 31.7 percent of the farmers reported that their level 
of participation was occasional or not often. A higher proportion (19 percent) 
reported that they hardly ever participated in irrigation governance.  
Similarly, in the JMIS, about 28.4 percent of farmers reported strong 
participation in irrigation governance, while 47.8 percent of them reported 
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occasional participation. About 19.4 percent of the respondents from the same 
system did not participate often in irrigation governance, while a small 
proportion (4.5 percent) reported having hardly ever participated in irrigation 
governance. Table 4.42 shows different stages of household participation in 
relation to irrigation issues.   
 
Table 4.42 Stage of household Participation in Irrigation 
Governance in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Stage of 
Participation Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Planning & Decision 
makings 
62.1 (41) 39.3 (24) 58.5 (38) 
Benefit sharing 37.9 (25) 60.7 (37) 41.5 (27) 
Total  100 (66) 100 (61) 100 (65) 
Chi-square= 7.530 
D.F. = 2 
P-value = .023 
   
 
The respondents were asked if their participation related to planning and 
decision making or did they engage with irrigation issues only in relation to 
sharing water from the canal.  It is clear that a higher proportion of farmers in 
the FMIS reported having participated at the decision making level through 
their involvement in planning and decision making, compared to both the 
AMIS and the JMIS. The proportion of respondents reported to have been 
involved in planning and decision making remains at about 62.1 percent in 
the FMIS compared to 39.3 percent in the AMIS and 58.5 percent in the 
JMIS.  
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   4.2.8 Communal Rules for Controlling Defrauding  
 
As mentioned earlier, in the absence of appropriate institutional 
arrangements, the problems of free-riding and fraud become endemic, which 
greatly hinders collective action. In many communities of irrigators, 
communal rules have been devised for controlling water theft. Some of the 
rules include financial sanctions, restricted use of water, additional 
contribution towards O & M activities and temporary suspension of 
memberships. Table 4.43 presents information on the existence of communal 
rules for controlling water defrauding and vandalising of irrigation 
infrastructures, as reported by the farmers.   
 
Table 4.43 Existence of Communal Sanctioning Mechanisms for 
Defrauders in the Three Irrigation Systems 
 
 
In the FMIS, 95.5 percent of the farmers reported the existence of communal 
sanctioning mechanisms compared to 62.3 percent in the JMIS and just 31.7 
percent from the AMIS. In many village level organisations, what is written in 
Existence of 
Communal 
Sanctioning for 
Defrauders Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
%  (n) 
JMIS 
%  (n) 
Overall 
% (n) 
Yes 95.5 (64) 31.7 (20) 62.3 (43) 63.8 (127) 
No 4.5 (3) 68.3 (43) 37.3 (26) 36.2 (72) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
Chi-square=  57.298 
D.F. = 2 
P-value =  0.005     
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the constitution and what is being implemented in practice are two different 
things. Often it is the case that rules are not implemented as prescribed in the 
WUA constitutions. The degree to which the rules are implemented appears to 
be associated with farmers’ involvement in irrigation management and also 
the presence of sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990).   
 
Table 4.44 Rules Implemented as Described in the Constitution in 
the Three Irrigation Systems 
 
Table 4.44 shows the proportion of farmers reporting the implementation of 
rules as written in the WUA constitutions. About 92.5 percent of the 
respondents in the FMIS reported that rules were implemented as prescribed 
in the constitution. However, only 60.9 percent and 37.7 percent of the 
farmers in the JMIS and AMIS respectively, reported having done so.  A small 
proportion of respondents in all three irrigation systems reported that they do 
not know whether communal rules are imposed on defrauders as prescribed in 
the constitution. About 1.5 percent of farmers in the FMIS reported that they 
did not know if communal rules imposed on water defrauders were as 
Rules Implemented as 
per Constitution Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Overall 
% (n) 
Yes 92.5 (62) 31.7 (20) 60.9 (42) 62.3 (124) 
No 6.0 (4) 66.7 (42) 37.7 (26) 36.2 (72) 
Do not know 1.5 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.5 (3) 
 100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
Chi-square=  52.423 
D.F. = 4 
P-value =  .000     
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prescribed in the constitutions, while 1.6 and 1.4 percent from the AMIS and 
the JMIS respectively reported this.  
 
Table 4.45 show the various types of reported sanctions which are imposed in 
the irrigation communities for farmers involved in water defrauding and for 
those vandalising canal infrastructures.   
 
Table 4.45 Nature of Sanctions Imposed on Defrauders in the 
Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 
 
For example, in the FMIS area a series of graduated sanctions are imposed 
depending on the nature of infractions and the damage they cause. For the 
first infraction, the defrauders are fined NRs. 100, while fines imposed on 
second and third time defrauders are NRs. 250 and NRs. 500, respectively.  
While financial sanctions were the most common form of sanctions, other 
forms were also commonly reported. Restricted use of the resource, in this 
case obviously irrigation water, and in rare cases temporary suspension of 
Nature of 
Sanctions imposed 
on water 
defrauders Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Overall 
% (n) 
Financial sanctions  53.7 (36) 39.7 (25) 53.6  (37) 49.2 (98) 
Restricted use 1.5 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.5 (1) 
membership suspension 37.3 (25) 0(0) 4.3  (3) 14.1 (28) 
NA 7.5  (5) 60.3 (38) 42.0 (29) 36.2 (72) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (67) 100 (199) 
Chi-square=  
68.976 
D.F. = 6 
P-value =  .000 
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membership were practised.  However, most of the minor incidents of 
defrauding were resolved at the local level.  In the FMIS, the WUA has fully 
implemented graduated sanctions compared to both the AMIS and the JMIS.  
Financial sanctions remained the most common form imposed on the 
defrauders in all three irrigation systems considered for this research. About 
53.7 percent of the farmers from the FMIS reported that financial sanctions 
were commonly practised while 39.7 percent and 53.6 percent of the farmers 
reported that financial sanctions were the most common form of sanctions for 
defrauders in the AMIS and the FMIS respectively. Interestingly, the WUA 
president in the AMIS was not in favour of financial sanctions, and he argued: 
“--- we have not imposed any sanctions to the defrauders or otherwise—
although I am aware that there are sanctioning provisions in the 
constitutions. But in my view it is not appropriate to imposed financial 
sanctions because it penalises the entire household. The mistakes are 
made by an individual but the fine imposed will be paid from the 
household’s income which will have a negative impact on already poorer 
households who are struggling to meet their daily needs---” 
(Male, 44, President of the AMIS)  
 
 
Amongst other forms of sanctions, the WUA in the FMIS also imposed 
restricted use of the water resources for irrigators while in serious and 
repeated cases, the defrauders might be temporarily excluded from the 
general membership. Almost 38 percent of respondents reported that in 
serious and repeated cases of defrauding, the WUA did temporarily suspend 
the memberships of the defrauders. But in both the AMIS and the JMIS 
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neither restricted use nor temporary suspension of members was practised. 
Also, farmers perceived that compliance with the rules is ensured by not only 
by the nature of the sanctions but also their strengths and the degree of 
implementation. 
 
Table 4.46 shows that in general the sanctions imposed remained of a 
moderate nature, with farmers in the FMIS reported heavier sanctions, while 
many farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS reported either no sanctions imposed 
or light sanctions if they were imposed at all.  
 
Table 4.46 Severity of Sanctions Imposed on Defrauders in the 
Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 
 
Around 13 percent of farmers in the JMIS reported that the sanctions imposed 
on defrauders were light, compared to just 1.5 per of respondents in the FMIS 
and 12.7 percent in the AMIS. Similarly, a significantly higher proportion of 
farmers in all systems reported having imposed moderate levels of sanctions 
in the FMIS. In the FMIS, 70.1 percent of farmers reported moderate 
Severity of 
Sanctions Imposed  Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) Overall 
Light 1.5 (1) 12.7 (8) 13.0 (9) 9.0 (18) 
Moderate 70.1 (47) 27.0 (17) 46.4 (32) 48.2 (96) 
Heavy 16.4 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5.5 (11) 
NA 11.9 (8) 60.3 (38) 40.6 (28) 37.2 (74) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
Chi-square=  38.294 
D.F. = 4 
P-value =  .000 
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sanctions, compared to 27 percent in the AMIS and 46.4 percent in the JMIS. 
While none of the farmers felt that the sanctions imposed on defrauders in the 
AMIS and the JMIS were heavy, 16.4 percent in the FMIS considered the 
sanctions strong.  
 
The results of the Chi-square test which is presented in Table 4.47 indicate 
that there is an association between the severity of communal sanctions and 
the prevalence of water theft in the irrigation systems. Although the 
association is not statistically significant, farmers naturally will not be 
prepared to take the risk of getting fined if the rules are strictly enforced. It is, 
therefore, plausible to suggest that there will be fewer incidences of water theft 
in irrigation systems where heavy penalties are imposed on farmers who break 
water distribution regulations. Farmers become reluctant to get involved in 
water fraud if the fines when they are caught and found guilty of misconduct 
are high.  
 
Table 4.47 shows farmers’ responses on the severity of communal sanctions 
and incidences of water theft in the irrigation systems considered for this 
study.  
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Table 4.47 Relationship between Severity of Communal Sanctions 
and Prevalence of Water thefts in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Severity of 
sanctions Prevalence of Water Theft 
 YES 
% (n) 
NO 
% (n) 
Light/No sanctions 68.9 (62) 31.1 (28) 
Moderate 56.7 (51) 43.3 (39) 
Heavy 36.4 (4) 63.6 (7) 
Total  61.3 (117) 38.7 (74) 
Chi-square = 5.880 
D.F. = 2 
P-value= .053 
  
 
There is an association between the severity of sanctions and incidents of 
water theft. Although the overall problem of water theft (61.3 percent) still 
remains high and continues to be an issue, as the severity of sanctions 
increases, incidents of water theft decrease. A significantly higher proportion 
of farmers (68.7 percent) who reported that the fines imposed were light or no 
fine was imposed, also reported prevalence of water theft in their community. 
Also, 56.7 percent and 36.4 percent of farmers who reported moderate and 
heavy sanctions imposed on defrauders, reported having problems with water 
theft in their communities, respectively.  
  
   4.2.9 Communal Social Capital and Access to Irrigation Water  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the level of trust amongst farmers has a great 
significance to the way they co-operate with each other. In developing 
countries, particularly in rural communities, factors such as trust and co-
operation are considered vital aspects of village life which not only impact on 
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farmers’ abilities to engage in irrigation management but also in other spheres 
of social life in the rural villages. 
 
In order to assess farmers’ perspectives on how they evaluate the level of trust 
in their neighbouring farmers, it was asked how they perceived this level of 
trust in relation to irrigation water.  The results are present in Table 4.48, 
which shows that an overwhelming proportion of farmers in the FMIS 
reported to have a high level of trust in one another, while an overwhelming 
proportion of farmers in the AMIS reported having a low level of trust in one 
another.  In the Begnas area, 61.2 percent of the farmers reported having a 
high level of trust, while the remaining 31.3 percent and 7.5 percent of farmers 
in the same system reported having a modest and low level of trust 
respectively. Similarly, in the Begnas area only 9.5 percent of the farmers 
reported to having a high level of trust, while the remaining 63.3 percent and 
30.2 percent of the farmers reported having a modest and low level of trust, 
respectively.  In the JMIS, 28.4 percent of farmers reported having a high level 
of trust, while the remaining 58.2 percent and 13.4 percent of the farmers 
report having a modest and low level of trust, respectively.  
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Table 4.48 Self-reported Level of Trust amongst Irrigators in the 
Three Irrigation Systems 
 
 
Table 4.49 shows that there is an association between the level of trust as 
reported by the farmers and their level of access to irrigation water.  
 
 
Table 4.49 Household Level of Access to Irrigation water and Level 
of Trust amongst the Farmers in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
 
 
In general, a higher proportion of farmers who reported having a high level of 
trust amongst them also reported strong access to irrigation water, while those 
Level of Trust amongst 
Irrigators Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
High Level of Trust 61.2 (41) 9.5 (6) 28.4 (19) 
Modest Level of Trust 31.3 (21) 60.3 (38) 58.2 (39) 
Low Level of Trust 7.5  (5) 30.2 (19) 13.4 (9) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (67) 
Chi-square=  44.270 
D.F. = 4 
P-value =  .000 
   
Level of Access  
to Irrigation Water Level of Trust amongst Irrigators 
 High 
% (n) 
Modest 
% (n) 
Low 
% (n) 
A strong access 83.3 (55) 58.2 (57) 24.2 (8) 
A weak access 16.7 (11) 41.8 (41) 75.8 (25) 
Total  100 (66) 100 (98) 100 (33) 
Chi-square=  32.884 
D.F. = 2 
P-value =  .000    
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reporting low levels of trust reported weak access to irrigation water. About 
83.3 percent of farmers who reported a high level of trust also reported strong 
access to irrigation water, while the remaining 16.7 percent reported weak 
access to irrigation water. Similarly, 58.2 percent of farmers reporting a 
modest level of trust reported strong access to water, while the remaining 41.8 
percent reported weak access to water. Perhaps not surprisingly, a significant 
proportion of farmers who reported having a low level of trust also reported 
weak access to irrigation water. About 75.8 percent of farmers reporting a low 
level of trust appear to have weak access to irrigation water, while only 24.2 
percent of them reported strong access to irrigation water.  A higher level of 
mutual trust facilitates the process of establishing ‘social norms’, where 
community members follow the rules of the community (Ostrom, 1994). 
 
Table 4.50 shows the level of trust in each of the irrigation systems 
considered, and the prevalence of water theft. While in general, the problem of 
water theft remains common to all three irrigation systems, there remains a 
continuum of incidence of water thefts remaining high at the lower level of 
trust and decreasing as the level of trust among farmers increases. The 
farmers who reported a high level of trust within the community also reported 
a lower incidence of water thefts in their area. It appears that low levels of 
trust amongst the farmers are associated with a higher incidence of water 
theft.  
 
In the FMIS, 43.9 percent of farmers who reported a high level of trust also 
reported prevalence of water theft in their area compared to 61.9 percent and 
80 percent of farmers reporting a modest and a low level of trust, respectively. 
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The proportion of farmers reporting prevalence of water theft remains high in 
the AMIS. 
 
Table 4.50 Level of Trust and Water Thefts in the Three Irrigation 
Systems 
 
Irrigation 
Systems 
Level of Trust Prevalence of Water Theft 
YES 
% (n) 
NO 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
 
FMIS 
High 43.9 (18) 56.1  (26) 100  (41) 
Modest 61.9  (13) 38.1  (8) 100  (21) 
Low 80  (4) 20  (1) 100  (5) 
 
AMIS 
High 83.3 (5) 16.7  ( 1) 100  (6) 
Modest 75.7 (28) 24.3  (9) 100  (37) 
Low 89.5 (17) 10.5  (2) 100  (19) 
 
JMIS 
High 16.7 (2) 83.3  (10) 100  (12) 
Modest 48.7  (19) 51.3  (20) 100 (39) 
Low 100 (9) 
0 (0) 
100  (9) 
 
Overall * 
High 42.4 (25) 57.6 (34) 100  (59) 
Modest 61.9 (60) 38.1 (37) 100 (97) 
Low 90.9 (30) 9.1 (3) 100  (33) 
 *Chi-square=  21.012 
D.F. = 2 
P-value =  .000 
   
 
 
Of the farmers who reported a high level of trust, 83.3 percent reported having 
encountered problems with water theft compared to 75.7 percent and 89.5 
percent reporting modest and low levels of trust, reporting problems of water 
thefts, respectively. Similarly, in the JMIS, 100 percent of farmers who 
reported a low level of trust also reported having experienced problems of 
water theft in their communities, compared to 48.7 percent of farmers with 
 333
modest levels of trust and 16.7 percent of farmers with a high level of trust in 
their communities. 
 
   4.2.10 Simplicity of Rules and Access to Irrigation Water  
 
The importance of simple rules for irrigation governance has been discussed 
in Chapter Two (Section 2.10.7). Simple rules for the management of 
irrigation systems are both easy to implement and follow, while complex rules 
are difficult to follow for uneducated farmers in rural Nepal. If the farmers are 
aware of the rationale behind the rules implemented, they can either support 
them or contest them. In order to raise awareness about irrigation systems 
and the rules governing them, the WUAs spend considerable amounts of their 
resources. However, the WUAs in some irrigation systems make greater 
efforts in raising awareness amongst the farmers than others.   
 
Table 4.51 Simplicity of Irrigation Governing Rules in the Three 
Irrigation Systems  
 
 
Respondents were asked how easy they found the rules governing the 
irrigation systems to understand. The results are presented in Table 4.51, 
Simplicity of Irrigation 
Governing Rules Irrigation Systems 
 FMIS 
% (n) 
AMIS 
% (n) 
JMIS 
% (n) 
Overall 
% (n) 
Simple/easy to understand 95.5 (64) 27 (17) 49.3 (34) 57.8 (115) 
Complex/Difficult to understand 4.5 (3) 73 (46) 50.7  (35) 22.1 (44) 
Total  100 (67) 100 (63) 100 (69) 100 (199) 
Chi-square=  77.430 
D.F. = 2 
P-value =  .000 
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which shows that the level of farmers’ engagement in irrigation governance 
influences their level of understanding of the rules imposed.  In the FMIS 
area, 95.5 percent of the farmers reported that they found their rules to be 
simple and easy to understand, while the remaining 4.5 percent reported the 
rules to be complex and difficult to understand.  Similarly, about 49.3 percent 
of the farmers in the JMIS area reported the rules to be simple and easy to 
understand while remaining 50.7 percent reported them to be complex and 
difficult to understand. However, a significant proportion of farmers in the 
AMIS area reported that their irrigation governing rules were overtly complex 
and hence difficult to understand.  In the AMIS, 73 percent of the respondents 
reported  that the irrigation governing rules are complex and difficult to 
understand compared to just 27 percent, who reported that the irrigation 
governing rules were simple and easy to understand. The results of the Chi-
square test indicate that there is a statistically significant association in the 
reported simplicity of irrigation governing rules among the three systems 
considered for this research.  
 
As such, the farmers have different levels of participation in the management 
of irrigation system and they also do so in different capacities.  The level of 
farmers’ participation in irrigation management of the three irrigation 
systems considered in this research can be described using Arnstein’s (1969) 
“ladder of participation”. The ladder of participation classifies the nature of 
participation into three categories; namely citizen power, tokenism and non-
participation.  In the FMIS, farmers have a full control of their irrigation 
systems where decisions are made at the local level by the users themselves. In 
the JMIS, the participation of the water users was merely consultations in 
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which the DoI was not legally obliged to consider the outcomes of those 
consultations in its decision making. Therefore, the nature of farmers’ 
participation in the JMIS was merely tokenism in which the participation was 
a functional participation to reduce operation costs (Rudqvist and Woodford-
Berger, 1996). As such, the farmers in the FMIS did not have decision-making 
power and fell victim to the manipulation of the external agencies. However, 
in the AMIS, farmers did not participate in decision making and remained at 
the bottom of the participation ladder in which they were passive recipients of 
the development interventions.  
 
 
Table 4.52 shows the relationship between the simplicity of rules governing 
irrigation systems and the extent of their implementation as prescribed in the 
constitutions. It is clear that farmers who reported that the rules governing 
their irrigation systems were simple also reported that the rules were 
implemented as prescribed in the constitutions. An overwhelming proportion 
of farmers (87.5 percent) in the FMIS area who reported that their irrigation 
governing rules were simple also reported that the rules were implemented as 
prescribed in the constitution, while only 33.3 percent of the farmers 
reporting complex rules reported that the rules were implemented as 
prescribed in the constitution. 
 
In the AMIS area, although the proportion of farmers reporting irrigation 
governing rules to be simple was less than both the FMIS and the JMIS areas, 
a higher proportion of farmers reporting simple rules also reported rules being 
implemented as prescribed in the constitution. 
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Table 4.52 Relationships between Simplicity of Rules and 
Implementation in the Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Irrigation 
System 
Simplicity of 
Irrigation 
Governing Rules 
Rules implemented as prescribed in WUA 
Constitution 
 
Yes 
% (n) 
No 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
 
FMIS 
Simple 87.5 (56) 12.5 (8) 100 (64) 
Complex 33.3 (1) 66.7 (2) 100 (3) 
Total  85.1 (57) 14.9 (10) 100 (67) 
 
AMIS 
Simple 52.9 (9) 47.1 (8) 100 (17) 
Complex 0 (0) 100 (46) 100 (46) 
Total  52.9 (9) 100 (46) 100 (63) 
 
JMIS 
Simple 64.7 (22) 35.3 (12) 100 (34) 
Complex 8.6 (3) 91.4 (32) 100 (35) 
Total  36.2 (25) 
63.8 (44) 100 (69) 
 
Overall * 
Simple 75.7 (87) 24.3 (24) 100 (115) 
Complex 4.8 (4) 95.2 (80) 100 (84) 
Total  45.7 (91) 54.3 (108) 100 (199) 
 *Chi-square=  
98.297 
D.F. = 1 
P-value =  .000 
   
 
About 52.9 percent of farmers in the Begnas area who reported that their 
irrigation governing rules were simple also reported that the rules were 
implemented as prescribed in the constitution, while none of the farmers 
reporting irrigation governing rules as complex reported that the rules were 
implemented as stated in the constitution. In the Rainastar area, a 
significantly higher proportion of farmers (64.7 percent) who reported their 
irrigation governing rules to be simple also reported that the rules were 
implemented as prescribed in the constitution, while only 8.6 percent of 
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farmers reporting their irrigation governing rules to be simple also reported 
that the rules were implemented as prescribed in the constitution. 
 
Table 4.53 shows the relationship between the simplicity of irrigation 
governing rules and the incidence of water theft.  It is clear that a reasonably 
high proportion of farmers who reported that the rules governing their 
irrigation systems were complex also reported incidence of water theft in their 
areas, in all the three irrigation system.  The WUA themselves are aware of the 
importance of keeping irrigators informed of the rules and regulations that 
govern their irrigation systems. Whilst the need for raising awareness 
amongst the local farmers is acknowledged by the technicians, the WUA and 
local farmers themselves, cooperation is lacking. 
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Table 4.53 Relationships between Simplicity of Irrigation Governing Rules and Incidence of Water Thefts in the 
Three Irrigation Systems  
 
Simplicity 
of irrigation 
governing 
rules 
Prevalence of Water Thefts in Different 
Systems 
   
  
FMIS 
% (n)  
AMIS 
% (n)  
JMIS 
% (n)  
Overall 
% (n) 
 Yes No Yes No Yes  No Yes No 
          
Simple 50.0 (32) 50.0 (32) 100.0 (17) 0 (0) 28.1 (9)  71.9 (23) 51.3 (58) 48.7 (55) 
Complex 100.0 (3) 0 (0) 73.3 (33) 26.7 (12) 76.7 (23)  23.3 (7) 75.6 (59) 24.4 (19) 
Total 52.2 (35) 47.8 (32) 80.6 (50) 19.4 (12) 51.6 (32)  48.4 (30) 61.3 (117) 38.7 (74) 
Chi-Square=  
14.859 
D.F.= 1 
P-value =000          
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The difficulties in maintaining cooperation amongst the technicians, the WUA 
and the irrigators can be attributed to the lack of awareness among the 
farmers. If they do not know the rules and regulations that govern their 
irrigation systems, it is difficult for them to judge their own behaviour.  
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has investigated whether there are relationships between 
different variables, both household, socio-economic, communal 
characteristics and resource specific features, and farmers’ capabilities to 
access irrigation water.  Simple statistical tests (Chi-square tests, ANOVA test 
and t-tests) have been carried out.  The results of different statistical tests 
indicate that farmers in the FMIS have better access to irrigation water 
compared to those in the AMIS and the JMIS, under the measure of access 
defined in the thesis. 
 
Caste remains an important factor in rural communities in Nepal. In the 
FMIS, a higher proportion of dalit farmers reported having faced caste based 
discrimination. However, none of the dalit farmers reported having faced 
caste based discriminations in irrigation-related activities. A similar pattern 
was observed in the JMIS, but the proportion of dalit farmers reporting caste 
based discrimination in irrigation governance still remains. Caste based 
discrimination, as reported by the dalit farmers, indicates that discrimination 
is rampant in the AMIS.  The dalit farmers consistently reported a weak level 
of access to irrigation water compared to higher castes in all three irrigation 
systems, but the difference between the systems is very clear. In the FMIS, the 
difference is very low whilst in both the AMIS and JMIS the difference is much 
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greater. Caste based discrimination is not only linked to access to water but 
also to landholding. The data show that the higher caste groups also have 
access to more productive Khet lands with good irrigation facilities, whilst the 
dalits have the less productive Pakho and Khoriya lands and cultivate in non-
productive lands with little or no access to water. 
 
The inclusiveness in irrigation governance in the FMIS has meant that 
marginal farmers have better access to irrigation water compared to their 
counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. On average, the marginal farmers in 
FMIS have higher average access scores than their counterparts in the AMIS 
and JMIS.  
 
The location of the landholdings along the main canal continues to be an 
important factor in farmers’ capabilities to access water from the irrigation 
systems. Whilst head-enders have enjoyed locational advantages, tail-enders 
continue to face disadvantages in accessing water in all three irrigation 
systems.  However, the differences in the head-tail inequalities are more 
conspicuous in the AMIS and JMIS compared to the FMIS. The comparison 
amongst the tail-enders in the three irrigation systems shows that the tail-
enders in the FMIS have better access to irrigation water compared to their 
counterparts in the JMIS and AMIS. 
 
Farmers’ agronomical knowledge helps to reduce inequalities in water 
distribution.  In the FMIS, the WUA has invested considerable time and 
resources in educating farmers about crop-water requirements to reduce 
wasteful use of water, whilst the WUA in the AMIS and JMIS were indifferent 
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to this issue and the head-enders in these two systems have used water in very 
inefficient ways.  
 
In rural Nepal, the society is very patriarchal and the effects of gender on 
access to water are glaring. The female-headed households have less access to 
irrigation water compared to the households headed by men. The traditional 
roles of nurturing and undertaking household tasks assigned to females have 
meant that their participation in debates and deliberations in irrigation 
governance is significantly lower than that of men. However, women’s 
contributions were significantly higher in operation and maintenance 
activities compared to that of the men. The male-headed households have 
productive landholdings with better access to irrigation water compared to 
female-headed households.  Also, the gender gap between the systems was 
significant. The WUA in the FMIS was very inclusive in gender dimension 
compared to the WUA in the AMIS and JMIS. Consequently, female-headed 
households in the FMIS have higher levels of access to irrigation water 
compared to their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS.   
 
The higher level of involvement in irrigation governance in the FMIS has 
meant that the bond between them is high and there is consequently a higher 
propensity to be involved in collective action, whilst the interferences of 
external agencies and unclear distribution of responsibilities between the 
WUA and the DoI in the JMIS and AMIS has meant that an environment of 
mistrust and disengagement with irrigation issues were high. This has serious 
implications in the performance of those two irrigation systems and a 
consequent effect on farmers’ level of access to irrigation water.  
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The presence of sanctions for defrauders and their implementation by local 
irrigators help to ensure compliance. In the FMIS, the farmers have been able 
to imbed those sanctions in the governance of their irrigation systems, while a 
weak implementation of the sanctions in the AMIS and the JMIS has meant 
that water theft and canal vandalism was acute in those systems.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO 
IRRIGATION WATER: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview   
 
This chapter follows the literature review presented in Chapter Two (Section 
2.10) and the statistical tests carried out in Chapter Four. It presents the 
results of statistical analysis to determine factors influencing household access 
to irrigation water. For the purpose of this analysis, a statistical model for 
household access to irrigation water has been built using variables which 
include household socio-economic characteristics, communal characteristics 
of irrigators and resource specific characteristics of the irrigation system.   The 
model constructed for the statistical analysis in this chapter is based on the 
findings in Chapter Four.  A detailed treatment of the three components of 
access, i.e. reliability, adequacy and equity, has been described in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.9) and Chapter Three (Section 3.9).  Chapter Five is broadly divided 
into two main sections, the first of which describes variables used for building 
the model to explain the factors influencing household access to water. It also 
presents the results of the statistical analysis. The second section of this 
chapter presents the discussions on the findings from the statistical tests. The 
data used to estimate household level of access to irrigation water come from 
the household survey.  The chapter also uses qualitative data gathered through 
key informant interviews and focus group discussions, to illustrate and explain 
the findings from the regression analysis reported in the first section of this 
chapter. Access to and control over irrigation water is inherently associated 
with both household socio-economic status and resource specific 
 344
characteristics to describe the findings from statistical analysis. A clear 
pattern of access to and control over irrigation water is reported. Results from 
the analysis indicate that the features associated with the FMIS have a positive 
influence on marginal and poorer farmers in their abilities to access water 
from irrigation canals, whilst the features particularly associated with the 
AMIS have negative effects on marginal farmers’ ability to access water from 
the canal system. The chapter concludes that the characteristics associated 
with the FMIS provide conducive environments for the marginal farmers in 
accessing irrigation water while those associated with the AMIS and the JMIS 
constrain their capabilities in accessing water from the canal systems. The 
statistical tests carried out in Chapter Four uncovered the variables associated 
with access to irrigation water.  The statistical analysis carried out in the same 
chapter has also led to further statistical analysis, carried out in this chapter. 
It should be pointed out that the variables considered in this chapter have 
been taken from the findings in Chapter Four.   
 
5.2 Modelling Household Access to Irrigation Water  
 
In order to understand the relationship between different physical and socio-
economic variables and access to irrigation water, a multiple logistic 
regression model has been developed.  The computation of household level of 
access to irrigation water has been described in detail in Chapter Three 
(Section 3.9). The regression analysis was carried out to predict the 
probability of strong access to irrigation water by farmers in households with 
different socio-economic characteristics and who are served by irrigation 
systems governed by different property rights structures. The regression 
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analysis is a statistical technique which is used to measure the predictive 
power of independent variables to determine the value of a dependent 
variable. The multiple logistic regression method is used to predict a 
categorical outcome (dependant variable) from a combination of a number of 
explanatory (independent) variables.  Since the dependent variable consists of 
two discrete and mutually exclusive categories, i.e. strong access and weak 
access, logistic regression analysis was the most suitable method of 
quantitative analysis.  Furthermore, the suitability of the logistic regression 
technique is also considered on the grounds of “flexibility”, as this technique is 
free from restrictions compared to many other regression techniques.  For 
example, binary logistic regression technique has no assumptions on the 
linear relationship between independent variables and can be used in any mix 
of dichotomous, discrete and continuous predictor (independent) variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
 
The logistic regression readily allows each variable in the analysis to be 
described in terms of its strength of contribution to the outcome, the odds of 
reporting a strong access to irrigation water and the direction in which this 
contribution is made, that is whether the odds increase or decrease the 
likelihood of farmers’ reporting strong access to irrigation water (Hair et al 
2006).  In probability terms, the two outcomes can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 
Odds = P (Y=1)/1-P (Y=1)             ------------------ (5.1) 
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Where Y=1 is the probability of households reporting strong access to water 
and 1-Y is the probability of households not reporting strong access to water 
(i.e. probability of reporting weak access to water).   
 
It is assumed that access to irrigation water is the function of both socio-
economic and physical characteristics of the resource base. By taking the 
natural logarithm of the odds that Y=1, as the dependent variable, the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables 
can be represented by the following equation: 
 
Logit (Y) = ∞ + β1X1 + β2X2+ -------+ βnXn + έ.  ----------------- (5.2) 
 
Where, Y in the left hand side of the equation 5.2 is the logit of the probability 
of reporting strong access to water by the respondent Y. The left hand side of 
model contains a set of nth explanatory variables X, a constant, ∞ and an error 
term, έ. 
 
To make the equation 5.2 simple and to express the parameters in terms of the 
odds, we need to exponentiate logit (Y) as Odds (Y=1) = e logit (Y). This results in 
the following equation: 
Odds (Y=1) = e ln [odds(Y=1)] 
                     = e (∞ + β1X1 + β2X2+ -------+ βnXn ------------ (5.3) 
A change of one unit of an independent variable (X) multiplies the odds by eβ 
which can then be converted back to the probability that (Y=1) by the 
following equation:  
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P (Y=1) = e (∞ + β1X1 + β2X2+ -------+ βnXn) /1+e (∞ + β1X1 + β2X2+ -------+ βnXn) + έ. ------- (5.4) 
 
The values of odds ratios inform us of the household level of access to 
irrigation water influenced by independent variables. The dependent variable 
(Y) has two possible values, 1 and 0 which represent strong and weak access 
respectively.  
 
5.3 Determinants of Household Level of Access to Irrigation Water 
   5.3.1 Variable Definitions and Regression Equation  
 
A detailed description of the variables and their association with the irrigation 
issues has been presented more broadly in the literature review in Chapter 
Two. This section describes the independent variables used in constructing the 
model to measure household access to irrigation water.  
 
The description of the fourteen independent explanatory variables which are 
assumed to influence household level of access to irrigation water and the sign 
of their expected relationship with the level of access to irrigation water is 
presented in Table 5.1.   The findings from Chapter Four demonstrated that 
household socio-economic characteristics and physical characteristics of the 
irrigation resource bases are associated with the level of access to irrigation 
water.  
 
The fourteen explanatory variables which are used to build the regression 
model can be grouped into three separate categories. Variables such as the 
physical condition (PHYCOND), nature of the source feeding the system 
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(SOURCE) and the direction of flow of the canal (GRAD) are physical 
characteristics of the irrigation systems, while variables such as location of 
landholdings such as head-enders (LOCH) and tail-enders (LOCT) represent 
the physical position of landholdings in the canal command area.  
 
Other variables, such as the type of farmer, such as small landholders (FARS) 
and landholders (FARL), represent the economic characteristic of the 
household. The household’s social and institutional characteristics are 
represented by the household’s caste group (CASTE), farmers’ agronomical 
knowledge (AGROKN), simplicity of irrigation governing rules (RULES), 
gender of the household head (HHSEX) and level of trust amongst the 
farmers, i.e. high level of trust (TRUSTH) and low level of trust (TRUSTL). 
Thus the model accommodates multidimensional characteristics of irrigation 
governance.  
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Table 5.1 Definition of Explanatory Variables  
 
 
 
Variables Explanations 
Expected sign 
of 
Relationship 
XCESS 
Dummy for access to water (1=a strong access, 
0=otherwise 
Dependent 
variable 
PHYCOND 
Dummy for physical nature of the canal system 
(1=cement lined, 0=otherwise) + 
 
RULES 
Dummy for simplicity of rules (1=simple, 
0=otherwise) + 
TRUSTH 
 
Dummy for higher level of trust (1=higher, 
0=otherwise) + 
TRUSTL 
 
Dummy for lower level of trust (1=lower, 
0=otherwise) - 
CASTE 
 
Dummy for castes (1=Dalits, 0=otherwise) - 
   
HHSEX Dummy for gender (1=male, 0=otherwise) + 
LOCH 
 
Dummy for landholding location at the head end of 
the canal (1=tail end, 0=otherwise) 
+ 
 
LOCT 
 
Dummy for landholding location at the tail end of 
the canal (1=tail end , 0=otherwise) 
 
- 
AGROKN 
 
Dummy for farmers agronomical knowledge used as 
a proxy for WUA engagement in educating farmers 
regarding water application (1= knowing crop-water 
requirement, 0=otherwise + 
   
FARL Dummy for Large farmers (1=large, 0=otherwise) + 
 
FARS 
 
Dummy for Small farmers (1=small, 0=otherwise) - 
GRAD 
 
Dummy for Canal flowing in East-West direction 
(1=EW flow, 0= otherwise ? 
   
SHAPE 
Dummy for Shape of the Canal (1= elongated with 
outlets at multiple distant locations, 0=otherwise) - 
SOURCE 
Dummy for source feeding irrigation system 
(1=perennial river, 0=otherwise) + 
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Based on the variables described above, the thesis model was constructed in 
Chapter Two (Section 2.11).  A modified IAD Framework described in Chapter 
One (Section 1.9) has been used as the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
The IAD Framework advocates that both policy process and policy outcomes 
are assumed to be affected by four major variables which include communal 
attributes of resource users, physical characteristics of the resources, 
interactions amongst the users and the institutional setup which govern those 
interactions (Ostrom, et al., 1994). The theoretical model constructed to 
measure household access to water argues that this access is influenced by the 
institutional arrangements which are designed and implemented to govern 
irrigation systems. The theoretical model of this thesis is presented in Chapter 
Two (Figure 2.3), which illustrates that various attributes of the physical world 
and the communal characteristics have implications on the households’ access 
to irrigation water. Furthermore, the institutional arrangements which are 
designed and implemented to govern irrigation systems provide the necessary 
action arena where farmers operate together to contribute towards and 
appropriate benefits from irrigation canal systems. Therefore, in order to 
understand the institutional issues, it is important to analyse how rules 
combine with the physical and community world to generate particular types 
of situations which determine household access to water from the canal 
system.  
 
 The model constructed for the purpose of this thesis is tested using the 
following regression equation:  
 
 351 
 XCESS = β0 + β1 PHYCOND + β2 RULES + β3 TRUSTH + β4 TRUSTL + β5 
CASTE + β6 HHSEX + β7 LOCH + β8 LOCT + β9 AGROKN + β10 FARL + β11 
FARS + β12 NSGRAD + β13 WATFED + β14 SHAPE+ ℮    ------------------- (5.5) 
 
Where, XCESS is a dummy variable measuring household level of access to 
irrigation water. The dependent variable, XCESS, has two values, 1 and 0, 
which represent strong and weak access to irrigation water, respectively. The 
β0 is the intercept of the regression equation and β1- β14 are the parameters of 
the regression model that describe the directions and the strengths of the 
relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables.  
The notation ‘℮’ is an independent, normally distributed error term with zero 
mean, which represents the random and unexplained error in the model.  
 
PHYCOND is a dummy variable and refers to nature of the physical condition 
of the canal, with value 1 denoting cement lined canals and value 0 
representing non-cement lined canals. Similarly, RULES is a dummy variable 
representing the simplicity of irrigation governing rules. The variable RULES 
was created through the household survey, by asking the respondents if they 
thought the irrigation rules governing their system were simple or not. The 
level of trust amongst the irrigators is assumed to influence household level of 
access to irrigation water. In order to gauge communal social capital, i.e. the 
level of trust amongst the farming communities, the respondents were asked if 
they considered their level of trust with fellow irrigators as low, medium or 
high. The variables TRUSTH and TRUSTL refer to a high and low level of 
trust, respectively. Both TRUSTH and TRUSTL are dummy variables with 
values 1 and 0, where 1 represents high and low level of trust while 0 
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otherwise.  Similarly, HHSEX and CASTE are dummy variables representing 
the gender and the caste of the household head. Their values are 1 and 0, 
which represent male and female for HHSEX and higher and lower castes, 
respectively.  
 
Similarly, the location of the landholding is a critical factor in determining the 
level of access to water in gravity flow irrigation systems.  The landholdings 
were placed into three categories, namely head end, middle end and tail-end 
depending on the location of the landholding in the canal command area. Both 
variables, LOCH and LOCL are dummy variables denoting landholdings 
located at the head and tail-ends respectively. Both LOCH and LOCT have 
values 1 and 0 which denote head-enders and otherwise for LOCH and tail-
enders and otherwise for LOCT. As mentioned in Chapter Three (Section 
3.6.3.2), households in the sample were divided into three categories, namely 
small, medium and large landholdings. The variables FARS and FARL are 
dummy variables and refer to small and large landholders, respectively. 
Similarly, variables SOURCE and SHAPE are also dummy variables. SOURCE 
refers to the nature of the water source feeding the canal and has two values, 1 
and 0 which represent permanent and perennial and seasonal sources of 
water feeding the canal, respectively.  The shape of the canal is assumed to 
influence household access to water. The dummy variable SHAPE refers to the 
shape of the canal and has two values 1 and 0 which represent an elongated 
canal with outlets at distant and multiple locations while 0 represents a non-
elongated canal with outlets at closer locations.  Similarly, GRAD is a dummy 
variable with values 1 and 0, which represent a canal flowing in a north-south 
direction and those flowing in east-west or west-east directions respectively.  
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   5.3.2 Results 
The conceptualisation of household access to irrigation has been described in 
Chapter Two (Section 2.9) and Chapter Three (Section 3.9). The respondents 
were asked about their perception of the reliability of their canal system in 
delivering water in all the three cropping seasons.  Also, the respondents were 
asked if the water they receive for crop production is adequate and whether or 
not they think the water in their irrigation system is distributed equitably.  A 
detailed description of the computation of strong and weak access has been 
presented earlier in Chapter Three (Section 3.9).The results of the logistic 
regression for household level of access to irrigation are presented in Table 
5.2.   
 
The model tested performs well with a pseudo R2 of 0.38 and an acceptable 
significance level of 95 percent confidence interval. The odds ratio column in 
Table 5.2 shows the impact of each variable in the model on the likelihood of 
households having strong access to irrigation water relative to those having 
weak access to water when all other variables in the model are held constant. 
The odds ratios measure how the odds of households reporting a strong access 
to water i.e. a strong access which is coded as 1 compared with those reporting 
that the household has weak access to water i.e. a weak access coded as 0. For 
categorical variables, an odds ratio greater than 1 shows the factor by which 
the odds of having  strong access to irrigation water for cases in which one 
category of the variable exceed the odds for those in the reference category.  
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Table 5.2 Logistic regression model to explain factors influencing 
the odds of having ‘a strong access to irrigation water’ 
 
 
Predictor    Β SE β 
Wald's       
χ2 Df p-value 
eβ (odds 
ratio) 
Constant 1.130 .899 1.580 1 .209 .323 
Physical conditions of canal -1.774 .595 8.888 1  .003*** .170  
Rules governing irrigation system  .062 .544 .013 1 .910 1.063 
High Level of trust amongst farmers   .554     .509    1.187  1          .276      1.740 
Lower Level of trust amongst 
farmers 
1.278 .603 4.495 1 .034** .278 
Caste (Dalits) -.203 .567 .129 1 .720 .816 
Gender  .217 .483 .203 1 .652 1.243 
Landholding location at head end .828 .645 1.648 1 .199 2.289 
Landholding location at tail end -.949 .481 3.891 1 .049** .387 
Farmers agronomical knowledge .504 .499 1.017 1 .313  1.655 
Small farmers  -.970 .489 3.934 1 .047** .379 
Large farmers .942 .540 3.043 1 .081 2.564 
Source feeding irrigation system    1.336    .521 6.589 
1      
.010** 
3.804 
Gradient of the Canal (EW-
direction) 
2.331 .658 12.534 1    
.028*** 
.280 
Shape of the Canal -4.409 1.271 12.043 1   .001*** .012 
       
***p<0.01 ** p<0.05, *p<0.1, Chi-square=2.860, df =8, Cox & Snell R2=0.382; Nagelker R2= 
0.516 
 
 
 
The results from the regression analysis indicate that the physical condition of 
the canal has a negative association with the odds of having strong access to 
water from the irrigation systems, and it is statistically significant. The results 
indicate that the odds of farmers having strong access to water are 
significantly decreased by being served by canals which are cement lined. 
Other physical characteristics of the canal have a significant influence on the 
household level of access to irrigation water from the canal. The odd of having 
strong access to irrigation water is increased by being served by canals flowing 
in an east-west direction. Also, the odds of having strong access to water are 
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significantly influenced by canals with outlets at numerous distant locations. 
This is partly because, if the canal has outlets at numerous distant locations, it 
is very hard to monitor the activities of the farmers and it is characterised by 
rampant water theft. This situation is particularly conspicuous in canals where 
there is lack of strong WUA and absence of or weak enforcement of sanctions 
for water defrauders.  
 
As the model predicts, other socio-economic characteristics of households are 
also significantly influencing their level of access to water from the canal 
systems.  The results from the regression analysis indicate that the odds of 
having strong access to irrigation are significantly decreased by being at the 
tail end of the canal. Similarly, odds of reporting strong access to water are 
significantly reduced by having a small landholding size. A low level of trust 
amongst the households also decreases significantly, the odds of having strong 
access to water.  
 
However, as the model predicts, variables such as caste, gender, head end 
location, large landholding, high level of trust and farmers agronomical 
knowledge have statistically non-significant effects on the household level of 
access to water.  It should be pointed out that although some of these variables 
have statistically non-significant results; this is not to say that they do not 
have practical significance in real life. Those variables which have practical 
significance despite being statistically non-significant are discussed in the 
section below.  
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   5.3.3 Discussions  
The following section presents the findings from the regression analysis. The 
discussions on the findings are presented in the order of the physical 
condition of the canal systems and household socio-economic position within 
the community, in relation to their access to water from the irrigation canals.  
 
 
    5.3.3.1 Physical Conditions of Canal and Access to Irrigation 
Water  
 
    5.3.3.1.1 Canal Lining 
 
Although the advantages of cement lining canals are well acknowledged, those 
come about at substantial cost (Snell, 2001; Meijer et al., 2006). It is reported 
that cement lining a canal reduces water loss through seepage, promotes 
smooth flow of water and increases the command area by not only reducing 
hydraulic roughness but also depositions and sedimentations, avoids 
waterlogging and reduces maintenance costs in the long term. Furthermore, 
by cement lining the canals, the growth of weeds is controlled and the channel 
beds and banks are stabilised (Khair et al., 1991). However, cement lined 
canals are not only expensive, but are also prone to high seepage losses, 
particularly in older concrete lined canals with deteriorated joints and frost 
heave or settled sections  (Hill, 2000; Zhu, 1991).  
 
This is particularly significant in terms of policy, as huge amounts of resources 
are invested in the cement lining for canals, both in the construction of new 
canals and rehabilitating of old systems. These are rather unusual results 
because of the fact that the purpose of cement lining the canals is to reduce 
seepage and facilitate unconstrained flow of water in the canals, which in turn 
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will help to reduce head and tail inequalities. However, the cement lined 
canals clearly did not achieve these objectives. Instead, data from qualitative 
interviews with participants explaining that when cement lined canals are 
damaged by aquatic crabs it is a problem that is both difficult to identify and is 
very costly to repair (much less of an issue in canals that are not cement 
lined).   
 
Also, in many rural parts of Nepal, particularly in the hilly region, it is 
common practice to grow big trees along the canal edge. This is done so that 
the canal is protected from landslides by the tree roots, as the terrains are 
fragile and prone to frequent landslides. However, root penetration beneath 
the canal bed and the canal cross section ruptures the cement lining leaving 
cracks in the canal cross section, which causes severe deterioration in the 
canal infrastructures, leading to a high level of water seepage. This in turn 
leads to increased head and tail inequality, while at the same time increases 
salinity problems at the head end due to water seepage. While the government 
is investing a considerable amount of money in the rehabilitation of cement 
lined canals and making considerable efforts in constructing new cement lined 
canals, the results support the idea that costly cemented irrigation 
infrastructures neither  guarantee water and nor necessarily enhance farmers’ 
levels of access to irrigation systems. Instead, non-cement lined canals, if well 
maintained in a timely fashion, can ensure water reliability and higher access 
to water from irrigation systems and help to reduce head and tail inequalities. 
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    5.3.3.1.2 Water Source  
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, the regression results indicate that the nature 
of the water source feeding the canal system appears to influence household 
levels of access to irrigation water positively and the relationship is 
statistically significant.  The nature of the water source feeding the irrigation 
canal system has the greatest impact in the model. Thus, it is imperative that 
the efforts to construct irrigation canals should consider the water availability 
at source, particularly during the autumn and spring.   
 
     5.3.3.1.3 Canal Gradient/ Shape and Access to Irrigation Water  
Similarly, the farmers who are being served by canals flowing in an east-west 
direction are likely to report strong access to irrigation, compared to farmers 
who are being served by canals which are flowing in a north-south direction.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (Section 2.10.8), the canals flowing in a north-
south direction have steep gradients and flow through difficult terrain. These 
canals are generally long, elongated, prone to landslides and in need of 
frequent operation and maintenance for a smooth flow of water in the canal.  
However, the canals which flow in an east-west direction have mild gradients 
and flow through command areas which are flat river basins. This being the 
case, maintenance efforts are lower and relatively easy. The shape of the canal 
was reported to have implications in the way the water is distributed in the 
irrigation systems. Farmers reported that irrigation canals which are long, 
elongated and with outlets at numerous places have a higher degree of 
inequalities in water distribution. The farmers reported that the existence of 
numerous outlets along the elongated canals not only allows defrauders to 
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tamper with the canal infrastructure to appropriate more than their fair share 
of water but also makes it extremely difficult to monitor the situation. 
However, short, non-elongated canals with less outlets and outlets spanning a 
shorter distance along the canal, help to distribute water more equitably as a 
Dhalepa in the JMIS said:  
 
“—this canal has the shape of the Nile river; it stretches long and far 
along the rugged terrain—can you see the landslides at numerous 
places,-- look here is one, you will find plenty of landslides damaging the 
canal--.– Look these damages are made by the defrauders illegally—to 
be honest we need at least ten Dhalepas to monitor the activities of the 
farmers, but there are just three of us, it takes almost a whole day to 
travel along the canal—it is almost impossible to keep an eye on 
everybody’s activities----” 
(Male 42, Tail end Dhalepa, from the JMIS) 
 
In such irrigation systems, farmers find it difficult to tamper with the canal 
infrastructures as it is easy for the WUA to monitor them. Therefore, the 
shape and the gradients of the canals have implications for farmers’ levels of 
access to irrigation water.  
 
     5.3.3.2 Location of Landholding and Access to Irrigation Water  
Similarly, the differences between the tail-enders and farmers in other 
locations (middle and head-end) in terms of access to water are statistically 
significant. This finding is consistent with earlier findings (Jahromi and 
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Feyen, 2001; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993).  In fact, water inequality faced by 
the tail-enders continues to present a major challenge in irrigation governance 
in Nepal. The irrigation canals in the mid-hills are constructed in difficult 
terrain and are prone to landslides, particularly during the Monsoon season. 
Also, farmers at the head end have a spatial advantage in appropriating more 
water. The farmers at the head end of the canal systems are often fuelled with 
a deeply rooted mentality because of their locations, that they should have 
priority over the natural rights to irrigation water:  
 
“---Do you expect me to stand and watch water flowing down the canal 
while my crops wilt? The whole thing about prioritising the tail end has 
become very political. The tail-enders in Dhamilikuwa area think that they 
have political connections and can influence the irrigation issues. ---we head-
enders were the first ones to compromise during canal construction, you see. 
We sacrificed our land--. Almost my entire cultivable land has been dissected 
by the canal--I lost my chickens and livestock in the canal--- my baby fell in 
the canal and nearly died—nobody compensates me—Is it not natural that the 
head-enders should get the water first? They can transport water by air if 
they want, but how can I see water draining down while my crops wilt---?” 
(Male, 43, JMIS head-ender)  
 
The natural locational disadvantages faced by the farmers at the tail-end of the 
canal not only has differential economic outcomes but also has implications 
for collective action, owing to different levels of incentives among head and 
tail end farmers. The tail-enders, particularly in the JMIS, have lost the sense 
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of belonging to the irrigation community. The perceptions of the farmers to 
both the WUA and the head-enders were, in general, not very positive as 
demonstrated by the following quote: 
 
“---Yes of course, they are interfering with the water.  They say ‘we are 
located at the head end, what can you do about it?’  The consequences of 
their negligence and reckless behaviour should be assessed and we 
should have a serious debate about them—their field is over-flooded 
while our crops are failing due to lack of water. We have been let down 
by the WUA. Who cares about tail-enders, anyway? ----Tail-enders 
always have suffered water austerity, while the head-enders enjoy plenty. 
Well, with a heavy heart, I must say ----this is the irony of this canal---” 
 (Woman, 44 from tail end of JMIS) 
 
Similarly, in the Begnas system, the locational advantage of water 
appropriation was being enjoyed by the farmers with landholdings located at 
the head end of the canal.  In fact, the severity of neglect of the irrigation canal 
was more pronounced at the head end of the Begnas canal than any of the 
canals considered in this study.  In the Begnas system, the hegemony of the 
head-enders could be conceived not only by a single dimension, although 
water appropriation was clearly the most significant. The cumulative effect of 
the neglect on the part of head-enders has led to a massive extent of canal 
deterioration. Apart from drilling canal banks to appropriate more water from 
the canal unlawfully, the head-enders have used canals for a number of other 
purposes, including, amongst other things, drawing water for household use 
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(washing clothes and utensils and feeding animals), making puddles at the 
head end for children to swim and buffaloes to bath, and dumping household 
waste: 
 
“---Well, the story is very long--- but the main problems arise from the 
irresponsible behaviour of the head-enders. --- head-enders are the ones 
who benefit the most from the canal--- they are the ones who are not 
contributing in the operation and maintenance (Jhara) regularly—the 
canal is dirty and filled with debris, it has become a dumping site (for the 
head-enders) --- they dump everything in the canal—households waste, 
fallen banana trees—dead and rotten chickens, dead bullocks—
everything—you name it—irregularities emanate from the head end of this 
canal ---” 
(Head end Dhalepa, AMIS)  
 
In both the JMIS and AMIS, whilst water shortages at the tail end of the canal 
were an immediate impact resulting from the activities of the head-enders, the 
farmers at the tail and middle sections of the command area alleged that the 
filthy water in the canal was also damaging standing vegetables and reducing 
the fertility and quality of the soil in their fields: 
“---You can see polythene bags and other garbage including the trunk of 
a banana tree, tree stem flowing in the canal water. This would not only 
damage the standing vegetable crops, but would also destroy the fertility 
of the soil---” 
(Male, 35 WUA member, AMIS) 
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Farmers at the middle section of the Begnas canal also related some of the 
most agonising situations they faced as a result of the negligence of the head-
enders. Although the middle section of the canal has a more adequate and 
reliable water supply compared to the tail-end, they are at a particular 
disadvantage when it comes to bearing the costs of cleaning and removing silts 
from canal beds and banks.  This was highlighted by the experiences of a 
farmer in the middle section of canal command area:  
 
“---We are in a fix—We work hard in cleaning the canal and wait a long 
time for our turn to irrigate, but when the water arrives it becomes a bitter 
pill to swallow-- If we use the canal water, it damages soil and crops and 
if we don’t use it our crops would wither away without irrigation---”. 
(Female, 41, middle end, AMIS) 
 
The WUA in the Begnas canal had assigned the head-enders to carry out 
operation and maintenance activities in their sections of the canal, but the 
head-enders had failed to do so. Their indifference to cleaning and 
maintaining the canal was vivid, as there was a swath of lotus plants and other 
noxious weeds growing in the canal cross sections, creating a number of 
problems in the canal irrigation. Firstly, it obstructed a smooth flow of water 
in the canal. Secondly, the plant growth in the canal increased evapo-
transpiration, causing water losses from the canal (Unal et al., 2004). Thirdly, 
and perhaps most importantly, the plant growth destroyed the canal 
infrastructure, as the plant roots penetrated into the canal bank and broke the 
cement linings and other reinforced concrete (RCC) structures, resulting in 
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increased water seepage. The dead parts of plants got deposited on the canal 
bed, which further reduced the canal surface area.  
 
    5.3.3.3 Level of Trust and Access to Irrigation Water 
Similarly, according to the model, communal social capital such as level of 
trust influences household access to irrigation water. A clarification is needed 
as to whether high social capital (trust) leads to better access to water or vice 
versa. It might be the case that the absence of trust creates conflict, making 
maintenance of field channels and control structure difficult, which decreases 
the system’s ability to provide water to the farmers efficiently. Water theft is 
common under these circumstances, which might have led farmers to report 
weak access to the resource (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Alternatively, 
weak access to the water resource, which can be unreliable and inequitably 
distributed or both, can cause resentment amongst irrigators, particularly 
those who do not get their fair share, and who lose their confidence in 
collective action and report a low level of trust.  In fact, the level of trust 
among the irrigators is positively associated with collective action, which is 
necessary for canal operation and maintenance (Seabright, 1993). This finding 
is consistent with earlier studies (Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). Trust is the 
foundation of cognitive social capital, which has been argued to be an 
important factor in the institutional and economic development of both the 
community and the country (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Generalised 
interpersonal trust plays a crucial role in determining the outcomes of socio-
economic interactions. Trust as social capital facilitates exchanges and 
interactions amongst individuals and groups of farmers without the necessity 
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for strict enforcement of rules and reduces transaction costs in doing so (Zak 
and Knack, 2001).  
 
The farmers particularly in the AMIS and the JMIS reported that the 
irrigation issue was highly politicised. As irrigation is used for political 
purposes, there is a high degree of mistrust amongst the irrigating households. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 4.2.9), a higher proportion of farmers 
in the FMIS reported having a higher level of trust within their community, 
compared to the farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS. The watchman (Dhalepa) 
in the Begnas irrigation system said:  
 
“---there is a real crisis of confidence and cooperation here amongst the 
farmers. The whole irrigation issue is heavily politicised. They do not 
cooperate with the WUA. They can’t do a good job and pull legs of 
individuals who are attempting to change things for the good. This canal 
is not a boon for weak farmers but a curse to be honest. The canal breeds 
conflicts ---.”   
                                         (Male 42, Tail end Dhalepa, from the JMIS)  
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the farmers, particularly at the tail end of 
the JMIS. The farmers reported that understanding of the irrigation governing 
rules is necessary but not sufficient to ensure the maintenance of the canal 
infrastructure and fair distribution of water resources. Along with an 
understanding of rules, the relationships amongst the farmers and between 
farmers and the WUA should be healthy and sound. The WUA should be 
trustworthy in generating compliance with the rules they hope to implement 
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for the betterment of the management of the irrigation systems. A culture of 
trust amongst the stakeholders is thought to be essential for ensuring 
equitable water distribution amongst farmers across different heterogeneities. 
The treasurer of the block committee located at the tail end of the JMIS 
argued that:  
 
“---There is such a high level of mistrust not only between the farmers 
but also between farmers and the WUA-- neither the WUA committee nor 
irrigators work cooperatively---people have such negative attitudes to 
prove  who is more powerful--. It is about taking revenge by being 
uncooperative with each other or even with the WUA --. Irrigation and 
local politics are inseparable, once you get politics sorted, things will 
ease out otherwise this lingering continues--.” 
                                          (Treasure of JMIS, tail-ender)  
 
 
Transparency in both the financial and operational aspects of the WUA are 
critical in nurturing the much needed trust between the WUA and the farmers.  
Whilst the FMIS had a proper financial audit, unfortunately the WUAs in the 
JMIS and the AMIS lacked proper accounting. A considerable number of local 
farmers and the watchmen alike in the Rainastar and Begnas irrigation 
systems have questioned the conduct of some of the WUA members, as a 
Dhalepa from the JMIS said: 
 
“--- There are allegations of fraud within the WUA —some individuals 
with large landholdings and higher caste group misused NRs. 44,000. 
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The incumbent WUA committee is making attempts to recover the sum 
but I doubt if it will be possible to do so. Neither the DoI have looked at 
the incidences of fund misuses nor the farmers questioned the WUA---” 
(Dhalepa, 43, head end, JMIS)  
 
Similar incidents of financial irregularities were repeatedly mentioned by the 
local farmers in the AMIS: 
“---The accountability of the previous committee is embarrassing. Looks 
like the people in the committee completely forgot what WUA stands for. 
They have neither submitted account details nor do they audit their 
transactions. We do not have a clue about their income and expenditure, 
how much they raised from local farmers, what they did with the money. 
It has surfaced that a total of NRs. 71,000, which is about six hundred 
seventeen pounds, was used for personal purposes.9 When we enquired 
about the money, the treasurer and president told us that they did not 
make personal use of the sum. This is a gross neglect of public money---
”. 
                           (Male, 43 President of AMIS) 
    
 
 5.3.3.4 Size of Landholdings and Access to Irrigation Water 
The odds of having strong access to irrigation is significantly reduced for 
farmers with small landholdings compared to the farmers in the medium 
landholding category. The disadvantages in water use endured by the small 
                                               
9 According to the Central Bank of Nepal, the Exchange Rate is £1= NRs. 115.88  on 22 
January 2011 (Central Bank of Nepal, 2011). 
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farmers are reported to be most conspicuous in the AMIS and the JMIS, 
compared to the FMIS.  The participants of the key informant interviews 
repeatedly mentioned the dominance of the large farmers in the management 
of the irrigation system in the BIS:  
 
“---Right from the beginning, the large landholders have assumed that the 
primary beneficiary of the canal should be them. And they have been 
enjoying the hegemony with regards to both water use and irrigation 
management. And they are the ones who created this mess and 
unsystematic cultur, a culture of neglect in the irrigation governance---.” 
                                                                 (Male, 45 from AMIS tail-ender)  
 
The irrigation systems continue to be the heart of village level politics, where 
the irrigation issues are being used by the large and powerful farmers for their 
political gains rather than the benefits of the marginal farmers. As a 
participant of a key informant interview expressed: 
“---Some selfish people with myopic thinking took the issue of irrigation 
lightly. For them irrigation was politics more than anything else. Irrigation 
is in fact life for marginal farmers.  The large landholders and head end 
farmers designed the rules to suit their needs without considering the needs 
of the marginal and tail end farmers---”  
                                                       (Male, 43, President of AMIS)  
 
The degree to which farmers can influence irrigation governance is also closely 
related to their landholdings, positions in the society and locations, amongst 
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other things. The farmers, particularly in the AMIS and the JMIS, consistently 
report that neither the needs of the farmers are treated equally nor are they 
equally represented in the management of irrigation systems. The influence of 
small farmers and tail-enders was reported to be very weak. As a farmer from 
the middle section of the Begnas system, who participated in the key 
informant interview argued:  
 
“---The influence of small farmers is negligible in irrigation governance. 
It is not yet in people’s consciousness that irrigation is a common 
property that each and every member has equal rights and 
responsibilities---” 
(Male, 52, middle section of AMIS)  
 
This further highlights the dominance of the farmers with large landholdings 
over the small farmers in irrigation governance and water acquisitions.  
However, the experts’ views expressed during the key informant interviews 
indicated a stark difference in the irrigation systems in relation to the 
influence of both irrigation governance and water acquisition: 
 
“--- Either you look at it from a management perspective or water acquisition point of 
view, it is the large landholders and more powerful people who always enjoy the 
hegemony over irrigation systems.  They might have a brilliant system but marginal 
farmers are often neglected. ---It’s a pity that neither the government has brought any 
package programme for the marginal farmers nor the WUA is sensitive towards this--
-”   
(Male, 34, Irrigation Expert)  
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Larger landholders in the AMIS also reported being more reluctant in 
undertaking their fair share of operation and maintenance activities. As a 
participant of the focus group discussion said:  
 
“---The farmers with larger landholdings are not only reluctant to take 
part in  but also procrastinate the most during operation and 
maintenance activities --- because marginal farmers are uneducated, 
ignorant and innocent but are hard working, and large landholders and 
influential farmers manipulate them (make them dance at their finger 
tips)---” 
                                                            (Female, 25, AMIS) 
 
Similar viewpoints were also expressed by both farmers and watchman alike 
in the JMIS, as demonstrated by the Dhalepas participating in key informant 
interviews in the following quotation: 
 
“---Yes, there are farmers with as much as 150 Ropanis of 
landholdings—also there is evidence that the same farmers have not paid 
the water levy --. The large landholders intentionally ignore rules and 
obstruct reforming rules too.—the larger farmers frequently defraud 
from irrigation governing rules—often stealing water from the canal---
they lease out land and ignore irrigation----” 
(Male, 39, Tail end Dhalepa, JMIS) 
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In the FMIS, the local farmers participated in all aspects of irrigation 
governance including design, installation and the decision making process on 
the location and size of water division structures (the Gahaks). As described 
later in Chapter Six (Section 6.4.1.5), equal participation of local farmers, 
irrespective of their social status, landholdings and location, provides them 
with assurance about equitable water distribution and enhances their 
engagement with irrigation issues. The installation of proportional weirs 
enables farmers to derive their fair share of water while also making water 
availability more predictable. Rules are strictly enforced and farmers failing to 
comply with them are sanctioned, which has helped to ensure more equitable 
water distribution amongst the farmers. These sentiments were echoed by 
farmers during the focus group discussions: 
“--- there isn’t any notion of head-tail in this system—we do not identify 
ourselves as head or tail-enders. We might be in different locations; our 
landholdings might be in different locations but for irrigation purposes 
we have no locational discrepancies.—we have transplantation in the 
head end as well at the Gandaki bank at the tail end at the same time---” 
(Male, 46, Tail end farmer, FMIS) 
The imposing of strict sanctions on defrauders in the FMIS has meant that 
water is more likely to be equitably distributed amongst the farmers. A 
participant of the focus group discussion from the FMIS argued: 
 
“--- If an individual takes water just to moisten soil on their potatoes – 
even for a short while during anothers turn, it is a clearly a misuse of 
water--, this will impact on other farmers crops and particularly the 
small farmers will be badly affected by this type of defrauding activity----
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no one can acquire water illegally. Small farmers should not be 
victimised as the results of water thefts by large farmers---” 
(Female, 39, tail-ender, FMIS) 
 
 
The roles of local religious beliefs have been used by farmers in the FMIS, 
where they have capitalised on local religious beliefs in the management of the 
irrigation system. The WUA of the FMIS has built a temple in close proximity 
to the head end to avoid any unnecessary intrusions and tampering in the 
canal headwork, as temples are considered sacred in Nepal. Such sentiments 
were echoed by elder members of the community, as an elderly farmer who 
participated in a key informant interview said: 
“--- In ancient times, the location of the headwork was considered a haunted 
place full of demons’ souls and we have constructed a Kali temple, the 
Goddess who fought against demons----- the local people have a great respect 
for the Goddess Kali  and they do not tamper with the headworks as they fear 
that their tampering will not please the Goddess and the canal will not function 
well---.” 
(Male, 85, local elderly in FMIS) 
 
   5.3.3.5 Simplicity of Irrigation Governing Rules and Access to 
Irrigation Water 
 
Although the result was statistically non-significant, farmers who reported 
that the rules governing their irrigation systems were simple and easy to 
understand were more likely to have strong access to water than those who 
reported their irrigation governing rules to be complex and difficult to 
understand.  Despite the statistically non-significant results, the simplicity of 
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irrigation governing rules has some practical significance. The WUA in the 
FMIS had made significant investments in educating farmers about their 
irrigation governing rules, making it easier for farmers to interpret the rules 
and follow them, while the farmers in the AMIS and JMIS reported that their 
irrigation governing rules were complex and difficult to understand. This is 
partly because the WUA did not make any effort to educate farmers. The 
farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS repeatedly reported that they know that 
whether their actions are wrong or right. A participant of the focus group 
discussion from the JMIS argued:   
 
“---I doubt if a lot of people here even know the  irrigation related rules-
-- this is the outcome of a sheer lack of public awareness—neither the 
WUA committee nor irrigators work cooperatively---people have such 
negative attitudes to prove  who is more powerful---”.                                
(Male, 46, Treasurer of the JMIS) 
 
Similar views were expressed by the irrigation engineer working in the local 
area, who participated in a key informant interview:  
 
 
“---Constructing irrigation canals is not the only thing, the issue at stake 
is developing the farmers’ capability to manage the systems ----. Farmers 
are not being educated on this front—this is not a problem of the 
present—evidence of the past also shows similar stuff--. We have not 
sought for ways to sustain the irrigation system for a long time. Lack of 
public awareness has resulted in a gross negligence of huge investment, 
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billions in fact---systems are not maintained and repaired regularly--. 
Neither the government nor the locals can sustain their system alone---”.  
                                                        (Male, 32 irrigation engineer, JMIS)  
 
Funding has remained a critical issue for undertaking an awareness raising 
campaign. The funding made available from the government agency is hardly 
sufficient to clean the canal, let alone raise public awareness. A lack of funding 
for raising social awareness amongst the farmers in terms of using water 
scientifically was repeatedly mentioned by the participants of the focus group 
discussions, as a Dhalepa from JMIS argued: 
 
“---well, the financial support from Department of Irrigation is so little 
that it is hardly enough to do basic repairs on the canal, how can we 
campaign for public awareness? Where do we get the money from---?”  
                                                      (Male, 43, Dhalepa, JMIS) 
 
    5.3.3.6 Gender/Caste and Access to Irrigation Water 
Although statistically non- significant, the results show that gender and caste 
have negative influences, whilst location at the head end of the canal appears 
to have a positive influence on the farmers’ level of access to irrigation water. 
These results have practical significance despite being statistically 
insignificant and warrant some discussion.  
 
The model predicts a number of factors influencing household access to water 
in the sample as a whole rather than making any comparisons according to 
systems. This is partly because of the very small number of cases in some of 
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the categories. Although caste and gender appear to have non-significant 
effects on the household level of access to water, the analysis presented in 
Chapters Four and Five demonstrate clear differences according to system, in 
household level of access to water, particularly for the dalits and female-
headed households. Results in Chapter Four (Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.5) on the 
systemwise comparison clearly demonstrate that a higher proportion of 
farmers from the dalits and female-headed households in the FMIS have 
strong access to water compared to their counterparts in the JMIS and the 
AMIS.  Despite statistically non-significant overall results, the egalitarian 
rules (discussed in Chapter Six) implemented in the FMIS to include the dalits 
and women in all aspects of irrigation governance, suggests that they are more 
likely to have strong access to water compared with their counterparts in the 
JMIS and the FMIS. Small landholdings, coupled with lower level of access to 
irrigation water, further marginalise the dalit households.   
 
In general, women have a very low level of involvement in the entire decision 
making process of the WUA. Women’s absence from WUA decision-making 
means that they have little contribution to the development of distributional 
rules (Agarwal, 1997). Also, in rural Nepal, in general males have higher 
education levels than females and it might be the case that better educated 
farmers have better earning opportunities outside farming and farming 
activities may be less attractive to them, while women who do not have such 
options are bound to agricultural activities and weak access to water hinders 
their chances of getting out of poverty. This finding is similar to that of 
Gunatilake (1998), who observes that education of female family members is 
negatively related to income from local commons in the tropical biosphere 
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reserves in Sri Lanka. Higher educational levels may also be associated with 
greater opportunity costs for labour (Yanggen and Reardon, 2001). This is 
probably the reason that farmers with better daily wage rates were reluctant to 
participate in the O & M activities and instead preferred to send women and 
children to carry out these activities, as the daily wage rate is very low. 
Farmers’ low level of access to water indicates the inability of the system to 
deliver water to farmers in times of need, with their consequent inability to 
benefit from irrigation infrastructures. 
 
Despite the statistically non-significant results, the farmers’ agronomical 
knowledge also has some practical significance and warrants some discussion, 
since it has implications for sustained head-tail inequalities in irrigation 
governance. The issue of farmers using excessive water with the intention of 
producing better quality grain  was already discussed in Chapter Four (Section 
4.2.4). The positive influence of farmers’ agronomical knowledge and their 
reported level of access to water have huge implications for policy makers.  In 
Nepal, while investment in irrigation infrastructure is impressive, little effort 
has been made to educate farmers and raise social awareness. This has serious 
implications for irrigation governance and ensuring equitable access to water, 
as farmers are often following unscientific water appropriation practices, 
based on blind faith. For example, the water replacement for paddy at the 
head end of the canal, with total disregard for the water shortage at the tail 
end, could be avoided with some effort to educate the farmers. 
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5.4 Conclusions  
This Chapter has sought to understand the relationship between household 
social-economic characteristic and the characteristics of the irrigation 
resources and access to irrigation water. Household access to irrigation has 
been investigated by building a regression model. The results clearly indicate 
differences in access to water by households in different categories of 
heterogeneities. In addition to household characteristics, those of the resource 
bases themselves appear to be critical in determining household access to 
irrigation water. The households with landholdings located at the tail end of 
the canal have been consistently disadvantaged in all three aspects of access.  
Although this result is not entirely surprising, given the nature of gravity flow 
irrigation, the farmers’ perceptions about irrigation systems under different 
property rights regimes is quite astonishing. Clearly, as the qualitative data 
suggest, marginalisation of the tail-enders both in access to water and access 
to irrigation governance is greater in the government managed system (AMIS) 
and jointly managed system (JMIS), compared to farmers managed system 
(FMIS).  
 
Similarly, the level of trust amongst farmers remains a critical factor in 
household access to irrigation water.  Higher levels of trust amongst farmers 
have meant that long-term co-operative outcomes were more likely than 
individual short-term benefits in lower levels of trust. The qualitative data 
clearly demonstrated that the level of trust amongst the farmers in the FMIS 
was considerably higher than the farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS. Farmers 
in the FMIS engaged in collective outcomes, while the farmers in the AMIS 
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and the JMIS lacked communal spirit in managing their system and ensuring 
better access to water.  
 
The better access to water by the larger landholders’ relative to the marginal 
farmers appears to be a function of the way the WUAs have been 
institutionalised. The composition of the WUAs is generally dominated by 
large landholders and farmers from higher castes groups. The rules devised by 
the WUA appear to be biased towards meeting the needs of larger landholders. 
However, the degree to which larger landholders dominate both water 
acquisition and irrigation governance greatly depends upon the property 
rights regime managing the canal system. The dominating roles played by 
larger landholders are significant in the AMIS and the JMIS, while the FMIS 
appears to be more inclusive both in terms of representation in the WUA and 
water appropriation.  This is particularly because of the inclusive nature of the 
WUA in the FMIS and the strict sanctions for defrauders, but in the JMIS and 
the AMIS, the WUA was not inclusive, nor were sanctions strictly enforced, 
which had left loopholes for the larger farmers to exploit at the cost of the 
marginal farmers.    
 
In addition to household characteristics, the specific features of the resource 
base also have implications for household access to irrigation water. The 
results of the statistical analysis show that an irrigation system fed by a 
perennial source provides farmers with better access to water compared with 
localised and seasonal streams.  Also, the results show that non-cement lined 
canals serve farmers better than those that are not cement lined.  Whilst it is 
not suggested that the canals should not be cement plastered, it does beg the 
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question whether enormous investments in cement lining canals is justified at 
the present level of access to the canals considered in this study.  In Nepal, 
most of the farmer managed irrigation systems are simple in design and 
construction, with non-cement banks, while the government managed and 
jointly managed irrigation systems are mostly sophisticated in their design 
and construction, with cement lined banks. These results show that for 
farmers to have better access to water, the management of the irrigation 
resource is more critical than the physical structure of the canal systems. The 
farmers also reported that the rules governing FMIS were simple and easy to 
understand, while the rules governing AMIS and JMIS were overly 
complicated and difficult to understand and follow. This is partly owing to the 
involvement of the Department of Irrigation, whose activities are guided by 
the national framework which is very complex for local farmers to understand 
and adhere to.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF WATER DISTRIBUTION 
INSTITUTIONS IN THREE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview   
By now, the extent of difference in household level of access to irrigation water 
in the three irrigation systems is clear. The thesis has addressed the first high 
level research question presented in Chapter One (Section 1.8.1) “Under which 
property rights structures do the farmers have the best access to irrigation 
water?” However, there is a clear need for further analysis to establish why 
such differences exist. In order to understand the causes of the differences in 
household level of access to irrigation water, the role of institutions in 
facilitating this access is critical. This chapter attempts to address the second 
high level research question presented in Chapter One (Section 1.8.2): “What 
roles do institutions play in enabling farmers’ to access irrigation water?” 
 
In this chapter, a comparative institutional analysis of the water distributions 
in the three irrigation systems considered for this research is carried out.  The 
aim of this chapter is twofold.  Firstly, it revisits the analytical framework, i.e. 
the IAD Framework, used in this thesis which was described in Chapter One 
(Section 1.10) to enhance our understanding of irrigation issues at the 
institutional level. In doing so, it provides a deeper understanding of the 
characteristics and operational mechanisms of the rules governing these three 
irrigation systems.  Furthermore, it is hoped that a detailed description of the 
institutional arrangements, which are designed and implemented in the 
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distribution of irrigation water in the three irrigation systems, will shed light 
on the discrepancies in household level of access to water from the irrigation 
systems.  Secondly,  based on the detailed analysis of the rules governing the 
irrigation system in general and water distribution in particular, the chapter 
aims to identify some of the institutions which enable farmers to access water 
from the canal systems as stated in research question (2a):  “What are the 
enabling institutions for farmers to access water from the irrigation canals?” It 
is hoped that the identification of the enabling institutions will shed light on 
the on the research question (2b): “What are the lessons that irrigation 
systems governed by different property rights structures can learn from each 
other to maximise their impact on farmers’ abilities to access water?” 
 
6.2 Institutional Analysis of Irrigation Governance Using IAD 
Framework   
 
As mentioned in Chapter One (Section 1.10), the IAD Framework is used as 
the analytical framework for institutional analysis of irrigation systems 
considered for this research.  Ostrom (1990) argues that the rules governing 
CPRs should be studied at three levels, namely operational rules, collective 
choice rules and constitutional choice rules, because cumulatively they affect 
actions taken and outcomes achieved in any socio-economic interactions. The 
same order is followed in describing the rules in use in the three irrigation 
systems considered for this research. The following section describes the 
interactions amongst farmers in carrying out different irrigation management 
related activities at the three levels and how activities at one level affect the 
activities at other levels.  The following section describes basic institutional 
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characteristics of water distribution in the three irrigation systems considered 
for this research.  
 
When viewed through the IAD framework, irrigation management encompasses a 
collection of actors who operate in the “action arena” (Ostrom, 1990 p. 52), guided 
by formal rules which are codified in laws, policies and regulations and by 
informal rules which are based on social norms of  reciprocity and community 
based cultural exchange (Imperial, 1999). The IAD framework “emphasizes the 
effect of both formal and informal institutions and their effect on outcomes amongst 
actors in public organisation and collective groups” (Heikkila and Issett, 2006 p.3). 
Furthermore, the IAD framework provides a unique opportunity for analysing 
decision making at multiple theoretical levels: Operational choice, collective 
choice and constitutional choice. The multiple levels of analysis help to diagnose 
different sets of rules and processes affecting the outcomes of irrigation 
interventions, as rules at one level interact with rules and actions at other levels.  
The usefulness of the IAD framework for multiple levels of policy analysis is 
presented in Figure 6.1. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) argue that the above mentioned 
“three level institutions are nested, with rules at the higher level impacting the production 
and governances of rules at the lower levels” (cited in Hardy and Koontz, 2009 
p.396). 
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Figure 6.1 Multiple Actions and Outcomes in IAD Framework 
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Operational 
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Choice 
Collective Choice Constitutional 
Choice 
Collective Choice Constitutional 
LEVEL OF ACTION  
ANALYSIS 
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Monitoring 
Enforcement 
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Governance  
Adjudication  
Modification 
Policy Making 
Management  
Adjudication  
 
Source: Ostrom (1990 p.53) 
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6.2.1 Operation Level Rules 
 
The operational rules delineate the conditions that farmers are required to meet 
in order to make legitimate use of the irrigation facilities. Additionally, the 
operational rules directly affect day to day decisions in terms of delineating 
appropriators, the time and place of resource appropriation, information sharing 
or withholding, and sanctions for any rule infringements (Ostrom, 1990 p.52).  
The operational activities in irrigation management include management actions 
such as issuing membership, communication, co-ordinating and performing O & 
M activities, conducting education and outreach campaigns, awareness raising 
activities, collecting water levies, maintaining financial audits and so on (Small 
and Svendsen, 1990; Nijman, 1992). The following section briefly discusses the 
details for the operational rules designed and implemented in the three irrigation 
systems considered for this research.  
 
     6.2.1.1 Boundary Rules 
 
The boundary rules dictate the membership of the irrigation systems, and the 
members are recognised as the legitimate users of the irrigation infrastructure, 
including the water. These rules are essentially access rights, whereby all defined 
users have a right to enter the system as per the specified rules and withdraw 
their entitlement of water. 
 
The constitutions of the both the JMIS and the FMIS explicitly state that farmers 
with landholdings and crop-sharers within the canal command area are eligible 
for membership.  However, in the AMIS, the clarity of membership has been 
questioned on many occasions. The constitution itself does not explicitly explain 
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the scope of the irrigation enterprise in terms of its members. The constitution 
reads “all the beneficiary individuals residing in the canal command area shall 
be granted membership” (AMIS Constitution, 2008). Similar view points were 
expressed by the president of the WUA of AMIS:  
 
“--- All the individuals using water from the canal, whether for 
irrigation, washing or cleaning are members of the canal system. The 
membership should not be confined to only individuals using the canal 
for irrigation purposes---”.  
(Male, 43, WUA President, AMIS) 
 
Whilst the President’s view was to treat every individual residing within the 
command area equally, irrespective of water use for agricultural purposes, water 
use by other farmers and contractors for non-agricultural activities, such as the 
construction of houses and the local fishery, has put added pressure on the 
available resources. It is important to point out that use of the canal water by 
individuals who do not hold landholdings within the command area,  are not 
members of the WUA and are not obliged to contribute towards O & M activities, 
was found to be problematic by many local farmers, particularly those with 
landholdings at the tail end of the canal.  A considerable number of participants 
of the focus group discussion echoed these sentiments: 
“---Contractors build houses and divert water for preparing cement, 
plastering walls and preparing mud, whilst we struggle to irrigate our 
crop--- they make money using water from the canal whilst we struggle 
for our livelihoods---they (contractors)  neither pay money to the WUA 
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nor contribute towards the O & M activities---the canal is for irrigation 
not for house construction, isn’t it?”  
(Male, 54, AMIS tail end) 
 
 In addition to the problem of a clearly defined boundary for WUA membership 
in terms of using canal water, the flexibility of transferring the water share 
amongst the irrigators was repeatedly mentioned by the farmers.  The farmers in 
the FMIS who hold water rights can transfer their share of the water to other 
farmers without explicit permission from the PIMC. The flexibility of transferring 
the water share amongst the households was repeatedly mentioned by the 
farmers in the FMIS: 
 
“--- when I struggled for water last year, I could borrow water from the 
other side through my neighbour’s plot--- yes it was fairly easy----. I will 
also lend water to my neighbour if he struggles in the future--, you have 
to reciprocate positively—door swings both the way---”  
(Female, 34, FMIS middle section) 
 
However, the farmers in the JMIS reported that they have to consult their WUA, 
who must authorise any transfer of water share as a farmer from JMIS argued:  
 
“---I have been struggling to get water since past few seasons---my land 
is located in a slightly elevated area and initially they had told me that 
the DoI would install a siphon but they didn’t.—there is a possibility of 
channelling water to my plots but it has to be through my neighbour’s 
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field--- he said he might help me but only if the WUA gets involved------ I 
think he is expecting some financial compensation from the WUA for the 
loss of his land—who would want to destroy their property (land) at no 
compensation anyway---”  
(Male, 64, Middle Section, JMIS) 
 
Similar views were echoed by the farmers in the AMIS, as a key informant 
interviewee said:  
“---Well I have been complaining to the WUA for a sakha (tertiary 
canal) for years---- I think it’s the fourth WUA committee which still has 
not considered my situation seriously--we are small farmers--- we are 
not powerful--- we don’t have connections--, they say an engineer has to 
come from the DoI but they came hundreds of times--, my heart breaks 
when I see green lush crops in other’s field while my land remains 
barren---!”                                                                                           
   (Female, 42, AMIS) 
 
Similarly, in the FMIS area, the WUA memberships are only distributed to the 
farmers after the payment of membership fees. It is absolutely essential that 
individual households have membership in order to have their concerns heard 
and interventions made by the WUA over any issues concerning irrigation, 
including conflict resolution: 
“---last year, Indre (name changed) got into bitter dispute with his 
farmers from Kumal Gaun, regarding water from the canal. I think there 
was a brawl too – umm--obviously whilst we sympathised with Indre we 
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couldn’t help him as he didn’t have the receipt for payment of the 
membership fee. I think police from the district headquarters got involved 
in the case –It’s a pity that the WUA couldn’t get involved even though it 
was an irrigation related issue but without membership we can’t 
intervene---” 
 (Female, 49, Treasurer, FMIS) 
 
However, both in the AMIS and the JMIS areas, payment of membership fee was 
not a pre-condition for acquiring membership. This probably explains the fact 
that the WUA in the FMIS have been able to raise 100 percent of the 
membership fees, whereas these have been overdue in the AMIS and JMIS areas. 
The issue of non-payment of the WUA membership fee and the annual water 
levy was mentioned by farmers participating in the focus group discussions: 
 
“---The issue of fee collection is something that the DoI has been 
nagging us about for years--- we have to pressurise the farmers to pay 
the water fee on time--. Records from my file show less than 60 percent of 
the farmers in my block have paid their water fee--whilst we accept we 
have not been successful in ensuring water to all the farmers throughout 
the year----Fee collection is very poor and patchy---”  
(Male, 50, Block 14 President, JMIS)  
 
    6.2.1.2 Input Rules 
Input rules stipulate the obligatory aspects expected of the irrigators in return 
for withdrawing water from the canal system.  Tang (1989) articulated four 
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major types of input that irrigators are expected to contribute, which include 
regular water fees, labour contribution for regular operation and maintenance, 
emergency repairs and contribution towards capital investment. It will be clear 
from discussions later in the chapter that the input rules designed and practiced 
in the FMIS were consistent with Tang’s findings, whilst both the AMIS and the 
JMIS did not have consistent arrangements for input rules. Furthermore, the 
allocation of responsibilities between the DoI and WUA were not clear in the 
AMIS and the JMIS.  Similarly, the allocation of labour contributions for O & M 
activities was not on the basis of proportionality in the latter two systems. The 
contributions were made both in cash and kind terms. In the past, the allocation 
of water shares was based on the contribution made during construction; 
however, a recent amendment to the constitution has changed the rules for water 
allocation and currently water distribution takes place in proportion to the 
household landholdings.  
 
In the area, two types of water charges are levied. Firstly, a general membership 
fee (sadasya shulka) at a flat rate of NRs 5, NRs. 10 and NRs. 50 is levied from 
each member, irrespective of landholdings and their locations in the FMIS, the 
JMIS and the AMIS areas respectively. In the FMIS all the beneficiary farmers 
were expected to pay their water service fee by mid-April. Failure to do this 
would lead to sanctions with an additional 5 percent of the total up until mid-
May and 10 percent until mid June. If it is still unpaid, then sanctions are 
imposed according to the provision of the WUA constitution. In extreme cases, 
the individual might be banned from using water from the canal if the fee is not 
paid. These measures were not taken by both the RIMC and the BIMC.  
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Secondly, a water service fee (sewa shulka) at a rate of NRs 3, NRs. 10 and NRs. 
10 per Ropani of cultivated land was levied from the farmers in the FMIS, the 
AMIS and the JMIS, respectively. However, despite this constitutional provision, 
a variable user fee was levied and in the JMIS areas farmers reported that in 
some of the blocks farmers paid NRs 20-22 per Ropani as annual water service 
fees. It should be mentioned that there is no data on the exact number of farmers 
who reported variable water fee. Nonetheless the participants of the key 
informant interviews repeatedly mentioned the prevalence of an inconsistency in 
the collection of water fees in the JMIS:  
“---The water fee is not consistently applied. I was asked to pay NRs. 220 
for 10 Ropani land which is NRs. 22 per Ropani of land, while my cousin 
paid NRs. for 10 Ropani land. The treasurer of the block committee told 
me that we have to pay for our kharbari (uncultivated land) too and I 
have to pay a water fee for a plot of land that I do not use irrigation 
water for---” 
(Male, 34, JMIS) 
Furthermore, the WUA managing the irrigation systems under the AMIS and the 
JMIS were required to deposit a proportion of their income obtained from the 
revenues with the DoI. The BIMC was legally obliged to contribute 30 percent of 
its revenue to the treasury of the DoI, while keeping the remaining 70 percent by 
the PIMC.  Similarly, in the JMIS, the RIMC contributed 20 percent of its gross 
revenue to the DoI whilst keeping 80 percent for itself. Provision was made that 
50 percent of the generated revenue (after deduction for a contribution to the 
DoI) was allowed to be kept with the Block Committees, while the remaining 50 
percent was transferred to the main WUA committee of the RIMC.  However, 
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since the PIMC was autonomous, it was not legally required to make any 
financial contribution to the DoI, as a key informant interviewee said: 
“--This is our canal and we collect the water fee and use it for the 
betterment of the canal. The WUA has its own savings bank account and 
we have been keeping some money in that account-- the interest rate is 
quite good too, obviously all the money including the interest from the 
savings is farmers’ money. The most important thing is that we do not 
have to give any money to the DoI. We collect the fee; we manage it as to 
our needs---” 
(Female, 49, Treasurer, FMIS) 
 
In the FMIS, the temporary nature of the headwork and the canal traversing a 
landslide prone area, has meant that regular O & M activities are required.   
Usually the PIMC carries out a walk along the canal to identify any urgent O & M 
activities, and all farmers are called upon to carry out these activities.  Whilst the 
O & M activities in the AMIS were all carried out by the DoI, the major O & M 
activities in the JMIS canal were done the by the DoI and minor work was 
carried out by the WUA.  Serious concerns were raised by the farmers 
participating in the focus group discussions and the key informant interviewees, 
about the lack of co-ordination between the DoI and the WUA:   
 
“---Our frustration is about not getting enough help from the DoI 
whenever we need help from them. Firstly, the DoI takes an awfully long 
time to respond. We need help at the beginning of the monsoon in May 
for major O & M activities but the DoI’s help doesn’t arrive until late 
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July. By this time it’s too late. What’s the point of medicine after 
patient’s death? Secondly, the overseers come, they just talk with the big 
people here, they do not talk with us, we know our problems regarding 
the canal, just walking along the canal does not solve the local problems 
associated with the canal---” 
                                                            (Male, 34, Dhalepa from JMIS) 
     
    6.2.1.3 Allocation Rules 
 
While the boundary rules provide conditions that individuals are required to 
meet in order to join the resource system, the allocation rules stipulate actual 
mechanisms for members to claim their rights and withdraw water from the 
appropriate resource, i.e. water distribution. In Nepal, a wide range of 
mechanisms are practiced for water allocation, including fixed proportion, fixed 
time slots and fixed orders. The allocation procedures depend on various factors 
including, size of landholdings, spatial location, crop-water requirement, 
individuals’ water share and government discretion, amongst others. The detail 
procedures for water distribution both at the branch canal and at plots levels are 
described in Section 6.4. 
 
    6.2.1.4 Penalty Rules 
 
In the absence of penalty rules, the individuals have little or no incentive to follow 
allocation or input rules, which increases incidence of free riding. The penalty 
rules restrict irrigators from defrauding, which helps to ensure rule compliance. 
Similar to the allocations and input rules, the penalty rules might take several 
different forms, including fines in cash, incarceration, restricted use and 
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temporary loss of all appropriation rights. However, incarceration is least likely 
to be practiced in many irrigation systems including the irrigation systems 
considered in this study, partly because of the fact that it requires the 
involvement of lawsuits and can often be very costly. A single penalty rule is 
highly unlikely to ensure compliance and a combination of rules is commonly 
practiced in Nepal, which include fines in cash, restricted use of water and 
withdrawal of membership, as discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.2.8).  The 
penalty rules help to ensure rule compliance and maintain cooperation, to 
achieve collective outcomes while managing the irrigation system.   
 
In the FMIS area, a series of graduated sanctions is imposed, depending on the 
nature of infractions and the damage they cause. For the first infraction, the 
defrauders are fined NRs. 100, while fines imposed on second and third time 
defrauders are NRs. 250 and NRs. 500, respectively. In the cases of severe and 
repeated fraud, the PIMC can temporarily suspend the individual’s water rights.  
The strict nature of sanctions imposed on the defrauders was vividly described by 
the farmers in the FMIS, as the President of the PIMC said:  
“---We have evidence of fining some defrauders NRs. 5000. A farmer 
from the head-end caused severe damage to the irrigation infrastructure 
as he attempted to transport wooden logs through the canal water. It was 
a serious breach of the rules and he made a mockery of the rules. I think 
the sanction the WUA imposed on him rightly reflects the seriousness of 
the offence---” 
(Male, 45, President of FMIS) 
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It is often the case that if a farmer is found to be involved in water theft, his/her 
next access slots will be suspended temporarily.  However, despite being written 
in the constitutions of the JMIS and the AMIS, such graduated sanctions were 
seldom implemented. These issues were raised by the farmers who participated 
in the focus group discussion: 
 
“---There is nothing in the canal--, the gates are tampered with and 
broken, the canal linings are damaged, they use all sort of local tools to 
steal water kuto/ kadalo (spade), ghan (hammer) gaichi (pick axe) and 
even gals (crowbar) to bore holes in the canal lining to steal water. The 
most worrying thing is that nobody gets sanctioned. They just get away 
with it---” 
(Female, 24, AMIS) 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the farmers in the JMIS, as participants of a 
key informant interview said:  
 “---Only god knows the rules in Nepal, who cares about the rules and 
regulations in this area? ---People, especially the powerful individuals, 
do what they prefer, the rules are not for them, rules are for us, the poor 
and powerless. The powerful farmers do not pay a water fee, add more 
tertiary canals, steal water, you name them this irrigation system 
resembles a travesty of Justice ---” 
(Male, 34, dalit from JMIS)  
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It should be noted that the operational level rules are neither self –generating nor 
self enforcing (Ostrom, 1990) and their effective implementation depends on the 
existence of the rule enforcers, the number of users and the degree of co-
ordination between them.  The importance of co-ordination and communication 
between the WUA and the farmers and between the farmers themselves, were 
highlighted by the participants of the focus group discussions:  
 
“---At the end of the day rules are effective as long as they are 
implemented effectively. Rules themselves are meaningless unless they 
are implemented adequately and monitored--- and this is what is lacking 
in this irrigation system---” 
(Male 56, JMIS) 
 
It should be pointed out that while it may be relatively easy to enforce operational 
level rules in systems with fewer members, it is quite difficult to enforce them 
with large a large number of members, owing to higher transaction costs for 
monitoring and sanctioning (Tang, 1989).  
 
   6.2.2 Collective Choice Rules 
 
The collective choice rules are applied by the users, the officials and external 
authorities in designing and implementing operational rules which govern their 
natural resources. Collective choice rules are better designed for tackling 
‘collective choice problems’.  The collective choice rules guide the operational 
choice of how a resource is to be used or how collective work should be carried 
out (Ostrom, 1990). In irrigation management, collective choice activities include 
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policy making, management, and adjudication of policy decisions (Hardy and 
Koontz, 2009). The collective choice activities help to improve the flow of 
information between the stakeholders, which in turn can result in more co-
ordinated management efforts (Imperial, 2005). The decisions on irrigation 
management are affected by the collective choice rules, which establish who has 
the right to participate and the modalities of doing so. Given the complex nature 
of irrigation management, all stakeholders in irrigation governance, including 
farmers, WUA and the DoI, often spend considerable time and effort on collective 
choice activities, which include creating comprehensive irrigation management 
action plans, formation of technical and financial committees, assigning different 
individuals to different tasks, drafting action plans for mitigating contingencies 
and designing and implementing other operational rules. However, the ‘non-self-
generating’ and ‘non- self-enforcing’ nature of the operational rules has meant 
that in the absence of external coercive agents, users are more likely to refrain 
from enforcing them, in order to maximise their own utilities, causing free-rider 
problems (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
In order to overcome free rider problems, the PIMC has successfully designed 
collective choice rules aiming to formulate, modify and enforce operational rules 
and provide users with incentives to maintain collective endeavours and exercise 
mutual self-restraint while using the resources. The collective choice rules are 
institutions encompassing collectively chosen rules, procedures and principles 
that enable users to respond to changes in operation rules, resolve conflicts and 
sustain productive relationships amongst users, through monitoring and 
sanctions against rule violations. This helps to overcome three basic problems of: 
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supply; credible commitment; and mutual monitoring, which are often nested 
hierarchically (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
In order to deal with the problem of institutional supply, the PIMC has designed 
workable sets of rules, procedures and sanctions regarding irrigation 
management, water harvesting and controlling fraudulent activities. 
Constitutional provision empowers the PMIC and the WUA members, providing 
them with the necessary mandate to amend operational rules, fix water charges 
(both water tax and membership fees) and to utilise surplus funds for irrigation 
related or other community development work within the canal command area.  
 
A large body of literature documents that religion has an important influence 
on the socio-economic behaviour of individuals including family, marriage, 
women’s role within and outside the family, education, income, natural 
resource conservation and so on (Rappaport, 1979; Taylor, 2005; Durkheim, 
1995; Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998; Lehrer, 2004; Harris, 1971; Posey 
and Balee, 1989; Sharma, 1999). A symbiotic relationship exists between 
nature and culture which is based on religious beliefs.  Indeed, for many 
people around the world, religious beliefs are central to their culture and 
provide natural codes for human-nature interactions in terms of how 
individuals should behave when dealing with natural resources (Ranger, 
1999). Similar to many parts of Africa (Sibanda, 2000), in rural parts of Nepal 
the presence of temples encourage individuals to have beliefs in god and 
affirm that religion is at least “fairly important” in their lives (Myers, 2000 
p.285). As such, temples are considered holy shrines in Hindu mythology and 
the general tidiness in and around the temple is considered to be very 
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important for receiving blessings from the god. It is believed that general 
tidiness in and around the holy shrines, such as temples, and honest 
behaviours help to enhance people’s spirituality by maintaining purity in the 
individual’s mind and body (Rappaport, 1999). In order to create purity in 
mind and body and to gain divinity, individuals visit temples to worship and 
pay their homage to the gods. Such activities are accompanied by religious 
beliefs which affect basic patterns of individual and group behaviours 
(Stevens, 2010). It is also a common practice to visit temples for marriages as 
paying homage to such holy shrines provides blessings for a happy and 
prosperous conjugal life (Waite and Lehrer, 2009).  This is because religious 
activities associated with temples and holy shrines are considered to be 
helpful in fostering positive attitudes amongst individuals and reinforcing the 
cultural values of wider society and to foster a sense of community (Bocock, 
1974; Verdy and Grosch, 1994). The WUA in the FMIS have used the local 
belief system associated with religion and temples for the management of the 
irrigation system.  
 
In fact, a branch committee of FMIS also intends to build a temple in close 
proximity to the head end to avoid unnecessary intrusion, as temples are 
considered sacred in Nepal.  In Nepal there is a religious belief that the area in 
and around the temple should be kept clean and any acts of dishonesty should 
not be carried out in and around that area. The construction of a temple is to 
reinforce this belief, and deter farmers from tampering with the outlets and 
obtaining water fraudulently.  
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In order to overcome the problem of credible commitment,  rules are put in place to 
raise awareness amongst the users that long term net benefits of collective 
engagement  are substantially higher than the net benefits gained by short term 
dominant individual strategies (Ostrom, 1990). Users are urged to demonstrate 
long term commitment to following rules, and maintaining self restraint. 
Similarly, in the FMIS, the arduous task of mutual monitoring is achieved through 
the employment of watchman, called Dhalepas. Two Dhalepas are employed by the 
PIMC on a salary basis, with the first one assigned responsibilities for looking 
after the upper half of the canal (head end) and the second one for the lower half 
of the canal. Along with observation, the watchmen also contribute towards the 
system operation and maintenance. While the Dhalepas are instrumental in 
monitoring users’ activities, the users themselves are very watchful and have the 
right to file petitions against any suspected fraudulent activities with the PIMC. 
There were three Dhalepas in the JMIS areas, each responsible for head, middle 
and tail sections of the command area. Two of the Dhalepas were remunerated by 
the DoI; the other’s salary was paid by the RIMC. Similarly, the AMIS had three 
Dhalepas who were employed by the DoI. Their salaries were paid by the DoI 
instead of the BIMC.   
The successful design and implementation of the above mentioned collective 
choice rules has helped to achieve positive collective outcomes through mutually 
imposed, self-financed and binding contracts, limiting users’ resource 
consumption activities.  
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   6.2.3 Constitutional Choice Rules  
 
The constitutional choice rules affect activities such as formulation, 
governance and adjudication, and modification of constitution level activities 
in irrigation management, by legitimising them. These rules involve 
establishing who should participate in collective choice activities and in what 
capacity (Ostrom, 1990 p.53).  
 
In irrigation governance, some of the constitutional level activities are the 
formation of the WUAs and the transfer of irrigation management to local 
users. The process of forming WUAs, including elections, composition, rights, 
responsibilities and tenure were carried out at constitutional level. The 
executive committees of the WUAs are mandated in running their irrigation 
systems. Similarly, the transfer of irrigation systems by the DoI to the local 
users involves significant changes at the constitutional level, including 
formation of WUAs, definition of their  scope, levy collection, financial and 
technical contributions to O & M activities, among others.  Once formed, the 
WUAs become functional and develop their own collective choice rules for 
making operational rules.  It is important to note that these three levels of 
rules may not always be mutually exclusive, though they may exhibit elements 
of specific activity at different levels. Some farmers are involved in different 
capacities in the management of the irrigation system and can assume other 
roles at the same time. For example, a farmer can be a member of the WUA 
committee, an irrigator and a liaison officer between the WUA and the DoI.  
Therefore, the above mentioned three levels of rules and activities guided by 
them affect the action taken, and outcomes obtained in different settings can 
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help illuminate differences in institutional arrangements and outcomes 
achieved across different cases (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982).  
 
6.3 Working Rules and Operating Principles of Water Distributions  
 
Taking a qualitative and institutional approach, this section of the thesis 
describes the mechanisms developed and followed for distributing irrigation 
water by the local farmers in the three irrigation systems considered for this 
research.  Firstly, this section highlights the context within which water 
distribution takes place in these three irrigation systems.  Secondly, it 
describes the water distribution rules as practiced by the farmers in the three 
systems. In this section of the thesis, the water distribution rules are 
presented in as much detail as possible.  Presentation will be very simple and 
descriptive.  
    
6.3.1 Water Distributions: The Context  
In the case study sites selected for this research, as elsewhere in Nepal, the 
demand for water is influenced by localised conditions which are both natural 
and man-made. The factors which influence the need for water include: the 
nature of distribution arrangements; the nature of the source water; the 
number of branch canals (outlets); the type of crops and their water 
requirements; and the topographical features of the command area.  As 
mentioned in Chapter Three (Table 3.1) the farmers in the three irrigation 
systems have more or less similar cropping patterns.  The farmers grow highly 
water intensive crops such as monsoon paddy (barkhe dhan) and spring paddy 
(chaite dhan) during the Monsoon and spring seasons respectively.  However, 
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during the winter, the farmers grow less water intensive crops such as wheat, 
mustard, potato, sugarcane, and other seasonal vegetables. Although these 
crops do not require intensive irrigation, they still need to be irrigated fairly 
regularly, which means the demand for water remains high even during the 
winter. 
Table 6.1 Crops and their growing periods in research sites with 
irrigation requirements 
 
SN Crops  Planting 
Month 
Weekly 
Irrigation 
Frequency  
Harvesting 
Month  
1 Monsoon 
paddy 
June-July  3 times October-
November  
2 Spring paddy  February-
March 
3 times June-July 
3 Wheat November-
December  
3 times per 
cropping season 
March-April 
4 Vegetables  All year around  5 times  All year around  
5 Potato November-
December  
3 times per 
cropping season 
March-April 
6 Mustard September-
October 
Not practiced February-March  
7 Millet September Not practiced October-
November 
8 Maize(summer)  April-May Not practiced June-July 
9 Maize(winter) October-
November 
Not practiced April-May 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2007) 
 
The FMIS has a temporary nature of water supply, whilst the JMIS derives 
water from a perennial source.  The AMIS is fed by a lake from where the 
water diversion has been restricted, particularly during the Winter and Spring, 
owing to its sensitive ecological importance.  Accordingly, in the FMIS and the 
JMIS, the spring season is characterised by a high degree of water stressed 
conditions, both in the source and the irrigation canal.  However, the JMIS 
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has an abundant water supply from the source throughout all three cropping 
seasons.  
 
Although the JMIS is fed by a perennial source of water, the sheer number of 
outlets in the canal and the rugged topographical area through which the canal 
runs has made water distribution a complex task for the WUA. The existence 
of several gorges, a difficult terrain and a larger number of outlets increase 
conveyance loss through evapo-transpiration and seepage. Furthermore, 
water theft has also been reported to be one of the most serious problems in 
the JMIS area, as farmers repeatedly reported:  
“---Well they say we have rotational distribution----but where is the 
rotational distribution if people use water as they wish? --- Who is there 
to monitor and impose sanctions against these sorts of fraudulent 
activities?  This system has been plagued by a series of systematic 
management failures--. If you ask me, I would say water is not the 
problem in this canal, there is plenty of water but management is the 
problem. I am afraid I have more questions than answers for you 
regarding water distribution in this canal system---” 
(Male, 39, Dhalepa, Middle end, JMIS) 
 
The problems associated with water distribution in the JMIS are also echoed 
by the members of the WUA: 
“--- What can you do if people do not feel ashamed of their improper and 
illegal activities? ---no sense of collective and communal spirit – mostly 
people on the upper section of the canal divert water from the outlets 
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when they should have been closed---- it is a matter of utter shame that 
despite almost the entire Chepe river is diverted into the canal system at 
the head end but we have not been able to deliver adequate water at the 
tail end---.” 
(Male, 53, Treasurer of RIMC) 
 
Similarly, the water source for the AMIS is a lake in which water should not be 
drawn to below a critical level, owing to the sensitive ecological landscape in 
which the canal is situated. Both the DoI and the WUA has been advised that 
the canal system should maintain a certain level of water in the lake when 
drawing water for irrigation purposes. This is done with due consideration for 
the important physical and ecological role played by the lake.  The lake is also a 
tourist attraction with recreational boating, which means a certain level of 
water has to be constantly maintained. It should be pointed out that the 
tourism sector is also an important business that contributes significantly 
towards the local economy. Many farmers also own lodges and pursue boating 
as a secondary occupation at the head end of the canal.   
 
Similarly, in the AMIS, a local fishery was in operation at the head-end section 
of the canal. The fishery was in direct conflict with the WUA, as it drew water 
from the irrigation canal. The conflict was particularly conspicuous during 
winter and spring , as water shortage in the canal is glaring and the demand 
for water is high both for fishery and irrigation activities. While the fishery has 
helped to achieve multiple use of the water and has increased the livelihood 
security of some farmers, it also has limited water availability in the canal, as 
the water is diverted from the canal to the fishery.   
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Similarly, the command area of the AMIS is witnessing an unprecedented level 
of urbanisation in recent years. The process of urbanisation has brought about 
many changes in terms of land use in the Lakhanath municipality areas. A 
considerable number of farmers, particularly those with landholdings on the 
edge of the municipality and with access to highways, carried out land-plotting 
for housing development. The contractors involved in the housing 
development also drew water from the irrigation canal, which further reduced 
the volume of water available for irrigation. The management of the fisheries, 
the house contractors and local farmers were in constant conflict as they all 
competed for water, as a farmer who participated in the focus group discussion 
argued:  
 
“---There is a fishery right at the canal mouth just drawing water from 
the canal. They are making loads of money at the expense of us (farmers) 
who have to pay the costs of water shortage in the canal ---- they even do 
not pay a water fee and we have to— Do you think that this is fair? They 
sell their fish to the tourists at a high price or take them to Pokhara, what 
do we get? No water for irrigation! Brilliant!!  I appreciate water is a 
natural and notational resource but this fishery has literally privatised it-
-   It is bad for the local farmers. This is unfortunate for us---!” 
                                           (Male, 47, Tail end AMIS)   
 
At the same time, farmers also tended to use water for preparing mud-loaf for 
brick production. Some farmers, particularly in the AMIS, showed their 
concern about the use of irrigation water for other than agricultural purposes, 
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as it is in direct conflict with agricultural activities. In fact, the Irrigation 
Regulation 1999 clearly defines irrigation as “the means of the act of supplying 
water through structures on the field for agricultural use” (DoI, 1999). By 
definition, the Irrigation Regulation 1999 clearly prohibits other uses of 
irrigation water in the system, except for agricultural purposes, and clearly 
this was not the case in the AMIS.  
 
   6.3.2 Water Distribution in the FMIS before Monsoon Season 
The initial land preparation for sowing paddy grain to grow seedlings marks 
the beginning of agricultural activities in Nepal. Right from the onset of land 
tillage the farmers need water in the fields and the role of irrigation is 
immediately felt. The growing of saplings takes place during the month of 
Baisakh (April-May) before the arrival of the Monsoon rain, and water 
demands are to be met through the application of irrigation water in the fields.  
 
During this time, each branch committee of the FMIS calls upon all the 
farmers in its canal sub-section to submit an application concerning their 
preferred land tillage date and sowing grain for growing saplings.  The 
application is sought by the WUA branch committees during the month of 
April every year. Upon receiving applications from the farmers, the branch 
committee convenes a meeting in early May to deliberate on the applications. 
The branch committee deliberates the water schedules, drawing up the first 
draft for paddy transplantation, with due consideration for water availability 
at the source, in the main and branch canals, and also the predicted arrival of 
the Monsoon rainfall. 
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In the mean time, the main WUA Committee (mul-samiti) calls upon all farmers to 
participate in O & M activities for the smooth delivery of water throughout the 
canal system. During paddy transplanting periods, the farmers get their share of 
water just for the plots where transplantation is planned, irrespective of their 
total irrigable land.  Then based on the schedules designed and implemented by 
the branch committees, individual farmers make arrangements for the 
transplantation, including labour, bullocks, plough, and seedlings.   
 
The first draft of the irrigation schedule is then circulated among the local 
farmers. The branch committee also seeks farmers’ comments on the first 
draft by the end of May each year. If the allocated timings suit the farmers and 
no concern is raised, then the branch committee finalises and implements the 
drafted irrigation schedules for sapling preparation and paddy 
transplantation. However, if the allocated time slots are not suitable for the 
farmers, those concerned negotiate with their neighbours.   
 
   6.3.3 Water Distribution During the Monsoon Season 
The Monsoon paddy growing season starts from mid- Ashad (end of June) and 
ends in the month of Mangsir (November-December). In the FMIS, all the 
branch canals draw water from the main canal simultaneously, without any 
rotational distribution at the branch levels. The available water in the canal is 
divided amongst the different branches with designated proportioning weirs 
called Gahaks. The Gahaks help to ration the available water amongst 
different branch canals, and a detailed description is presented later in 
chapter Six (Section 6.1). The proportioning weirs are constructed at the 
bifurcation of the branch canal from the main canal. The size of the 
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proportioning weirs depends on the command area for which the particular 
branch delivers water for irrigation. In general, for every hectare of command 
area, one inch of cross section incision is made on the wooden structure to let 
water flow into the branch canal from the main canal. For example, a branch 
canal designed to deliver water for a command area of 32 Ha of land will have 
32 inches of cross sectional incision in the Gahaks.  The water distribution 
mechanism adopted in the FMIS during the Monsoon season is presented in 
Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2 Irrigation Cycle in the FMIS during Monsoon Season  
 
Branch Name Turn Command 
Area in Ha 
hours in 
one cycle 
Weekly Calendar 
Chaubiskuriya 1 81 40 7am (Sunday)-11pm (Monday) 
Jogichaur 2 79 39 11pm (Monday)-2pm (Wednesday)
Dee Area 3 37 18 2 pm (Wednesday)-6am (Thursday)
Kumal Gaun 4 62 30 6am (Thursday)-12pm (Friday) 
Saatkuriya 5 82 41 12pm (Friday)-7am (Sunday) 
 
Similarly, the WUA of the JMIS holds its meeting before the start of the 
Monsoon season to discuss water distribution issues and prepare a schedule 
for the season. The meeting is also attended by the representatives of each 
block. The meeting generally takes place during the month of Jestha (May-
June) every year before the start of the Monsoon paddy cultivation. The WUA 
records show that a schedule was agreed upon for the Monsoon season in 
2007, during the time of my field work, which is given in Table 6.3.  
 
Whilst the FMIS practise a continuous flow of water distribution during the 
Monsoon seasons, the JMIS adopt a rotational distribution during the same 
season. The entire command area of the JMIS has been divided into sixteen 
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blocks. It should be made clear that the demarcation of the blocks does not 
resemble any political, geographical or administrative division adopted by the 
Government of Nepal. Instead, the blocks are demarcated as the 
administrative units only for the purpose of irrigation governance. Each block 
has its own block committee, comprising 11 members. Blocks are divided on 
the basis of the number of households and size of the command area in the 
section of the canal command area. 
 
In order to deliver water to the blocks, water gates (outlets) are installed along 
the main canal to let the water flow off the canal into the branch canals. 
 
Table 6.3 Branch Level Water Schedules during Monsoon Season 
in the JMIS 
 
Branch Name 
(Block) 
 
Village Name 
Turn Command 
Area in Ha 
Hours in 
one cycle 
Weekly Calendar 
Block 1 Borankhola 1 25 21 6am (Sunday)-3am (Monday) 
Block 9 Syaauli Bazaar 1 46 21 6am (Sunday)-3am (Monday) 
Block 2 Phant 2 54 21 3am(Monday)-12am (Tuesday) 
Block 10 Bisuralgaun 2 65 21 3am (Monday)-12am (Tuesday) 
Block 3 Bhalayakharka 3 47 21 12am (Tuesday)-9pm (Tuesday) 
Block 11  Pakhetar 3 32 21 12am (Tuesday)-9pm (Tuesday ) 
Block 4 Timure 4 56 21 9pm (Tuesday)-6pm (Wednesday) 
Block 12 Saatghare 4 53 21 9pm (Tuesday)- 6pm (Wednesday) 
Block 5 Saatbise 5 64 21 6pm (Wednesday)- 3pm (Thursday) 
Block 13 Hatiya-Pauwa 5 80 21 6pm (Wednesday)- 3pm (Thursday) 
Block 6 Alkatar 6 67 21 3pm (Thursday)-12pm (Friday) 
Block 14 Panchbhai 
Chautara 
6 55 21 3pm (Thursday)-12pm (Friday) 
Block 7 Tinpiple 7 73 21 12pm (Friday)-9am (Saturday) 
Block 15 Parajuligaun 7 50 21 12pm (Friday)-9am (Saturday) 
Block 8 Kumalgaun 8 58 21 9am (Saturday)-6am (Sunday) 
Block 16  Garambesi 8 75 21 9am (Saturday)-6am (Sunday) 
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In the JMIS, a water distribution schedule is implemented when all the 
farming households complete paddy transplantation. Accordingly, the 
rotational water distribution schedule begins from mid-Asadh (end of June). 
The distribution schedule comprises eight time slots for a total of sixteen 
blocks.  According to the distribution arrangement, each time slot has 
duration of twenty one hours. In any one time slot, two blocks draw water 
from the main canal while the remaining fourteen outlets remain closed.    In 
general, the blocks from the head end and middle section are paired up, while 
blocks from the middle section are paired up with blocks from the tail end of 
the canal command area.  The first cycle of the schedule begins from 6 a.m. on 
Sunday morning, in which block 1 (located in the head section) and block 9 
(located in the middle section) irrigate their paddy fields for a period of twenty 
one hours until 3am on the following day, when the Dhalepa closes the rotating 
heads of blocks 1 and 9 and opens the rotating heads of blocks 2 and 10, 
closing all other outlets for the next twenty one hours.  These two blocks 
(blocks 2 and 10) divert water from the main canal for a period twenty one 
hours starting from 3 am on Monday to mid-night on Tuesday, when the 
Dhalepas close the rotating heads of these two branch canals, opening outlets 3 
and 11. This is the weekly cycle for distributing water which is presented in 
Table 6.3 above.  
 
The distribution cycle repeats itself at 6am on Sunday the following week. The 
same schedule is adopted until the paddy is harvested, during the month of 
Mangsir (November-December).  From the schedule, it is clear that water is 
allocated on a timed rotational basis at the block level. However, the allocated 
duration for the branch did not reflect the size of the command area. Every 
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branch draws water for duration of 21 hours on a weekly schedule. Whatever 
may be the logic and rationale for the water distribution at the branch level, 
the water distribution in the JMIS is inequitable. Firstly, the time slots 
allocated for different branches do not correspond to their entitlements, as the 
distribution does not correspond to the command area for which the branch 
canal is supplying water. For example, according to the currently practiced 
water distribution schedule, Block 13, with 80 Ha of command area, is getting 
water for a period of twenty one hours, and Block 11, with a command area of 
only 32 Ha, is also getting water for same period of time, which clearly 
indicates inequitable water distribution.  
 
Also, the water distribution at the branch level does not follow any contiguity 
in the JMIS. Whilst the pattern of water distribution appears regular, it is 
bound to create some complications in water distribution.  According to the 
schedule, the pairing up of outlets from different locations leaving the outlets 
in between, provides farmers with real temptation to steal water,  particularly 
during times when farmers need more water, for example during paddy 
flowering periods. The lack of a sufficient monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanism has meant that water theft is a persistent problem in the JMIS.  
The farmers in the Tinpiple village, which is located in the middle section of the 
canal command area, expressed the following viewpoints during a focus group 
discussion:  
“--- Ram Kumal [name changed] in Kumal Gaun in Block -8 broke the 
outlets unlawfully and diverted water for almost a month.  What 
was the WUA Doing? Where did the Dhalepas go? The Dhalepas 
are paid by both the WUA and DoI, did they do their job properly? 
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This is just an example; there are plenty of incidents where farmers 
have unlawfully appropriated water from the canal. ---Individuals 
who are caught red hand stealing water and vandalising canal 
infrastructure are not penalised - --?” 
          (Female, 50, middle section, JMIS)  
 
Similar to other two irrigation systems (FMIS and JMIS) considered in this 
study, the Monsoon paddy growing periods remains the same in the command 
area of the AMIS. The water schedule comes into effect after the completion of 
paddy transplantation by all the beneficiary farmers in the canal command 
area.  During the Monsoon season the water in the Begnas canal is divided 
amongst the branch canals according to the canal command area which the 
particular branch is delivering water to. There was no timed rotation practiced 
in the AMIS. Instead the DoI provisioned for a continuous supply of water in 
all the branch canals. The water allocation in the AMIS is given the Table 6.4.  
According to the current water distribution provisions, all the four branch 
canals appropriate water simultaneously. The DoI had provisioned that the 
Branch Canal 1 (BC-1) which supply water to the Sainik Basti area appropriated 
50 percent of the total canal flow, while BC-2 which delivered water to the 
village of Satmuhane. The BC-2 appropriated only 15 percent of the total canal 
flow. Similarly, the allocation for BC-3 which delivered water to the village 
called Kholako Chheu which was allocated 17.5 percent of the canal flow whilst 
BC-4 which delivered water to the village of Rajako Chautara was also entitled 
17.5 percent of the total canal flow.  
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Table 6.4 Branch Level Water Schedules in the AMIS during Monsoon Season 
 
Branch Name Turn Volume proportion in  
% of total canal release (A) 
Command 
Area in 
Ha 
Volume Entitled as 
% of total canal 
release (E) 
 
 
Difference  (A-E) 
in % 
 
hours in 
one cycle 
Sainik Basti (BC1) 1 50 200 34 + 16 Continuous 
Satmuhane (BC2) 1 15 180 31 -16 Continuous 
Kholako Chheu  
(BC3) 
1 17.5 60 10 +7.5 Continuous 
Rajako Chautara  
(BC4) 
1 17.5 140 25 -7.5 Continuous 
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The canal command area of BC-1 is 200 Ha while the canal command area of 
BC-2 is 180 Ha. Similarly, the canal command area of BC-3 and BC-4 was 60 
Ha and 140 Ha respectively. The current water allocation arrangements made 
by the DoI are clearly not equitable as the water allocations at the branch level 
do not correspond to their water entitlements. In other words, the farmers do 
not get their fair share of the total canal flow given time slots allocated for 
them for irrigation. Table 6.4 presents the discrepancies between water 
diverted and the actual amount of water entitled in different branch canals in 
the AMIS.  For example, the current distribution arrangement allows BC-1 to 
divert 50 percent of the total volume of water flowing in the canal whereas its 
entitlement based on proportionality is only 34 percent of the canal flow. 
Clearly, this is an over-appropriation of water by 16 percent more than its 
legitimate entitlement. Similarly, according to current water distribution 
arrangements, the allocated share of water for BC-2 is 16 percent less than its 
entitlements based on proportionality. Also, BC-3 is over-appropriating 7.5 
percent more water than its legal entitlements while BC-4 is under-
appropriating 7.5 percent of its legal entitlements.  
 
The local farmers, especially at the tail end of the canal, expressed a strong 
dissatisfaction over the current branch level water distribution arranged by 
the DoI; as a farmer said:  
“---These are highly qualified individuals working at the DoI but they 
just do not seem to grasps the local settings--. The water distribution 
schedules are prepared based on the experience of the Terai (southern 
plains) whereas our local topography and soils are totally different.  
They have an allocated water flow of 6 cusec per Ropani of land in our 
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branch—this is the estimation for terai paddy. Given the type of soil in 
this area we need almost 18 cusec water flow per Ropani in the area. I 
am an agronomist and I clearly see that the new engineers and overseers 
lack knowledge about the local settings—we request technical assistance, 
but it takes an unusually long time to get the responses. They just walk 
along the canal bank and estimate the budget and walk away--.  Do not 
get me wrong---, but I do think that they are concerned more with their 
daily allowances than helping farmers prosper—after all they are not 
from the local area anyway---”.  
(Male, 39 years, an agronomist and farmer, AMIS) 
 
The Dhalepas in the AMIS are employed by the DoI and have responsibility for 
opening and closing the gates of the branch canals. They also ensure that 
farmers adhere to the current water distribution rules. However, the Dhalepas 
are increasingly under threat from unruly local residents, particularly the local 
youths, who are coercing them to release water as needed by the farmers:  
“--- Well, you have come to interview me but after a while those local 
boys come and pressurise me to release water---. Look at this scar! Some 
drunken guys from BC-1 attacked me a few months ago.  They 
manhandled me, punched me and pushed me in canal because I did not 
release the water according to their demands --- of course I cannot 
release water as those thugs wish. This is quite a challenging job. 
Sometimes farmers come to divert water with knife and naked khukuri—
this can be scary and traumatising--. You go to the canal with other tools 
like kuto and kodalo not khukuri-----. Sometimes farmers are not happy 
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with the DoI and they vent their anger on us, Dhalepa. We do not make 
the decision with regards to the canal-- We just follow their instructions” 
                                                               (Male, 45, Dhalepa, AMIS)                                                              
 
   6.3.4 Water Distribution during the Winter Season 
 
As mentioned earlier, the way in which water is allocated to different branches 
within the irrigation canals changes with the seasons.  This is because the 
amount of water available differs with different cropping seasons, as do the 
crops grown and their water requirements. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
Three (Table 3.2), all the three case study sites had similar cropping patterns 
and the farmers grew wheat and mustard as the main winter crops. Some 
farmers also grow spring onions, onions, potatoes and other leafy vegetables. 
Whilst the demand for water remains high (although less intensive than for 
paddy), the water in the canal is reduced drastically and careful planning is 
required in the water distribution.   
 
The water supply in the FMIS during the winter season is very low and 
considering these fluctuations in water availability, the WUA in the FMIS has 
adopted rotational water distribution into the different branch canals.  Every 
year, between November and February, the farmers use a particular type of 
rotational distribution method  for allocating water to different branches.  The 
water rotation in different canals during this time period is known locally as 
‘paanch-paalo.  In these methods of rotational distribution, each branch 
acquires water for a duration of 12 hours before handing over to the next 
branch. The individual who is the last to be irrigating in the branch canal 
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informs the first irrigator of the next branch that it is his turn to divert the 
water to his branch canal, which is known locally as ‘paani pharkaune’. If the 
individual who is irrigating fails to inform the farmers of the branch canal to 
whom the water is to be transferred and over-appropriates water, then the 
farmer concerned will be sanctioned by the WUA. There are five branches in 
the FMIS area, which means that each branch can divert water for a duration 
of 12 hours and the cycle repeats itself every one and half days (i.e. every sixty 
hours). The detailed rotation duration and different branches in the FMIS are 
presented in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 Irrigation Cycle in FMIS during Winter Seasons 
 
Branch Name Turn Command  
Area in Ha 
 Hours in  
a cycle 
Weekly Calendar 
Chaubiskuriya 1 34 12 7am (Sunday -7pm (Sunday) 
Jogichaur 2 32 12 7pm (Sunday)-7am (Monday) 
Dee Area 3 14 12 7am (Monday)-7pm (Monday) 
Kumal Gaun 4 26 12 7pm (Monday)-7am (Tuesday) 
Saatkuriya 5 36 12 7am (Tuesday)-7pm (Tuesday) 
 
 
The FMIS consists of five major branch canals, which are Chaubiskuriya, Jogi 
Chaur, Dee Area, Kumal Gaun and Saatkuriya. The rotating schedules for each 
branch are listed in Table 6.5. During the winter season, the Chaubiskuriya 
branch uses the water first, and their turn begins at 7 am on the first Sunday 
of the month when the irrigation schedule commences. The Chaubiskuriya 
branch draws water for a duration of twelve hours before handing over to the 
Jogi chaur branch at 7 pm on the same day. The last irrigators of the 
Chaubiskuriya alert the first irrigator of the Jogi Chaur branch to divert water 
into the canal.  According to local practice, a reminder is given about fifteen 
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minutes prior to the end of the time allocated to the last farmer of the 
Chaubiskuriya branch. A similar pattern is followed with the other branches. 
It is the duty of the farmers to let other farmers know their timing for 
diverting water into their branch canals, and failure to do so, as well as any 
overuse of irrigation water, results in sanctions being imposed on them by the 
WUA. The WUA of the FMIS enforces the rules very strictly and there is a high 
degree of compliance. The farmers are expected to adhere to the rules or face 
sanctions. The farmers interviewed believed that both the costs and benefits 
from the canal have been shared proportionately by farmers of different 
categories, as one farmer said:  
 
“---Although we may not have abundant water during Winter and Spring, 
we do know when the water will be made available to us---- we get water 
as per our entitlements which is based on cultivated lands---  we share 
the burden of water scarcity--- we share the joy of having plenty of 
water---” 
(Female, 59, tail-ender, FMIS)  
 
It should be noted that the farmers in the FMIS have been following the same 
schedule for the last fourteen years, and it is considered a stable water 
scheduling mechanism.  The current water distribution schedule was decided 
through a lottery system about fourteen years ago, and farmers see no need for 
revising the schedules.  The farmers in the FMIS repeatedly expressed their 
satisfaction with the water distribution mechanisms in the FMIS, as a 
participant in the focus group discussion said: 
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“---Well there is no need for revising the water distribution schedule, the 
farmers are satisfied; they are happy and the WUA is happy too with how 
things are working here--- it’s working for everybody---” 
(Male, 45, FMIS)  
 
It should also be pointed out that there are no legal obligations for the farmers 
to stick to the same rotation pattern. These arrangements are more for 
convenience and consistency rather than legally binding. If the local farmers 
feel the need for change in the rotation pattern in the distribution of water 
resource, it can be done through deliberations by the PIMC, which is the 
committee managing the irrigation resources in the Phalebas area.  
 
The water schedule which is implemented by the WUA in the JMIS canal 
during the winter and spring is presented in Table 6.6. The farmers reported 
that the head-tail inequalities increased as the water in the canal reduced 
during winter and spring. Whilst the inequalities can be attributed to the 
reduced volume of water in the canal, they are exacerbated by the nature of 
the water distribution schedule implemented by the WUA in the JMIS. 
According to the schedule, the first three blocks, namely 1, 2 and 3, get water 
all the time throughout the week, while other branches get water just once a 
week. The rotating heads of the outlets of branch canals delivering water to 
the fields plots in blocks 4-7 are opened, keeping other outlets closed (except 
the first three outlets) for a period of twenty four hours on Sunday.
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Table 6.6 Branch Level Water Schedules during Winter and Spring season in the JMIS 
 
 
Branch Name 
(Block Number)
 
Village Name 
Turn Command  
Area in Ha 
 hours in  
one cycle 
Weekly Calendar Water  
Availability  
Block 1 Borangkhola All the time 25 No cycle 24 hours a day Abundant  
Block 2 Phant All the time 46 No cycle 24 hours a day Abundant  
Block 3 Bhalayakharka All the time 54 No cycle 24 hours a day Abundant  
Block 4 Timure  Every Sunday 65 24 hours 24 hours on Every Sunday  Enough  
Block 5 Saatbise Every Sunday 47 24 hours 24 hours on Every Sunday Enough 
Block 6 Alkatar Every Sunday 32 24 hours 24 hours on Every Sunday Enough 
Block 7 Tinpiple Every Sunday 56 24 hours 24 hours on Every Sunday Enough  
Block 8 Kumalgaun Every Monday 53 24 hours 24 hours on Every Monday Enough  
Block 9 Syaauli Bazaar Every Monday 64 24 hours 24 hours on Every Monday Limited  
Block 10 Bisuralgaun Every Monday 80 24 hours 24 hours on Every Monday Limited  
Block 11 Pakhetar Every Monday 67 24 hours 24 hours on Every Monday Limited  
Block 12 Saateghar Every Monday 55 24 hours  24 hours on Every Monday Limited 
Block 13 Hatiya-pauwa Every Tuesday 73 24 hours 24 hours on Every Tuesday Scarce 
Block 14 Panchbhai Chautara Every Tuesday 50 24 hours 24 hours on Every Tuesday Scarce 
Block 15 Parajuli Gaun Every Tuesday 58 24 hours 24 hours on Every Tuesday Severely scarce 
Block 16 Garambesi Every Tuesday 75 24 hours 24 hours on Every Tuesday Severely scarce
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The Dhalepas working in the JMIS reported that on Monday they opened the 
rotating heads of the outlet canals of blocks 8-12 inclusive, while other outlets 
(except the first three blocks) remained closed for period of twenty four hours.  
Again on Tuesday morning, the Dhalepas opened the outlet gates of blocks 13-
16, leaving other gates closed (except the first three gates).  Similar to the 
water schedule implemented during the Monsoon season, that implemented 
during the winter and spring appeared to distribute water on the basis of 
proportionality. Clearly, the duration of the time slots allocated for the larger 
blocks is the same as that of the smaller blocks. Also, the first three blocks 
located at the head end of the canal command area received water all the time, 
while the remaining blocks appropriated water just once a week.  
 
Inequalities occurred because the nature of the scheduling was echoed by the 
farmers. The availability of water in their field plots, particularly the ones 
located at the tail end of the canal, was being heavily affected by the nature of 
the water distribution mechanism implemented in the JMIS. The majority of 
the farmers reported that the water availability in the first three blocks in the 
JMIS was abundant, while the water availability in the middle section was 
reported to be just sufficient. Similarly, as one went down the canal command 
area, the water availability reduced significantly, with farmers at the tail end 
of the canal reporting water availability as limited and scarce. The qualitative 
data indicated that that while the tail-enders (famers from blocks 15 and 16) 
contributed more towards operation and maintenance activities, the water 
available to them was very scarce and they risked crop failures. The problems 
associated with inequitable water distribution in the JMIS were echoed by the 
farmers, as a key informant argued:  
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 “--- Lets not talk about irrigation water for us! --- The WUA only comes 
and asks for our labour contributions during O & M activities. Last year 
the seeds on the paddy plot bed got roasted and I had to cultivate green 
lentil instead.  Life remains the same for us—we used to look at the cloud 
coverage to plan our paddy transplantation in the past and we do the 
same even these days ---!” 
(Male 28, tail end from JMIS)  
 
Other farmers also echoed similar sentiments with regards to water in the 
canal in the JMIS:   
 
“--- Well, we did not receive any water from the canal last season and I 
had to graze my cattle on the transplanted paddy crops as we lacked 
water-- plots dried up due to lack of water ---Plants completely wilted 
turning yellow ----it was pretty miserable for us---”.  
(Female, 43, Tail end, JMIS)  
 
The DoI in collaboration with the WUA of the AMIS had a separate 
arrangement for winter cropping. The water distribution mechanism during 
the winter is presented in Table 6.7.   
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Table 6.7 Branch Level Water Schedules in the AMIS during Winter 
Season 
 
 
Unlike during the Monsoon season, the DoI has adopted timed rotational 
water distribution at the branch canal level. The preference for a timed 
rotation to continuous irrigation water flow in the branch canal results from 
the reduced level of water in the source lake.  As mentioned earlier, the lake is 
ecologically so sensitive that a certain level of water has to be constantly 
maintained.  
 
The winter schedule comes into effect in the third week of November, when 
the farmers finish cultivating their winter crops. Every branch canal diverts 
water for a period of 48 hours, irrespective of the command area and water 
needs. The irrigation schedule starts from the head end of the canal as BC-1, 
delivering water to the Sainik Basti area. The Sainik Basti area diverts water 
from 6 am on Saturday until 6 am on Monday, when all the gates of other 
branch canals are kept closed.  When the turn of the Sainik Basti area ends at 6 
am on Monday, the gates of the BC-2, which delivers water to the village of 
Satmuhane, are opened and the other three gates kept closed. The village of 
Satmuhane receives water for of the next 48 hours until 6 am on Wednesday. 
When the village’s turn ends, the water is diverted towards BC-3 to provide 
Branch Name Turn Command  
Area in  
Ha 
Hours  
per week 
Weekly Calendar 
Sainik Basti (BC1) 1 200 48 6am (Saturday)-6am (Monday) 
Satmuhane (BC2) 2 180 48 6am (Monday) – 6am (Wed) 
Kholako Chheu  
(BC3) 
3 60 48 6am (Wed) – 6am (Friday) 
Rajako Chautara  
(BC4) 
4 157  48 6am (Friday)- 6am (Sunday) 
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water to the village of Kholako Chheu for next 48 hours until 6 am on Friday. 
The village of Kholako Chheu is at the far tail-end of the canal and farmers 
reported that a significant proportion of water in the canal was lost through 
seepage and evapo-transpiration. The farmers from the village of Kholako 
Chheu reported that whilst water loss due to evapo-transpiration was a 
concern for them, water loss owing to seepage posed the greatest threat to the 
water security for the cultivated crops.  When the turn of the village of 
Satmuhane comes to an end at 6 am on Friday, the gates of BC-4 are opened 
to release water for the village of Rajako Chautara, whilst the other three 
gates remain closed for next 48 hours when the water is diverted to BC-1 at 6 
am on Monday.  
 
   6.3.5 Distributions during Spring Season 
 
Similar to the distribution mechanism for winter crops, the WUA of the FMIS 
has a separate water distribution mechanism for the spring. By nature, the 
water demand for spring paddy is high, but the water supply both in the canal 
and the source is very low during the spring. High demand and low supply has 
meant that the competition for water is very high during the spring. In order 
to cope with the water shortage, the farmers have to grow spring paddy under 
a carefully designed water distribution mechanism. The water distribution 
schedule implemented in the FMIS during the spring is presented in Table 
6.8.  
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Table 6.8 Irrigation Cycle in FMIS During Spring  
 
Branch Name Turn Command  
Area in Ha 
 Hours in  
one cycle 
Weekly Calendar 
Satkuriya 1 34 36 7am (Sunday) -7pm (Monday) 
Kumalgaun  2 32 36 7pm (Monday)-7am (Wednesday) 
Dee Area 3 14 36 7am (Wednesday)-7pm (Thursday) 
Jogichaur 4 26 36 7pm (Thursday)-7am (Saturday) 
Chaubiskuriya 5 36 36 7am (Saturday)-7pm (Sunday) 
 
During the spring, the farmers undergo even more stringent water scheduling, 
which is known locally as the tin paalo.  During the tin paalo system, each 
branch canal gets water for a period of 36 hours, i.e. two days and one night 
continuously, after which the water is diverted to the next branch.   Firstly, the 
village of Satkuriya diverts water for a period of 36 hours starting from 7 am 
on Sunday, and its turn for irrigation ends at 7 pm on the Monday. At this 
time the farmer who is diverting water from the canal is expected to inform 
the farmer from the Village of Kumalgaun. The process is repeated for the 
village of Dee Area and Jogichaur. The village of Chaubiskuriya, which diverts 
water first during the winter under the panch paalo system, diverts water last 
during the spring season. When the turn for diverting water for the village of 
Chaubiskuriya ends at 7 pm on Sunday of the following week, the cycle 
repeats itself for the rest of the spring until the paddy is harvested.  
 
It is important to point out that the water distribution cycles during the panch 
paalo and the tin paalo are in reverse order. In the paancho paalo, the 
Chaubiskuriya branch gets the water first during the winter, while it gets the 
water last during the tin paalo during the spring, as the Chairman of the WUA 
argued: 
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“---we have to make everybody satisfied with the distribution rules. 
Of course there is no magic formula to make everybody satisfied. 
But there are ways in which we can make things work for everybody 
in the village. I think, if some branch is getting the first priority in 
one season, then it should compromise in the next seasons for water 
appropriation---since the last fourteen years, the water rotation 
begins with Chaubiskuriya first during the winter seasons and it 
diverts water last during the Spring seasons---” 
(Male, 45, President of FMIS) 
 
The farmers in the FMIS believed that the entire irrigation management, 
including the water distribution, is guided by a spirit of fairness, as an elderly 
farmer who participated in a focused group discussion said:  
 
“---Although there may be head and tail ends in physical sense of 
the terms—but in practical terms there is nothing called head ends 
and tail ends in this canal. But in our system we have paddy  
transplantation at the head end areas and also at the extreme tail 
end areas ---- right at the bank of the Kaali Gandaki—this is the 
beauty of the Phalebas canal!—And this has been possible only 
because all the members believe and act with true spirit of fairness 
and justice---”  
(Female, 50 from Tail end, FMIS) 
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In the JMIS, the schedule which is implemented during the winter is also 
continued through the spring. The water distribution schedule implemented 
in the JMIS in spring is presented in Table 6.6. It should be pointed out that 
the farmers in the JMIS areas cultivate less water intensive crops, such as 
potato, wheat and mustard, during the winter while more water intensive 
crops, such as spring paddy, are grown during the spring. The water schedules 
designed for the winter reflect less water demanding situations.  The schedule 
is not adjusted to meet this increased demand for water.   Therefore, the 
WUA’s efforts to meet the increased demand during the spring with water 
distribution designed for the winter do not necessarily reflect the demand for 
water in the field.  
 
Considering the decreased water supply, the WUA in the AMIS has designed 
water schedules on an ad-hoc basis.  During this period, the farmers in need of 
water make a request to the WUA chairperson. Upon receiving such requests, 
the chairperson of the WUA, in consultation with DoI staff, gives instruction 
to the Dhalepa to release the gates of the canal to allow the flow of water into 
the canal from the source lake. The pattern of water distribution in the AMIS 
is presented in Table 6.9 below.   
 
In fact there is no regular pattern in water distribution during the spring in 
the AMIS and a considerable degree of variation exists in water distribution.  
In the AMIS, allocation of water is based on need rather than entitlement.  
Unless there is a special case, water is usually, but not always, released every 
Saturday for farmers to irrigate their plots. It is therefore not surprising that 
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the water appropriation by the farmers is often reported to be inadequate, 
irrespective of locations and branches.  
 
 Table 6.9 Branch Level Water Schedules in the AMIS during 
Spring Season 
 
The inability of the AMIS to meet the increased demand for water owing to a 
decrease in water supply, has meant that apart from a few farmers at the head 
end of the canal, an overwhelming proportion of the farmers reported that 
water was severely constrained during the spring.  Whilst the water shortage 
in the AMIS could partly be associated with the nature of the water source, the 
water distribution arrangements implemented by the WUA also contributed to 
a growing disparity in water appropriation by the farmers. The lack of a 
proper and regular pattern of water distribution during the spring has added 
to the already existing head-tail inequalities in water appropriation. A growing 
number of farmers in the AMIS repeatedly argued that the pattern of water 
distribution was equally responsible for the inequitable access to irrigation 
water, as a participant in a focus group discussion argued: 
“--- if the nature of the water source is to be held responsible for 
severe water shortages in the system, why  do head-enders have  
good access to water, even during the driest period of the year? 
Branch Name Turn Volume Proportion Command  
Area in Ha 
 hours in  
one cycle 
Weekly 
Calendar 
Sainik Basti (BC1) Variables  Not proportional  
to command area  
200 As per need  
(often inadequate)  
Every 
Saturday  
Satmuhane (BC2) Variables  Not proportional to  
command area  
180 As per need 
(often inadequate) 
Every 
Saturday  
Kholako Chheu  
(BC3) 
Variables  Not proportional to  
command area  
60 As per need  
(often inadequate)  
Every 
Saturday 
Rajako Chautara  
(BC4) 
Variables Not proportional to  
command area  
140  As per need 
(often inadequate) 
Every 
Saturday 
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Should not the water shortage equally affect all the farmers within 
the system? Water itself doesn’t discriminate between head and tail-
enders, does it? Water flows where it is directed. The WUA is 
perhaps attempting to pass on the blame to the physical nature of the 
canal, but it is quite clear that the WUA is weak at the institutional 
level and the tail-enders suffer from their inabilities. People can’t be 
both witch and witch doctor at the same time!” 
(Male, 34, AMIS) 
 
6.4 Water Distribution Technology in the Irrigation Systems  
 
The following section describes the water division technologies used in the 
three irrigation systems considered for this research. 
 
   6.4.1 Use of Traditional Technology for Water Distribution in the 
FMIS  
 
The core process of irrigation practice includes control, allocation and 
distribution of water and making water available to farmers to apply for crop 
growing.  Water control structures provoke a particular type of water 
allocation and distribution practice (Pradhan, 1996).   Parajuli (1999) argues 
that the irrigation technologies employed shape operational characteristics, 
which in turn strongly influence equity, operational flexibility and 
organisational development.  
 
In the FMIS, farmers have designed and installed traditional proportional 
weirs using locally available resources.  The proportional weirs, called ‘Gahak’ 
are hydraulic structures made of timber with notches of uniform depth cut 
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into them.  The flow splinters (Gahak) which are placed across the direction of 
flow of water in the canal and divide water volumes into different secondary 
and tertiary canals which are proportionate to the land area they are 
irrigating.  The Gahak are made of wood from the simal tree, which is water 
resistant with high durability. The widths of the notches in the Gahak 
represent the farmers’ water entitlements (water share) in a particular branch.   
 
Photo 6.1 The Structure of the Gahak 
 
 
To ensure that equity in water distribution is maintained, farmers in the FMIS 
area have used a traditional pressure normalisation technique. For the 
purpose of pressure normalisation, simple wooden structures or obstructions 
made of blocks consisting of a combination of iron rods and cement are 
constructed across the flow of water to break its speed and hence normalise 
water pressure and maintain the level crest on the canal bed. It is important to 
point out that, owing to hydraulic characteristics, the water pressure decreases 
as it travels further down the canal and in absence of speed breakers, the net 
total flow of water through outlets at the head end are always more than their 
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counterparts at the tail end, despite their equal sizes. However, the use of a 
pressure normalisation technique forbids hydraulic flexibility to exceed by 
unity.10 The control of hydraulic flexibility at less than unity level helps to 
maintain uniform flow fluctuation rates in both parent and branch canals 
when water supply to the parent canal increases.  
 
Furthermore, the use of the Gahaks, coupled with the pressure normalisation 
technique has some additional advantages. First, it helps to distribute the final 
products of irrigation efforts, i.e. water, equitably according to the farmer’s 
share. Second, it helps to internalise the externalities created by the 
oversupply of water, particularly during the Monsoon.  The Gahak system 
helps to dissipate externalities equally among the farmers, and avoid the 
flooding of terrace bunds used for cultivation, as any fluctuations in water 
supply to the parent canal has equal impacts on branch canals.  Thirdly, the 
fixed structures of the Gahak have meant that a frequent adjustment of outlets 
by operational staff and farmers are not required and help maintain equity at 
lower transaction costs. Also, by using the Gahak, illegal water appropriations 
through tampering with the water division structures are minimised, as they 
are fixed and inflexible. It is the farmers who are required to manage their 
water share at secondary canal level.  
 
However, at the tertiary canal level, the use of ad-hoc adjustment of water 
distribution has meant that farmers exercise more flexibility in terms of actual 
                                               
10 It is defined as the rate of change of flow in the parent and branching canals. 
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water use and can and do exchange turns for irrigation, particularly during 
periods of water scarcity.    
 
6.10 Branch, Command Area and Size of the Gahaks in the FMIS  
 
Branch Name Command Area in 
Ha 
Size of Gahak in  
Inches 
 
Jogichaur 32 32 
Dee-area 14 14 
Kumal Gaun 26 26 
 
Saatkuriya 
Thulachaur 6 6 
Wallosaat 18 18 
Pallosaat 12 12 
Chaubiskuriya Wallochaubis 18 18 
Pallochaubis 16 16 
 
 
 
   6.4.2 Open Close Type of Water Distribution Technology in JMIS 
and AMIS  
 
The involvement of external agencies equipped with financial resources and 
technical expertise, has meant that both the AMIS and the JMIS were 
characterised by sophisticated and modern water division technologies.  
Photos 6.2 and 6.3 show the types of water division structures used in the 
AMIS and JMIS respectively.  
 
In the AMIS, the DoI has installed Open-Close slot gates, whilst in the JMIS, 
gates with Open-Close rotating heads are installed. Both the slot gates and 
rotating heads consist of bifurcated metallic hydraulic structures, fitted with 
open-close devices which are placed on the canal. These structures divide 
water into two or more parts. The mechanical nature of the equipment has 
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meant that these structures have required frequent opening and closing 
manually. 
 
Photo 6.2 Open-Close Slot Gates in AMIS 
 
 
Photo 6.3 Open-Close Rotating Gates in JMIS 
 
 
Although these structures appear sophisticated and efficient, farmers have 
struggled to operate the rotating water gates, because they are jammed with 
rust. This has resulted from the lack of proper maintenance of the canal 
infrastructure. Farmers in the rural villages lacked knowledge about the size of 
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the rotating head and their water entitlements. Often those farmers who were 
powerful and had influence used more water than they were entitled to at the 
expense of weak, smaller farmers and tail-enders. The nature of water division 
structures and their characteristics are given in Table 6.11.  
 
Table 6.11 Characteristics of Water Division Structures used in 
Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Water  
Division Structures 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Open-Close 
• Simple bifurcated hydraulic structures fitted with 
open-close  
device 
• Divide water into two or more parts 
• Frequent open/close requirement 
• Used at tertiary canal and farm level 
• Share only benefits but not risks associated with 
excessive Water 
 
 
Ad-hoc Adjustment 
 
• Simple open cut (turnout)  
• Adjustment through either altering turnout size/shape 
of hydraulic  head 
• Divide water into two or more parts 
• Great human artisanship requirement for adjustment 
• Used at main and branch canal level 
• Share only benefit but not risks associated with 
excessive water 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Proportional 
• Simple orifice or weirs 
• Divide water into two or more parts proportional to 
water share 
• Usually made of wooden timber 
• Consists of multiple notches with uniform depth 
• Used at main and branch canal 
• Share both benefits and risks associated with excessive 
water 
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6.5 Findings from Qualitative Institutional Analysis 
Based on the qualitative data obtained from key informant interviews, focus 
group discussions, documentary analysis and field notes, this section 
highlights the main themes emerging from the institutional analysis of the 
irrigation governing rules in general and rules for water distribution in 
particular, which are designed and implemented in the three irrigation 
systems considered for this research.  
 
It is clear that the PIMC is mandated by the WUA and the FMIS is 
autonomous, both in operational activities and financial transactions. The 
PIMC controls the irrigation infrastructure and water flow in the system. The 
autonomous nature of the PIMC has meant that the DoI does not interfere in 
its affairs. Increased autonomy has helped the PIMC readjust the water flow 
depending on the availability of water in the canal. The autonomous nature of 
the FMIS has ensured that decisions made are by the farmers for the farmers. 
A number of farmers in the FMIS reported that the autonomous control of the 
resources, both financial and canal infrastructure has provided them with a 
sense of ownership of the irrigation resource. Table 6.12 presents the 
summary of the institutional analysis of the AMIS, the FMIS and the JMIS, 
considered for this research.  
 
The farmers in the FMIS reported emotional attachment to the canal system. An 
elderly farmer who participated in the key informant interview said:  
 
     “---Look, this canal has been constructed with a great deal of sacrifices 
from the local farmers. The people of Phalebas have sweated a lot for the 
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canal— every drop of water flowing in the canal is our sweat and our 
ancestors’ sweats-- we worked all day--- every day for months and years 
to bring water to the Phalebas area- We feel proud and blessed to have 
this canal----the canal is a life line of every villager—and it is our 
responsibility to keep the spirit of our ancestors who dug the canal high--
-. This canal is run by the local farmers for the local farmers---!” 
                                      (Male, 85 years, FMIS)  
 
Table 6.12 Summary of Findings of Institutional Analysis  
Institutional  Principles  Irrigation  Systems 
  
 AMIS  FMIS   JMIS  
Autonomy 
 
 NO YES  PARTIAL 
  
 
  
 
 Contiguity 
 
 NO YES  NO 
 
Rights  NO YES  NO 
Proportionality 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Duties  NO YES  NO 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Techniques  NO YES  NO 
Uniformity   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Right  NO YES  NO 
  
 
  
 
 Transparency 
 
 NO YES  NO 
  
 
  
 
 Monitoring  
 
 NO YES  PARTIAL 
  
 
  
 
 Graduated 
Sanctions 
 
 NO YES  NO 
Farmers’ 
Participation 
 
 MINIMAL  FULL  PARTIAL  
 
 
Albeit partial control of the AMIS is given to the farmers and the BIMC has been 
instituted in recent years, in effect, the DoI controls the irrigation infrastructure 
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and its operational activities. The water distribution is directed by agency staff. In 
essence, the government directs and controls not just the operation of the WUA 
but also the water distribution, making the WUA non-autonomous.  The local 
users have minimal involvement in the management of their irrigation system. A 
number of farmers from the AMIS reported remarkably contrasting views 
regarding their irrigation canal, as a local farmer who participated in the focus 
group discussion said:  
 
 “---We do not know who controls this irrigation system. We have a 
puppet WUA which appears to work to please the DoI and their political 
agents. The WUA should work for the local farmers not the hakims 
(bureaucrats) in the headquarters, don’t you think so? Too much politics 
flows in the canal, there should be water flowing in the canal, not 
politics! Look, to be honest, our views are not respected here, we are 
poor small farmers. Who bothers to listen to us? We are not big people, 
you see! We also have the right to be heard by the WUA and the DoI. If 
they can come to collect a water levy from us, why can’t they come to 
discuss issues related to the irrigation system? They should come and 
talk to us and we will tell them what we need---” 
(Male, 43, AMIS) 
 
 
Similarly, although the management of the irrigation system has been devolved 
to local users in the JMIS, their participation is only partial.  The WUA in the 
JMIS works in collaboration with the DoI, particularly in relation to major O & M 
activities which require technical support. Since t
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with the DoI, it has some input into operational activities, but the final decisions 
regarding the canal system, including both financial and structural changes, have 
to be approved by the DoI. This has made the RIMC more of a semi-autonomous 
entity than completely independent. The lack of ownership in the management of 
the irrigation canal in the JMIS was noted by local farmers, as a key interviewee 
said: 
 
“---There is a crisis of identity between the WUA and the DoI in this 
system. The tussle between DoI and the WUA has resulted in a chaotic 
situation here. Come mid-June, they will be looking at each other as to 
who should do the O&M activities. The WUA thinks the DoI should 
provide financial and technical resources for the O & M activities but the 
DoI thinks it is the responsibility of the local farmers to carry out the O 
& M activities. What is a major O & M activity is also not clear. What is 
major to WUA is not major to the DoI. We do not feel in charge of our 
own canal. This is a real shame but what to do---” 
(Male 55, Ex-Chairman of RIMC)  
 
It is argued that the lack of a sense of ownership of the irrigation resource 
amongst the farmers has serious implications for much needed collective 
action in managing the irrigation system in general and carrying out O & M 
activities in particular.  The data indicated that the FMIS demonstrated a 
greater degree of not only autonomy but also financial flexibility, including 
revenue generation, fixing and collection of the water levy and the spending 
pattern. The ‘bottom up’ approach adopted in the FMIS helped to foster 
collective goals rather than the pursuit of self-centred individual goals 
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amongst the irrigators. In contrast, failure to provide financial and 
operational autonomy and a ‘top-down’ approach of irrigation governance 
adopted in the AMIS and JMIS gave very little incentive to the local farmers 
(Hilton, 1992).  The autonomous nature of the FMIS provided opportunities 
to identify, assess and prioritise the needs of the local farmers and give a 
prompt response to any problem.  The non-autonomous nature of the JMIS 
and the AMIS has meant that the farmers have lacked the authority to 
identify, assess and prioritise their needs. The DoI assumed the role of priority 
setting for local farmers, often failing to consult the local farmers  and 
imposing its own agenda over them. The persistent communication gap 
between the local farmers and the DoI lengthened the response time in 
combating any contingencies related to the irrigation system.  
 
   6.5.1 Contiguity in Water Distributions  
It is clear that all the farmers in the FMIS appropriate water with the same 
frequency, and the water distribution takes place continuously during the 
Monsoon season. However, during periods of water scarcity, a timed rotational 
distribution is practised. At the field channel levels, irrigation takes place 
upwards from the tail-ends of branch canals during the winter and downward 
from the head end during the spring. This not only makes water distribution a 
conspicuous activity but also helps to ensure the reliability of water supply in the 
FMIS. 
 
The contiguous order in the water distribution, particularly during periods of 
water scarcity is fundamental not just for water conservation but also in 
achieving collective outcomes.  The contiguous nature of water scheduling in the 
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FMIS has a number of advantages.  First, the farmers in the FMIS prioritised tail-
enders by allowing them to irrigate first. In this way, the farmers were able to 
mitigate the risk of crop failure at the tail-end owing to lack of water.  Second, the 
progression of  movement of water upward in the canal, starting from the tail-
end, on the one hand made farmers aware of their turn for irrigation and on the 
on the minimised chances of water theft.  Third, contiguous water application 
during rotational distribution concentrated irrigation activities in one branch, 
which made the entire irrigation process a more visible public event and farmers 
could observe each others’ activities. This helped to deter fraudulent water 
appropriation.  Fourth, the contiguity principles were easy for farmers to 
understand and follow. 
 
Farmers in both the AMIS and the JMIS do not appropriate water with the same 
frequency.  Even when there is a continuous supply of water, farmers struggle to 
operate the rotating water gates because they are jammed with rust. This is the 
result of a lack of proper maintenance of the canal infrastructure. The farmers in 
the rural villages lacked knowledge about the size of the rotating head and their 
water entitlements. Often powerful farmers who have greater influence, use more 
water than they are entitled to at the expense of weak, smaller farmers and the  
tail-enders. Farmers neither use water with same frequency nor is the 
distribution according to landholdings under cultivation.  Although farmers 
practice a timed rotation method of water distribution, this does not reflect 
equity in the distribution of water. Farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS had not 
followed any ordered pattern in the distribution of water. The movement of water 
along the canal was “zigzag” lacking any contiguity.  However, both in the AMIS 
and JMIS, the lack of contiguity in irrigation made the rules complicated, as 
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water scheduling followed a “zigzag” pattern which left abundant opportunity for 
water theft.  The farmers in the JMIS and the AMIS appropriated water with 
variable frequencies and the lack of knowledge on the size of the rotating heads at 
the outlet meant that farmers were not aware if they appropriated water as per 
their entitlements. 
 
   6.5.2 Proportionality in Distribution of Rights and Duties  
    6.5.2.1 Proportionality of Distribution of Rights  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Six (Section 6.7.1), all the farmers in the FMIS 
receive water with the same  frequency, although with different  time slots 
proportional to the  amount of land cultivated, irrespective of landholdings and 
their locations. However, the water distribution in the AMIS and the JMIS did 
not take into account the principle of proportionality, i.e. water entitlements were 
not according to the amount of irrigable and cultivated lands. As a result, head-
tail inequalities were rampant, both in the AMIS and the JMIS. Also, the 
distributional mechanisms adopted provided loopholes for farmers to exploit in 
using water unlawfully at the costs of the other farmers, particularly the tail-
enders.  
     
    6.5.2.2 Proportionality of Distribution Duties 
The qualitative data indicate that in the FMIS, all users are expected to contribute 
their fair share of labour for O & M activities and to pay the water levies 
according to the landholdings using canal water for irrigation.  However, in the 
AMIS, the O & M activities are not performed on the basis of proportionality. 
Small, marginal farmers and those from the lower castes tend to be active in O & 
M activities whilst larger and better off farmers do not contribute their fair share. 
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The response of the DoI towards canal maintenance has been slow and 
inadequate, having an enormous impact on the water distribution in the canal 
system.  
 
Similarly, in the JMIS, the contributions made by the local farmers is not 
commensurate with the benefits they derive from the canal, i.e. the participation 
in O & M activities does not take place according to the principles of 
proportionality. Small, marginal, tail-enders and farmers from the dalit castes 
contribute more towards O & M activities compared to larger and better off 
farmers. The DoI take responsibility for any ‘major’ O & M activities while ‘minor’ 
O & M activities are to be carried out by the user farmers. However, the 
understanding of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ activities is not clearly defined and often 
misinterpreted. This has led to high expectations of local farmers from the DoI 
and vice versa.  
 
   6.5.3 Uniformity in the Distributions of Water Rights, Duties and 
Techniques  
 
    6.5.3.1 Uniformity in Distributions of Water Rights and Duties  
Similarly, uniformity in water appropriation remains a critical factor in 
enhancing farmers’ access to water.  In the FMIS, the farmers receive water with 
the same frequency, and in the case of farmers being convincingly in need of 
more water, they are able to negotiate with their neighbours and the WUA for 
further allowances.  This must be approved by the WUA and the farmers assured 
that everyone will be provided with similar opportunities if needs are felt. 
However, in both the AMIS and the JMIS, farmers receive water with variable 
frequency. Although in principle, farmers’ water rights corresponded to the size 
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of landholdings under cultivation, there was clear evidence of inequalities in 
water distribution. The head-tail inequalities, and inequalities across 
landholdings and castes were obvious. 
 
Uniformity in water distribution takes place in two ways, namely frequency 
and water distribution technology.  Uniformity in water distribution in the 
FMIS helps to bring a basic commonality amongst the farmers and 
contributes towards achieving equitable distribution of irrigation water. It also 
helps to minimise suspicion amongst farmers regarding their water 
appropriation, because everybody in the system is irrigating with the same 
frequency. Also, uniformity in water distribution technology helps to achieve 
equitable water distribution amongst the farmers, as described later in 
Chapter Six (Section 6.6.3.2).   The farmers in the FMIS irrigated with the 
same frequency in all three cropping seasons, whilst the farmers in the AMIS 
and the JMIS irrigated with variable frequencies. Whilst it is true that 
different crops have different water requirements, the farmers in the AMIS 
and the JMIS areas had more or less similar cropping patterns but dissimilar 
frequency in water appropriation. This raised doubts over the activities of the 
farmers who were irrigating more frequently than those who did not get water 
with the same frequency.  Also, the farmers in the FMIS had installed Gahaks 
in their entire system, which brought uniformity in water distribution, while 
in the AMIS and the JMIS farmers used variable methods. The ad-hoc 
adjustment at the outlets in the AMIS and the JMIS left real opportunities for 
some farmers to appropriate water disproportionately.  
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The proportionality principles both in rights and duties appear to be the most 
important factors in ensuring equitable water distribution.  The water 
distribution in the FMIS conformed to the proportionality principles on which 
the allocations of water rights were based. The water distribution was 
proportionate to farmers’ cultivated land. There was more or less a single 
water to land ratio in the FMIS while the water distribution did not take place 
on proportional basis in either the AMIS or the JMIS. The water scheduling 
designed and implemented in the AMIS and the JMIS did not conform to 
proportionality principles. Consequently, some farmers appropriated more 
water than they were entitled to, while others did not get their fair share of 
water. Similarly, the O& M responsibilities were not proportionally distributed 
amongst the farmers in the AMIS and JMIS, while they were distributed 
proportionately amongst the farmers in the FMIS. The proportionate 
distribution of both rights and accompanying duties amongst the farmers 
helped to achieve fairness amongst them, which in turn helped to achieve 
collective goals.   
 
    6.5.3.2 Uniformity in Water Distribution Techniques 
The technological adaptations used in the FMIS were exercised uniformly in 
all outlets ensure fair distribution of water proportional to the amount of 
cultivated lands. The use of similar technology, i.e. the Gahaks, in water 
division at the outlet levels helped to reduce conflict among the farmers, as all 
the branches got their fair share.  Although the canal infrastructures in the 
AMIS and the JMIS had sophisticated equipment such as rotation gates, the 
water was not distributed in an equitable manner. The farmers also lacked 
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knowledge on operating the rotating heads of the gates. The rotating gates 
were rusty and jammed, owing to lack of regular maintenance.  
 
The proportionality principles both in rights and duties appeared to be the 
most important factors in ensuring equitable water distribution.  The water 
distribution in the FMIS conformed to the proportionality principles on which 
the allocations of water rights were based. Water distribution was 
proportionate to farmers’ cultivated land. There was more or less a single 
water to land ratio in the FMIS, while distribution did not take place on a 
proportional basis in either the AMIS or the JMIS. The water schedule 
designed and implemented in the AMIS and the JMIS did not conform to 
proportionality principles. Consequently, some farmers appropriated more 
water than their entitlement, while others did not get their fair share of water. 
Similarly, the O & M responsibilities were not proportionately distributed 
amongst the farmers in the AMIS and JMIS, while they were amongst the 
farmers in the FMIS. Proportionate distribution of both rights and 
accompanying duties amongst the farmers helped to achieve fairness and 
foster collective goals.   
 
   6.5.4. Transparency in Irrigation Governance  
An equally important factor, which is critical for ensuring good governance in the 
management of irrigation, is that of transparency. Transparency in both financial 
and operational terms helped to establish a healthy relationship and build trust 
amongst the members of the WUA committees and the irrigators. The absence of 
transparency would create mistrust and reduce much needed social capital in 
irrigation management.  Allocation and the rules for water use were known to all 
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users in the FMIS. Also, an adequate monitoring mechanism was put in place in 
the FMIS and helped to ensure compliance to the rules. In the FMIS, the WUA 
had a regular audit of its accounts and financial transactions and its operational 
activities, while such arrangements were absent in the AMIS and the JMIS.  A 
level of trust amongst the farmers in the FMIS in their WUA committee members 
was significantly higher than that of the farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS.  A 
high level of trust and faith in their WUA provided farmers in the FMIS with 
incentives to participate in irrigation related activities.   
 
However, the farmers in both the AMIS and the JMIS did not understand the 
water allocation principles fully and did not adhere to the proposed allocation 
principles. There was absence of an adequate monitoring mechanism for 
infringement of rules. The WUA had poor accountability and there was no 
transparency in the financial operation of the WUA because of the absence of 
proper financial auditing. 
 
   6.5.5 Regularity in Water Distributions   
For the last 14 years, the PIMC has been practising the same routine for water 
distribution (although the routine varies within the branch) and the use of 
‘tinpalo’ and ‘pachpalo’ to ensure regularity and uniformity in water distribution. 
More importantly, in each branch canal, the farmers always irrigate from the tail 
end, which means they have a robust and regular water distribution mechanism 
both at the branch canal level and at the field plot level. However, in the AMIS 
and the JMIS, the WUA didn’t follow a regular pattern in water distribution at 
either level. The irregular pattern of water distribution made water availability 
unreliable for the farmers. Also, the distribution pattern practised by the farmers 
 447
in the JMIS was not the most effective or efficient use of water. Opening few 
outlets at the head and tail-end omitting the outlets in the middle sections, 
provided plenty of loopholes for farmers to use water unlawfully.  
 
   6.5.6 Monitoring Farmers’ Irrigation Related Activities    
It is important to point out that an appropriate monitoring mechanism 
helps to ensure that the ‘rules of the game’ are followed appropriately and 
sanctions are imposed to penalise fraudsters, which in turn helps ensure 
‘best practice’ in the management of irrigation systems. The farmers in the 
FMIS had appropriate monitoring mechanisms for ‘keeping track’ of each 
other regarding irrigation related activities. The monitoring was done 
through the Dhalepas and the katuwal. The monitors were independent 
and credible in their operation and were neither coerced nor intimidated. 
Along with monitoring of farmers, the WUA was scrutinised for its 
operation to ensure transparency.  
 
Although Dhalepas were present both in the AMIS and the JMIS, they 
were assumed to have responsibility to the DoI rather than the local WUA. 
Neither the individuals nor the WUA were properly monitored. Dhalepas 
were often coerced and intimidated during their activities. A lack of 
monitoring of users left plenty of loopholes for farmers to free ride and 
steal water, while absence of accountability in the WUA resulted in 
financial irregularities and ineffective governance. The Dhalepas 
employed by the DoI assumed they were answerable to the DoI rather than 
the WUA and conflicts of interests were common. The Dhalepas were 
intimidated to release water for the use of powerful and abusive farmers. 
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The independence and integrity of the Dhalepas were pushed aside. 
Neither the activities of the defrauding farmers nor of the WUA committee 
were monitored properly, which resulted in accountability in the WUA and 
financial irregularities and ineffective governance. 
 
   6.5.7 Graduated Sanctions 
A sanctioning mechanism also remains crucial for ensuring good 
governance in irrigation management. In the FMIS, the WUA have 
developed and implemented a range of sanctioning mechanisms which 
were commensurate with the gravity of the offences in irrigation related 
activities. Although they had been written into the constitution, sanctions 
were not implemented effectively in either the AMIS or the JMIS. 
Individuals vandalising canal infrastructures and water defrauders were 
not punished according to the gravity of the offence. This made it too easy 
for farmers to get away with canal vandalism and water defrauding.  
 
   6.5.8 Farmers’ Participation  
The importance of user participation in the management of natural resources 
including irrigation resources, have been increasingly recognised by national 
and international policy circles (Mark et al., 2009; Hilton, 1992). Whilst the 
typologies of participation have already been presented in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.10.2), those models of participation have relevance in explaining 
the nature of farmers’ participation with the irrigation issues and the capacity 
in which farmers interact with the irrigation bureaucracy, particularly with the 
DoI. Figure 6.2 presents the nature of participation of the farmers in the 
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management of their irrigation system considered for this research using 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Level of Participation in the three irrigation systems 
using a ladder of participation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the three irrigation systems considered in this study, the level of 
participation of the irrigators in the management of the AMIS was the least, 
which was almost non-existence. In Arnstein’s ladder of participation, the 
participation of farmers in the AMIS was at the lower end of the ladder. This is 
because the DoI played a dominant role in managing all aspects of the canal 
system in the AMIS and the farmers had little participation in the 
development efforts of their irrigation canal system. Even though the local 
farmers were consulted at times, those consultations were manipulative and 
therapeutic (Rafter, 1984) and characterised by complete dominance of the 
DoI (Lam, 1998). When the DoI made visits to the canal area for a run-
through along the canal to identify damages in infrastructures and budget 
Citizen Control 
Delegated Power 
Partnerships  
Citizen Power  
Consultation 
Informing 
Placation  
Tokenism  
Therapy 
Manipulation  
Non-Participation  
Medium Participation: JMIS  
Strong Participation: FMIS  
Weak Participation: AMIS  
 450 
estimations for repairing such damages, the farmers only took the officials 
around the canal and did not have the opportunity to take part in the 
interventions that followed. As such the farmers in the AMIS lacked a sense of 
ownership of their irrigation system because of the failure on DoI’s part to 
involve them in decision-making pertinent to their irrigation system (Adnan et 
al., 1992; Duyne, 1998). A sense of frustration amongst the farmers because of 
the dominance of the DoI in canal management was frequently expressed by 
the local farmers, as one of them said:  
 
“---Because we are poor small farmers, our views are not respected 
here, Who bothers listening to us? We are not big people, you see! We 
also have right to be heard from the WUA and the DoI---” 
                                                                 (Male 43, AMIS) 
 
In the AMIS, the DoI not only controlled the WUA and O & M activities, it also 
controlled water distribution through its agency staff.  In this sense, the 
farmers in the AMIS appeared to be only the passive recipients of irrigation 
interventions as the government directs and controls not just the operation of 
the WUA but also the water distribution.  The local users have minimal 
involvement in the management of their irrigation system. Also, as the AMIS 
was non-autonomous, the farmers’ level of engagement in the management of 
irrigation was passive and manipulative where the DoI played an exclusive 
role in decision-making. The nominal participation (White, 1996) of the 
farmers in the AMIS did not provide a platform for them to be heard and their 
viewpoints to be considered in making decisions on the irrigation system.  
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Whilst the level of farmers’ participation in the JMIS was higher than the one 
present in the AMIS, the nature of participation was piecemeal in which their 
participation was only during the consultations without any power to 
influence the decisions and interventions, which followed such consultations.  
The participation of farmers in the JMIS took place in the form of functional 
participation (Pretty, 1995). The functional participation of farmers in the 
management of the irrigation system played an instrumental role as it enabled 
the DoI to meet project objectives, and most importantly reduce operation 
costs. For example, farmers in the JMIS were required to contribute towards 
O & M activities compulsorily to reduce canal operation costs by the DoI. The 
farmers in the JMIS, particularly, the tail-enders repeatedly mentioned a lack 
of collaboration between the DoI and the WUA, as one farmer said:  
 
“--- Lets not talk about irrigation water for us! --- The DoI doesn’t 
care if we get water or not. They come and ask for our labour 
contribution during Operation and Maintenance activities---” 
                                              (Male 28, JMIS) 
 
Although the farmers were consulted in problem identification such as 
spotting damage to infrastructures, they were not involved in making 
decisions and/or allocating budget nor did the DoI have mandatory 
obligations to integrate farmers’ views in decision-making. A lack of 
mandatory obligations by the DoI to incorporate outcomes of the 
consultations has meant that farmers’ participation was a mere tokenism 
rather than a genuine participation as one farmer from the middle section of 
the JMIS said:  
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“Overseers come, they just talk big things with the big people here, 
they neither talk with us nor we hear what they talk about with the big 
people --- we know our problems regarding the canal, just talking big 
things with big people alone does not solve the local problems 
associated with the canal---” 
                                                                   (Male, 39, JMIS) 
 
However, the level of farmers’ participations in the FMIS can be considered to 
remain on the top of the “ladder of participation” as proposed by Arnstein 
(1969). The autonomous nature of the FMIS has meant that farmers had 
operational independence both in O & M activities and financial transactions. 
The farmers had full control of their irrigation infrastructure in terms of its 
management, including water distribution. The autonomous nature of the 
FMIS also provided the WUA, which was responsible for managing the canal 
on a day-to-day basis, with a favourable environment free from any 
interference from the DoI. All the decisions related to irrigation issues are 
made at the local level with full participation of the beneficiary farmers. Also, 
the farmers’ participation was highly interactive as they were involved in all 
aspects of problem identification, policy formulation and decision-making. 
Such level of autonomy provided the local farmers a sense of ownership of the 
canal resources as an elderly female said:  
“---this is our canal and we manage it. We collect water fee and use it 
for the betterment of the canal, basically we are the in-charge here! We 
collect the fee; we manage it as our needs---” 
                                         (Female, 49, FMIS) 
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The five-tier model of participation proposed by Pretty (1995) can be used to 
understand and explain the nature of farmers’ participation in the 
management of the three irrigation systems considered for this study.  
 
The AMIS was characterised by minimal involvement of the local farmers in 
the management of their irrigation system. Government bureaucracy through 
the DoI heavily influenced all the aspects of the AMIS. Whilst the 
participation of the local farmers was encouraged in the JMIS, participation 
was partial and piecemeal. The level of farmers’ participation in the 
management of the AMIS was very weak.  The DoI played an exclusive role in 
making decisions regarding all aspects of irrigation systems including 
construction, O & M activities and budget allocations. In the AMIS, the WUA 
responsible for liaising with the DoI was unelected and did not demonstrate 
accountability towards the farmers. There is a burgeoning literature on 
unelected leadership and lack of accountability in development discourses 
(Blair, 2000; Haas, 2004; Benner et al., 2004; Bäckstrand, 2006). 
 
Table 6.13 presents the characteristic of participation of local farmers in the 
management of their irrigation system using typologies of participation 
proposed by Pretty (1995). The Pretty’s five-tier model of participation used to 
understand the different degree of farmers’ involvement in the management 
of irrigation systems was different in the three irrigation systems considered 
for this research.  
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Table 6.13 Characteristics of Participation in the three irrigation systems  
 
Type 
  
Characteristics  
 
Manipulative 
Participation 
No decision power on users, unelected 
representation 
Passive Participation 
Lack of user engagement, unilateral decision 
making by external agency 
Participation by 
consultation 
A mere consultation with users, non-mandatory 
incorporation of consultation during decision 
making 
Functional participation 
Users participation to only to reduce costs and 
meet pre-determined project objectives 
Interactive participation 
A dynamic and holistic participation of users in 
all stages of project, including problem 
identification, assessment and decision making 
Self-mobilisation  
Users participate through their own initiatives 
Independently in all aspects of project  
 
 
Adapted with modifications from Pretty (1995). 
Medium Participation: JMIS  
Strong Participation: FMIS  
Weak Participation: AMIS  
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The unaccountability of the WUA coupled with unilateral decision-making by 
the DoI has meant the nature of farmers’ participation in the AMIS was 
manipulative where the WUA operated just to please the DoI rather than 
contributing towards local development. Also, a lack of proper user 
engagements in the management of irrigation canal in the AMIS has meant 
that the farmers are passive recipient of development interventions. Although 
the DoI had both financial resources and technical expertise, a lack of 
institutional arrangement to consult and empower farmers has contributed 
towards such a low level of participation (Huppert, 2008). The farmers in the 
AMIS repeatedly expressed such lack of consultations by the DoI, as a local 
farmer said:  
 
“---The water distribution schedules are prepared based on the 
experience of the Terai (southern plains) whereas our local 
topography and soils are totally different.  ---And this is the 
consequence of a lack of consultation with the local farmers---” 
                                                 (Male, 39, AMIS)  
 
Whilst the level of farmers’ participation in the JMIS was higher than the 
AMIS, such participations were mere consultations with the users rather than 
genuine participation. In the JMIS, the local farmers contributed towards 
minor O & M activities, whilst the DoI carried out the major O & M activities. 
However, both farmers and the DoI differently interpreted the notions of 
major and minor O & M activities. As a result, there was an apparent 
mismatch between each other’s expectations and contributions in the 
management of the irrigation system.  
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Also, the DoI did not have mandatory obligations to respond to the issues 
raised during the consultations with the farmers. The professional hegemony 
enjoyed by the DoI staff enabled them to make unilateral decision without 
being accountable to the farmers.  Although the farmers in the JMIS 
participated in the O & M activities, such participation had a number of 
functional roles as describe by Pretty (1995). Firstly, farmers’ involvement in 
the O & M activities has helped to reduce operational costs by the DoI.  
Secondly, such functional participation enabled the DoI to achieve per-
determined project goals at lower costs (Inocencio et al., 2005; Cornish and 
Perry, 2005).  
 
The FMIS demonstrated a high degree of farmer participation in the 
management of the irrigation system. The farmers were involved in all 
aspects, including O & M activities, sanctions, construction, levy collection 
and so on. The farmers in the FMIS had a real sense of ownership of their 
irrigation resources.  Also, the WUA was more inclusive in the FMIS, with 
representation of dalits, women, tail-enders and marginal farmers, whilst the 
WUA in the AMIS and JMIS was characterised by hegemony of the large and 
powerful farmers.  The level of participation demonstrated by the farmers in 
the FMIS was strong and interactive. The farmers in the FMIS were involved 
in all the stages of irrigation management including problem identification, 
assessment of the local needs and decision makings regarding their irrigation 
system (Korten, 1980; Uphoff, 1986). The nature of farmers’ participation was 
in line with the Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) proposed by the 
World Bank, one of the major donors in funding a large number of irrigation 
systems in many developing countries (World Bank, 1996). The farmers in the 
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FMIS were involved in ‘all aspects’ including information sharing, with WUA, 
joint assessment of problems and shared decision-making (World Bank, 
2007); and in ‘all stages’ including construction, supervision and financing,  
O & M activities, and monitoring and evaluation of the system (Renault et al., 
2007). The autonomous nature of the WUA managing the FMIS has meant 
that the farmers could involve at ‘all levels’ including both tertiary, secondary 
and main system level (Svendsen et al., 2000). 
 
6.6 Conclusions  
This chapter has sought to provide a bigger picture of the issues concerning 
irrigation governance in Nepal by presenting a qualitative institutional 
analysis. The IAD framework is used to understand the details of water 
distribution arrangements in the three irrigation systems considered for this 
research. By using the IAD framework, it has been possible to investigate the 
complex action situations which comprised of both natural and socio-
economic conditions in which the interactions amongst the farmers and 
between farmers, and irrigation bureaucracy occurred. Those action situations 
are influenced by various factors such as attributes of the physical world, 
attributes of community, and rules-in-use. The interactions at all three levels: 
operational, collective choice and constitutional choice; are influenced by the 
rules in use which appropriators use for ordering their own relationships with 
regards to the irrigation system.  All the irrigation related activities including, 
O & M activities, water appropriation, payment of water levy, sanctions, 
formation and composition of the WUA and water distribution, are guided by 
the institutional structures designed and implemented for the governance of 
the irrigation systems.  The institutional analysis carried out in this chapter 
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has demonstrated that the institutional setup differ amongst irrigation 
systems governed by different property right structures; the nature of 
interactions amongst the farmers also vary considerably.  
  
The irrigation systems governed by different property rights structures have 
designed and implemented different sets of water distribution arrangements, 
both at the intra-branch canal and inter-branch canal levels.  The results show 
that farmers use different rules in different cropping seasons. This is done to 
cope with different levels of water availability and water requirements of the 
crops. However, some irrigation systems are more flexible and consistent in 
re-adjusting the distribution pattern within the canal command area than 
others.  The comparative study of institutional arrangements in the three 
irrigation systems indicates that the FMIS was autonomous from the DoI in its 
operation and governance, whilst the JMIS and the AMIS were to a large 
extent controlled by the DoI.  The AMIS was more dependent on the DoI than 
the JMIS.  The involvement of the DoI in the management of AMIS has 
interfered in the water distribution, while its involvement in the management 
of the canal has created confusion over the roles of the WUA and the DoI. The 
expectations and misunderstandings of each other’s responsibilities has 
meant that co-ordination has become very difficult in both in the AMIS and 
the JMIS, whilst the autonomous nature of the FMIS has made it flexible and 
easy to organise irrigation related activities.  
 
Contiguity and uniformity in water application remain important features for 
successful irrigation governance. The contiguity (pattern) and uniformity 
(similar frequency) in water application help to ensure predictability in water 
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supply and in generating a critical mass in organising operation and 
maintenance activities. The farmers in the FMIS always applied water from 
the tail-end of the branch canal, following both uniformity and contiguity 
patterns.  In doing so, the farmers have prioritised the needs of the most 
vulnerable group of farmers for accessing irrigation water. Apart from 
ensuring provision of water at the tail-ends, the contiguity pattern makes 
water supply more reliable and predictable. The reliability and predictability 
in water supply informs farmers of the timing and duration of their allocated 
share. However, both in the AMIS and the JMIS the irrigation pattern lacked 
contiguity. The absence of contiguity in the application of irrigation water not 
only makes water availability unreliable and unpredictable but also increases 
opportunistic behaviour amongst the irrigators. In turn, this aggravated head-
tail inequalities and inequalities in water appropriation across other 
heterogeneities.  
 
The notion of proportionality both in rights and duties appears to play a 
crucial role not only for ensuring farmers’ water allocation but also fulfilment 
of designated responsibilities. The proportionality principles in rights and 
duties and their strict enforcement has helped to maintain the canal systems 
in the FMIS area, whilst the lack of a strong mechanism in the enforcement of 
this principle has led to weak participation and often inequitable contribution 
to irrigation related activities resulting in poor conditions in the canal systems 
both in the AMIS and JMIS areas. The physical conditions of the canals have 
also influenced farmers’ abilities to appropriate their rightful claim to water.  
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Transparency, monitoring and graduated sanctions complement each other. 
For the WUA, transparency both in financial and operational activities is 
critical in securing farmers’ support in successful management of the canal 
system. Monitoring helps to ensure transparency from the WUA as well as the 
farmers. The ability to monitor each other’s activities helps to remove ‘clouds 
of doubts’ and ‘a climate of mistrust’ between farmers and the WUA and 
amongst the farmers themselves.  The prevalence of sanctions and their strict 
enforcement help to reduce fraudulent activities in irrigation management. 
The sanctions help to ensure accepted norms of behaviour, both from the 
WUA and the farmers, in their conduct in irrigation management.  However, 
graduated sanctions have been successfully designed and implemented in 
some irrigation systems, whilst in others they have not been strictly enforced. 
Availability and enforcement of sanctions in the FMIS have meant that 
fraudulent activities have been minimised, including water theft and 
vandalism of canal infrastructures, using a “tough love” approach. Lack of 
both a proper monitoring mechanism and also of sanctions in the AMIS and 
JMIS have meant that destruction of the canal infrastructure and incidence of 
water theft were rampant. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
 
7.1 Chapter Overview   
 
This chapter draws together the main findings of this research in order to 
address the research objectives and answer the research questions set out in 
Chapter One. In doing so, it revisits the research objectives and the associated 
research questions and discusses some policy implications of the research 
findings. It also sheds light on the importance of institutions in understanding 
water distribution and irrigation governance in general. This thesis has 
attempted to illustrate the distributive aspects of irrigation water under 
different property rights regimes through an institutional analysis of water 
distribution mechanisms in three irrigation systems in Nepal. In-depth and 
comparative analysis of three irrigation systems which are governed by 
different property rights regimes have been carried out. This chapter draws 
some conclusions based on the analysis and results presented in the previous 
chapters. It also highlights the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis 
and describes the direction of future research for exploring distributional 
implications of irrigation management and the role of institutions in achieving 
the equity goals of irrigation interventions.  
 
7.2 Introduction  
Water as a valuable natural resource contributes to our lives in a myriad of 
complex ways, including providing water for irrigation and industrial 
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purposes, sustaining complex ecosystems (Petts, 1998; Saleth and Dinar, 
2004) and sustaining livelihoods of many rural poor in developing countries 
(Lipton, 2007; Reardon and Vosti, 1995). Irrigation water is vital to the 
livelihood strategies of many vulnerable people in these countries, but water 
resources have faced fierce pressures owing to increasing demand and 
constrained supply. The demand on water is increasing daily, owing to the 
need for expansion of agricultural activities to meet the food demand of 
increasing populations and rapid urbanisation. But water on a daily basis 
becomes more scarce owing to deterioration in both quality and quantity 
because of the effects of climate change and over-exploitation.  
 
Irrigation continues to remain the single most important sector for water 
consumption with 70 percent taking place in the agricultural sector worldwide 
and more than 96 percent in Nepal (WECS, 2001).  In order to manage 
irrigation systems, different institutional arrangements are designed and 
implemented all over the world and Nepal is no exception. Nepalese irrigation 
systems are managed by three types of property rights regimes, which are 
characterised by distinct sets of institutional arrangements.   
 
Firstly, historical evidence vis-à-vis present trends show Nepal’s rich portrayal 
of farmers’ engagement in the management of irrigation canals which have 
become commonly known as the FMIS. The FMIS continue to occupy a 
prominent position in agricultural development in Nepal as they are the 
highest contributors towards the gross irrigated agricultural practices. 
Currently the FMIS contribute up to 70 per cent of total irrigated land 
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(Pradhan, 2000). The role of FMIS is critical in the hilly areas since as much 
as 90 percent of irrigated areas derive water from them as compared to about 
70 percent in the Terai (Pradhan, 2005).  Many FMIS are designed, 
constructed and managed by local farmers using locally available resources 
and traditional technologies. Mostly, the canal linings are run-of-the- river 
diversions where the headworks are made of mud (Chappari), stones and 
wooden logs/leaves (Jhikra) and the canal linings are not cement plastered.  
The temporary headwork and non-plastered canal linings are prone to 
damage by heavy flooding during the monsoon seasons and require frequent 
maintenance and repairs. Also, the management aspects of the FMIS are 
devolved to local users associations called Water Users Association (WUAs). 
The local WUAs are governed by an elected body (usually elected for a period 
of two years) and make rules and regulations regarding water distribution, 
water allocation, expansions and maintenance.  Since the management of 
FMIS is a collective enterprise availability of water and its equitable 
distribution remains critical for the function of both irrigation infrastructure 
and the management committees. 
 
Secondly, whilst the FMIS have been operating in Nepal since historic time, it 
was not until the inception of a planned development in mid-1950s that Nepal 
witnessed a surge in the development of irrigation infrastructures through the 
involvement of the government and external agencies. The irrigation systems, 
which are designed, constructed and managed either by the government or 
external agencies, are commonly known as the AMIS. Since many AMIS have 
a huge construction and maintenance budget, they are usually large in size 
and technologically robust. They have permanent headworks and the canal 
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linings are cement plastered. The management of AMIS is done through the 
DoI which is an auxiliary body of the Government of Nepal solely responsible 
for the development of irrigation infrastructures in Nepal.  
 
Thirdly, some irrigation systems are jointly managed by the beneficiary 
farmers and the government or an external agency. These irrigation systems 
are commonly called Jointly Managed Irrigation Systems (JMIS). The design 
and construction of the JMIS is carried out by the DoI, which also manages 
the canals for first few years of their operation. The DoI or the external agency 
involved in the management of canals also invests significant amounts of its 
resources in the development of communal capacity for the management of 
the irrigation systems. The management of the canals are handed to the 
beneficiary farmers when the farmers are capable and willing to undertake the 
management responsibilities. In the JMIS, the government carries out the 
major O & M activities while the farmers contribute towards minor O & M 
activities.  
 
 
In Nepal, as elsewhere in many developing countries, irrigation has been 
advocated as a vehicle for poverty reduction and substantial investments have 
been made in this sector by both national government and international donor 
organisations. While the expansion of irrigation infrastructures is good and 
should be welcomed, the distributional aspects of irrigation development have 
rarely been explored. Equally, despite a major policy shift in irrigation 
management from government to local users, its impact has not been 
adequately assessed, especially from the perspectives of the local farmers. In 
response to these problems, this research has carried out an in-depth and 
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comparative institutional analysis of irrigation management in the mid-hills of 
Nepal. The thesis has considered various stakeholders who have an interest in 
irrigation governance and has considered the benefit appropriation by farmers 
with different capacities. In particular, this thesis has aimed to demonstrate 
the level of access to irrigation water by the marginal and weak farmers in 
rural Nepal. The level of access to irrigation water by small landholders, dalits, 
tail-enders and female-headed households in the three irrigation systems 
which are governed by different property rights regimes has been investigated.  
The thesis also has looked at the institutional arrangements of irrigation 
governance in general and water distribution in particular in different 
irrigation systems governed by three different property rights regimes. The 
aim of the comparative institutional analysis was to identify institutional 
barriers and how they have influenced the level of benefit appropriation from 
irrigation resources, particularly by weak and marginal farmers.   
 
These three irrigation systems, which are governed by three different property 
rights regimes, were selected for an in-depth case study. In addition to 
property rights regimes, the thesis aimed to investigate the role of institutions 
in farmers’ abilities to access water. The data generated for this study come 
from a range of sources, both primary and secondary. The primary data were 
generated in a number of ways, including a household survey, focused group 
discussions and key informant interviews. The secondary data included 
government publications, reviews, and project appraisal reports.  
 
The government has formulated a plethora of policy interventions which 
essentially sought to hand over management responsibilities to the local 
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irrigation communities in one form or another under the aegis of ‘Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT)’. The Water Resource Act (WRA) of 1992 paved 
the way for transferring irrigation management responsibilities to local users, 
and was followed by The Irrigation Regulation of 1999 and the amended 
Irrigation Policy of 2003, both advocating increasing performance and 
enhancing cost recovery from the irrigation systems. The involvement of 
communities in the management of natural resources, including irrigation 
systems, were considered solutions to problems such as information 
asymmetries, incentive incompatibility, lack of effective monitoring and 
maintenance, which were endemic to state management (Ostrom and 
Gardner, 1993). 
 
Although there are compelling theoretical arguments for and in support of 
transferring irrigation systems to local users, and the impetus for doing so is 
strong, the distributional implications of policy change need to be considered.  
I am in no way advocating centralisation of natural resource management, but 
arguing that the IMT should not be taken at face value as a panacea for the 
problems associated with many agency managed irrigation systems. The 
assumption that the transfer of management roles to local users automatically 
leads to an equitable distribution of the resource bases should be scrutinised.  
In fact, evidence has demonstrated that the objectives of many projects 
involving management transfer to local users, such as resource productivity, 
equity, poverty alleviation and organisational and environmental 
sustainability, have not been met (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999; World 
Bank, 1996a).  
 
 467
It is hoped that the policy lessons drawn from this research could be useful for 
the government, particularly the DoI and the irrigation communities at large.  
Since the inception of the planned development in the mid-1950s, the 
Government of Nepal has assumed a central role in all spheres of national 
development, including the management of its natural resources, including 
irrigation. The necessity for  centralized management of the natural resources 
has emanated from the prevalence of market failure, particularly positive and 
negative externalities and the strategic importance of the natural resource 
bases in order to avoid ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968; 
Yugandhar and Raju, 1992; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995).  Until the 
1990s, the irrigation systems in Nepal, particularly those managed by the 
government, suffered from related problems including low performance, 
deteriorating physical infrastructures and low cost recovery. The following 
section describes the main findings of this research. Each research objective 
and its associated questions are addressed in turn. 
 
7.3 Main Findings and Policy Implications  
 
  1. Under which property rights structures do the farmers have the 
best access to irrigation water?  
 
a. Are the farmers from the dalit community benefiting equally from 
irrigation systems under different property rights regimes? 
b. Are marginal farmers benefiting equally from the surface irrigation 
systems governed by different property rights regimes? 
c. Under which property rights regimes do the ‘tail-enders’ have the best 
access to water from the canal system? 
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d. Are the female-headed households benefiting equally from irrigation 
systems under different property rights regimes? 
 
In order to answer the above mentioned research questions, an in-depth 
comparative case study of three irrigation systems governed by three different 
property rights regimes was carried out. The data for this research came from 
a number of sources, including focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, household survey and documentary analysis.  
 
A total of 249 households (83 from each of the systems) were surveyed for the 
quantitative analysis. However, only 199 valid responses were used in the final 
analysis as 51 questionnaires were discarded as they were incomplete. The 
main criterion used for the categorisation was the area of land owned by the 
household. There was no leasehold land in the research sites, whilst share-
cropping was commonly practised. In order to capture spatial and 
caste/ethnic hierarchy, households were randomly selected on a proportional 
basis from different locations, landholdings and castes in each ward of the 
Village Development Committee (VDC) served by the irrigation canals. Private 
landholding reflects the economic and socio-political status of a household. 
Those with larger landholdings are respected, have greater authority and often 
take part in village judicial arbitration. Households were categorised into 
three landholding groups: small, medium and large landholders, based on the 
area of irrigation land available to them (Richards et al., 1999; Fox, 1983).  In 
order to capture spatial and caste/ethnic hierarchy and socio-economic 
heterogeneities, households were randomly selected on a proportional basis 
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from different locations, landholdings and castes from each ward of the 
Village Development Committee (VDC) served by the irrigation canals.  
 
Although overall, the regression model presented in Chapter Five indicated 
statistically non-significant results in predicting odds of strong access to water 
by caste, the comparison of the dalit households in the three irrigation 
systems presented in Chapter Four (Section 4.2.1) shows that a significantly 
higher proportion of the dalit households in the FMIS reported strong access 
to water compared to their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS.  
Therefore, caste continues to be an important factor in the distribution of 
irrigation water.  Households belonging to the dalit communities are socially, 
economically and politically excluded and have no say over policy decisions 
that affect their lives.  In Nepal, neither land reforms nor irrigation 
interventions have been pro-dalit (Bhattarai, 2003; Wily et al. 2008). 
Customarily, caste status was associated with differential access to resources 
such as landholdings (Seddon, 1987; Cameron, 1998).  As mentioned in 
Chapter Two (Section 2.10.1), households from higher caste groups have 
access to greater and more productive landholdings, while the dalit 
households have very little access to more productive parcels of land. Farming 
by the dalit households takes place primarily in unproductive and barren 
landholdings called khoriya which are usually situated at the edge of the 
village locality. These landholdings are not generally preferred by higher caste 
groups as they are not very productive and give less return for investment. The 
level of access to water by the dalit households is weak, partly because dalit 
households reside at the edge of the village, are often secluded from the 
normal communal activities and have landholdings at the tail-end of the canal. 
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The dalits have fewer landholdings which are unproductive and they also have 
weak access to irrigation water. This creates double jeopardy for the most 
deprived and vulnerable members of Nepalese society and further reinforces 
already existing inequalities. However, comparative study of the three 
irrigation systems clearly demonstratesd that the dalit households in the 
FMIS have better access to water than their counterparts in the AMIS and the 
JMIS. The institutional structures designed and implemented in the FMIS are 
egalitarian and based on democratic values and the principle of 
proportionality. Lack of such democratic decision making in the AMIS and the 
JMIS, supported by existing structures of authority, reinforces already 
existing caste exclusion. Unlike in the FMIS, both the JMIS and the AMIS 
have not implemented proportionality principles in the issues of irrigation 
governance. The current institutional arrangements in the AMIS and the JMIS 
maintain status quo rather than breaking barriers, and farmers from the dalit 
communities do not benefit as much as they should. Therefore, in the absence 
of a more egalitarian management regime, households from the dalit 
communities are more likely to lose out from irrigation development than 
those from the higher caste groups.  It can be argued that if the status quo is 
maintained and inflexibility towards social transformation, including resource 
governance, is continued, a wave of disenfranchisement and disincentive for 
collective action prevail.  This, in turn, leads to fraud, non-compliance with 
rules, non-maintenance of canals and so on, ultimately leading to what Hardin 
called “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968).  Political dominance of 
non-dalit elites over the dalits and other indigenous caste groups has meant 
that the latter’s influence over local natural resource governance is very feeble. 
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The livelihoods of more than 1.3 billion small farmers in the developing world 
critically depend on agriculture and its associated activities (Dixon et al., 
2001). Small landholders are vulnerable to food insecurity owing to low 
productivity and small or negligible landholdings in their dispositions 
(Tiwary, 2005). Numerous studies have shown that irrigation plays a crucial 
role not only in enhancing food security but also lifting people out of poverty 
(Angood et al., 2002; Brabban et al., 2004; Hussain, 2007). Thus it is 
necessary to ensure water security for the marginal farmers, but distributional 
implications of the irrigation infrastructure have not been explored in greater 
detail.  In many instances, the benefits from the irrigation developments have 
gone to the rich and large landholders, who own the irrigable and most fertile 
lowlands.  The poor, who are often either landless or have only a small patch 
of non-irrigated upland, are deprived of the benefits accruing from investment 
in irrigation, which mostly come from the national treasury or international 
grants and loan assistance. 
 
Although the overall regression model presented in Chapter Five predicts a 
statistically non-significant result, the large landholding is positively 
associated with strong access to water. A higher proportion of farmers with 
larger landholdings reported having strong access to irrigation compared to 
farmers in the medium and small landholding categories, as described in 
Chapter Four (Section 4.2.2). The small landholding is negatively associated 
with strong access to water and the difference is statistically significant, as 
shown by the regression model presented in Chapter Five (Section 5.3.1). 
Equally important, a cross-system comparison in Chapter Four (Section 4.2.2) 
indicates that a higher proportion of small landholders in the FMIS reported 
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having strong access to water compared to their counterparts in the AMIS and 
the JMIS.  
 
Also, whilst it is understandable that larger farmers require more water than 
small farmers because of the large amount of land at their disposal, but for 
them to have strong access to water whilst small farmers struggle for this  
access raises serious questions about the current water allocation procedures. 
Also, because of the egalitarian institutional arrangements implemented in the 
FMIS as described in Chapter Six, the small farmers have strong access to 
water compared to their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. These 
findings are interesting, since the government invests massively in the 
expansion of irrigation facilities in Nepal to improve the livelihoods of the 
rural poor. It begs the question is the current distribution of benefits from 
irrigation equitable, as the level of access to irrigation water by the marginal 
farmers is less than their larger landholding counterparts.   This creates a 
vicious circle, where more and more small farmers, particularly those whose 
livelihoods depend on agricultural activities will be trapped in poverty and 
insecure livelihoods.  
 
The results of the statistical analysis indicate that head-tail inequalities 
continue to be a major concern in irrigation systems in Nepal. Although the 
head-enders enjoy their locational advantages in all the three irrigation 
systems, the tail-enders in the FMIS have better access to irrigation water 
than their counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. A clear asymmetry 
between head and tail-enders exists. However, the WUA in the FMIS designed 
and put in place appropriate institutional arrangements to internalise this 
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issue. Firstly, the farmers in the FMIS always irrigate from the tail-end both in 
the main canal and also at the branch canal level. The contiguity in water 
application has also helped to ensure water at the tail-end. The sanctions and 
their strict enforcement have deterred the head-enders from demonstrating 
opportunistic behaviour in water appropriation. However, in the AMIS and 
the JMIS, the lack of appropriate sanctioning mechanisms and weak 
enforcement of the rules and non-contiguity in water application have further 
increased already existing asymmetries between the head and the tail-enders.  
Both in the AMIS and the JMIS, the head-enders often perceive water to be 
‘easily available’ leaving a tendency to appropriate more than their 
entitlement or more than the amount necessary for crop growth. Also, the 
head-enders have not made any particular effort to block leakages, assuming 
that such leakages are the problems of the downstream farmers. Unless the 
headwork is damaged or there is a major leakage which massively reduces the 
water availability to the head-enders, they make no efforts to control them. 
The cumulative impact of such a level of indifference by the head-enders has 
serious consequences for the tail-enders (Bromley et al., 1980; Moore, 1980, 
Skold et al., 1984; Wade, 1988).  Absence of an appropriate sanctioning 
mechanism for such ignorant and indifferent attitudes to the problems, which 
could jeopardise collective outcomes, has meant that the needs of the tail-
enders have been consistently ignored in both the AMIS and the JMIS.   
 
Also, the presence of a permanent headwork both in the JMIS and the AMIS 
has meant the head-enders are less dependent on the tail-enders to keep the 
systems running smoothly. As long as the headwork is functional and the 
head-enders can appropriate water, their propensity to co-operate with the 
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tail-enders is very low and an ‘up-canal monopoly’ in water use has been 
rampant (Price, 1995). However, in the FMIS, the temporary nature of the 
headwork needs regular repair and this is necessary even for the head-enders, 
as lack of maintenance of the temporary headwork will seriously jeopardise 
their water availability as much it does to the tail-enders. The 
interdependence between the head and tail-enders in the FMIS has led 
farmers to cooperate with each other, irrespective of their location along the 
canal. Unfortunately, the head-enders in the AMIS and the JMIS do not have 
to take this factor into consideration in appropriating water from the canal.   
 
It is equally important to rethink the strategies adopted by the government in 
cement lining the canals to enhance their performance, partly because this has 
not improved despite high investment. Cement lining can reduce the 
interdependence amongst farmers to co-operate with each other and work 
collectively. Furthermore, the cement lined canals, once damaged by tree 
roots growing along the canal bank and also the presence of aquatic crabs, 
suffers greater seepage and exacerbates head and tail inequalities. Seepage 
increases water salinity and reduces soil productivity in the land located at the 
head end section of the canal command area. I am not suggesting that the 
canal systems should not have permanent headworks or always have 
temporary headwork, or that canals should not be cement lined, but my aim is 
to raise awareness about the factors which deter the head-enders from 
participating in collective action and to highlight the necessity for appropriate 
institutions to be put in place to rectify the activities of the head-enders.  
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The results from the statistical analysis demonstrate that gender is negatively 
associated with access to water from the canal.  The level of access to irrigation 
water amongst female-headed households in different irrigation systems 
which are governed by different property rights regimes is statistically 
significant. A significantly higher proportion of female-headed households in 
the FMIS reported having strong access to irrigation water compared to their 
counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS, as presented in Chapter Four 
(Section 4.2.5).   The analysis presented in this thesis indicates growing 
gender differences in access to and control over irrigation water. In fact it is 
almost a ritual for women to participate in the more laborious operation and 
maintenance activities, whilst men dominate the decision making in the WUA.  
Women’s contribution in the non-decision making sphere of agricultural 
activities such as weeding, seedling preparation, transporting manure, 
harvesting, participating in cleaning the canal and so on continues to be 
significant in Nepal.  However, the assumption that the women will 
automatically hold water rights and appropriate benefits indirectly through 
the males, particularly their husbands, and that the latter will represent 
women’s issues well in irrigation governance are driven by stereotypical 
beliefs which needs rethinking if women are to benefit from irrigation and be 
lifted out of poverty (Agarwal, 1994; Zwarteveen, 1997). Although, generally 
the participation of women in the WUA is low in all the three irrigation 
systems considered for this study, women’s level of access to water and their 
participation in the management of the irrigation system was significantly 
higher in the FMIS compared to both the AMIS and the JMIS. Women’s better 
access to irrigation water in the FMIS can be attributed to the robust 
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institutional mechanisms designed and implemented, compared to the 
institutional arrangements in the AMIS and the JMIS. 
 
Similarly, farmers’ agronomical knowledge helps to reduce wasteful use of 
water. Household perception of access to water is being influenced by level of 
agricultural knowledge. For example, it is common to assume that greater 
water application ensures higher crop yields amongst the farmers, who lack 
even some basic knowledge of crop-water requirements. And those farmers 
both waste water and are more likely to over-appropriate it, creating water 
shortages for the tail-enders. Too much water application also increases soil 
salinity and reduces soil productivity in the long term. Therefore, it is 
imperative that the WUAs should invest their resources in launching 
awareness raising campaigns to educate farmers about the appropriate use of 
water. This will help farmers to change their attitudes towards the 
environment and enhance their knowledge not only on the impact of 
agriculture in the environment but also the consequences of their activities in 
over-appropriating irrigation water from the canals.  
 
It should be pointed out that the WUA in the FMIS has implemented some 
awareness raising activities like “door-to-door” visits and through local 
women’s groups, while such activities were absent both in the AMIS and the 
JMIS. In fact the WUA in the FMIS allocated a budget for awareness raising 
campaigns and the programme is considered an essential part of WUA’s 
annual programmes. Interestingly the WUA in the FMIS has utilised local 
beliefs such as the construction of a Kali temple to ensure the canal 
infrastructures are not tampered with and water flow is not obstructed. 
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This research also highlights the importance of social capital for enhancing 
collective action in managing irrigation resource bases. It has revealed that 
communities with a high level of trust tend to have strong access to water, 
while low levels of access are associated with low levels of trust. 
Trustworthiness amongst individuals and between households helps to 
establish a bond between individuals managing natural resources. Both 
interpersonal and inter-household trust provide much needed impetus to 
build up confidence in promoting co-operation and solving collective action 
problems (Coleman, 1990; Putnam et al.,1993).  However, it has to be stressed 
that absence of trust creates conflict, making difficulties in the maintenance of 
field channels and control structures, which in turn make water delivery 
unreliable, inadequate and inequitable or all three, and water theft is common 
under these circumstances, which might have led farmers to report weak 
access to the resource (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Alternatively, weak 
access to water can cause resentment amongst irrigators and those who do not 
get their fair share lose their confidence in collective action and hence report a 
low level of trust.  Therefore, these findings are indicative rather than 
definitive in terms of causality between social capital and access to irrigation 
water and a further research is needed to ascertain whether a high social 
capital (trust) leads to better access to water or vice versa.  Nonetheless, the 
notion of trust and its understanding remains a critical factor for channelling 
information, establishing social norms and raising expectations and fulfilling 
obligations in building institutions for managing natural resources including 
irrigation resources (Coleman, 1990). These in turn foster collective actions 
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for minimising defrauding activities which have major implications for the 
maintenance of and ensuring unconstrained flow of water in the canal.   
 
It should be mentioned that it is not just the trust amongst the neighbouring 
farmers that is important in irrigation governance, trust between the farmers 
and the WUA also remains critical as through trust, the later is able to gain 
support and loyalty from the entire rural community to achieve their collective 
objectives of managing irrigation systems.  Hence, trust not only boosts the 
morale of the WUA, but also empowers local farmers to believe in and show a 
high degree of engagement in collective action whilst at the same time 
demanding responsiveness from the WUA (La Porta et al., 1996).  Previous 
studies also have shown that the level of trust among the irrigators is 
positively associated with collective actions, which are necessary for canal 
operation and maintenance (Seabright, 1993; Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). The 
comparative study of the three irrigation systems considered here indicates 
that a significantly higher proportion of farmers in the FMIS reported a higher 
level of trust with regards to the irrigation issues amongst themselves and 
stronger access to water compared to the farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS.  
 
Similarly, this research also has highlighted the influence of the physical 
characteristics of the irrigation canal systems on household level of access to 
irrigation water. In fact there has been a long standing argument on the 
physical-environmental factors in shaping, limiting or determining various 
forms of group-shared behaviour (Berry, 1976; Dunlap and Catton, 1983).  
Perhaps two of the most interesting findings of the thesis are the impact of 
canal gradients and the shape of the canal on household’s level of access to 
 479
irrigation water. The pattern of infrastructural development in Nepal such as 
roads, irrigation canals and electricity lines all follow river gradients. While 
the canal construction costs may be reduced by following river gradients 
during the construction of the canals, the operation and maintenance tasks 
become laborious once the canals come into operation. The canals flowing in 
east-west or west-east directions have mild gradients and require less 
operation and maintenance while those flowing in north-south direction have 
steep gradients and require more operation and maintenance activities 
(Regmi, 2007). Both the AMIS and JMIS have deep high gradients with steep 
slopes and canals are prone to landslides necessitating a regular operation and 
maintenance of the canals.  However, farmers in those two systems namely 
the AMIS and the JMIS had a level of low social capital (low level of trust) 
amongst each other not least in organising collective actions for canal 
maintenance. Whilst the physical nature of canal demanded high level of 
collective action, the community’s failure to organise such collective actions 
had serious implications water availability and ultimately in the household 
level of access to irrigation water.  
 
Also, another important factor influencing household access to water is the 
shape of the irrigation canal. The regression analysis in Chapter Five (Section 
5.3) demonstrated that the odds significantly decreased on being served by a 
canals which are elongated and with a number outlets at multiple and distant 
locations.  In the mid-hills areas in Nepal, the elongated canals transcend 
across difficult geographical terrains which make them prone to landslides 
and need regular operation and maintenance. Also, outlets at the numerous 
and distant locations make it incredibly difficult for the WUA and other 
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farmers to monitor the activities of the farmers. In the absence of proper 
monitoring mechanisms and well implemented sanctions imposed on the 
defrauders, farmers in such canals are often involved in water defrauding 
which have serious implications for water particularly at the tail end. It has to 
be mentioned that the costs for monitoring such elongated canals with 
numerous outlets and distant locations are also significantly high (Easter, 
2000).  
 
 
Whilst the differences in the level of household level of access to water have 
been demonstrated in Chapter Four and Chapter Six, the reasons for such 
discrepancies were explored in Chapter Six through an institutional analysis of 
the governance structure and water distribution mechanisms designed and 
implemented in the three irrigation systems considered for this research.  
 
 
 2. What roles do institutions play in enabling farmers’ to access 
irrigation water?  
 
a) What are the enabling institutions for farmers to access water from 
the irrigation canals? 
 
b) What are the lessons that irrigation systems governed by different 
property rights structures can learn from each other to maximise 
their impact on farmers’ abilities to access water? 
 
There is a growing awareness that institutions play a critical role in the 
process of irrigation development (Coward, 1980; Shivakoti et al., 2005; 
Ostrom; 1990). In fact, policy debates in natural resource management has 
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circled around “getting the prices right to getting the property rights right to 
getting the institutions right” (Williamson, 1994 p.3). With a due 
acknowledgement of this policy debate, this thesis has carried out an in depth 
comparative institutional analysis of the water distributions in the three 
irrigation systems. The rationale for doing so was to identify some of the 
‘enabling institutional’ arrangements embedded within the FMIS which 
enhance farmers’ ability to access water.   
 
Nepal, with its rich hydraulic civilisation and abundant irrigation systems 
which are governed by different property right regimes provided a fertile 
terrain to undertake a comparative study of the irrigation institutions. 
Institutions are considered as humanly designed arrangements which either 
facilitate or constraint human interactions. As such, institutions represent a 
set of ordered relationship amongst individuals, which define their rights, 
acknowledge the rights of others, privilege, forbearance and responsibilities 
which in turn provide action situations and determine the incentive 
environment behavioural conditions for human interactions (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
The thesis has made use of a modified “Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) Framework” to compare water distribution rules across 
the three irrigation systems more systematically. The theoretical model 
proposed in this thesis argues that the access to irrigation water from the 
irrigation canal is affected by four major variables. These variables include the 
following (a) attributes of the physical world, (b) attributes of the community 
within which actors are embedded, (c) rules that create incentives and 
constraints for certain actions, and (d) interactions with other individuals. 
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By applying a modified IAD framework the thesis has “emphasised the effect of 
both formal and informal institutions and their effect on outcomes amongst 
actors in public organisation and collective groups” (Heikkila and Issett, 2006 
p.3). Furthermore, the IAD framework provided a unique opportunity for 
analysing decision making at multiple theoretical levels: Operational choice, 
collective choice and constitutional choice. The multiple levels of analysis help to 
diagnose different sets of rules and processes affecting the outcomes of irrigation 
interventions as rules in one level interact with rules and actions other levels.  
Kiser and Ostrom (1982) argue that the above mentioned “three levels 
institutions are nested, with rules at the higher level impacting the production 
and governances of rules at the lower levels” (cited in Hardy and Koontz, 2009 
p.396). 
 
Given the complex socio-environmental context in which the three irrigation 
systems operate, it is useful to recast the IAD framework in terms that captures 
not only the resource specific characteristics, communal characteristics and 
institutional features but also the exogenous variables that are useful in designing 
irrigation policy in Nepal.  Whilst the original IAD framework has the historical 
emphasis on the production and appropriation of CPRs, a modification of the 
original IAD framework has enabled this research to specifically include 
exogenous aspects such as social capital (level of trust), human capital 
(agronomical knowledge of farmers), simplicity of irrigation governing rules  and 
competitive use of water resources.  The modified IAD framework is presented in 
Figure 7.1. The theoretical propositions on those exogenous variables are 
presented in Chapter Two (section 2.10), whilst the empirical verifications have 
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been presented throughout the analysis chapters of this thesis (Chapters Four-
Six). 
 
The findings of the comparative study of three irrigation systems indicate that 
the design principles of the FMIS were more robust and egalitarian compared 
to the AMIS and the JMIS. This thesis neither prescribes nor advocates for ‘a 
one size fits all’ model of irrigation management in Nepal. In fact, the thesis 
recognises the challenges posed by the complex socio-ecological systems 
within which the irrigation systems function.  Furthermore, irrigation systems 
should be studied with a due consideration of the geographical terrains in 
which they are located and the institutional structures which are designed and 
implemented for their management. However, some general design principles 
which have worked well in the FMIS can be tried and tested in other irrigation 
systems too. The enabling institutions designed and implemented at the FMIS 
can indeed help towards achieving greater equity in the distribution of 
benefits from the irrigation. Whilst the irrigation management transfer 
programme is being vigorously persuaded by the Government of Nepal in 
recent years, the transfer should not be done without developing proper 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The findings of the institutional analysis described in Chapter Six (Section 6.7) 
has attempted to identify “enabling institutions” to enhance access to water 
for marginal and vulnerable farmers. The purpose of the institutional analysis 
was to seek answers to research question (2a) and the “institutional lessons” 
that the irrigation systems can learn from each other i.e. research question 
(2b). These institutions are referred to as “enabling institutions” because they 
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are egalitarian, fair and conducive for enhancing households’ access to water 
particularly the marginal farmers, women, tail-enders and the farmers from 
dalit community.  
 
The following section briefly revisits the findings of the institutional analysis 
in identifying the “enabling institutions” for enhancing farmers’ access to 
irrigation water.  
 
Autonomy:  In the FMIS the irrigation community has a full control over 
the irrigation infrastructure and the flow of water in the canal whilst in the 
AMIS the irrigation system was run with a tight fist of the DoI without any 
autonomous rights granted to local users. Albeit some efforts were made to 
make the JMIS autonomous, the decisions were heavily reliant on and 
influenced by the DoI.  
 
Contiguity:  Water distribution in the FMIS takes places in a contiguous 
fashion where water moves from one landholding to another in a 
succession from tail end to the head end without moving back and forth 
whilst there was no contiguity in water distribution in both the AMIS and 
JMIS. 
 
Proportionality:  In the FMIS, both rights and duties are distributed in 
accordance to the principle of proportionality.  All the farmers get water as 
per their entitlements and no one can over-appropriate more water than 
their legal entitlements. Also household contributions towards O & M are 
according to the amount of land under irrigation. However, such 
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proportionality principles neither existed nor were implemented in the 
JMIS and the AMIS. 
 
Uniformity: All farmers in the FMIS use water uniformly with same 
frequency (uniform rights) and with similar techniques. However both in 
the AMIS and JMIS no such uniformity in water distribution was 
practiced.  
 
Regularity: All the farmers in the FMIS distribute water in the same way 
in every same season. However, such regularity in water distribution was 
absent in both AMIS and the JMIS. If needed, adjustments are made with 
regularity in every season in the FMIS.  For example adjustment from the 
Monsoon to Winter and Winter to Spring are carried out similarly every 
year.  
 
Transparencies: All the farmers in the FMIS are aware of the rules, 
their nature and have the capacity to conform to the rules. The analysis 
indicated that farmers in the AMIS and the JMIS lacked knowledge on the 
irrigation governing rules. This could be due to the proactive roles played 
by the WUA in the FMIS in organising social awareness regarding their 
irrigation system help to “enhance common knowledge, awareness and 
skills by thinking, discussing and acting together” (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al.,2000 p.12). Simplifying rules through public awareness not only helps 
in understanding of the rules and regulations that guide the terms of 
resource management compliance by farmers, but also fosters a high 
degree of commitment to a process of mutual learning in which irrigators 
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agree to achieve collective outcomes (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000 p.132).  
However, the WUA in the AMIS and JMIS did not make sufficient effort to 
raise social awareness amongst the farmers regarding irrigation issues.  
 
Monitoring: In the FMIS, both the WUA and individual farmers can 
keep track of each others’ irrigation related activities both by themselves 
and also through the employment of water guards to ensure credible 
commitments are made and rules are adhered to. A proper monitoring 
mechanism is designed and implemented to ensure conformity to the 
irrigation governing rules including water distribution and contribution 
towards O & M activities. However, no such rules were presented in the 
AMIS and although some monitoring mechanisms were put in place in the 
JMIS, they were weakly enforced.  
 
Graduated Sanctions: The WUA in the FMIS enforced rules and 
regulations, which were designed and implemented to govern irrigation 
system very strictly to ensure that farmers all conform to the rules and any 
infringements of the rules resulted in tough sanctions being imposed on 
the defrauders. However, both in the AMIS and the JMIS sanctions were 
rarely present and if implemented were weakly enforced and were not 
graduated and did not reflect the gravity of the defrauding caused.  
 
Farmers’ Participation: The governance structure of the WUA in the 
FMIS has enabled farmers to show an active participation in the 
management of their irrigation system whilst the governance structures of 
the JMIS and the AMIS were such that the farmers had little opportunity 
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to participate in the management of their irrigation systems. Also, both the 
AMIS and the JMIS were characterised by heavy involvement of the DoI 
which did not necessarily understand the concerns of the local farmers. 
 
Based on the analysis presented in the thesis, Figure 7.1 presents the 
modified model of the thesis with variables that this thesis has identified 
which have an affect in the household level of access to water from 
theirrigation canal systems.  
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Figure 7.1 Modified Theoretical Model of Thesis 
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The following section describes the policy lessons that the irrigation 
systems can learn from each other based on the findings of this research.  
 
It is commonly believed that one of the key requirements in promoting users 
participation in managing an irrigation system is to devolve decision-making 
power so that the available water resource can be shared most efficiently and 
equitably (Fisher, 2000). The WUA should be autonomous both in terms of 
financial and administrative capabilities to make their activities more effective 
and more accountable to the local farmers and to maximise the impacts of 
irrigation development.  
 
The operation of the WUA should be monitored through auditing of its 
financial and administrative responsibilities to ensure greater accountability 
and transparency are maintained. This will help to enhance to effectiveness 
and responsiveness of the WUA and make them answerable to the farmers. 
The monitoring should be for both the farmers and the WUA committee 
members to ensure their compliance to the rules of irrigation governance. In 
case of rules infringements, the sanctions must be applied to both the WUA 
committee and the farmers. The sanctions should be graduated and their 
severity should reflect the gravity of the offence.  These findings are consistent 
with previous studies which suggest that irrigation organisations are shaped 
by variables such as the concentration of authority, structuring of activity, 
accountability and responsiveness (Uphoff, 1991).  
 
Similarly, both rights and responsibilities should be based on the principle of 
proportionality. A greater share of benefits should be equated to a greater 
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share of the responsibilities.  Farmers’ willingness to engage in and contribute 
towards the irrigation resources depends on their perceived long term benefits 
from them and sense of interdependence and mutual benefits from the natural 
resource as a result of involving in collective actions. The presence of well 
crafted and properly implemented sets of credible, simple and well 
understood and property enforced rules provide positive incentives for 
farmers to believe in and contribute towards the collection actions in 
managing irrigation systems (Regmi, 2007).   
 
The water distribution should be uniform both in techniques and rights. 
Water should be divided amongst the farmers using similar technology which 
is critical to assure farmers that all the farmers in the system are using the 
similar technology and no one is using excessive water by tampering with 
gates and outlets. Although for different durations, the farmers should receive 
water with similar frequency. The duration of irrigation should reflect farmer’s 
water rights based on the principles of proportionality. If the distribution of 
costs and benefits are based on the principle of proportionality then 
comments like “he has irrigated five times this week but I just irrigated once 
or twice” would be less likely to arise. Uniformity in irrigation frequency 
removes any clouds of doubts that some farmers might be having more water 
as they are using water more frequent that the others.   
 
Another important lesson to be drawn from this study is the contiguity in the 
water application.  The water availability can be made more predictable and 
reliable if water distribution takes place following a contiguous fashion as it 
avoids confusion over water scheduling and the movement of water in the 
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canal. The water distribution scheduling practiced in both the JMIS and the 
AMIS were a discontiguous which moved water randomly back and forth in 
different locations of the canals which provided a real opportunity for farmers 
to tamper with water distribution particularly during the water scarcity period 
in those systems. Water applications at the tail ends and head ends leaving the 
middle section without water tempted farmers from the middle section to 
appropriate water by tampering with irrigation infrastructures such as 
unwarranted opening of gates in the canals. However, the farmers in the FMIS 
followed contiguity in water distribution where irrigation took place from the 
tail end with scheduling moving progressively upward in the canal. This 
ensured water for the most vulnerable groups i.e. tail-enders in the FMIS but 
in both the JMIS and the AMIS, the tail-enders faced consistent 
disadvantages.  
 
7.4 Contributions to the Knowledge Made by This Thesis  
 
This thesis has contributed to the knowledge primarily in three ways. Firstly, 
the thesis has made efforts to combine two types of research methodologies 
namely the qualitative and quantitative methods in irrigation research. The 
mixed methodology approach taken in this research has helped to draw a 
range of inferences from the research findings through methodological 
triangulation. Also, the methodological contribution made by this thesis is the 
use of subjective measure of access to irrigation water. Secondly, this thesis 
has made some important theoretical contributions in determining the factors 
that influence household access to irrigation water.  Thirdly, the thesis has 
questioned the current thinking on irrigation management transfer and has 
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initiated a policy debate on the effectiveness of such a policy shift. The 
following section presents a brief discussion on the contributions made by this 
thesis.  
    
   7.4.1 Methodological Contributions 
     7.4.1.1 Methodological Triangulation in Irrigation Research  
 
While methodological triangulations have been used in sociological research, 
the studies of irrigation institutions have felt a dearth of methodological 
synthesis. Anthropological studies on irrigation have been overtly qualitative 
(Pradhan, 1991; Price, 1995; Wittfogel, 1956), while quantitative treatments of 
irrigation have failed to capture qualitative side of farmers’ livelihoods which 
depends on irrigation water. Furthermore the quantitative treatments of 
irrigation have been treated mostly as exclusive domain of engineering, 
agronomy and economics (Wilson, 2008; Howell, 2001; Carruthers and Clark, 
1981).  However, studies of irrigation should not be reduced to a mere act of 
hydraulic engineering (Kelly, 1983) or price determination (Johansson, 2000) 
or agronomical calculations (Lascano, 2000).  
 
The development of irrigation has been heralded as one of the most important 
achievements in human civilisation. This is because irrigation has helped 
human beings to grow crops to feed themselves. Initially, the development of 
irrigation represented a sophisticated development as water is diverted from 
its source through complex networks of canal to grow crop in distant places. 
The important nature of irrigation to human beings has made it an 
increasingly important economic good. In the past, irrigation has been treated 
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as an exclusive domain of engineering. The treatment of irrigation issues 
explicitly from only one discipline has led to studying irrigation from a narrow 
defined methodology. The inferences drawn from such studies are one-
dimensional and findings are restrictive in their generalisations. In response 
to these criticisms there is a growing recognition that  studies of irrigation 
should be carried out with “specialist knowledge of management and 
techniques which should be supplanted and influenced by detail local 
knowledge and by insights from other relevant disciplines including 
sociology, social anthropology and/or political science” (Bottral, 1981 p.3). 
Recognising the importance of mixed method research, this thesis has used 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches to investigate the research 
problem posited in Chapter One. The use of multiple methods of data 
generation, which includes focus group discussions, key informant interviews 
and household survey, enabled the author to cross-check if the findings are 
consistent, rigorous and unbounded by any particular methodological 
approach. It is hoped that the methodological triangulation in irrigation 
research will make the findings more robust and recommendations made 
from such research more convincing and adaptable to the policy makers 
involved in irrigation development not in Nepal but also in other parts of the 
world.       
 
7.4.1.2 Subjective Measure of Access to Water 
Previous comparative studies on irrigation have mainly been characterised by 
macro level project appraisal studies, which tend to have an overwhelmingly 
technical focus (Laitos, 1986; Pradhan et al., 1988; Renault et al., 2007). At 
best, such research is undertaken to appease the donor agencies to secure 
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funding for irrigation development. Some of the previous studies have carried 
out comparative study of the performance of the FMIS and the AMIS in Nepal, 
which mostly focused on performance measures (Lam, 1998; Shivakoti et al., 
2005).  The performance measures have been undertaken following technical 
procedures and not surprisingly have technical outcomes laden with technical 
jargon which the local farmers found very difficult to understand. As a 
consequence, the local farmers often have a considerable antagonism towards 
the technical individuals involved in irrigation enterprise as the former often 
felt water inadequate and poor performance of the system, while the latter 
would press on water abundance based on technical measures.  Indeed in 
Nepal, the management of irrigation resources, particularly ones with 
involvement of external agencies have been characterised with the hegemony 
of technocrats and bureaucratic with no or little say by the local users (Lam, 
1998).  The technocratic hegemony has been characterised by objectivity in 
measuring performance of irrigation systems (Gorantiwar and Smout, 2005; 
Bastiaanssen and Bos, 1999). Whilst objectivity in measuring the performance 
of irrigation systems is necessary, it is not sufficient to measure irrigation 
performance from the perceptions of the local farmers. Also, the objective 
measure of irrigation performance rarely contributed towards empowering 
local farmers in measuring the performance of their irrigation systems. 
Engineers might measure how much water has reached the tail end of the 
canal and give an excellent performance rating for an irrigation system but 
they often ignore the fact that water flows through a range of socio-economic 
terrain. As a result, an overtly objective measurement of performance of the 
irrigation canal has obscured the ‘perceptive’ measure of access and led a 
 495
systematic failure to incorporate farmers’ perceptions in assessing their level 
of access to irrigation water. This thesis has attempted to rectify this. 
    
   7.4.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
This thesis has clearly demonstrated the fallacy of the current policy thinking 
in irrigation management which has become ‘distributional blind’. The 
statistical analysis carried out in this research has highlighted the need for 
distributional aspects to be taking into consideration in any irrigation 
interventions. The results of the statistical analysis presented in Chapters 
Four and Five highlight that vulnerable farmers such as dalits, women, tail-
enders and small farmers continue to face disadvantages in accessing 
irrigation water. However, these vulnerable farmers have a relatively better 
chance of engaging in irrigation governance in general and having a strong 
access to irrigation water in particular in the FMIS compared to their 
counterparts in the AMIS and the JMIS. The egalitarian governance approach 
adopted by the FMIS has helped to ensure that the most vulnerable farmers 
do not face any disadvantages in appropriating benefits from irrigation canals. 
The design principles of the FMIS could be replicated and tested in other 
irrigation systems to ensure that the some of the distributive aspects of 
irrigation interventions illustrated in this thesis can be addressed.  
 
While it may not be totally surprising to see head and tail inequalities in 
gravity flow irrigation systems, the level of difference on the level of access to 
irrigation water amongst the farmers who are being served by irrigation 
systems governed by different property right regimes is very striking. Also, the 
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higher amount of benefit appropriations by male-headed households, high 
caste households and large farmers and their dominance in irrigation 
governance begs questions on the efficacy of the reforms in the irrigation 
sector. The reform strategies to overcome these endemic problems through 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) have not still been able to look at the 
distributive aspects of irrigation interventions.  
 
Taking property rights as a theoretical premise, this thesis has demonstrated 
that institutions play a pivotal role in enhancing or constraining farmers’ level 
of access to irrigation water.  The institutional arrangements designed and 
implemented in the FMIS, which is a Farmers Managed Irrigation System are 
more conducive in terms of enhancing farmers’ level of access to irrigation 
water compared to the institutional arrangements implemented in the AMIS 
and the JMIS which are Agency and Jointly Managed Irrigation Systems 
respectively.  This thesis has identified some of the institutional arrangements 
which are found to be more ‘farmer friendly’ in terms of enhancing their 
ability to access water from the canal systems. These institutions include 
autonomy of the systems, contiguity of water distribution, proportionality of 
rights and duties, uniformity in water distribution and water distribution 
techniques, development of a proper monitoring mechanism and graduated 
sanctions for to control defrauding and to ensure compliance to the rules 
governing irrigation systems.  
 
Apart from socio-economic factors influencing household level of access to 
water, some of the other research findings from this thesis are worth 
mentioning particularly the role of social capital (trust) and the shape of the 
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canal and its gradient in ensuring a better access to irrigation water. The 
results of statistical analysis reported in Chapter Four (Section 4.2.9) and 
Chapter Five (Section 5.3) indicated that households with a low level of trust 
with other farmers are significantly less likely to report a strong access to 
water while those with high level of trust are more likely to report a strong 
access to irrigation water. The absence of trust amongst the farmers and 
between farmers and the WUA can give rise to conflicts in the management of 
irrigation systems. Because of the conflicts amongst the farmers, there is little 
co-operation in maintaining field channels and control structure, which in 
turn makes water delivery not only unreliable but also inadequate. In the 
absence of trust amongst the farmers,  and water theft is common which fuels 
water related conflicts.  
 
Similarly, the shapes of the canals and their gradients have a significant 
influence on household access to irrigation water. The pattern of 
infrastructural development in Nepal such as roads, irrigation canals and 
electricity lines follow river gradients. While the canal construction costs may 
be reduced by following river gradients during the construction of the canals, 
the operation and maintenance tasks become laborious once the canal comes 
into operation. The canals flowing in east-west or west-east direction have 
mild gradients and require less operation and maintenance while those 
flowing in north-south direction have steep gradients and require more O & M 
activities. This will have an impact on farmers’ ability to access water from the 
canal systems. 
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Also, the thesis demonstrates that the shape of the canal also have 
implications in the way the water is distributed in the irrigation systems. 
Farmers reported that irrigation canals which are long, elongated and with 
outlets at numerous places have higher degrees of inequalities in water 
distribution. The farmers reported that existence of numerous outlets at 
multiple locations along the elongated canals makes it extremely difficult to 
monitor farmers’ canal related activities and the monitoring activities become 
costly.  In the absence of a proper monitoring mechanism, the defrauders find 
it easier to tamper with the canal infrastructures to appropriate more water 
than their entitlements. However, in irrigation canals which are both short 
and non-elongated and have a fewer number of outlets, where the outlets are 
located at a close distance along the canal, makes farmers’ canal related 
activities more visible and easy to monitor. The relative ease in monitoring 
farmers’ canal related activities reduces the chances of tampering with the 
canal infrastructures. As a result, there will be fewer incidences of water thefts 
and infrastructural vandalism, which helps to distribute water more equitably. 
In such irrigation systems farmers find it difficult to tamper with the canal 
infrastructures as it is easy to monitor by the WUA.  
 
   7.4.3 Contributions to Policy Debates in Irrigation Management 
 
The IMT has been persuaded by many governments around the world and 
Nepal is no exception to it. The logic and rationale for the transfer is to benefit 
farmers by improving efficiency and reliability of water supply through the 
participation of the beneficiary farmers in the decision making process. 
However, while the intention of the IMT sounds good and performance might 
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temporarily improve, the assumption that the IMT is the panacea to the 
chronically underperforming irrigation systems begs questions. The 
transferred irrigation systems do not operate in a vacuum and the transfer 
should be persuaded only after the development of sufficient communal 
capacity so that the community can manage the handed resources. The 
institutional set up should be studied carefully and modified gradually if 
necessary before the transfer of the irrigation systems.  The unequal level of 
access to irrigation water and distribution of the benefits of irrigation in 
general are institutional problems. These institutional problems should be 
resolved as institutions guide users’ activities which in turn will determine the 
long term sustainability of the irrigation systems.  Similarly, the transfer 
process should be preceded by a clear delineation of the scope and the 
boundaries of the users and the agency involved in the management of the 
irrigation systems. A clear delineation of rights and responsibilities of all the 
stakeholders would reduce confusions as to who should do what and when.  
 
7.5. Policy Recommendations and Future Directions for Research 
 
The current water distributions mechanisms in the two irrigation systems 
namely the AMIS and the JMIS, continue to reinforce traditional social and 
economic hierarchies prevalent in rural Nepal.  The IMT strategies and the 
institutional rules which are currently implemented do not take into account 
the distributional aspects of irrigation interventions. This study recommends 
that the marginal farmers such as women, the dalits, small landholders and 
tail-enders should be given adequate representation in the management of 
irrigation systems which would give a voice to the less powerful and facilitate 
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more impartial rules. The water distribution should follow a contiguous 
pattern during irrigation which will help to reduce the water loss and 
defrauding activities. The use of uniform techniques and frequency in the 
distribution of water from the canal resource would help to enhance equitable 
distribution of irrigation water.  Similarly, rights and duties associated with 
the irrigation activities should be divided proportionally amongst the farmers 
to ensure that the contribution of the farmers in O & M activities. 
 
Research in the future should focus on the effects of institutions on the trickle 
down effects of irrigation interventions. Along with property right structures, 
research in the irrigation sector should consider the institutional 
arrangements incorporating all aspects of the rules governing irrigation 
systems, water distributions and responsibilities towards operation and 
maintenance activities.  
 
7.6 Strategies for Disseminating Research Findings 
The dissemination of research findings is absolutely critical for policy changes 
to bring about the necessary shifts in policy thinking in irrigation sector in 
Nepal.  To this end, the dissemination strategy involves interactions with local 
farmers and government policy makers.  Firstly, I intend to organise end user 
networks within, and across, case study sites, which will involve the respective 
WUAs as coordinators and the respective DIO of the district in which the 
three irrigation systems considered for this research.  Secondly, I am planning 
to organise local dissemination activities such as presentations and workshops 
in every case study area to raise awareness about the distributional 
implications of irrigation water and importance of institutions for the 
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successful management of irrigation resources. Thirdly, I will establish strong 
links between the WUAs, DoI and the National Federation of Irrigation Water 
Users’ Association (NFIWUA) in Kathmandu to highlight the importance of 
research findings and the lessons which can be learnt from the findings. A 
workshop is planned to this end in which local researchers, academicians, 
government officials, professionals and NGO members working on 
community-based natural resource management will be invited to attend. I 
will also disseminate the results through IUCN/Nepal, NFIWUA, Nepal Water 
Conservation Foundation (NWCF), Farmers Managed Irrigation Systems 
Promotion Trust (FMISPT) and other organizations working on water issues 
in Nepal. Fourthly, I will disseminate my research through the publication of a 
number of research papers in academic journals.  Fifthly, I will also create a 
website (to be hosted by the NFIWUA in Kathmandu) to disseminate research 
findings and provide reports in downloadable form. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: 
 
Appendix 1a: Commonly used internal and external 
performance parameters, their definitions and indicators 
(Wahaj, 2001) 
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Appendix 1b: Literature on Irrigation Performance 
Measurement 
 
Researchers Performance Measure 
Abernethy (1986) Equity, regularity, reliability and durability  
Chambers (1988) Productivity, equity and stability. 
Uphoff (1988) and Steiner 
(1991) 
Productivity, equity, harmony, environmental sustainability and 
economic sustainability or cost effectiveness 
Abernethy (1989) Productivity, equity, profitability, sustainability and quality of life. 
Plusquellec et al. (1990) 
 
Water availability, water use efficiencies (conveyance, field 
application and overall efficiencies), equity of water distribution, 
cropping intensity and crop yields and project economic rates of 
return. 
 
Molden  and Gates (1990) Adequacy, efficiency, dependability and equity at different levels in 
the water delivery systems. 
Goldsmith and Makin 
(1991) Adequacy, equity, reliability, productivity and equity. 
Makin et al. (1991) Water delivery performance parameters such as actual versus 
targeted water supply along with equity, reliability and adequacy 
El-Awad et al. (1991)  Adequacy, water losses (distribution efficiency), equity, cost (annual 
operating cost of system per unit area), water users convenience and 
durability 
Kaushal et al. (1992) Productivity, equity and adequacy. 
 
Mujumdar  and Vedula 
(1992) 
 
Reliability (matching water release from the reservoir in particular 
period with total irrigation requirement of all the crops in that 
period), resiliency (likelihood of the system recovery from a failure 
once a failure occurs) and productivity. 
 
Bos et al. (1994) Water supply performance (conveyance indicators, maintenance 
indicators, utility of water supplied, and equity), agricultural 
performance (area indicators and production indicators) and 
economic, social and environmental performance (economic 
viability, social viability and environmental sustainability and 
drainage) 
Purkey and Wallender 
(1994) 
Water supply and deliveries, water conveyance, on-farm irrigation 
and the environmental sustainability 
Meinzen-Dick (1995) Timeliness of irrigation (cumulative deficit in water deliveries over 
the crop season and cumulative excess in water deliveries over the 
crop season) 
Oad  and Sampath (1995) Adequacy, dependability (reliability and predictability) and the 
equity 
Kalu et al. (1995) Productivity (agronomic efficiency-the total quantity of crop 
production under irrigated agriculture and economic efficiency-the 
total net benefits) and equity 
Makadho (1996) Adequacy, equity and timeliness 
Small and Rimal (1996) Productivity (conveyance efficiency, physical productivity of water, 
physical productivity of land, economic productivity of water) and 
equity. 
 
Bos (1997) 40 multidisciplinary performance indicators, which cover water 
delivery, water use efficiency, maintenance, sustainability of 
irrigation, environmental aspects, socio-economic and management 
 
Sarma  and Rao (1997) Water supply–requirement ratio, irrigation intensity, crop 
productivity and change in cropping pattern 
Makombe et al. (1998) Deviation of actual water supply from the desired supply as 
measured by the crop water requirement adjusted with the effective 
rainfall (how accurately the water management system is achieving 
the desired supply). 
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Appendix- 2 
 
Household Survey Questionnaire 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF YORK 
 
Department of social policy and social work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Student: Mr.Bishnu Pariyar 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
Conducted at: 
Phalebas Irrigation System (FMIS) 
Begnas Irrigation System (AMIS) 
Rainastar Irrigation System (JMIS) 
 
Date of Survey: 26/10/2007-27/12/2007 
 
Type of Survey: Rural Household Survey 
Number of Respondents: 249 
 
Language translated to: Nepali 
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Namaste! 
 
I am conducting a research on institutional aspects of irrigation governance in 
Nepal. For the purpose of this research, the Phalebas, Begnas and Rainastar 
Irrigation Systems have been selected for conducting household survey.  This 
research is solely for academic purpose and all your responses will remain 
confidential. We will try our best to share the results of our research with you 
once it is completed. We will be extremely grateful if you agree to collaborate 
with us and give some of your time to answer a set of questions we have. The 
questions are designed to help us understand how irrigation systems are 
managed and irrigation water distributed. We thank you for your time and 
eagerly hope for your cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: Bishnu Pariyar                                  Interviewer: 
Date of Interview:                                                    Village/Ward 
Household Head Name:  
                                                                                 Age……  Caste……. 
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A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
Q. 1a. Please read out and fill the following household information 
 
S.N.   
 
HH Members Age (Yr)  Sex 
(M/F) 
Education 
No. of 
School Yr. 
Occupation  
Code  
1              
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
Occupation Code:  
 
Agriculture = 1 Business = 2 Public Service = 3 Private Service = 4 
Cottage Industry = 5 Agriculture + Business = 6 Agriculture + Service = 7 
Wage Labour = 8 Other = 10 (Please Specify…) 
 
 
 
B. LANDHOLDINGS, TENURE AND PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
 
Q 2a What type and how much Land you have got? 
 
SN Type of Land* Amount of Land (Ropani) 
A Khet Bari  
B Pakho Bari  
C Khar Bari  
* NB: arranged in terms of productivity  
 
 
 
 
 
Q 3a Please fill the table below to the best of your knowledge to inform us 
about the agricultural activities/ output for major crops 
 
 
Activities Crop1 Crop2 Crop3 Crop4 Crop5 
Name of Crop (most 
important first) 
     
Method of Irrigation 
water distribution * 
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* Mode of irrigation Distribution: 
1.= continuous flow  2. rotation       3. demand    4. request           5. others 
 
 
Q 4a State the location of majority of landholding with respect to main and 
outlet canals 
 
Canal 
Reference  
                                Location  
Head End Middle End Tail End  
Main Canal    
Outlet Canal     
 
 
Q.5a. Did you do Adhiya or tyahu last year? 
 
1.   Yes                              2.  No  
 
If yes to Q 5a.  go to  Q. 6a.         If No Go to Q. 7a 
 
 
Q. 6a  How was the production cost shared? 
 
Production factors production cost sharing  
 By Land Owner 
(prop./amount) 
By land Cultivator 
((prop./amount) 
 
Seeds/Siblings  
 
 
 
 
 
Labour Cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manure 
 
 
 
 
 
Time/ money in 
Irrigation O & M* 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers using HYV 
for this crop 
     
Farmers using 
chemical 
fertilizer/pesticides  
     
Max. yield (Muri/Rp.) 
Min Yield (Muri/Rp) 
     
Average Yield 
(Muri/Rp) 
     
Fraction of Crops 
marketed (%) 
     
Rainfed based yield  
(Muri/Rp) 
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* it is not clear that, whether landlord or the crop sharer contribute towards O 
& M activities as conditions for access to water  
 
Q. 7a what are the major crops you have produced in the past year and annual 
income from selling agricultural products? 
 
SN  Unit Total  
Production 
Unit 
Sold   
Unit 
Price 
(Rs)  
   Total Income  (Rs) 
1 Rice     
2 Maize     
3 Millet     
4 Wheat/ 
Legumes 
    
5 Mustard     
6 Barley     
7 Fruits     
8 Potato/ 
Vegetables 
    
9 Peanuts      
10 Others     
 
 
Q. 8a  How long the field crop production can meet your household food 
demand? 
 
1. < 3 months  2.   3.  to 6 months   3. 6 to 9 months   4. 9 to 12 months  5. > 
than 12 months 
 
Q. 9a Did you have enough food for your family before irrigation canal 
operated? 
 
1.    Yes                   2.     No 
 
Q.10a Do you have enough food for your family after irrigation canal 
operated? 
 
1. Yes                  2.   No  
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C. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND UTILISATION 
 
 
Q.1c What is the total area irrigated, and fallow, in Ropani during each 
cropping seasons # 
 
Area/Season* Spring Monsoon Winter Area 
Irrigated 
by Pvt. 
Kulo 
(Indicate 
S/M/W) 
 Khet   Pakho Khet Pakho Khet Pakho  
Irrigated area (Ropani)        
Unirrigated area (Ropani)         
 
Q.2c Tick as appropriate to inform us about your experience of water 
appropriation from irrigation canal 
 
* Seasons: Monsoon- June 1- October 31; Winter-  November 1- January 31; 
Spring- February- May 31 
# those area which were pakho before irrigation canal construction, should be 
treated as pakho 
 
 
 
 
Q.3c Please tick, which location does majority of your landholdings are located 
and put appropriate number below to indicate the characteristics of water 
availability 
 
Characteristics of 
water availability (Put 
number from below 
marked by * below ) 
Location (Indicate your location as Head end, 
Middle end or Tail end (--------) 
Monsoon Spring Winter  
    
    
* 1= abundant    2= limited      3= scare      4= non-existence   5= do not know 
Q.4c Approximately, how many hours do you irrigate your field using water 
from the irrigation canal 
 
Type of Length of time irrigation in different 
Reliability (wt. 1/3) Adequacy  (wt. 1/3) Equity (wt. 1/3) 
Seasons  Season Season 
Monsoon Winter Spring Monsoon Winter Spring Monsoon Winter Spring 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
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Land 
/Season* 
seasons (in Hours)*  
 
Monsoon 
 
Spring 
 
Winter 
Khet    
Pakho    
* if days/per week, change them to total hours in particular season 
 
 
Q.5c How the irrigation water is distributed? 
 
1. Family size/equity              2. Land size      3. According to the labour 
contribution during construction    4.  Equal time irrespective of 1, 2 and 3 
 
Q6c Are you satisfied with the existing distribution process? 
 
1. Yes                               2.  No 
 
 
Q7c. Do you use water for supplementary irrigation (During the wet season)? 
 
1.    Yes                         2.   No  
 
Q8c If no, to Q3e, why not 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Q9c. Do you feel you share of water you current get is fair in the scheme? 
 
1.     Yes                           2.  No  
 
Q10c. If no to Q6e what do you think is the reason for the inequality? 
 
1. Ethnicity                2.  Gender          3.   Political Power   
4) Religion                5. Crop Type                 6. amount and location of land 
7.Others/Specify ------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Q11c. If there is inequality, which groups of people get more? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Q12c. If there is inequality, which groups of people get less? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Q13c. If you get less, do you believe this is reasonable?  
 
1. Yes                 2.  No    
 
Q14c. If no, what measures do you take in response? 
 
1. Become Reluctant to participate in operation and maintenance 
2. Try to over use water in my turn  
3. Align with my likes in order to bring about equality  
4. Other / specify -----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Q15c.   Do you get irrigation water if you are reluctant to participate in 
maintenance? 
 
 1. Yes                 2. No 
 
Q16c.  Do you know about crop water requirement?  
 
1. Yes                2. No  
Q17c.  If yes to Q16c, do you use crop water requirement rates for watering 
your fields?  
 
1. Yes                         2.  No  
 
Q18c. If yes, to Q16c. who gives you the rate? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Q19c. If yes to Q 16c, do you always stop watering when the rate is met even if 
the usual time given to watering turn is yet to get?  
 
1. Yes                           2.  No    
Q20c If no to Q 19c, why don’t you stop at the given rate? 
 
1. There is water uncertainty   2.  I prefer to have some extra water table in my 
plot 
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3. Bad relationship with next plot & wants to give him/her less water     4.  
Other (please specify)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Q21c. Are there special considerations for crop-type and stage of growth 
during water allocation? 
 
1.   Yes                                    2. No   
 
Q22c. If No to Q21c, what happens when somebody is convincingly in higher 
need of water for his/her field? 
 
1. Can do nothing until his/her term is up        2. Can contact water controlling 
body in terms of emergency and get water   
3. Can negotiate with the fellow irrigator of that turn and get water  
4. Other/specify ------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Q23c.  Do you pay any water use fees?  
 
1. Yes                       2. No 
 
Q24c If   yes to Q23c, How much do you have to pay (fees) for harvesting 
water from the irrigational canal annually? 
 
NRs. ------------ 
 
Q25c. Is the fee paid towards the contribution of O &M costs? 
 
1. Yes                                   2. No  
 
Q26c. If  No to Q25c, What are the fee collected used for? 
 
1.   Fee to Dhalpa                 2.  fee to irrigation officials      3. Operation and 
Maintenance 
4. members of water users association 
 
 
Q27c. Who determines who should get the water after you irrigated? 
 
1. RIMC/AIMC/BIMC             2. Plot Comm.        3. Yourself     4. Your 
Neighbour           5. It’s been following conventionally 
 
 584
 
Q28c. Do you have flexibility on as to which direction you want to put the 
outlet in your field plot? 
 
1. Yes                       2. No  
 
Q29c If you have two different owners’ land next to your plot, do you have 
preference as to whom you want to let have water? 
 
1. Yes                       2. No 
 
Q30c Is your relatives’ plot next to yours? 
 
1. Yes                             2. No  
 
Q31c.  If No to Q30c, what determines the as to who should get water after 
your plot? 
 
1. Good social relation              2. financial incentives          3. party politics 
 
Q32 c. Have you got alternative source irrigation, such as private kilos? 
 
1. Yes                                           2. No  
 
 
Q33c. what type of water division structures you are currently using? 
1. Open-Close            2. Ad-hoc Adjustment                3. Fixed Proportion 
 
Q34c. What type of water distribution methods is used? 
 
1. Continuous to every user in proportion to land area or share 
 
 2. Continuous or rotational delivery of water to every user in proportion to 
land area,        land type and crop 
 
3. Continuous to certain Sections of irrigated area in proportion to land area 
or share and timed rotation within the Section  
 
4. On demand, based on crop water need 
 
 
 
 
D. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
 
Q1d. Did your household participate in the construction of the irrigation 
schemes? 
 
1. Yes                   2. No 
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Q2d. If yes to Q1d, How many person-days of labour did your households 
contribute (approx.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------- 
 
Q3d. If yes to Q1d, Was it mandatory for the households to contribute towards 
canal construction to get water later? 
 
1. Yes                 2.No 
 
Q4d. If No to Q3d. Why not? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------ 
 
Q5d. Does your household participate in Operation and Maintenance 
activities?  
 
1.  Yes                                           2. No  
 
Q6d If yes to Q5d., Where do you participate in Operation and Maintenance? 
 
1. On the network canal leading to my plot     2. On the main canal         3. On 
the diversion dam    4.  All of the above 
 
 
Q7d. If No to Q5d, why not  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------ 
 
Q8d. Besides regular labour contributions by appropriators, are there 
specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance 
 
1. No                2. Yes, all are appropriators              3. Yes all are non-
appropriators  
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4. Yes, some are appropriators; some are non-appropriators  5. Do not know 
 
Q9d. Does there appear to be any insurance mechanism available to the 
appropriators related to variability of water appropriation from the irrigation 
canal? 
 
1. Yes                          2. No             3.  No that I am aware of  
 
 
E. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Q1e. Does the system has permanent headwork? 
 
1. Yes                  2. No  
 
Q2e. If No to Q1e, What materials do you use for temporary headwork? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---- 
Q3e Is the main system canal lined? 
 
1. Yes                        2. No 
 
Q4e Is the outlet canal lined? 
 
1. Yes                 2. No  
 
Q5e Did the authority give your plot pipes for water appropriation? 
 
1. Yes                    2. No  
 
 
Q6e. How well are the physical conditions of the appropriation resource base 
maintained? 
 
1. Well maintained- excellent working order  
2. Moderately well maintained- good working order 
3. Some resource deterioration occurring due to insufficient maintenance 
4. Badly maintained- not in good working order  
 
 
 
Q7e How frequently does the  main canal structure get damaged in a year? 
 
1. once        2. twice     3.    3-4 times   5. More than 5 times 
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Q8e How does the outlet canal get damaged in a year  
 
1. once        2. twice     3.    3-4 times   5. More than 5 times 
 
 
Q9e. Do you think that the irrigation infrastructures have degraded over the 
years? 
 
1. Yes                                 2. No  
 
 
Q10e, if Yes to Q. 9e, What are the problems with the infrastructure? 
 
1. Siltation in the canal 
2. Canal destroyed by natural disasters like landslides/floods 
3. Breakage of the water gates 
4. Breakage of the cement lining to steal water 
5. Weak bund and sluice 
 
Q11e, what are the reasons for lack of maintenance/revival efforts 
 
1. Villagers do not have authority to take up repairs & DoI is not taking up 
repairs 
2. The repair is beyond the capacity (financial/technical) of the community 
members 
3. The canal structure is multi-village, so cooperation is difficult 
4. Repairing damage is the responsibility of the DoI 
 
Q12e Please give the details of the improvements/repairs done in the last 3 
years 
 
Repair/Maintenance                      Contributing Agents 
 
 
Farmers              DoI 
Headwork 
 
  
 
Main canal structure 
  
Distribution 
network 
 
  
Sluice and Gates 
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Q13e Please give the details of the contributing organisations for 
improvements/repairs done in the last 3 years 
 
Repair/Maintenance                      Agents making financial contribution  
 
 
Farmers              DoI 
Headwork 
 
  
 
Main canal structure 
including  
  
Distribution 
network 
 
  
Sluice and Gates 
 
  
Disilting the canal  
 
  
Eviction of 
Encroachment 
  
 
 
 
F. CONFLITC RESOLUTION 
 
Q1f. Have you had any conflicts with fellow irrigator(s) with regards to water 
appropriation? 
 
1. Yes                           2.No 
 
Q2f. What do you think is/are the main cause/s of conflict in your scheme? 
 
1. Water allocation               2. Water distribution   3. Land redistribution  4. 
water theft  
5. Others/Specify -----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Q3f. Is there a problem of water theft in your fields?  
 
1a.  Yes                           2.  No  
 
Q4f. If yes to Q50e, which groups of people steal do you think (know)? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Q5f. If yes to Q3f, at what time does the stealing take place? 
 
1. At day time            2. At night time      3. Any time  
 
Q6f. What hostile activities are there among the community members 
resulting from conflict over irrigation production? 
 
1. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
2. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
3. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
4. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
5. 
_____________________________________________________
_________ 
 
 
Q7f. If yes to Q3f, what is done in cases of water distribution defaults? ---------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Q8f. Does the community have a system of rule for controlling water 
distribution default? 
 
1. Yes                     2. No  
 
 
Q9f  If yes to Q8f, what does the rule say?  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Q10f. Keeping in mind the rules in this system has evolved/adopted to govern 
the activities it has organised, classify these rules according to the following 
scale: 
 
 590
1. Simple, easily understood             
2. Relatively complex, can be understood through learning and experience   
3. Very complex, difficult to understand 
4. I know nothing about the rules 
 
 Q11f. If yes to Q8f, do you believe the rule is enforced in the way formulated? 
 
1. Yes                   2. No  
 
 
Q.12f. If no to Q11f, what are the weaknesses? Please, list down in order of 
importance 
1. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
2. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
3.____________________________________________________
___________ 
4.____________________________________________________
___________ 
5. 
_____________________________________________________
__________ 
 
Q13f The Enforcement of the rules in this organisation (system) is primarily 
undertaken by: 
 
1. Members of the organisation (RIMC/AIMC/BIMC)                  
2. Plot Comm.                   3. Members and external officials             4. external 
officials only     5. None 
 
 
Q14f. How would you characterize the levels of mutual trust amongst 
appropriators  
 
1. moderate to high levels of trust (e.g. Oral promises given high credence) 
2. modest levels of trust (e.g. Oral promises are used but appropriators may be 
uncertain about performance) 
3. low level of trust 
 
Q15f characteristics of usual behaviours of the members of the groups with 
respect to local operational level rules in use related to the appropriation 
process from the irrigation systems 
 
1. Almost all members follow the rules  
2. Most members follow the rules   
3. About half of the members follow the rules  
4. Most members do not follow the rules  
5. Almost all members do not follow the rules        
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6. Do not know           7 NA 
 
 
Q16f.  Estimate the number households in your plot area 
1. less than 25      2. 25-50             3. 51-100          4. 101- 200          5. 201-500 
6. 501- 1000 
 
 
Q17f Can fines be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the 
appropriation and/or maintenance of this resource? 
 
1. Yes                               2. No 
 
 
Q18f, if Yes to Q17f mention the severity of fines 
 
1. Light               2. Moderate    3. Heavy              
 
Q19f Please mention the nature of fine imposed,  
 
1. Cash                  2. Restricted use     3. exclusion from membership 
 
 
Q20f. Is there a gradation of social, physical, and official sanctions that varies 
with the severity of rule violations? 
 
1. Yes, considerable range of sanctions are imposed depending on type of rule 
infractions 
2. Yes, moderate range of sanctions are imposed depending on type of rule 
infractions 
3. Yes, limited range of sanctions are imposed depending on type of rule 
infractions 
4. No, little or no variation on sanctions 
5. No rules, no sanctions 
 
 
G. HOUSEHOLD AWARENESS/ PARTICIPATION/ POLICY 
ISSUES/ IN IRRIGATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Q1g Is there water users’ association (WUAs)? 
 
1. Yes                     2. No 
 
Q2g If yes to Q1g, When was the water group and executive committee formed  
 
(BS---     ) 
 
Q 3g. When was community members started involving in the irrigation 
management     
 
(BS------) 
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Q4g Who is empowered to formulate and implement rules and regulations for 
water use and management decisions? 
 
1. DoI                   2. WUAs                       3. NGOs working in Irrigation sector 
 
 
Q5g What do you think are the roles of the various social and economic groups 
in the WUA 
1. Roles of Social Groups (caste based): 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------- 
2. Roles of Economic Groups (rich and poor) 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------- 
 
 
Q6g What are the problems faced by the WUA? 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Q7g Do those problems, have implications on increasing access to irrigation 
water? 
 
1. Yes                               2. No 
 
Q8g. Does any members of your households participate in users’ annual/ 
monthly assembly? 
 
1. Yes                    2. No 
 
 
Q9g Does your household has the right to participate in the management of 
irrigation system? 
 
1. yes de jure          2. yes de facto        3. No my household exercises neither de 
jure or de facto rights     4. No but my household have de jure rights      
 
 
 
Q. 10g Are any women members from your household represented in users 
committee? 
 
1a. Yes                          2.  No 
 
Q.11g How do you evaluate the performance of users committee? 
 
1. Highly satisfactory   2.  Satisfactory   3. Neutral    4. Not satisfied 
 
Q. 12g. At what stage do you and your family members participate in 
organisation activities? 
 
1. Planning and decision-making 2. Implementation 3. Benefit sharing 5. 
Evaluation 
 
Q.13g. How do you evaluate the rate of your and family members participation 
in Water User Group? 
 
1. Strong participation   2. Occasional participation     3. Not very often 4. 
Hardly ever 
 
Q.14g. How do you know when to divert irrigation water to the field? 
 
1. Attending committee meeting   2. Informed by committee members 
3. Informed by neighbours       4. WUG assembly 
 
Q15g Does your households use water from canal for alternative purpose? 
 
1. Yes                2. No 
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Q16g if Yes to Q15g ,What purpose is the water from the canal being used? E.g. 
Water mills 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Q17g Is your households being consistent disadvantage in appropriating water 
from the canal system? 
1. Yes                        2. No 
 
Q18g, if Yes to Q17g, why do you think you are being consistently 
disadvantaged? 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------- 
 
Q19g Please Mention the sources of Revenue   
 
 
Sources of Revenue                      Amount in Last Year the last 3 years 
 
 
              
Government  
 
  
Household Levy   
Charitable 
Donation 
 
  
 
 
Q20g Are monetary fees collected by the concern irrigation authorities? 
 
1. Yes  and regularly collected           2. yes and some fees collected    3. yes, only 
insignificant or no fee collected 
 
 
Q21g If yes to Q20g, Do the fee collected is being used for Operation and 
maintenance costs of the irrigation system  
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1. Yes                                 2. NO  
 
Q22g. If yes to Q21g, Do the fees collected cover operation and maintenance 
costs of the irrigation system? 
 
1. Yes fully           2. Yes just partly                3. No  
 
 
 
Q23g If fees collected, what agency assesses/determines the fees? 
 
  
1. RIMC/AIMC/BIMC         2. external officials only      
 
Q24g If fees collected, what agency collects the fees? 
 
1. RIMC/AIMC/BIMC          2. external officials only      
 
 
 
Q25g. Is there a direct relationship between the fee collection and water 
appropriation? 
 
1. Yes                                   2.No 
 
 
Q26g How are the fund collected being maintained? FGD 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Q27g How much time you need to spend annually in following WUG 
obligatory activities? 
 
SN Activities  Time Spent  (days) in a Year Remarks 
1 Irrigation canal 
cleaning 
  
2. WUG meetings   
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Q28g. Is there any direct cash incur to your household annually for 
communicating, information gathering and travelling for irrigation related 
activities? If yes, what are the tentative direct cash expenses?  
 
(NRs------------) 
 
 
Q29g.  What amount (User Group membership fee) you have to pay annually 
as a member of Water User Group? 
 
1. Pay   (NRs. ---------)                      2. Do not need to pay  
 
 
Q30g. Do you hire any paid labour beside your family members in involving 
irrigation canal maintenance activities?  
 
Number------------------- 
 
 
Q31g.  What is the hired labour rate per day? (NRs--------------) 
 
 Q32g. Who in your family involve in WUG meetings?   
 
1. Men                                2.  Women                             3. Children 
 
Q33g. Who in your family involve in Irrigation Cleaning Programmes?   
 
1.   Men                     2. Women                     3. Children 
 
 
 
 
Q34g what are the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the Water 
Users Group? 
 
SN Advantages of Membership Disadvantage of Membership 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
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8   
9   
10   
11   
 
 
 
 
Q.35g What is your perception regarding equity issue in irrigation canal? 
 
Equity Issues Y/N How 
Are you relatively satisfied with existing institutional 
arrangements? 
 
 
 
 
How you ever been disadvantaged by institutional 
arrangements? 
  
Is allocation of membership rights in organisation 
fair? 
  
Has distribution of resources and wealth change?   
Are costs and benefits of resource management base 
on individual’s ability to pay? 
 
 
 
 
Others (please specify)   
Q36g Did you lose any asset of your own because of irrigation canal 
construction? 
 
1. Yes                           2. No  
 
Q37g  If Yes to Q 36g, what did you lose? 
 
1. Grazing land          2. Cultivated land          3. Residential house and place 
4. Others, specify 
 
Q38g If yes to Q36g, what was your response to your loss? 
 
1. Opposed the construction              2. I accepted my loss assuming the future 
benefit 
3. Internally opposed; however I eventually yielded in as I didn’t have the 
power 
4. Others, specify -----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Q39g is there a frequent contact and communication between people in this 
location and the irrigation officials in an administrative centre? 
 
1. Yes                               2. No  
 
 
Q40g Did your household have a say over the location of outlet in the main 
canal? 
 
1. Yes                                 2. No  
 
Q41g Are you satisfied with the location of the outlet in the main canal? 
 
1. Yes                            2. No  
 
Q42g If No to Q41g, why not? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q43g Did your household have a say over the choice of the water distribution 
technology? 
 
1. Yes                           2. No  
Q44g If yes to Q43g, Are you satisfied with the type of technology current 
being used for water division at the outlet? 
 
1. Yes                    2. No  
 
Q18g  if No to Q44g why not?  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------ 
 
H. Miscellaneous  
 
 
Q 1.h. Are you or your members are associated/participated in any village 
development organisation? 
 
1. Yes                           2.  No 
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Q2h. if yes please provide the following information? 
 
SN
. 
 
Name of 
Organisatio
n 
 
Type* 
 
 
Nature 
of 
Work*
* 
 
No Involved 
 
Positio
n 
held  
 
Remarks 
 
 
M F 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
 
* Local informal =1 Local formal = 2, Government = 3 NGO=5, INGO=5 
** Saving and credits= 1       Conservation=2       Agriculture/ livestock 
product=3, Women’s organisation=4, Village Co-operative=5, others=6 
(specify) 
 
 
 
Q.3h Do you need credit for your livelihood activities?          
  
 1. Yes                             2. No 
Q4h If yes to Q3h,  yes, where do you for credit?  
 
  1. Bank             2. Land lord      3. Neighbour    4.  Relatives       5. Co-
operatives 
6. others (please specify) 
 
Q5h) How does WUG investing surplus fund (if any) various community 
development activities?  
 
 
 
Q6h What are the trends in employment opportunities in the past 10 years in 
your area? 
 
SN. Nature of Employment  Increase Decrease  
1 Agricultural based employment   
2 Cottage industry based opportunities    
3 Government   
4 Non-government   
5 Private Sector    
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6 Others    
 
 
 
Q 7h.Do you feel you being discriminated on the ground of castes 
      1. Yes                            2. No 
 
Q8h If Yes to Q7h, Are you being discriminated in irrigation water on Caste 
grounds? 
         
1. Yes                              2. No  
 
Q9h Are you affiliated to any political party? 
 
1. Yes                              2. No  
 
Q10h. Do you take part regularly in political meetings? 
 
1. Yes                             2. No  
 
Q11h If no to Q10h  why not? 
 
1. Not invited            2. Not interested       3. Not getting information 
 
       
Q12h Which party has the majority in your area? 
 
1a. Nepali Congress       2. CPN-UML        3. CPN-M,          4. RPP 
 
 
 
Q13h. Which party the does the VDC Chairman belongs? 
 
1. Nepali Congress       2. CPN-UML        3. CPN-M,          4. RPP 
 
 
Q14h Does the VDC Chairman take initiatives in negotiating water right on 
your behalf? 
 
1. Yes                       2. No 
 
Q15h Do you think local politics influence in irrigation management? 
 
1. Yes                        2. No  
 
Q16h Do you think you are being discriminated in irrigation on political 
background? 
 
1. Yes                       2. No  
 
 601
 
 
Q17h Do you have any suggestions regarding the improvement of existing 
(specially equity aspects) of irrigation canal development? How irrigation 
canal can be made more profitable and sustainable?  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------- 
 
-------------THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR RESPONSES-----------
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Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 3a: Sample size in the BIS (Lekhnath Municipality) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The percent of households in each category were obtained from the knowledge of the local informants in the area. 
 
          Ward 
No. 
Households            % of total HH Households 
to be 
Surveyed 
Total Number of households 
surveyed 
Total  % of 
Total  
Small  Medium Large   Small  Medium Large 
1  1204 27.9 842.8 
(70) 
240.8(20) 120.4 
(10) 
23.15 16 5 2 
Total 
irrigators[4304] 
 
11 795 18.4 651.9 
(82) 
95.4 (12) 47.7 
(6) 
15.27 12 2 1 
 12 922 21.4 737.6 
(80) 
138.3(15)  
46.1(5) 
17.76 14 2 1 
 13 922 21.4 829.8 
(90) 
64.54 (7) 27.66 
(3) 
17.76 15 1 1 
 14 462 10.7 346.5 
(75) 
46.2 (10) 69.3 
(15) 
8.87 6 1 1 
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Appendix 3b: Sample size in the PIS (Phalebas Devisthan VDC) 
 
          Ward 
No. 
        Households Total Households  
n (%) 
Households to 
be Surveyed 
Total Number of 
households surveyed 
Total  % of 
Total  
Small  Medium Large   Small  Medium Large 
1 60 (total 
number of 
irrigator =505)
11.8 52 (86) 6 (10) 2 (4) 10 8 1 1 
2  11.8  5 (8) 1 (2) 10 8 1 1 
60 54 (90) 
3 85 16.8 80 (94) 4 (5) 1 (1) 14 12 1 1 
4 60 11.8  5 (8) 1 (2) 10 8 1 1 
54 (90) 
5 78 15.4 56 (71) 19 (24) 3 (5) 13 9 3 1 
6 82 16.2 66 (80) 13 (16) 3 (4) 13 10 2 1 
7 80 15.8 72 (90) 4 (5) 4 (5) 13 10 2 1 
The percent of households in each category were obtained from the knowledge of the local informants in the area. 
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Appendix 3c: Sample size in the RIS (Dhamilikuwa and Bhalayakharka VDC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ward 
(Dhamilikuwa 
VDC) 
Households     Number of Households  
N ( % ) 
Households 
to be 
Surveyed 
Total Number of 
households surveyed 
(rounded to the nearest 
decimal place) 
Total 
number of 
households  
% of 
Total  
Small  Medium Large   Small  Medium Large 
1 101 (748) 13.5 37(37) 35 (35) 29(28) 5 2 1 1 
2 110 14.7 41(37) 39(35) 40(28) 5 2 2 1 
3 124 16.5 46(37) 43(35) 35(28) 6 3 2 1 
  4 97 12.9 36(37) 34(35) 27(28) 5 2 2 1 
5 95 12.7 35(37) 33(35) 27(28) 4 2 1 1 
6 104 13.9 38(37) 36(35) 30(28) 5 2 2 1 
 8 105 14.0 39(37) 37(35) 29(28) 5 2 2 1 
Bhalayakharka 
VDC 
         
1 60 (180) 11.1 16 (27) 31(52) 13(21) 1 0 1 0 
3 60  11.1 16 (27) 31(52) 13(21) 1 0 1 0 
4 60  11.1 16 (27) 31(52 13(21) 1 0 1 0 
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Appendix 3d: Sample size in the RIS (Chakratirtha VDC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The percent of households in each landholding category in Dhamilikuwa VDC is obtained from Feasibility studies of Rainastar Irrigation 
Project, Lamjung and Attrauli-Puttar Irrigation Project, Tanahun, Department of Irrigation and for Bhalayakharka VDC, Due to the lack of data, 
we use average of Dhamilkuwa and Chakratirtha V.D.C to calculate the number of households in different categories of landholdings.
Ward No. 
(Chakratirtha 
VDC) 
Households    Number of Households  
N ( % ) 
Households 
to be 
Surveyed 
Total Number of 
households surveyed 
Total  % of 
Total  
Small  Medium Large   Small  Medium Large 
1 112   (780) 14.3 19(17) 77(69) 16 (14) 5 1 3 1 
2 180 23.2 31(17) 124 (69) 25 (14) 5 2 2 1 
5 128 16.4 22(17) 88 (69) 18 (14) 7 1 4 2 
6 88 11.3 15(17) 61 (69) 12 (14) 5 1 3 1 
  7 112 14.2 19 (17) 77 (69) 16 (14) 7 1 4 2 
8 112 14.2 19(17) 77 (69) 16 (14) 7 1 4 2 
9 48 6.5 8(17) 33 (69) 7 (14) 2 0 2 1 
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